Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia
Small town wars

Gerry van Klinken

Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asia Series
Indonesia democratized after the long and authoritarian New Order regime ended in May 1998. But the transition was far less peaceful than is often thought. It claimed about 10,000 lives in communal (ethnic and religious) violence, and nearly as many in separatist violence in Aceh and East Timor. This book is the first comprehensive analysis of the episodes of long-running, widespread communal violence that erupted during the post-New Order transition.

Communal violence on this scale is new to Indonesia. It has been poorly understood by the interested public and specialists alike, whether within Indonesia or outside it. By adopting a contentious politics approach that examines the sociological processes of communal violence, the book details six episodes including ethnic fighting in West and Central Kalimantan, and Muslim–Christian violence in Central Sulawesi, Maluku (Ambon) and North Maluku. Drawing on exhaustive empirical material and detailed reports gathered from field visits to all the affected areas, van Klinken argues that there exists enough similarity between these episodes of communal violence to consider them as a single phenomenon. This violence can be linked to the practice of politics in Indonesia’s frontiers, namely provincial towns beyond Java where democratization and decentralization has led key figures to compete for control of the local state in ‘emergency mode’, by mobilizing ethnic and religious crowds. Such occurrences demonstrate how communal violence can erupt in a poor Third World country when the state is weak. By providing an alternative understanding of violent ethnic conflict in Indonesia through new source material and up-to-date field research, Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia will be essential reading to students of Southeast Asian studies, social movements, political violence and ethnicity.

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Gerry van Klinken
To all who suffered through the wars and to those unsung heroes in remote places who worked for their end
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Preface

The idea of writing a book about all the episodes of ethnic and religious conflict taking place around Indonesia after the democratization of 1998 arose when I was living in Jogjakarta in 2001. In long conversations with Herbert Feith, my old friend and mentor who lived just around the corner on the Gadjah Mada University campus, the many unexpected happenings after the end of the authoritarian New Order on 21 May 1998 seemed at once to convey hope and fragility. Democracy was flourishing, the press was free for the first time, elections were being held. Yet, at the same time, more or less serious fighting was breaking out in places no one had ever paid much attention to. Indonesians are capable of so much forebearance and good humour that it sometimes seemed perverse to zoom in on the pools of blood in the frontline clinics on either side of A. J. Patty Street in Ambon, as if the whole country was falling apart. It clearly was not. I also had no wish to engage in the kind of pornography of violence that flourished on the Internet, gruesomely symbolized by one popular image of a severed head with a cigarette hung casually from its lips. This book contains few descriptions of the horror. Perhaps this instinctual avoidance mechanism led too quickly to an eager search for ‘explanations’, and made this study less than it might have been. Gyanendra Pandey in his book Remembering Partition warns against the rush to normalize a violent event by making it part of a history that can be understood. Instead, ‘the violence is in all of us’, he writes (Pandey 2001: 45–66, 176). It is an important warning, one that privileges the survivor over the policy maker and the ‘objective’ scholar. Nevertheless, callous as it may sound, such events occur often in many parts of the world, although it was the first time in Indonesia on this scale. We need to understand them as part of a social life full of regularities and hence possibilities for steerage. Indonesia’s post-authoritarian communal violence was a challenge precisely because it was so difficult to understand. Having lived and travelled in Indonesia for over 10 years starting in 1977, I had often confronted violence, but never of this kind. This was citizen against citizen, spread over a large area and going on for weeks or even years. A difficult problem offers greater rewards than an easy one to those who contemplate it. That was the intellectual motivation. It was difficult also for Indonesia’s public intellectuals, some of whom I am privileged to count as friends. They too found it hard to grasp that this violence was not primarily a human rights violation by the state, but
arose somewhere within society. In that case the question became: What does this mean for Indonesian democracy?

This was a big question. In the end it proved too big to answer directly, and I had to adopt a rather more modest approach, as explained in the Introduction. Still, I did not want just to narrate or be documentary. The thick description beloved of anthropologists would have made this book too fat, without necessarily contributing an equal measure of understanding. I wanted to see all the large-scale, long-running episodes of communal violence, whether religious or ethnic, as belonging to a single type of event. I decided to look for patterns in the way they began. This heuristic approach opened new perspectives for me that are now leading to more work at our institute on social life generally in provincial towns especially outside Java. Whether the reader experiences the same growth of insight, or on the contrary finds the abstraction involved clumsy and an obstacle to a good history, is now out of my hands.

KITLV, Leiden
June 2006
Acknowledgements

To all those who were willing to talk with me in depth during brief but intensive visits to various places in Indonesia I owe a profound debt of gratitude. They are listed below. Many of these places were extraordinarily beautiful even to a visitor, let alone to anyone who was born there, and it was utterly discordant to imagine them filled with the screams of battle. Sensing the bitterness and bigotry that the trauma had left behind in many of those with whom I spoke was painful. But I also met young people who were proud that they had not been ‘contaminated’ by the hatred, and who were working hard to rebuild social bridges. To be honest, even the bigots were full of good fun and hospitality.

I also want to thank the organizers of two conferences who gave me a chance to test out some of these ideas. Rosanne Rutten, Rapta Saptari, Henk Schulte Nordholt, John Sidel and Oskar Verkaaik gave invaluable feedback at a special 1-day workshop in June 2005. Together with the critical comments of three anonymous reviewers from Routledge they have helped, I trust, to make this a better book.

This work was generously funded by a grant from the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts (KNAW) to the Renegotiating Boundaries project at the Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies (KITLV). My colleagues there, particularly the director and the library staff, have been terrific. Marjan Groen expertly drew the maps and a graph. I especially want to record my thanks to project director Henk Schulte Nordholt for his collegiality. Finally, almost too intimate to mention, my debt is incalculable to my friend and wife Helene van Klinken, with whom I first backpacked from Australia through Indonesia and who has stuck with me ever since.

Barely listing those from whom I learned the most specifically for this project – 165 names – is scant proof of my gratitude. I can only hope they recognize themselves in the manuscript, even if they cannot always agree with it.

Acknowledgements


*Elsewhere:* Antonius Made Tony Supriatma, BPS offices everywhere, Centre for Peace and Security Studies, UGM, Jogjakarta, Dave McRae, Dias Pradadimara, Farsijana and Bernie Adeney, Greg Fealy, Henk Schulte Nordholt, John Sidel, Iqbal Djajadi, Olle Törnquist, Oskar Verkaaik, P. M. Laksono, Ratna Saptari, Rosanne Rutten, Sidney Tarrow, students from Poso and Maluku in Jogjakarta and Wim Manuhutu.
Glossary

adat  custom, tradition
AM-GPM  Angkatan Muda Gereja Protestant Maluku, Youth Organization of the Maluku Protestant Church
Bappeda  Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah, Regional Development Planning Board
BKPM  Regional Investment Coordinating Board
BPS  Badan Pusat Statistik, Central Bureau of Statistics
cukong  business patron
Depnaker  Departemen Tenaga Kerja, Labour Department
DoC  Dynamics of Contention
DPKSH  Dewan Penegakan Keamanan dan Sistem Hukum
FICA  Federation of Indonesian Christian in America
FKPM  Forum Komunikasi Pemuda Melayu, Communication Forum of Malay Youth
FPI  Front Pembela Islam, Islamic Defenders Front
FPPMU  Forum Pemuda Pelajar Mahasiswa Maluku Utara, North Maluka Youth, Pupil and student Forum
FSHU  Forum Solidaritas Halmahera Utara
GDP  Gross domestic product
Gemusba  Generasi Muda Sultan Babullah, Sultan Babullah Younger Generation (Ternate, North Maluku)
GKST  Gereja Kristen Sulawesi Tengah, Central Sulawesi Christian Church
GMIH  Gereja Masehi Injili Halmahera, Evangelical Messiah Church of Halmahera
GMKI  Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia, Indonesian Student Christian Movement (Protestant)
Golkar  Golongan Karya (main New Order political party)
GPM  Gereja Protestant Maluku, Maluku Protestant Church
GRDP  Gross Regional Domestic Product
HMI  Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, Association of Islamic Students
ICMI  Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IKAMA</td>
<td>Ikatan Keluarga Madura, Madura Family Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>kabupaten</td>
<td>administrative district, led by bupati (district chief)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kapolres</td>
<td>Kepala Kepolisian Resort, district police chief</td>
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<tr>
<td>kecamatan</td>
<td>administrative sub-district, led by camat (sub-district chief)</td>
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<td>KNPI</td>
<td>Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia, Indonesian National Youth Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>kodim</td>
<td>Komando Distrik Militer, military district command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kopassus</td>
<td>Komando Pasukan Khusus, Special Forces Commando</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>krismon</td>
<td>krisis moneter, monetary crisis (Asian economic crisis)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KUT</td>
<td>Kredit Usaha Tani, Farmers Credit Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>laskar</td>
<td>fighter, group of fighters (often religious)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LMMDD-KT</td>
<td>Lembaga Musyawarah Masyarakat Dayak dan Daerah Kalimantan Tengah, Central Kalimantan Institute for Dayak and Regional Social Consultation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Masjumi</td>
<td>pre-New Order Muslim political party</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPR</td>
<td>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, People’s Consultative Assembly</td>
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<td>MUI</td>
<td>Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Indonesian Ulemas Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>Muspida</td>
<td>Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah, Regional Leadership Consultation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-government organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NHM</td>
<td>PT Nusa Halmahera Minerals</td>
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<td>OPM</td>
<td>Organisasi Papua Merdeka, Free Papua Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pancasila</td>
<td>Indonesian national five-point ideology</td>
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<tr>
<td>pangkalima</td>
<td>war commander (Dayak)</td>
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<td>perang</td>
<td>Partai Kristen Indonesia (pre-New Order Protestant political party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>pasukan</td>
<td>special forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>khusus (passus)</td>
<td>Partai Bulan Bintang, Crescent Star Party (conservative Islamic)</td>
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<td>PDI</td>
<td>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesian Democratic Party (secular nationalist party formed by fusion during New Order)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDI-P</td>
<td>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan, Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle (breakaway from PDI in late New Order)</td>
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<tr>
<td>pemekaran</td>
<td>subdivision of an administrative region such as a province or district into two or more smaller ones</td>
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perda  peraturan daerah, regional regulation
Permesta  Perdjuangan Semesta, Universal Struggle (anti-communist rebellion in Sulawesi in 1956)
pesantren  Islamic boarding school
PGI  Persekutuan Gereja-gereja di Indonesia, Indonesian Communion of Churches
PIKI  Persatuan Inteligensia Kristen Indonesia, Union of Indonesian Christian Intellectuals
PK  Partai Keadilan, Justice Party (post-New Order Islamic party)
PKI  Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Communist Party (banned in 1965)
PNI  Partai Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Party (pre-New Order party supported by many bureaucrats)
PPP  Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development Party (Muslim party formed by fusion during New Order)
PRRI/Permesta  Pemerintah Revolucioner Republik Indonesia, Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (anti-communist rebellion based in Sumatra, 1957, allied with Permesta movement in Sulawesi – see earlier)
putra daerah  ‘son of the region’ (local-born candidates for public office)
reformasi  reform (post-New Order)
RMS  Republik Maluku Selatan, South Maluku Republic (Ambon-based secessionist movement, 1950)
satgas  satuan tugas, task force (for security)
sekwilda  sekretaris wilayah daerah, regional secretary
siskamling  sistem keamanan lingkungan, neighborhood watch system
STAIN  Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri, State Islamic College
TNI  Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian Armed Forces (previously called Abri, Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia)
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNSFIR  United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery
1 Introduction

The first time it happened was in Sambas district, West Kalimantan. It was January and February 1997. Newspapers reported that indigenous Dayaks began attacking migrant Madurese in their homes in the small town of Sanggau Ledo, then moved to other small towns around the district, sending tens of thousands fleeing for their lives. Indonesians were shocked. Collective violence between Indonesian citizens over communal identity had not happened before. Or rather it had not impressed itself on the public consciousness to this extent, for there had been several 1- or 2-day riots against Christians and Chinese in Java in previous months. This was on a much larger scale. The one-sided violence went on for weeks, and ranged across several districts.

The bloodshed was disturbing in itself, but something else was even more unsettling. It came from nowhere. It jarred the average Indonesian’s mental universe because it had no ready-made explanation. Indonesians had long known of violence in three remote places in their country – Aceh, Papua (then still called Irian Jaya) and East Timor. Although largely closed to reporters, they knew that secessionist sentiment was driving guerrilla resistance movements there, and that the Indonesian military had killed many in counter-insurgency operations. The state as the source of violence: this was as easy to understand for regime officials as for human rights activists. It was part of the common discourse about what was wrong with the New Order. And it happened closer to home as well. The big riot in Jakarta following a military-backed attack on the headquarters of opposition party PDI in July 1996 fitted the pattern. So did a litany of other incidents of military human rights abuse, such as the harbour-side shooting of hundreds in Tanjung Priok, Jakarta, in 1984, and the massacre in Talangsari village, Lampung, in 1989.

A democratic state with the military on a short leash was the ideal to which everyone aspired, even regimists who believed the ideal lay still far off in the future. But the emotions evoked by the Sambas reports were different. Who were the baddies in this story? It was not clear. The military now seemed guilty not of causing it but only of not doing enough to stop it. The metropolitan press reported the story, but the opinion columns were remarkably silent on the profound moral question it posed. That question was, of course, how can Indonesia be a democratic country if in Sambas ordinary citizens attack each other for no better reason than cultural loathing? Where Indonesians did explain it, they often resorted to cultural
stereotypes such as the savagery of Dayaks or (later) the irascibility of Ambonese. This explained nothing but the prejudices in the heads of the commentators, and obscured the real drama by writing any notion of agency out of the story. Where policy makers began to take them seriously – and they did in West and Central Kalimantan – they made things worse by institutionalizing racist sentiments.

The confusion in Indonesia’s opinion columns was enough reason to write this book. Living in that country gave me an appreciation of how seriously its public intellectuals take their calling. If they were at a loss it was because they had little to draw on. Since then the gap has been filling rapidly with Indonesian and foreign publications. We will look at some of this profusion of conference proceedings, journal articles and technical reports in the next chapter (see bibliography by Smith and Bouvier-Smith 2003). Several edited volumes have described the violence in this period (Anderson 2001; Colombijn and Lindblad 2002; Coppel 2006; Törnquist 2000; Wessel and Wimhöfer 2001). However, none focus on post-authoritarian communal violence as a single phenomenon. The same can be said of two single-author books. Bertrand (2004) brackets Christian–Muslim conflict in Maluku with separatist conflict in Aceh, Papua and East Timor as part of a general crisis in Indonesian nationalism. Sidel (in press) will be read mostly as a study in Islamist violence.

Two years after ‘Sambas’ fighting broke out between Muslims and Christians in Ambon, the largest urban centre east of Makassar. This was even more painful for the Indonesian public. Ambon could not be imagined as a battleground in the jungle. It was a thriving harbour town. Ambonese singers were famous in Jakarta’s sophisticated cabaret circuit. Moreover this was the reformasi era. President Suharto had resigned the previous May (1998) amid massive demonstrations. The dailies were full of democratic reforms in every sector. Ambon was a massive blow to the optimism that followed the end of the authoritarian New Order. Nor was this about some primitive tribal culture, as many metropolitans unkindly viewed the Dayaks, but about the two religions to which nearly all Indonesians belonged. And still the opinion columns offered few democratic answers, though undemocratic ones flourished in the sectarian press.

At about the same time, late 1998 and early 1999, communal fighting also erupted in two other places. In Sambas district, West Kalimantan, it broke out again, in a slightly different area but again leading to the expulsion of Madurese, this time perpetrated by indigenous Malays. And in Poso, a small town in Central Sulawesi, it broke out between Christians and Muslims. The bad news did not seem to stop. A year later, late 1999, escalating tensions exploded in North Maluku involving multiple theatres, some pitting Muslims against Christians, others Muslims against Muslims. The area lay over 400 km from Ambon and had its own dynamics. Then it happened in Central Kalimantan. In a pattern reminiscent of West Kalimantan, indigenous Dayaks attacked migrant Madurese in the harbour town of Sampit in February 2001 and then moved throughout the province expelling Madurese.

Taken together these six episodes in five places – West Kalimantan, Maluku (Ambon), Central Sulawesi (Poso), North Maluku and Central Kalimantan – described
a distinct pattern of violence. They form the subject of this book. Unlike the secessionist violence in the three peripheral areas just mentioned, which had been running for decades, the violence in these five places was new. That is to say, it was not entirely without precedent. West Kalimantan Dayaks recalled a series of incidents with Madurese going back many years, and Ambonese Muslims remembered that the Republik Maluku Selatan (RMS) revolt of 1950 involved religious sentiment too. But the ferocity this time far exceeded that which had been seen earlier, while the identities involved were largely detached from claims about the nation, thus unlike the experience in Ambon in 1950. Each conflict was long running – from several weeks to years. Each claimed many victims – hundreds or thousands dead and tens or hundreds of thousands displaced. Each was widespread – ranging at least over a district (kabupaten) or an entire province. And each was communal – between groups within society along ascriptive lines of ethnic origin or religion, not explicitly about class and not against the state.

Recapping, this book concerns large-scale communal violence, because it is new in this country and needs to be explained. But it is not the only kind of collective violence that took on heightened forms at this time. An important question for subsequent work will be to see how all these troubles related to each other. We can distinguish four types.

- **Secessionist violence.** Best known was the paroxysm of military-sponsored violence in East Timor over the ballot in 1999 (Greenlees and Garran 2002; Tanter, Ball and Klinken 2006). Similar repressive violence was occurring in Aceh and, at a lower level, in Papua throughout this time.

- **Large-scale communal violence,** both inter-religious and inter-ethnic (the subject of this book).

- **Localized communal riots.** Several violent incidents occurred on the scale of one town or city and lasting a couple of days. Best known was the massive riot in Jakarta in May 1998 that led to Suharto’s resignation (Aspinall, Feith and Klinken 1999). Before that, short and sharp anti-Chinese riots had occurred in 1996–7 in the towns of Tasikmalaya (West Java), Banjarmasin (South Kalimantan), Situbondo (East Java), and Makassar (South Sulawesi) (Sidel in press). Afterwards Christian–Muslim riots occurred in Ketapang (Jakarta) and Kupang (West Timor) in November 1998 (Mas’oed, Maksum and Soehadha 2001).

- **Social violence.** Less well known, but claiming a significant number of victims, were ‘social’ phenomena such as vigilantism (lynching thieves) and inter-village brawls. These also showed a peak after the collapse of the New Order, yet without an evidently ‘political’ connection (Barron, Kaiser and Pradhan 2004; Welsh 2003). It occurred particularly in Java, Lombok and South Sulawesi (Varshney, Panggabean and Tadjoeddin 2004: 33). An intriguing series of murders against alleged black magicians in East Java late in 1998 appears to fall in between the more-or-less organized communal riots and social violence (Campbell and Connor 2000; Siegel 2001).
Terrorist violence could be considered a fifth type. It attracted a great deal of attention around the world after 9/11, and it has occurred in Indonesia (Sidel in press). However, it is committed by small groups of people acting in extreme secrecy, so cannot be regarded as collective violence to the same degree. By comparison with the other types of violence, it has also claimed far fewer lives, though the shock impact of these deaths has of course been out of all proportion to their number.

How many died? Non-secessionist collective violence has been estimated by the United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery (UNSFIR) to have cost over 10,000 lives in Indonesia in the period 1990–2003 (Varshney, Panggabean and Tadjoeddin 2004). This is the only national estimate by province and covers the entire transitional period. The estimate was based on provincial-level newspaper reporting. It is a conservative estimate. A World Bank study on district-level newspapers in East Java and East Nusa Tenggara provinces for the years 2001–3 has shown that provincial newspapers seriously under-report conflict-related deaths, especially of the kind Varshney et al. label social violence (Barron and Sharpe 2005). However, the social violence statistics collected by this localized World Bank study counts crime deaths as conflict related, which may be a questionable assumption. Secessionist violence in East Timor, meanwhile, is thought to have caused between 1,400 and 1,500 deaths in 1999 (with 250,000 forcibly removed to West Timor) (CAVR 2005: Section 7.2 p. 245). The toll of secessionist violence in Aceh remains poorly documented, but has been estimated at around 7,200 from the end of the New Order until mid-2005.1 Figures for Papua are much lower, and have been neglected in this count. Taken together (and retaining the conservative UNSFIR estimates), a rough estimate for the toll of deadly violence associated with Indonesia’s transition of 1998 is almost 19,000 victims, of which over half died due to communal conflict and most of the remainder in secessionist violence. Displaced persons were another measure of the social impact of fighting. Near its peak in July 2002 about 1.3 million people were displaced from their homes due mainly to secessionist and communal disturbances (Norwegian Refugee Council 2002). The total ever displaced was much higher.

Writing only of the non-secessionist violence, and excluding social violence, the UNSFIR report drew the following conclusions:

- Both the number of incidents and the number of deaths began to rise sharply in 1996, and peaked in 1999–2000, declining quickly after that (Varshney Panggabean and Tadjoeddin 2004: 25) (Figure 1.1). The peak thus came immediately after the collapse of the New Order, but violence had begun to rise about 2 years before it.
- Almost 90 per cent of those deaths were due to communal violence, both large-scale and localized. Of these deaths, 57 per cent were due to Christian–Muslim violence, 29 per cent anti-Madurese, and 13 per cent anti-Chinese (Varshney, Panggabean and Tadjoeddin 2004: 26). In other words, the large-scale communal violence discussed in this book, namely Christian–Muslim
and anti-Madurese, claimed by far the largest number of victims of any type of collective violence.

- The six provinces with the greatest violence were North Maluku (25 per cent of deaths), Maluku (that is, around Ambon, 18.3 per cent), West Kalimantan (13.6 per cent), Jakarta (11.8 per cent), Central Kalimantan (11.5 per cent), and Central Sulawesi (6.0 per cent) (Varshney, Panggabean, and Tadjoeddin 2004: 30). Except for Jakarta, these were the locations of large-scale communal violence and form the focus of this book.

Anti-Chinese riots occurred during short burst of localized urban violence. It had been a recurring pattern throughout the New Order (Chirot and Reid 1997; Coppel 2002). Curiously, it disappeared along with the New Order. The last big event was the riot in Jakarta (and Solo) that brought down Suharto in May 1998. John Sidel (2001; in press) argued that the anti-Chinese riot was part of the ascendancy of a state-dependent Muslim elite, and that this type of riot came to a sudden halt when this group upped the ante during the post-1998 window of opportunity by engaging in straight religious competition. Anti-Chinese rioting is not further discussed in this book.

Communal violence thus claimed more lives than any other type of violence in this period – marginally more than secessionist violence, considerably more than ‘social violence’ (a grey category that shades into ‘ordinary’ criminality and that also surged at this time), much more than the localized single-location riots of the last years of the New Order, and very much more than the terrorist violence that so preoccupied the minds of post-9/11 commentators on Indonesia.
In terms of scale and duration, the only killings more bloody than this to have occurred in Indonesia were the anti-communist purges of 1965/66 (Cribb 1990). These spread more widely and killed half a million, but were worst in Java and Bali. The military organized them, but societal actors such as religious organizations also took part. A careful comparison of these two tragic affairs would be a worthwhile exercise. Underneath the clearly class-based ideology, which the post-1998 events lacked, 1965/66 involved ascriptive identities, mainly different experiences of Islam. Most importantly, the purges occurred at a moment of regime change, from the Sukarno to the Suharto presidencies, just as the episodes described in this book occurred during the transition from the Suharto to the reformasi era. Other episodes of collective violence in Indonesian history have also mixed political ideologies of nation or class with ethnic or religious identities – for example, the Darul Islam revolt of the 1950s (Dijk 1981), and of course the national revolution of 1945–50 (Reid 1974). What sets the post-New Order violence apart is that issues of class and the Indonesian nation virtually disappeared and fighting revolved almost exclusively around communal identities. This is what shocked the Indonesian public, which had always believed that being Indonesian had little to do with ethnicity or religion.

What are we to make of this communal violence? Indonesian public discourse revolved around the word ‘disintegrasi’. Calculating the relative frequency of this word at various times in my extensive collection of Indonesian electronic newspaper clippings, I discovered it leapt into the newsprint vocabulary in June 1998, within days of the massive riots that brought down President Suharto. It remained one of they key buzzwords of the period, only fading again towards the end of 2001. By that time most of the communal fighting had ended, and a new president had been elected, Megawati Sukarnoputri, who was widely seen as a leader who would restore order. The word suggested not just that the political compact called Indonesia was falling apart, but so were the ordinary social bonds among neighbours. Another word I traced was ‘Pancasila’, the rather banal semi-secular ideology often invoked by the New Order. Its frequency declined dramatically after 1998, suggesting a crisis in ‘official’ nationalism. Islamist had long condemned Suharto’s insistence on Pancasila, saying he was honouring the mere work of man at the expense of God’s revelation, but now their criticism was heard much more openly. Foreign experts on Indonesia echoed this feeling of breakdown in their writings (Dijk 2001; Kingsbury and Aveling 2003). Bertrand (2004) traced various kinds of collective violence in Indonesia to this crisis of identity. The readiness with which the word disintegration came to the minds of mainstream opinion makers suggested the powerful influence of an intellectual tradition that ascribed communal violence to the breakdown of social bonds. This so-called social strain and breakdown view saw rioting as a social pathology, as the aggressive, irrational behaviour of crowds driven by fear or frustration. Horowitz (2001: 7, 34–42) provides a useful review of the extensive literature based on such ideas, and reveals that he is an adherent of it to a great extent.

However, when I extended the counting exercise to other key words I found a second suggestive trend. This contradicted the view that things were falling apart, and instead reflected an alternative ideology of nationhood emerging at the local
level. The term ‘putra daerah’, meaning ‘son of the soil’ and associated with ethnic localism, rose quickly after 1998. Likewise the term ‘adat’, meaning customary law. Both tended to decline again in the mainstream press after 2001. All this was a hint, easily confirmed by simply visiting the regions beyond Java, that what was seen as social breakdown in Jakarta might just be considered locally as a new beginning. The naive yet widespread view in Jakarta was that provincial Indonesians were traditional, religious and passive. But there was life and hope out there that expressed itself in a discourse Jakarta did not hear. Often it had a strongly localist, even xenophobic character and tolerance of different religions and ethnicities was thin. Violence was not far below the surface. But the point is that this was all positively political, and not just anomic. It was above all about reclaiming local government for the local community.

This led me to search for an alternative theoretical literature, one that made room for the political character of episodes of communal violence. I found some newer developments within social movements theory attractive in this regard. In some cruel sense, the violence was a part of normal politics. Shocking as this sounds, I believe the facts will largely bear it out.

The editors of The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements (Snow, Soule and Kriesi 2004b: 11) define the social movement, somewhat inelegantly but comprehensively, as

> collectivities acting with some degree of organization and continuity outside of the institutional or organizational channels for the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority, whether it is institutionally or culturally based, in the group, organization, society, culture or world order of which they are a part.

This conceptualization involves five axes, and any movement must show at least three of them to be considered a social movement. These are

- collective, or joint, action;
- change-oriented goals or claims;
- some collective action that is extra- or non-institutional;
- some degree of organization;
- some temporal continuity.

As this book will illustrate, the Indonesian events had several of these characteristics. The crowds of people who attacked Madurese settlers in Kalimantan at various times, the massed fighters in the streets of Ambon or the villages of Central Sulawesi and North Maluku – these were certainly examples of collective action. Such crowd behaviour of course also had a place in the social strain literature, where it was considered irrational ‘collective behaviour’ (Gurr 1970; Smelser 1962; Turner and Killian 1987). But the Indonesian movements had other characteristics that made them look almost reasonable. They had clear goals. Some were tactical, such as expelling or defeating other collectivities seen as alien or dangerous, as well as (especially) getting their own members appointed to important local government positions. Others were strategic, such as
demanding that immigrant groups submit to the cultural dominance of *sons of the soil* indigenous people, and being recognized by the central government as the legitimate powerholders in that area. No doubt these were xenophobic goals, but in the context of the militarized, rigidly top-down nature of the New Order they also represented change, the demand for a kind of democracy and local autonomy.

The extra-institutional nature of these movements’ collective action is one of their most interesting aspects. They used public spaces – the streets – for purposes for which these were not designed. Yet, like the demonstrations that flourished all over the country from 1998 onwards, they carried a clearly political agenda at a time when most institutions were in a state of complete disarray. Moreover, and this is a major point, the movements that engaged in communal violence were at least semi-organized. Much of what happened was *ad hoc* or got out of hand, but much else occurred by design. Indonesian discourse at the time pointed the finger at mysterious ‘provocateurs’ tasked by agencies in Jakarta to wreak havoc in remote places, but a little investigation revealed more convincing local institutional connections. Exactly how locally significant elites and their political parties, churches, mosque organizations, NGOs (non-government organizations) and pressure groups helped organize the crowds on the streets is the burden of this book. Temporal continuity, the fifth axis defining the social movement, is a bit more of a problem in the Indonesian cases we study. One of the curious features of these episodes is their evanescence. Many observers said they came from nowhere, and afterwards left no trace on the social landscape except segregated communities. But even here first impressions deceive. In fact ethnic organizations in Kalimantan had been working quietly for several years before the big outbreak. And religious organizations, with all their competitive exclusiveness, had been at the heart of every local community throughout the twentieth century.

In short, social movements theory, with its interest in organization and the link with normal politics in crisis mode, offered more fruitful perspectives on Indonesia’s episodes of communal violence than could be found in standard textbooks on collective violence such as those by Horowitz (1985, 2001). I have learned much from his work, as well as from that of Gurr (1993) and from a wealth of Indianist studies, will sometimes quote them and still have more to learn from them. But the promise of using a small number of theoretical constructs to speak of a large number of real world events, inherent in the social movements research programme, trumped the allure of becoming a specialist in the literature of collective violence.

The first new development in the theory of social movements was a structuralist innovation in the 1970s called resource mobilization. It was based on the recognition that outcomes of struggles were driven less by the grievances of movement participants than by their ability to maximize access to organizational resources. All kinds of collective settings at the grass roots – from churches to friendship networks – could be the starting point for organizing a movement. A second development came from the recognition that not just resources but political opportunities determined the moment when social movements stood the best chance of making significant advances. Opportunities provided the link between
formal politics and social movements. They could explain, for instance, that movements flourished in Indonesia in 1998 because the president’s sudden resignation led to institutional breakdowns in the government. A third development took account of the growing awareness that what had hitherto been described as structures were in fact culturally determined ideas inside people’s heads. ‘Framing’ focused attention on the role of gripping new ideas and identities in shaping social movements. It reflected the emerging ‘cultural turn’ in the social sciences. Movement organizers mobilized by framing issues for potential participants in terms that were meaningful for them. The threats posed by alien ethnic and religious groups, for example, were important framing devices in the communal violence in Indonesia. Related to framing was the dramaturgical notion of repertoires of action. Repertoires were brought into the theoretical mix to suggest that the actions movements engage in, such as demonstrations, name-calling and ethnic cleansing, are best seen as public performances aiming to impress both opponents as well as movement participants themselves. All these ideas, coming from different theoretical traditions, were blended together in a single volume entitled Comparative perspectives on social movements (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996). Not everyone was satisfied that this really was a theoretical ‘synthesis’ and not a grab bag of disparate techniques, but most continue to see this book as a milestone. Much of this seemed promising for the problem of communal violence in Indonesia. Bringing non-institutional and sometimes violent movements into the field of normal politics was exactly what I wanted to do.

However, the theory in other ways did not seem to fit the problems in the present book. Most of the research that produced the new social movements theory had focussed on emancipatory movements in the affluent West, for race or gender equality, ecological sustainability, a nuclear-free world, and so on. The idea was to explain why young protestors in North America and Western Europe in the 1960s seemed not at all pathological but eminently political. Protest by the marginalized lay at the heart of the theory, but an important limiting assumption was that their movements operated in a democratic space, which included prominent and effective roles for the mass media and for state institutions delivering legislation, justice and security. Few of these assumptions applied in Indonesia. The movements we will study were chauvinistic rather than emancipatory. People often participated in them while in the grip of a moral panic. Their protests were aimed, not directly at the government, but at other groups within the local community, though indirectly the attacks were often intended to demonstrate prowess and hence to establish claims over the local state. Information flows were mainly oral – rumour played a big role – rather than via the mass media. Patron–client relationships, hardly understood in the individualistic West, dominated the social landscape in the outer island areas of Indonesia where violence occurred. The organizations behind the communal violence did not resemble the businesslike ‘social movement organizations’ acting in a free marketplace of movements, so beloved of some social movement theorists. They were opportunistic, transitory ‘forums’ and ‘fronts’, although they were often clandestinely linked to more permanent institutions. Moreover they did flourish in an atmosphere of
breakdown – not perhaps of social relations but certainly of the state. None of the institutions of governance worked well, least of all the democratic ones. Security worries were uppermost in the minds of movement participants. Perhaps the social strain literature had something to offer after all. This was originally designed to explain why Nazis and Stalinists were able to mobilize such large crowds to support an agenda that was hardly in the long-term interests of ordinary folk. The answer lay in fears and frustrations, rather than in rational politics. It is a difficult problem, and not one we can solve here. We will return to it at various times in subsequent chapters, for example when we consider the so-called security dilemma (Chapter 6). Suffice to say now that in my view, even in the midst of such security crises, many people were still conducting politics as usual, albeit in crisis mode and of a kind considered patently abnormal in the West. Such crises were part of a vicious game played often in countries where the institutional state is weak. In other words, the lesson is that the spirit in which social movement theorists work remains applicable, although in several aspects we require new theoretical work.

A second milestone in the new social movements research opened up possibilities to overcome these problems, and it was written by some of the same individuals. *Dynamics of contention* (DoC) (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001) expanded the range of phenomena it wished to explain beyond social movements to include industrial conflict, nationalism, revolutions and democratization. All were brought together under the label ‘contentious politics’. Its 15 heuristic case studies included several non-Western contentions (such as the 1989 Tiananmen protests), non-democratic ones (Hindu–Muslim rioting in India), as well as movements under weak state conditions (Kenya’s Mau Mau Rebellion). To attempt to understand such widely divergent phenomena with a single set of tools was an attractively bold research project. It immediately drew praise as ‘undoubtedly the most ambitious, and arguably the most important, book on social movements (and related phenomena) written in the past two decades’ (Tindall 2003).

Not merely the scope but also the approach of DoC moved beyond *Comparative perspectives on social movements*. Much of DoC was concerned with what it called ‘transgressive’ contention, which takes place outside the bounds of the formal polity and can include violent protests. DoC rightly considered that previous work in this area had been too static, suitable for comprehending the life cycle of a single organizational actor but not for grasping a broader dynamic in which many actors interact with each other. Process (drawing on political process theory) rather than structure now became the key thought. The intention was to identify a sparse set of basic mechanisms and processes that recur in a wide variety of settings. A mechanism is defined as an event that alters relations among specified elements in similar ways (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 25). Most mechanisms in DoC are relational, though some are environmental and others cognitive. A central example of a relational mechanism is brokerage, in which two social units are brought into relationship with each other by a third. A process, furthermore, is a concatenation of more elemental mechanisms. A process is not the same as a universal law. A process may have
many different outcomes. By way of experiment, and without pretending to be comprehensive, DoC proposed five key processes in contentious politics. They were these:

- Identity formation – How does a sense of bounded identity grow in a group?
- Scale shift (or escalation) – How does a conflict that starts small escalate to involve many more actors?
- Polarization – How does the political space between rival claimants widen as they gravitate towards the extremes?
- Mobilization – How do you get normally apathetic people onto the streets?
- Actor constitution – How does a previously unorganized or apolitical group become a single political actor?

Dynamics of contention drew considerable criticism. The number of mechanisms and processes, it was noted, is too great to be considered sparse – one author counted 44 of them. Moreover they are too complex to reduce real-life phenomena to more concrete levels. The result is a set of concepts on the way to a general law but lacking the clarity to inspire real hope of getting there (Barker 2003; Tindall 2003). Others find the structuralist bias still too deeply entrenched, and this makes it impossible to give a proper accounting of an agent’s freedom to act, since it ignores culture and emotions (Jasper 2004; Platt 2004). These criticisms and others like them no doubt raise important issues. But their authors do not produce a similarly comprehensive set of tools to take the place of DoC. For the moment, DoC is the most advanced treatment we have of the kinds of phenomena in which the present book is interested.

For my purposes, DoC offered insightful categories for analysing these events at an achievable middle level of generality. I wanted an approach that stayed close to the narrative. But I did not want to add to the growing stack of research reports that uncritically rehashed journalistic stories, as if these events were so unique as to lack any underlying regularities.

The aim in this book is not to give a comprehensive account of every episode. That would take far more than one modest volume. Much detail is already available in reports on individual episodes, and more are being written. Rather the aim is to understand the dynamics of the biggest events in a class of conflicts that have not been seen in Indonesia for several decades. I decided to write each episode through the lens of just one process. There were episodes in five Indonesian places, and by chance the number of processes that happened to be presented in DoC was also five. In fact all these processes – escalation, polarization, mobilization and so on – are no doubt found in every conflict. But they often involve the same elemental mechanisms, and it is not necessary to examine them all to understand something important about a particular episode. The choice to link an Indonesian episode with a theoretical process was arbitrary. There is no suggestion, for instance, that Ambon was more particularly an example of mobilization than Poso. Nor should these chapters be read as somehow a recipe book that will work everywhere. Rather I hope heuristically to build a more general vision of
how post-New Order communal conflict occurred, by means of a disciplined study of each episode using the lens of one process. Each will contribute to the overall purpose, which is to understand the social and political dynamics that gave rise to the particular pattern of contentious politics we observed in several Indonesian localities.

Now a few words on the layout. The next two chapters are about context. They prepare the ground for a detailed consideration of the narrative. Chapter 2 begins with the temporal context – why did violence occur at the moment that it did? It surveys a variety of social change processes that culminated in 1998. All have been cited by scholars of differing persuasions as important for understanding the communal violence. This chapter serves the double purpose of introducing background developments and critically reviewing some basic literature about post-New Order collective violence in Indonesia. The chapter after that (Chapter 3) discusses geographical context – why did violence occur in these places and not elsewhere? This moves directly to the typical social site of the post-New Order communal violence, already promised in the book’s title, namely small towns beyond Java. The method adopted here is unashamedly structuralist. It is also sparse, in that it wishes to show we need only two factors to identify those places prone to communal violence – rapid urbanization (from a low base) and high dependence on the state sector. The chapter then moves on to discuss the kind of state that could bring such violence in its wake at moments of instability. Its tone differs markedly from the more dynamic contentious politics approach in the rest of the book. It does not claim to explain everything, but I hope it explains some things and will help set the stage for the more process-oriented chapters to follow.

After that, five chapters (Chapters 4–8) tell in some detail what happened during the conflictual episodes in each of the five places. They are generally presented in chronological order of the conflict’s starting date. This was a bit arbitrary, as episodes occurred in phases of differing intensity and moreover ran parallel to each other. West Kalimantan, for example, had two episodes but is treated in only one chapter arranged by the first one. This was chronologically the first. The first phase in Poso’s episode (Central Sulawesi), used to place Poso second in chronological order, was actually quite small by comparison with the second phase, which occurred when fighting was already going on in a third place, Ambon. The first chapter on processes of violence (Chapter 4) considers identity formation (in West Kalimantan). This is a complex, difficult question but placed here because identity is fundamental to the subsequent chapters. Each of these asks another question. How does a conflict escalate from a neighbourhood brawl into an international issue, pulling in more and more people along the way (Chapter 5, on Poso)? How are normally apathetic people moved to become involved (Chapter 6, on Ambon)? How do people who used to work together pull apart into opposing camps (Chapter 7, on North Maluku)? How is a collective actor born (Chapter 8, on Central Kalimantan)? To try to answer all these different (though related) questions for every episode would be tedious. Each requires a slightly different analytical approach, pitched at the middle level of explanation. Painstakingly recreating a single middle-level process in this way gives us the
satisfaction that we have made an episode intelligible without having to blame it on some unique characteristics of that place and time. A final chapter (Chapter 9) draws together the conclusions about the relationship between the violent episodes in these five places and post-New Order democratization, and points out some of the most important implications for Indonesian democracy activists.

In relation to sources, my original intention was to use the existing specialized reports on each episode in order to build a more general and comparative picture of Indonesia’s post-New Order communal conflicts. This turned out to be more difficult than expected. In some places such as Central Kalimantan very little scholarly work had yet been done. In others area specialists had done impressive work. Yet each time I visited the area I learned new things that were not in the reports. Sometimes it was a matter of information – a large electronic database of news clippings I had collected yielded new details. More often it was a matter of coming to a problem with different questions. The mostly middle-class people I met during these short visits – intellectuals, journalists, bureaucrats, politicians, activists and preachers – also saw things differently to the peasants and fighters who met with other observers. Clearly, I cannot delude myself with ambitions of completeness, and am no doubt quite wrong in some of the interpretations offered here. Much work remains to be done.

Finally, a note on nomenclature. The title of this book adopts the term ‘communal’ to mean both ‘ethnic’ and ‘religious’. Violent conflict occurred across the boundaries of both kinds of solidarity in Indonesia at this time. One often flowed into the other, as the account will show, and ethnic and religious violence has many similar dynamics. It is true that ethnic solidarities – those connected with place of origin rather than sacred convictions – are less institutionalized than religious ones in this country. It is also true that one can in theory choose one’s religion but not one’s ethnicity. But the differences should not be exaggerated. In practice people rarely choose their religion, whereas they are known to choose a new ethnicity; indeed new ethnicities are being invented all the time. Why there should have been more communal conflict of the ethnic kind in Kalimantan and of the religious kind further east remains a mystery to me, beyond acknowledging that each pattern arises from a long history of organizational activity. Western minds have been taught by recent history in the Balkans and Africa to think of violent internal identity politics as *ethnic*. Some authors therefore prefer to broaden the term *ethnic* to include both place of origin and religion (Bertrand 2004: 9; Horowitz 1985: 41, 53). But in Indonesia there are separate and mature discourses about ethnicity and religion. *Etnis* is a common equivalent for the older term *kesukuan* (tribalism), which has always been regarded as dangerous for national integration. Religion, on the contrary, is seen as a social positive, provided it is practised with respect for others. It would be confusing to subsume religion under ethnicity. Yet the political roles they play clearly have much in common. The term *communal*, first used in India, solves this problem by introducing a new term to embrace both types of identity politics.

Two other words commonly used in Indonesia to describe the type of violence discussed in this book are ‘primordial’ and ‘horizontal’. Both, to my mind, have...
more problems than the term *communal*. The first is often traced to a chapter by Geertz (1963) written over 40 years ago whose basic premise is now regarded as inadequate. These days ‘primordialism’ has become almost a term of abuse among social scientists for views that hold ethnic and religious identities to be instinctual and ineffable, when in reality they are ‘constructed’, negotiable and open to reason. The notion of *horizontal* violence, meanwhile, focuses not on identity but on the absence of the state in this type of fighting, by contrast with ‘vertical’ violence such as separatism. Clearly the state was far from absent in the violence described in this book, so the term horizontal is inappropriate. Indeed it can be seen as a deliberate attempt by statists to obfuscate the presence of the state in the violence and to place the blame solely on ‘the people’. Actually the term *communal* suffers from the same drawback, as it was used by the colonial British to suggest the same absence (Freitag 1989). In that sense we have as yet no suitable adjective for this kind of violence. But it has been easier to rid the word *communal* of the misunderstanding than the word *horizontal*, where it is embedded in the semantic.
Why did violent communal conflict break out in Indonesia at the time that it did? Clearly it had something to do with the end of the New Order, which occurred a few months earlier (see Table 2.1), but what exactly? To be confident of the answer we need to examine the narrative of every occurrence in some detail, and we will do that in later chapters. But those narratives do not stand alone. They are part of a tangled web of countless other narratives that make up the context. To understand this interrelatedness of one story with many others is a theory-laden exercise. Is the resignation of a president in Jakarta really context for a fight between testosterone-charged youths thousands of kilometres away? What about a sudden drop in the value of the rupiah on the Jakarta Exchange? Or the slowly changing religious proportions in a population? Do previous episodes of fighting resemble this one enough to constitute a ‘culture of violence’?

This chapter casts the contextual net wide, from economics to politics, from culture to psychology. It complements the core narrative chapters of the book. The contentious politics approach of the latter, as discussed in the introductory chapter, focuses on dynamics involving certain key actors. This is a good idea in a chaotic situation such as that prevailing in Indonesia around 1998, but at the cost of relegating important macrolevels of the story to ‘context’. This chapter wishes to recover some of the macroambitions that have been sacrificed in the social movements quest, which is now even looking for ‘microfoundations’ in the emotions of individual participants (Jasper 2004).

Sketching context is important, but preliminary, since it is not the same as explanation. Interrelatedness is not causation. The trouble with many large-N studies about communal violence is that they stop at suggestive correlations, when the real need is to uncover the social mechanisms that can add directional arrows to them. For example, the 2006 Failed States Index by the US journal Foreign Policy (2006) lists Indonesia as ‘in danger’ because of an accumulation of factors such as internal refugees, group grievances, economic decline and a factionalized elite, without explaining which of these are causes and which consequences of instability. Other studies imply a mechanism behind the claimed context but do not spell it out. The present survey of temporal contexts therefore becomes at the same time a critical literature review of various alternative approaches to understanding the origins of communal violence.

2 Why now? Temporal contexts
Change processes can be long term or short term. The sudden eruption of violence around 1998 came after a lengthy period of steady social and economic development. This long-term process brought about significant social dislocation, but also created rising expectations among those who benefited from the growth. Thus the broadest contextual observation is that communal violence was somehow part of a crisis created by three decades of modernization. Pro-democracy protest by students, workers and indigenous peoples grew out of this modernization, but so did cultural pathologies such as ethnic and religious intolerance and a tendency to violence. But a long-term process never actually sends people into the streets by itself. We also need to identify change processes with a shorter timeframe. The Asian Crisis of 1997–8 hit Indonesia harder than any other Asian country, and this economic catastrophe led directly to political collapse. President Suharto’s resignation in May 1998 set in motion government reforms that, while rightly viewed as desirable, were too often naively assumed to be safe as well. Democratization and (particularly) decentralization were frequently seen as simple administrative improvements, while forgetting substantial evidence warning of the resulting instability if the changes are implemented within a weak state. We review in turn the various strands of these long- and short-term change processes and how they may have contributed to communal violence.

The New Order lasted for 32 or 33 years (depending on which moment in the ‘creeping coup’ of 1965–6 is seen as decisive). It was marked by the growth of capital, and by increasing state penetration into everyday life. Indeed, with some interruptions during war and revolution, these two trends characterized the entire twentieth century. General Suharto’s New Order was often compared to the last decades of Dutch colonial rule. They shared the same dedication to economic growth and bureaucratic omnipotence, and the same suspicion of popular forces. But to an extent only dreamed of in the 1930s, the growth of capital in the 1970s transformed social and ecological landscapes. The pace at which farmers left for the city increased. Factories mushroomed on the outskirts of major cities particularly in Java. Transport became cheaper as roads were built with money from the oil boom. New passenger ships plied the shallow seas among Indonesia’s thousands of islands. State-controlled television brought news, entertainment and propaganda via satellite dishes into the remotest parts of the archipelago. Schools and health clinics were built by the thousand. The number of civil servants to administer all this change grew faster than the population.

A new middle class began to emerge, mainly in the larger cities. Its consumerist habits, its political conservatism, but also its potential for democracy and its thirst for new ideas suddenly became the object of public discussion in the mid-1980s. Students carried the hopes of their elders, and the brightest of them demonstrated sporadically for more freedom to speak their minds. Beyond the campus, private television, more private radio and the Internet emerged in the 1990s to challenge state control of information. Religion was important to them. Contrary to the expectations of modernization theorists (who had shaped the New Order’s developmentalism), the appeal of religion did not wither as this middle class grew. Attendance at mosques, churches and temples continued to grow. The agnosticism
so fashionable in the West failed to emerge in Indonesia. Public etiquette, once dominated by the Sanskrit formalities of the Javanese aristocracy, became more Islamic. Students joined religious discussion groups. A tiny proportion engaged in religiously inspired terrorism such as sporadic bombings and suffered the consequences in the subsequent repression.

At the other end of the social spectrum, workers, slaving on low wages in the often foreign-owned factories, began to organize. From the early 1990s strikes and labour demonstrations grew more frequent, demanding better conditions and the right to organize. They were usually met with often crude military repression. Developmentalism was a dominant ideology in the Third World in the 1960s. Strong government was the essential ingredient. Military juntas in Latin America, South Korea and Indonesia clamped down on ‘divisive’ political demands and opened their markets to Western capital. Although a good number of cabinet ministers in Jakarta were civilian technocrats, the military were the real power behind every government structure. Active or retired officers occupied key positions, from government departments, parliament and the law court, down through the bureaucracy to the village chiefs. Even where they did not hold office, a system of military garrison commands that paralleled local government down to the remotest village exercised a dominating influence over the administration. Factory owners could call in the military to suppress labour activists. Newspapers were regularly shut down for stepping across the government line. Behind the scenes, military intelligence manipulated the congresses of political parties, business councils and even of religious organizations. The last resort was to shoot and this happened often in the New Order. The list of atrocities is long, from East Timor to Aceh and places in between.

In the less developed, thinly populated outer islands beyond Java the social development trends lagged a few years behind Java, but the authoritarianism was if anything more naked. At the same time the economy often had a frontier character, in which massive timber extraction, mines, oil wells, rubber and palm oil plantations dominated the statistics. The environment suffered dramatic reversals as a result. As old growth forests disappeared, run-off caused flooding, rivers silted up and marine sedimentation smothered reefs.

More than in Java, the constant flow of people in the outer islands, for work or to reduce overpopulation elsewhere, altered societies more rapidly than before. Where previously only large cities and harbour principalities had been cosmopolitan places, now the new roads brought immigrants into the remote interior, challenging hitherto isolated indigenous societies with new problems of cash and cultural pluralism. Forest dwellers who had earlier lost their trees to the timber companies now had to learn to accept strangers among them with a different religion who traded aggressively.

Some of these changes carried the seeds of the New Order’s destruction. Not only the frustrations of the marginalized but the rising expectations of the affluent would sooner or later have challenged the New Order straitjacket. Liberal elements within the growing middle class, encouraged by the spectacles of the Berlin Wall and Tiananmen of 1989, were bound in due time to begin making
demands on their authoritarian government as insistently as their counterparts had done in Manila, Bangkok and Seoul. The growing assertiveness of the middle class began to attract scholarly attention from the mid-1980s (Tanter and Young 1990). Labour militancy was also on the increase (Hadiz 1997). Both groups were to play prominent roles in the surge of political demands around 1998.

However, despite predictions to the contrary by newspaper columnists, pro-democracy and labour activism did not degenerate into large-scale communal violence even amidst the turmoil of 1998. At least it did not in the metropolitan heartlands so familiar with most observers. The relatively low levels of violence during the massive student demonstrations of early 1998 that led to Suharto’s resignation and then on election day in June 1999 led relieved commentators to conclude that the democratic transition in Indonesia had been remarkably peaceful. This was only half true. A large number of people did die in the transitional period, and this book will show that the violence was political, but the relationship was indirect. The fighters on the streets were not middle-class democracy activists or urban workers, but members of local communities claiming to be driven by their religious or ethnic identities.

One group of protestors who may have been led to violence by grievances created by New Order developmentalism were indigenous peoples. This has been argued in the case of Kalimantan, and less so for Sulawesi and Maluku as well. Environmental degradation was thought to be the main problem. The line of reasoning was stimulated by the neo-Malthusian observations of Homer-Dixon (1999). Parts of Indonesia are highly overpopulated, and decades of developmentalism have caused untold damage to forests, rivers and seas. The argument that this produced communal conflict was made most strongly for West Kalimantan (Bamba 2000; Dove 1997; Human Rights Watch 1997; Peluso and Harwell 2001), Central Kalimantan (Casson 2001; International Crisis Group 2001b; McCarthy 2004) and Central Sulawesi (Aragon 2001; Harley 2003). However, the legacy of ecological resource depletion was not the only factor at play and may not have even been the main one. It is the state that issues licenses to log and build plantations. The struggle to control the state is usually as much part of the story as the struggle for land (Goldstone 2001; Klinken 2006). Perhaps the communal violence was not so much a product of popular grievances as a result of mobilization by powerful local patrons competing with each other.

The clearly ‘cultural’ nature of so much of the violence led other analysts to focus on the anthropology of anomie rather than on the socio-economic or political change processes at work. They saw the anomic reactions as the long-term, negative spin-offs from the modernization process described earlier. The studies focusing on endogenous cultural dynamics behind the violence were concerned with subjectivity, discourse, values, legitimacy, ideology, meaning and identity – in short with culture. The most consistent writers along these lines see the world very differently to those who are concerned primarily with institutions or the material interests of groups and individuals. The diverging philosophies underlying these two broad methodological streams have been called culturalist versus objectivist (Steinmetz 1999: 2). Where objectivists project a ‘homogeneous form of human
subjectivity across time and place’, which allows them to write in a language like that used in the natural sciences, culturalists ‘emphasize the causal and socially constitutive role of cultural processes and systems of signification’. The cultural turn in the social sciences in recent years has seen the tide swing towards the latter group. Culturalists argue that ‘culture’ constitutes a context of its own, one not simply determined by the economic and political contexts discussed so far.

Different observers highlighted a great variety of cultural contexts. The least historically minded saw a long-term propensity for violence rooted in Indonesia’s social configurations. Sometimes they did not see any kind of change happening at all but attributed violent behaviour to ingrained cultural patterns that had always been there. The notion of a culture of violence is widely accepted within Indonesia, both among commentators and communal propagandists. Indonesian scholars wrote about ethnic prejudices among people who are not yet modern (Surata and Andrianto 2001; Sutirto 2000; Warnen 2002), about the politics of intolerance (Abdilah 2002) and the fragile clannishness in Ambon dating to pre-colonial times (Trijono 2004: 4–12). The idea that ethnic identities are real and ancient – known as primordialism – carried the prestige of Geertz’ work four decades ago (1963).¹ ‘Perceptions’ were also a safer topic of public discussion than real political events, and this helps explain its popularity with conservatives. At the same time propagandists for ethnic and religious causes deployed everyday primordialist stereotyping as a weapon against their enemies. The popular Islamist magazine Sabili, with its rabid labelling of infidels, was a good example.

Outside observers also pondered why violence seemed so ‘normal’ in Indonesian culture. Colombijn (2001) used principles of social psychology to argue that xenophobia was a consequence of robust social cohesion in Indonesia, concluding: ‘It seems that a very strong social identity and its corollary of a dehumanized Other lies at the root of all sorts of Indonesian violence.’ Collins (2003) makes a somewhat similar argument on linguistic grounds. Violent language is normal in Maluku rural culture (though this does not have to mean people act the way they talk). A propensity for violence is the most troubling of a long list of cultural attitudes that are likely to block democracy for a long time yet (Payne 2005).² Other such attitudes include ‘extreme self-centeredness, intolerance, naïveté, hubris, paranoia, and emotionalism’. The very fact of ethnic and religious heterogeneity thus came to be regarded as destabilizing. This lent itself to statistical analysis, based on the assumption that ethnic or religious affiliation is a static social fact. As it happens, Indonesian census takers in 2000 asked a question about ethnicity that had not been asked for 70 years. Some studies were quick to conclude from the resulting abundance of data that, for example, the religious heterogeneity of Maluku correlated suggestively with the conflict there (Suryadinata, Arifin and Ananta 2003: xxiii, 178). However, two more thorough studies have concluded that ethnic and religious diversity correlated only weakly with violent local conflict (Barron, Kaiser and Pradhan 2004; Mancini 2005).

The reason why studies that assume cultural diversity as itself a source of violence fail to convince is that they adhere to an overly static view of culture. We have long had reason to know better. Cultural differences become salient at times...
of political crisis. We cannot understand such moments of crisis by studying culture alone. Fortunately other culturalist authors insisted that a propensity for violence was better explained in historical terms. This insistence reflected a major shift in the study of ethnicity since the early 1970s, away from primordialism and towards more political readings (Govers and Vermeulen 1997). Perhaps, suggested one reflexive author, the very idea of a culture of violence was a historically conditioned effect in the mind of the observer. Amuk is regarded as a typically Indonesian form of irrational violence. Public intellectuals have been discussing it since the early twentieth century, and they did so again in 1998 (Good and Good 2001). Colonial psychiatrists and administrators wrote their speculations about the causes of amuk – whether the Malay or Javanese character, Islamic fanaticism or excessive opium use – against the backdrop of larger discussions about native violence in response to colonial rule. As then, so today (so argued Good and Good), people who write about violence do so from a hegemonic perspective that treats all political action as ‘unnatural’ disorder. From this literature we learn more about the historical middle-class observer than about some ahistorical lower-class deviant.

More often culturalist analysts saw cultural violence as real, and linked it to broad processes of social and political change. Many saw evidence of violent social break down (‘anomie’) or cultural decay resulting from decades of too-rapid modernization. This was the thought behind much of the pseudo-scientific Indonesian disintegrasi discourse alluded to in the introductory chapter, but more academic foreign observers echoed the same thought when they appealed to Durkheim to help explain the same phenomenon. Once harmonious communities had been disrupted by the arrival of powerful uninvited guests – migrants from other parts of Indonesia, state officials or missionaries. At the heart of two rich papers by Dieter Bartels, for example, lies the Durkheimian suggestion that the violence in Ambon was due to the gradual erosion of an integrative indigenous religion, as outsiders and the state introduced more orthodox forms of religion (Bartels 2003a,b). This cut young people loose from the guiding hand of their elders and led to socially undesirable behaviour. Similar arguments have been made for other places such as Central Kalimantan (Smith 2005).

Some of the work along these lines gives such great autonomy to processes of social psychology and the creation of meaning that it is not clear which comes first, the objective social crisis or the subjective psychological one. Phenomenological and semeiotic approaches to violence and its social consequences have been important in India and Sri Lanka (Daniel 1996; Das et al. 2000, 2001; Kakar 1996; Kleinman, Das and Lock 1998). Nils Bubandt (2004), writing about apocalypticism in North Maluku, has done some of the most interesting work along these lines for Indonesia. Although it takes care to describe the political changes coinciding with these popular mood shifts, Bubandt’s approach contrasts with conventional political science. Where the latter sees actors driven by essentially rational motives, here a Freudian irrationality prevails. This is reminiscent of earlier collective behaviourism, discussed in Chapter 1. Fears and anxieties, according to this school of thought, are not reducible to the calculations of rational actors out to increase
their own advantage. We will have a little more to say about this in Chapter 6, as it represents a challenge to the social movements/contentious politics approach adopted in this book. I will argue that fears alone are insufficient to explain the dynamics of communal violence. We need the sense of opportunity and mobilization provided by contentious politics theory. Semeiotics, or the study of signs, meanwhile, is interested in communication and the creation of meaning. New communication technologies such as the Internet helped shape the violent conflicts that occurred (Bräuchler 2003; Hill and Sen 2002), and even conventional print media produced meanings that altered the conflict dynamics (Eriyanto 2003; Spyer 2002). They are mentioned here because these approaches, too, often give considerable autonomy to subjectivity.

The challenge, therefore, is to reestablish the link between the emergence of militant communal movements and objective changes in the state. One fruitful long-term approach along these lines was proposed by David Brown (2001). Reviewing South-East Asia as a whole, he argued that ethnic movements have not arisen by themselves and thus weakened the nation state, but on the contrary a weakly legitimated nation state has generated ethnic movements that offer new forms of political community. He attributed the weakening of civic nationalism in South-East Asia and the concomitant strengthening of communal identities to three key developments: the growing currency of democratic ideas, the incidence of patrimonial politics and the loss of faith in the justice promises of state elites. The argument was intended to describe long-term changes, but appears to apply equally well to Indonesia’s post-New Order transition.

An even more objectivist explanation for the resurgent communal movements as an alternative to civic nationalism is provided by Jacques Bertrand (2004), who applied an approach known as historical institutionalism in his comprehensive survey of post-New Order violence. Historical institutionalism takes seriously the ability of political institutions to determine human behaviour. Broadly conceived, institutions such as electoral, legislative or executive systems embody a certain conception of the nation. When an institutional rupture occurs – known as a ‘critical juncture’ – competition erupts and ethnic groups are able to renegotiate the concept of nation. The end of the New Order was such a juncture. This is an important insight that helps us understand why so much cultural ferment occurred just at a moment of institutional transition. It also gives us the shorter-term perspective we are looking for. The main problem is that historical institutionalism is not well equipped to understand what causes such critical junctures (Hall and Taylor 1998: 20), nor what happens when institutions fail. It is precisely in the chaotic institutional vacuum between the collapse of many New Order institutions and the reestablishment of ‘order’ a few years later that the most interesting things happened. The narratives of collective violence in Bertrand’s useful survey therefore tend to outstrip the explanation, and the reader is left wondering what exactly happened during the moment of rupture to produce such ferocity. Nevertheless, the insights of Brown and Bertrand will help to ground studies on the numerous cultural movements in the period around 1998 in objective conditions, and this bridging effort can only be for the good.
Religion has always been closely tied to the ups and downs of institutions. Religious identities grew stronger in the post-authoritarian period. To a greater extent than ethnicity, which was actively discouraged under the New Order, religious experience had been growing steadily more orthodox also in middle-class circles over the preceding decades. The uncertainties of reformasi made the family-like security of a faith community seem more attractive. Democracy also offered the opportunity to recharge politics with authentic moral values, an antidote to the amoral technocracy of the New Order. This was a charismatic moment of breaking with the past and opening up new futures. Too little of the burgeoning post-9/11 Western literature on sectarian radicalism is aware of this much larger and more mainstream growth of religiosity, a result of both long-term modernization and of state failure in 1998. An interesting but little-explored possibility is that the more radical Islamic resurgence may be associated with marginalized lower classes, while secular nationalists dominate the upper reaches of the state (Liddle 2003).

The best recent work on Islam in Indonesia contextualizes radical Islamist groups such as Laskar Jihad at the margins of a long tradition of mainstream religious politics in Indonesia (Baswedan 2004; Bruinessen 2002; Effendy 2003; Fealy 2003). Islamic political parties proliferated during the tumultuous reformasi years, exacerbating the long-standing fragmentation of the Islamic community and producing a sectarian fringe that hoped to make the big time. The most militant groups sprang up in this moment of charisma, and sometimes made themselves useful to one or other political elite faction (Hasan 2002). Election results in 1999 and 2004 proved that the more radical hopes were unrealistic. Although religious parties (also Christian ones) scored better than they had done under the New Order, they never even reached the percentages of the liberal 1950s, when they had also failed to dominate. Most of this work is written from the centre. We know far less about how religion works in the outer islands. The best-informed reports on religiously inspired militant groups in our problem areas of Maluku and Central Sulawesi suggest a complex mix of collaboration and resistance between the sometimes overbearing groups from the centre and home-grown ones (Hasan 2005; International Crisis Group 2004). Much remains unknown. One key unanswered question is why religion served as the point of mobilization in the eastern part of the archipelago, whereas in Kalimantan it was ethnicity.

Indigenous peoples also experienced rising self-awareness, particularly in Kalimantan but also in other outer islands. Known as *adat* movements, indigenous movements surged in the reformasi period (Davidson and Henley in press). In the post-cold war, post-nationalist, democratizing world, ethnicity can be part of a progressive movement, especially if it is linked to other agendas of marginalized peoples such as the environment or economic emancipation (Nederveen 1993). The resurgence of ethnic identity movements is the most surprising cultural development of the post-1998 period in Indonesia. Rather than representing break down, they expressed a flowering of new energies after the repressive New Order. From revitalized ethnic identities to deepened religious piety, everywhere people found safety and satisfaction in communal social bonds. Indonesians of
Chinese descent rediscovered their festivals. Malays and Dayaks formed new ethnic associations and revived long-dormant customs. Papuans and Acehnese hitched revived ethnic pride to a separatist agenda (Kingsbury and Aveling 2003; Sakai 2002). Some, however, were far from progressive. Militant ethnic movements have conducted ethnic cleansing against poor immigrant communities in West Kalimantan (Davidson 2003) and Central Kalimantan (Klinken 2002).

Now we turn to the political and economic upheavals around 1998 in more detail. A fatal weakness of many of the long-term explanations cited thus far is that they lack the historical perspective to be able to answer the question ‘Why now?’ Long-term processes feed into short-term ones, and it is the latter that generate the required shocks. The key concept in the contentious politics approach adopted in this book to explain why things happen when they do is ‘opportunity’. The democratic movements of 1998 clearly took advantage of the political opportunities offered by the multiple crises of that year, but so did those who organized the episodes of communal violence. At least, this will be the key argument of this book. The basic concepts of opportunity have been recently reviewed by Kriesi (2004). Weak states have an ‘open’ political opportunity structure – they provide easy access to the political system for protest and establishment groups alike, but at the same time their capacity to act is limited. Indonesia has an open opportunity structure in that sense, and it opened up much more again once the crises of late 1997 and early 1998 began to bite. Among the important short-term developments that made potentially revolutionary change a possibility in 1998 were these four: the inability of the state’s security apparatus to deal repressively with protest; the fragmentation of the national elite following the sudden resignation of President Suharto; the presence of a large number of educated and talented but frustrated aspirants to elite positions who no longer believed in the legitimacy of their leaders; and a population suffering economic decline and who were ready to be mobilized.

Signs of dysfunctionality within the New Order regime became increasingly obvious in the 1990s (Aspinall 2005; Eklöf 1999). An ageing Suharto was losing his grip on power. Outside Java, unprecedented demonstrations took place in Central Kalimantan against the Jakarta appointee to the governor’s office in 1993 (Malley 1999). In 1994 huge labour demonstrations occurred in Medan in North Sumatra, followed by Surabaya (East Java) in 1995. A corruption scandal setting cabinet ministers one against another in the same year showed that top elites were beginning to jockey for the post-Suharto period. The badly mismanaged storming of the Jakarta headquarters of the political party Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI) in July 1996, the increasingly open ridicule heaped on Suharto’s nepotistic children throughout the 1990s, Suharto’s ever more erratic decisions – all these events indicated a regime sinking into crisis. The monetary crisis (krismon) beginning late in 1997 merely hastened the demise.

The Indonesian rupiah was among several Asian currencies that began to nose down in late 1997. It crashed spectacularly in January 1998, triggering massive inflation and hence social dislocation. Multilateral lending agencies imposed a wide-ranging reform programme, and supported an unprecedented ‘social safety net’
programme to feed the worst affected. Every conceivable economic indicator plunged to historic lows in 1998, began to recover the following year, but only returned to pre-crisis levels about 5 years later. Thus what started as an exchange rate crisis had turned into a general economic malaise with serious social consequences (Aspinall, Feith and Klinken 1999).

Krismon by itself did not lead to violence. If it had, it would have confirmed the view that grievances such as economic deprivation are the most significant trigger for collective violence. But the weight of evidence is negative, and this tends to support the conclusion of contentious politics theorists that grievances by themselves are insufficient. Actually it is not entirely an open-and-shut case, for the social impact of krismon was uneven. Various parts of the country, and sectors of society, experienced it differently. Even today its complexity remains poorly understood. The plummeting exchange rate harmed Java-based industries reliant on imported materials, but boosted exports such as cocoa and pepper grown outside Java (Booth 2000; Frankenberg, Thomas and Beegle 1999). Civil servants on constant wages were badly hit by rising prices, but middle-class people with dollar bank accounts did well. A map of the severity of the crisis as perceived by local government officials in late 1998 showed much less negativity outside Java than inside, though even that is too simple to describe the patchwork quilt nature of the map (SMERU 1998). Precisely those areas hit by extended communal violence all lay outside Java, the area least affected by krismon. Thus the attractively simple conclusion that economic crisis led to violence is not plausible. Those scholars who have put it forward in a general way (Conway, Kishi and Carment 2002: 11; Soemardjan 2002) were unable to present any real data to support it. Certainly krismon can explain the sporadic food rioting in rural East Java that occurred in January 1998, as well as (in part) Jakarta’s massive 3-day riot of May 1998. But the sustained civil war on Ambon did not correlate clearly with especially serious, sudden and widespread economic deprivation in that area. Nor did the other episodes we study in this book.

Where studies have linked economic grievances with conflict they have not taken krismon as their point of departure, but the longer-term economic differences between one province and another. Tadjoeddin, Suharyo and Mishra (2003) argued that the threat of violence came mainly from disintegrative assertions by resource-rich provinces against the national capital. This is hardly a grievance-based explanation, but a political one that begins with a perception of strength in rich provinces at times of national crisis. It is also more applicable to the secessionist violence in Aceh and Papua than to the communal violence discussed in this book. Secessionist dynamics differ from those of the communal conflict. Aceh and Papua are resource-rich provinces who have to hand over most of their resource revenues to Jakarta. Both struggles had been running for many years by 1998. No new secessionist conflict started in 1998. East Kalimantan, another resource-rich province and multiethnic to boot, might have been predicted to join them in 1998. But it took only mild posturing for it to get a better deal under the decentralization laws of 1999, and there has been no serious violence.

This negative conclusion about the suspected link between economic grievance and communal violence is not to say economics are not important, just that the
right questions have probably not been asked. Class differences appear to be a subtext in much conflict in Indonesia, but they remain under-studied. Do ethnic and religious cleavages proxy for class? Are urban class differences sharper outside Java than in Java? We do not know. The banning since 1966 of class-based organizing has contributed to our ignorance, as has the general scholarly neglect of the islands beyond Java.

One general conclusion involving economics does stand up to scrutiny. Poor countries are more likely to suffer from internal violence than wealthy ones. The State Failure Project (now called the Political Instability Task Force), a CIA-funded study of all cases of serious internal instability in the world since the Second World War, found that low material welfare as measured by infant mortality rates roughly doubled the risk of ‘state failure’ (Goldstone et al. 2000: 14). Indonesia is poor and therefore more at risk than, say, Australia. But poverty alone did not cause the events we are describing in this book. Indonesian infant mortality rates have been among the worst in the South-East Asian region for decades without serious upheaval. Some of the poorest parts of Indonesia, such as the provinces of East and West Nusa Tenggara, did not suffer serious communal violence after 1998. More detailed statistical studies are somewhat equivocal. One national study in all of Indonesia’s villages similarly concluded that violent local conflict did not correlate strongly with poverty (Barron Kaiser and Pradhan 2004). Another statistical study based on census data shows that districts with a low Human Development Index were somewhat more likely to erupt into violence, but that income inequalities did not increase the likelihood of violence (Mancini 2005). Simply saying that poverty or inequality correlates broadly with the risk of internal violence, in other words, does not tell us when, where or how something dreadful may happen.

Economic deprivation did not by itself trigger serious communal violence, but it did have grave political effects. Demonstrations against the Suharto government exploded in nearly every city of Indonesia as the economic shock began to strike home early in 1998. The military was unable or unwilling to control them, and this only emboldened the young protesters. The economic crisis had turned into a political crisis. When a huge riot swept across the capital city between 12 and 14 May 1998 – military agents provocateur were implicated in some reports – it dawned on Suharto’s inner circle that he had to step aside. This he did on 21 May, appointing his Vice-President Habibie in his place. What happened next can be broadly understood as a regime transition (Diamond et al. 1997; Linz and Stepan 1996; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). An authoritarian regime will first show signs of internal decay, then crumble rapidly, giving way to a period of creative and destructive ferment, before a new ruling coalition emerges. The new regime may or may not be more democratic than its predecessor. The events discussed in this book coincided with the window of opportunity, hopeful for many but fearful for others, that followed the resignation of Suharto. While euphoric students celebrated and the former dictator cowered in his heavily guarded home, the weak new government made haste to promise major changes. Even establishment figures who previously denounced democracy as un-Indonesian now joined the demand for democratic reform, reformasi.
The numerous changes instituted by the Habibie government can be analyzed along two dimensions: democratization and decentralization. Though usually spoken in one breath in those days, they are conceptually distinct, since it is possible to have one without the other. Democratization involved measures like the release of political prisoners, removing censorship, abolishing extrajudicial military powers, prosecuting corruptors and human rights abusers and elections. Especially elections. Throughout the second half of 1998 the newspapers were full of all that had to be done to make them happen – permit new parties to register, punish or shackle the New Order parties, design better electoral rules, empower parliament with respect to the executive and much more. By December 1998 a new law on elections was ready, and the big date was set for May 1999, which later became 7 June 1999. No such free elections had been held in Indonesia since 1955, a lifetime ago. That they were held on time around this vast archipelagic country, and with a near-universal participation rate despite being voluntary, is testimony to the power that the myth of democracy conveyed. Predictions of widespread electoral violence proved unfounded. However, some of the violence described in this book can be regarded indirectly as such. Five years later, in 2004, national elections were held again, and nearly 120 million voters directly elected a new president. On the simple criterion of holding two successive democratic elections, Indonesia had become a democracy.

The rapid institutional changes suggest that the key contextual factor for communal violence was not economic but political. This possibility has been examined from many different angles, all united by the general idea that sudden institutional shifts can lead to violence. Surprisingly, initial studies of the democratization process in Indonesia failed to foresee that it was fraught with the danger of violence (Liddle 2001). Yet large-N statistical studies have shown that transitions of the kind Indonesia experienced are risky. The conditions conducive to ethnic conflict were studied extensively in The State Failure Project (Goldstone et al. 2000), so named because it considered political violence a case of state failure. This study correlated a list of ‘failing’ states around the world with no less than 1,300 political, demographic, economic, social and environmental variables for every country in the world between 1955 and 1998. Four types of state failure events were distinguished: revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, adverse regime changes and genocides/politicides. Considered as a single phenomenon, state failure was most dependent on just a single factor, namely regime type. The study concluded that, all other things being equal, the odds of failure were seven times as high for partial democracies as they were for full democracies and autocracies (Goldstone et al. 2000: 14). The conclusion that internal armed conflict, now the world’s most frequently occurring type of warfare, was far more likely in these mid-stage so-called anocracies was confirmed by some of the same scholars with more data in subsequent years (Marshall and Gurr 2003: 19–20). They wrote: ‘Whereas democracy and autocracy are very different forms of governance, they are very similar in their capacity to maintain central authority, control the policy agenda, and manage political dynamics. Anocracies, by contrast, are characterized by institutions and political elites that are far less capable of performing these fundamental tasks and ensuring their own continuity.’
Indonesia’s political crisis had by early 1999 turned into a security crisis. The statistics of violence took a leap in 1999, as was discussed in the Introduction (Varshney, Panggabean and Tadjoeddin 2004). Indonesia began to be discussed at international conferences on ‘failing states’, in the once unlikely company of countries like Sierra Leone, Congo, Sudan, Somalia, Colombia, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Fiji, Haiti and Lebanon (Rotberg 2003). The International Crisis Group established an office in Jakarta and began to bring out high-quality reports on security crises around the country. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and many other international agencies followed suit, if not always with the same élan.

The blame for transitional violence of this nature around the world can often be laid on remnants of the old establishment. The generals and their business cronies typically take advantage of the poorly institutionalized new democratic spaces to sabotage the emerging freedoms by sponsoring communal conflict (Snyder 2000). This led the keen Jakarta observer Kevin O’Rourke (2002) to see the hand of armed forces commander General Wiranto in much of the violence that occurred around Indonesia in the years after 1998, from East Timor to Ambon. Some studies on Ambon and Poso reached similar conclusions (Aditjondro 2001b, 2003). Indonesian human rights activists had seen three decades of state terror, often by means of militia proxies. Many were convinced they recognized it again after 1998.

Certainly instability in Jakarta did coincide with violent conflict in the provinces. Table 2.1 shows that most of the worst communal fighting took place at times when the president in Jakarta lacked real authority especially vis-à-vis the conservative military. Having had only two presidents since independence in 1945, of whom the second was in power so long that most Indonesians could remember no one else, the country now had new presidents every couple of years. President Habibie won little credit for having overseen the institutional transition to democracy and decentralization. The army blamed him for having ‘let go’ East Timor when he allowed the people there to vote for independence in August 1999. The People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) voted him out in November 1999, a year and a half after taking office. By this time violence had occurred in four of the five areas discussed in this book (not yet very seriously in Poso, Central Sulawesi). East Timor, not discussed here, had just dissolved into an orgy of post-referendum violence instigated by the vengeful departing Indonesian military, which led to international armed intervention. Habibie’s replacement was the popular cleric Abdurrahman Wahid, known as Gus Dur, long an intellectual voice for tolerance and non-violence. But less than 2 years later he had been impeached. His main achievement in office was to sack General Wiranto from his post as armed forces commander. Wiranto was responsible for the violence in East Timor. Otherwise he was a poor administrator whom the establishment soon turned into an object of ridicule. Violence occurred in all five areas during his presidency. In July 2001 President Megawati replaced him. Although she had been a popular opposition figure under Suharto, by 2001 she had several retired generals among her advisors and key sections of the military had come to regard her as no real threat to their interests. Indeed, after she became president all serious investigations into
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military human rights abuse stopped. The wheels of government began to turn smoothly once more. Peace agreements in Ambon and Poso ended the worst of the fighting, and tension had also wound down in the three other areas of interest.

So did the military do it in Ambon and the other communal arenas? The evidence for the military instigating violence was overwhelming in the cases of the secessionist struggles in Aceh (Aspinall and Crouch 2003), Papua (King 2004) and above all East Timor (Tanter, Ball and Klinken 2006). Liberation movements in each were pushing hard for independence while the post-1998 window of opportunity remained open. The Indonesian military felt their duty to preserve the country’s territorial integrity gave them the right to deploy every trick in their arsenal. But it was not so easy to see why they might want to invest scarce manpower opening up new theatres of conflict where none existed, such as in Ambon. Nor do we have the details of meetings, telegrams, arms shipments and statements by defectors, so abundant for East Timor, that would confirm such a scenario for the communal conflict areas. The strongest evidence that General Wiranto did provoke violence rather than containing it in Ambon does not come from the year 1999 in which the conflict started. It comes from the following year, when it apparently suited him to give arms to a radical Muslim militia in order to distract attention from President Wahid’s pursuit of his

### Table 2.1  Continued

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**Note**

a Dark shading shows intensive fighting in key locations, light shading lower-level violence.
abuses in East Timor. Thus, evidence that the military actually lit the flames in Ambon and other places of communal violence is weak.\textsuperscript{6}

This is not to say the security forces carried out their duties professionally. Anti-democratic conspiracy or not, their performance all over the country beginning in 1998 was deplorable (Human Rights Watch 2002; International Crisis Group 2002b). One reason was that the police had been separated from the military as part of reformasi, and given the primary role in internal security. Not used to being sidelined, military units sometimes fought with the police rather than cooperate with them when asked to assist in an emergency. One result was that security forces often caused more deaths than they prevented, another that they effectively granted impunity to perpetrators of gross crimes. A weak judicial system exacerbated the de facto impunity.

A more fundamental reason for the poor security lay in the Indonesian military’s territorial structure, in which troops are garrisoned all over the country. They obtained only about 25 per cent of their funding from the state budget, not so much because the state was poor but because the military wanted to maintain their independence of action. Many soldiers spent a good part of each day earning money for their unit, and thus building relationships, both legal and illegal, with local business and political elites. Democratization and decentralization both reduced the role the military played in Jakarta, but actually enhanced that role in the provinces. The logic of the military’s decentralized structure (we might almost say its warlordism) led it to take sides in local conflict for quite local reasons. Marcus Mietzner (2003: 256) wrote about this phenomenon:

> With the collapse of the omnipotent central regime, the fragmentation of power in the post-Suharto era and the disengagement of the TNI [armed forces] from formal political institutions, the armed forces no longer have a stake in defending a specific political regime, either at the centre or in the regions…. Accordingly, the TNI provides security services to an individual power-holder rather than offering institutional support.

Surprisingly few studies of the post-1998 communal violence have turned to the second theme of Indonesia’s post-1998 transition, namely decentralization. Yet there are strong arguments for laying this connection. Violence was localized, and this was also the level of the political transformation brought about by decentralization. Decentralization was intended to be an enlightened response to the perennial fear in Jakarta that its hold over this outstretched country was tenuous and that revolt could break out at any time (Malley 2001). The New Order dealt with these fears by always keeping the mailed fist raised. Now the answer to the threatened disintegrasi was to give them what they wanted, provided Indonesia’s borders remained intact. (Even the border was up for negotiation in the case of East Timor, brutally occupied in 1975 but finally offered a vote on its future association with Indonesia in 1999. But that was considered a unique case in Jakarta.) Two laws were passed in 1999 giving the regions greater control over the way they spent their money (though no greater control over its collection), and
increasing the powers of the local elected assembly to determine who would rule. The unit of autonomy was the district (*kabupaten*), not the province (which had been the seat of secessionist movements in the 1950s). The autonomy laws were to go into effect on 1 January 2001, but many districts took an advance on their powers before that, sensing Jakarta was unlikely to stop them. One unusual feature of the decentralization process in Indonesia was not part of the original plan. This was the great demand for new administrative provinces and districts, carved out of existing ones. The process of administrative fragmentation was known in Indonesia as *pemekaran*, which literally means ‘flowering’.

The most desirable post in local government was now the district chief, who enjoyed greater powers over an enlarged budget. The money had grown as bureaucrats were transferred to the district payroll from the regional offices of central government departments, dissolved in favour of district services. The law specified that the chief be to be democratically elected by the district assembly. In the past this decision had always come from above, based on non-compulsory advice from below.

Even more so than the early literature on democratization, most of the extensive literature on Indonesian decentralization even today remains technocratic and fails to consider the security implications (e.g. Turner *et al.* 2003). This is curious, because decentralization was intended as a conflict resolution mechanism, and it might have been considered possible that the shift in power relations might itself prove conflictual. However, some early reports did warn that decentralization was raising local stakes and that the election of district chiefs in particular sometimes led to violent conflict (Human Rights Watch 2001; International Crisis Group 2002c, 2003). More recent studies are bringing to light a rich field of observation about how personalized and weakly institutionalized politics at the local level play into the mobilization of group sentiment (Aspinall and Fealy 2003; Kingsbury and Aveling 2003; Schulte and Klinken 2007).

Missing from most of the scholarly work on changes in state institutions after 1998 is a fundamental reappraisal of what the state in Indonesia actually is. During the New Order the dominant academic view of the state was orderly. It saw reflections of Latin American state corporatism (King 1982), and considered that the state enjoyed almost complete freedom to act against its cowed population. Some have argued that even after the end of the New Order little has changed. A book on Indonesia’s post-New Order political economy by Robison and Hadiz (2004) argued that vested interests of political and economic elites at the fringe of Suharto’s regime have survived its downfall and successfully appropriated the institutions of the state. However, retaining strong concepts of state autonomy after the New Order do not help us to understand the spectacular state failures that lie behind the communal conflicts studied in this book. In reality endemic rent-seeking through fragile patron–client networks made Indonesia more like a sub-Saharan state than a Latin American junta-led one. William Reno (1995: 2–3), writing of Sierra Leone, described what he called a Shadow State, where political authority is drawn, not from the possession of undisputed force, but from the ability to control markets and material rewards, or, in other words,
from hegemony in the ‘black economy’. Indonesia’s state was on the whole a lot more coherent than Sierra Leone’s; yet in its frontier regions there were unmistakable parallels, which became the more marked as these places passed through the fragile moment of transition (Schulte and Klinken 2007).

At the district level we know far less about the operations of the state than in Jakarta. What does seem clear is that decentralization did not bring more disposable state money to the districts than before. The design was done in the spirit of the neo-liberal lean state. A large number of bureaucrats were transferred from the centre to the districts, and their salaries more than soaked up the extra funding district-level government’s control (Saad 2001; Turner et al. 2003; World Bank 2003). This resulted in a significant increase in shadow state-type activities in the districts, for example, through illegal levies on road transportation in South Sulawesi (Ray and Goodpaster 2003) or illegal tin mining in Bangka Belitung (Erwiza Erman in Schulte and Klinken 2007). Communal violence in West Kalimantan may also have been related to illegal logging operations, another typical shadow state activity (Klinken 2006). These illustrations bear out William Reno’s warning from Sierra Leone, that emasculating the state by means of a neo-liberal austerity programme will not produce better governance in a developing country. Instead, it will force state elites to enter more deeply into the informal markets in an effort to retain the authority to rule. Clientelistic rent-seeking behaviour within the shadow state takes place under the threat of violence as the security apparatus become factionalized and serve privatized ends. We will return to this issue in the next chapter.

Some explanations of state weakness took a broader view. They attributed it to globalization – either in its structural guise as global capital directed from the halls of power in Washington that undermined state power on the peripheries of the world system, or in its ideological guise of alternative notions of political community. A proper survey of the literature would take us too far afield, but the possible connections with communal violence warrant a brief excursion. As global flows of finance began to increase, the captains of finance in Washington demanded less regulation by states. Multilateral lending agencies enforced the message on their reluctant clients in the developing world. Coupled with a decline in redistributational resources that imperilled its legitimating authority, this analysis of the declining state has become a commonplace (Hirst and Thompson 1999; Strange 1996). Indonesia appears to bear it out. Wave upon wave of deregulation throughout the 1990s culminated in the Internationa Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment programme forced on the government after krismon struck in late 1997. The failure of state patronage, caused by krismon but exacerbated by the IMF austerity programme, was a significant factor in the final catastrophic loss of elite support for Suharto in those hectic days of May 1998. Thus the regime crumbled, and with it its ability to maintain social harmony. David Brown, as we saw earlier, has argued that this very crumbling of state powers itself generated the ethnic communities that offered new forms of political community and the promise of social justice (Brown 2001).
The upshot of this discussion is that it is not a good idea to ignore power when trying to understand communal violence. When the state appeared to be in complete disarray it was tempting to put it aside and look to more societal causes for the eruption of violence – perhaps economic grievances or cultural predispositions. There were some good reasons to take this view. Early explanations for the violence, which held that these events were essentially like the anti-authoritarian protests so common towards the end of the New Order, and therefore that they could only be understood with the conventional notions of the dominant New Order state, appeared not to fit the facts. Most of the fighting was being done, after all, not by government officials and their stooges but by ordinary young men and women defending their homes. Perhaps the ideas in their heads, the dominant mood in their community or the communications that passed between them could tell us more about the violence that occurred than any amount of economic or political analysis can do? Such was the reasoning of those who preferred to ignore the state. However, this will not do, as subsequent chapters will show. The connections with a state in crisis mode are not the less compelling for being difficult to unravel.

Now that the parade of contexts has passed the review stand, what have we learned? Put briefly, three things. First, that the social change processes at work in Indonesia around the year 1998 were multidimensional. It is not possible to discuss the economic crisis apart from the political one that followed on its heels. The reverse is also true, since the political crisis in turn caused the economic one to drag on. Nor should we talk about violence without linking it to the social dislocations caused by years of developmentalism, and to the hopes springing from gradually maturing sub-national ethnic and religious identities. Second, we learn that contexts by themselves are not explanations. Explaining requires a reasonably clear idea about how the social world works. The next chapter proposes to make a start, but it does not immediately move towards political process. After this temporal context chapter we need a geographical context chapter. Third, we learn that the crucial temporal context was the weakening of the repressive capacities of the state and the fragmentation of its ruling elites as a result of the multiple crises of 1998. This created opportunities for popular movements favouring democracy and decentralization, of which communal mobilization was sometimes a part. Chapter 3 therefore highlights notions of the weak state already touched on here, to discuss why communal violence erupted in those particular outer island provincial towns in which it did. It adopts a simple structural approach based on the material interests of local elites in provincial Indonesia.
Serious communal conflict broke out in five places after the end of the New Order. By no means all of Indonesia was in flames all of the time. Explanations that fail to disaggregate ‘Indonesia’ in space and time fall short of the mark. And yet five episodes at about the same time was too often to be mere chance. The temporal context was the subject of the previous chapter. Can we now identify the social setting of those geographic places where such events were more likely to occur at a moment of stress? Even without knowing the stories in detail, we already know they all occurred in the outer islands. Moreover, as we will see later, the key brokers of violence all lived in town – often a district or provincial capital. Fighting did occur in rural as well as urban areas, but nothing grows to such a scale without organization, and the organizers were invariably urban. Most importantly, as will also be explained, the crucial issue for these brokers was control over the local resources of the state: who would become district chief or governor of the existing or newly created administrative territory? This chapter, like the last, complements the contentious politics approach of the core narrative chapters by recovering a macrodimension, in this case in geographical space rather than in time. The approach is frankly structural. It revolves around the material interests of those with a stake in the local state. Statistics allow us to identify those places where this group dominates the urban landscape. When played out in the weakened state institutions that characterized Indonesia at this time, those material interests in these places were more likely to result in communal conflict. The actual processes by which that conflict emerged are not described here – that is left to the following chapters.

The real social setting of the post-New Order communal violence was therefore the outer island town. Let us see what light we can shed on these places. Table 3.1 lists the locations and populations of the main towns that will be mentioned in this study. Statistics of urban sizes are problematic in Indonesia because definitions of the urban vary significantly in time and place. Most Indonesian figures are based on populations within administrative boundaries, which are not always uniformly urban. This table is compiled from various sources and not definitive. The most consistent and accurate data is still in Rutz (1987: 265–82), and most have been projected to 2000 using Rutz’ growth figures. The ranks also derive from Rutz. Facilities rank indicates how that town

3 Why here? The town beyond Java
The town beyond Java

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Table 3.1 Towns and communal violence

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Note

a Palangkaraya: (BPS Kalimantan Tengah 2000: 45). Sampit: ‘20.000 Pengungsii Terkurung di Sampit: Korban Jiwa 187 Orang’, Kompas 24-2-2001. Rutz gives a very high 10% 1971–80 growth rate for Palangkaraya (when the city was still being built) and a low 1.3% rate for Sampit (before the timber industry took off). If these are respectively adjusted down to 6% and up to 10% for the period after 1980 and used to extrapolate Rutz’ 1980 data to 1998, the results approximate to those in the table.

Poso: Extrapolated from Rutz (1987: 274). The BPS data is seriously flawed, partly because the census was taken during the conflict, and I was unable to find pre-conflict urban statistics in (BPS Sulawesi Tengah 2001a: 39–41).


ranks nationally in terms of facilities such as banks and offices. Clearly these towns are not among the large cities that have been much better studied. They are small and intermediate urban centres, virtually a new world for scholars. Ambon, the largest of them, has been ranked as Indonesia’s thirty-sixth largest urban centre. Over half these towns have populations below 100,000. This makes them small towns according to some authors, or intermediate centres according to others.1 Using the facilities index for 1980, Rutz (1987: 200) classified Ambon and Palangkaraya, which are provincial capitals, as higher order centres (one category below the regional metropolises), and the remainder as middle and lower order centres. (Since then Ternate has also become a provincial capital.) Decentralization after 1999 set these small and intermediate centres abuzz with political activity in ways they had not seen for decades.
The pattern of politics in the outer islands is different from the one more commonly observed in Java. Golkar continued to receive lots of votes there in 1999, whereas Java and Bali swung radically towards Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (PDI-P) (King 2003: 151–3). The PDI-P protest vote was strongest in more literate and urban places. A case study in Lombok (West Nusa Tenggara) suggests that outer island Golkar votes are personalized – they were more often determined by the ‘locally important person’, as if the traditional patrimonial polity of local kingdoms remained a reality (Cederroth 2004).

Africanists have also noticed the personalization of politics in the Third World town, particularly smaller ones. There is a long-standing debate among urban geographers about the role of the Third World city in development. Does it generate development by spreading modernity to the surrounding countryside, or is it on the contrary parasitic because it sucks up the development assistance that should flow to the countryside? The latter view is known as urban bias. On the whole urban bias has lost ground in the intellectual debates of recent years (but see David Smith 1996). However, as one moves down the urban hierarchy towards smaller towns the consensus shifts. Urban bias, and the related phenomenon of uneven urbanization (where towns grow too big in relation to the surrounding population), does seem to be a reality at the provincial level (Pedersen 1997: 11–18). The reason, according to the Africanist Goran Hyden, lies in a different kind of political economy. He speaks of an ‘economy of affection’, in which power and money flow not through formal institutions but through networks of kinship and other affinities. Community solidarity plays a bigger role than individual self-interest in the social collectivity. Smaller urban centres represent the ‘frontier’ of state expansion. Hyden and Williams writes (1994: 74),

Unlike the familiar American example, where independent individuals engaged in technological and economic entrepreneurship, survival and ingenuity, the African frontier has been of a socio-political nature, devoted to achieving influence and power through the acquisition of adherents and the fabrication of alliances.

The informal economy is here more important than the formal one (Datta 1990). The state has to accommodate these networks, and when it is unable to do so it becomes dysfunctional. By contrast with others who continue to see the intermediate towns in developing countries as positive sites for the diffusion of development benefits such as innovation and government services (Rondinelli 1983), Hyden and his colleagues see a darker picture of exploitation and inequality. Little systematic study has so far been made of the intermediate towns in Indonesia to judge the truth of the matter. This chapter can at best make a start, while keeping the focus on the social setting of communal violence.

What kinds of indicators will we look for to build a systematic picture of Indonesian town life, particularly outside Java? One analytical dividing line separates approaches broadly into cultural and structural categories. Cultural ones look at things like the relative size of religious and ethnic groups, in-migration by
other groups, intolerant attitudes and the history of communal conflict. Structural ones look at such factors as unemployment, social mobility, education and social misery such as infant mortality. Cultural explanations clearly appeal in some of the places of concern. Poso, Ambon and West Kalimantan all have a small number of fairly evenly balanced religious or ethnic populations. But this class of explanation is conceptually problematic. It assumes that communal identity is always politically explosive (‘salient’). In reality this only occurs at certain moments. What causes the temperature to rise at those moments may have little to do with communal identity as such, but rather with more structural factors such as a sudden change in power relations. Nor does communal diversity invariably lead to trouble. Among the places in Indonesia with high diversity that did not explode after 1998 are North Sumatra and East Kalimantan.

A similar conclusion, counter-intuitively perhaps, holds for internal migration. It is true that internal migrants became a widely resented group in the localist politics of the reformasi period, as indicated by slogans preferring ‘sons of the soil’ (putra daerah). It is also true that migrant Madurese were the target of all three violent episodes in Kalimantan, with migrant Bugis and Butonese playing a similar though less central role in Central Sulawesi and Maluku. Yet anyone who tries to prove that excessive migration by itself produced cultural clashes that led to violence will be disappointed, for the numbers do not compute. The Madurese, as we saw, only made up a tiny proportion of the population – less than 3 per cent in West Kalimantan, about twice that in Central Kalimantan. The Statistical Yearbook for 1995 tells us that in South Sulawesi, migrants from other provinces made up over 10 per cent of the population, in West Sumatra the figure reached 20 per cent, and in Jogjakarta 30 per cent – all places without serious communal violence. Meanwhile in our four provinces of interest they hovered around a barely significant 5 per cent.

Another important conceptual division among explanations for violent conflict is between grievance-based versus mobilizational ones. Explanations based on grievance assume that violent conflict emerges because people are hurting. Mobilizational explanations, by contrast, take a greater interest in the way leaders are able to organize the resources they need to seize an opportunity, possibly through violent means. The former type of explanation is widely used, particularly in the press, and it does appeal to common sense. But, as will be shown later, such explanations do not always work well. So, for example, the economic crisis of late 1997 and early 1998, surely an important source of grievance, struck hardest in Java, yet we saw only sporadic rioting there. Although the 2-day rampage in Jakarta in May 1998 was certainly bloody, no sustained war occurred in Java as happened, for example, in Ambon. The reason is, no doubt, that people hurt often but they rarely manage to get organized to engage in sustained violent conflict.

A more promising strategy will therefore be to look for structural factors that can help answer the question: why did people in these particular places have more reason than in others to organize communally and militantly? The towns at the heart of the episodes of communal violence were smaller centres of administration in the outer islands. Their size indicates that they have a more intimate
relationship with the surrounding countryside than a large city. Figures on urbanization, as we have seen, are unreliable in Indonesia and indeed the very concept of a sharp urban–rural boundary has come under question. But patterns of employment provide a good alternative indicator. This will also take us closer to the economic interests at work in the communal conflict. What proportion of people does not work mainly as farmers (or fishers)? Most of these people will live in town or depend on it for their livelihoods. We should also investigate how quickly farmers have been leaving their farms and moving into town. Being administrative, government money in these towns moreover plays an important economic role. State resources were a crucial prize in the narratives in subsequent chapters. We should investigate systematically how important government money really is. One way to measure that is to count the proportion of non-agricultural workers who are civil servants and, perhaps, whether that proportion has been changing over the years. Where lots of people have been moving out of agriculture into town, and many of them end up working for the government, we expect to see more intense and possibly transgressive forms of competition for the resources of the state. Once this basic groundwork is done, we will consider a more rounded model of how urban town dwellers might interact with the state to produce the competitive dynamics that sometimes led to violent conflict.

The most readily available disaggregated statistical data for Indonesia are at the level of the province. There were 27 of these for most of 1999. The data are in the annual *Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia* produced by the Central Bureau of Statistics. This is not an entirely satisfactory level of analysis, since the violent episodes usually played out in areas smaller than the province. Unfortunately, wide-ranging statistical data for the hundreds of districts in Indonesia are published at provincial level, where they vary significantly in the indicators measured both in space and time, making this level of analysis problematic. The five areas where communal violence occurred fell in four long-standing provinces. They were West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi and Maluku. North Maluku was still part of Maluku province until late in 1999.

We begin by measuring an increase in the non-agricultural working population – this is our alternative measure of urbanization. This worldwide phenomenon is called deagrarianization (Bryceson 1997; Rigg 2001). It is not exactly the same as urbanization. Deagrarianization describes a reduced dependence on agriculture caused by growing penetration of town life into the countryside. A farmer who abandons the land and moves permanently to town is only one of its several manifestations. Booth has shown that about two thirds of deagrarianization corresponds to urbanization, the remaining farmers moving into off-farm work while still residing in the countryside (Leinbach 2004: 16). Indonesia as a whole experienced a massive shift out of agriculture throughout the New Order. The percentage of Indonesians who said they worked mainly outside agriculture increased by about half from 36 per cent in 1971 to 55 per cent by 1998. Every province experienced this shift, but the figures are not uniform. Outside Java and Bali the non-agricultural working population started from a much lower base, and they have never caught up with the ‘core’ regions (Table 3.2). So for example...
West Kalimantan only reached a level of 38 per cent non-agricultural workers by 1998, about the same level as Central Java nearly three decades earlier. The main exception is East Kalimantan, which has been about as deagrarianized as West Java at least since the early New Order. On the whole, though, deagrarianization came late to the outer islands.

Did the rate of deagrarianization (and hence urbanization) also vary by province? Some indications suggest that it occurred most rapidly in several outer island provinces. The data is not good enough to be sure. Apparent changes in definitions caused sudden jumps in some years that make comparisons across time inexact. Nor is data available for every year and every province. Instead of making firm assertions, therefore, we will treat the following discussion as a hypothesis requiring further work. If we take 1990 as the turning point and compare average proportions

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**Table 3.2 Proportion of non-agricultural workers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Non-ag. workers 1998 (%)</th>
<th>Increase 1970s/1980s to 1990s (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irian Jaya</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E Timor</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengkulu</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E Nusa T</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maluku</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W Kalt</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S Sum</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE Sul</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Sul</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riau</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N Sum</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N Sul</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Kalt</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S Kalt</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E Java</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W Sum</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Indonesia</em></td>
<td><strong>55.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Java</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bali</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jogja</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E Kalt</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W Java</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>99.1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

of non-agricultural workers by province for the 1990s with averages for the 1970s and 1980s, this somewhat shaky data shows the fastest rate of deagrarianization in Central and West Kalimantan, Central and South-East Sulawesi, and Bengkulu (Table 3.2). Maluku came out low, but the data there oscillates wildly and is probably worthless. On the whole, therefore, the most unstable places in 1999 had deagrarianized most rapidly. Without making too much of it, it suggests that not only did deagrarianization come late, but it had come most rapidly to those places that proved to be unstable after 1998, especially during the 1990s.

Where did all these deagrarianized people work? In Java, industrialization soaked up a large number of them (Hill 2000: 222f.). In the outer islands, with far fewer factories, the state tended to absorb the excess. It played an increasingly important role in outer island urban economies. The expansion of the state into these more remote areas had only begun to gather speed in the 1930s. It was interrupted by war and revolution and then picked up again 40 years later in the New Order. The bureaucracy offered jobs and the development budget created work for building contractors. Multiplier effects from state-funded infrastructure development such as roads also helped boost the economy. The hope was that foreigners would follow-up with major investments, although this proved unrealistic on the whole. A crude estimate of the degree to which the urban working population is dependent on the state is the ratio of civil servants to the non-agricultural working population. For all the outer islands that figure is substantially higher than in Java and Bali. Whereas for Central Java the ratio was 7.5 per cent in 1990 (below the national average of 12 per cent), in West Kalimantan it was 19 per cent, in Central Sulawesi 32 per cent, and in Maluku 33 per cent (see Table 3.3). This only captures part of the picture. Dependence on the state extends beyond jobs in the bureaucracy. Many building contractors also depended on government contracts.5

The number of civil servants in Indonesia has grown dramatically since colonial days, and this has been particularly true of the outer island regions in recent decades. Evers (1987) has shown how every political revolution brought in its wake a bureaucratic revolution. The first leap followed independence in 1950, the second martial law in 1957 and the third the defeat of communism in 1966. As Evers wrote this, the oil windfall of the early 1970s was continuing steadily to push up civil servant numbers. Table 3.4 shows that the number of civil servants per thousand head of population throughout Indonesia grew from 14 to a peak of 21 throughout the 1980s, a per capita increase of 50 per cent. However, once again the difference between Java and the outer islands is stark. Whereas in Central Java the proportion grew by half from 12 to 18 in this period, in West Kalimantan it more than doubled from 10 to 21. Other outer island provinces were already bureaucrats rich in 1979 but continued to grow throughout the period. In Central Sulawesi the corps grew from 16 to 28 per thousand, in Maluku from 18 to 30, and in Central Kalimantan from 19 to a whopping 32 per thousand. Bureaucratic expansion stopped when the oil boom slowed, in about 1990. Numbers have stayed steady after that or dropped slightly in relation to the population. Unlike all the other political upheavals, the 2000 figures show that reformasi and regional autonomy did not produce another bureaucratization jump.
The figures show convincingly that we are watching the high-speed creation of urban societies in the outer islands, societies that make up for what they lack in industrialization with a dependence on state funding. Now let us see if the four provinces vulnerable after 1998 are indeed those in which both the speed of deagrarianization (Table 3.2) and dependence on the state (Table 3.3) are high. In Table 3.5 a ‘vulnerability index’ $V$ is constructed by multiplying the speed of deagrarianization $D$ by the dependency on the state $B$. $D$ is the factor by which the proportion of non-agricultural workers increased between the 1970s and the 1980s and the 1990s. $B$ is the percentage of the non-agricultural working population employed as civil servants in 1990, the peak year for civil servants. Thus:

$$V = D \times B$$

Only the relative value of this index matters, not its absolute value. Provinces with a high rate of deagrarianization (cum urbanization), and a high proportion of
civil servants among non-agricultural workers, will therefore score a high vulnerability index.

The results do match up. (There is not enough data for East Timor and Irian Jaya.) The least vulnerable provinces are in Java. The outer islands all fall above the national average. All four conflict-affected provinces have a high vulnerability index. Note that Aceh, whose secessionist conflict we do not consider in this book, also yields a high vulnerability index, which might indicate that its conflict dynamics are not as different from those of other places as is often supposed. This is a remarkable conclusion. It has been achieved without resorting to cultural arguments about ethnic or religious diversity. Indeed it explains why some places with substantial diversity did not experience violent conflict. East Kalimantan, for example, has just as much ethnic diversity as Central or West Kalimantan. Yet it did not explode after 1998 (Klinken 2002). Its vulnerability index is low. Its level of deagrarianization is as high as East or West Java. By 1998, 68 per cent of East Kalimantan’s workers were non-agricultural, well above the national average of 55 per cent. But that figure was no longer increasing rapidly in the 1990s as it was

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1979</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>Change 1979–1990 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>W Java</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E Kalt</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Java</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N Sum</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riau</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S Sum</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E Java</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jambi</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N Sul</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S Kalt</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maluku</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yogyak</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aceh</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E Nusa T</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W Sum</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Sul</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W Nusa T</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Kalt</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lampung</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S Sul</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE Sul</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengkulu</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W Kalt</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bali</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E Timor</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irian Jaya</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
elsewhere, so deagrarianization D was low. Also, only 14 per cent of those non-agricultural workers were civil servants (1990 figures), not much different from the national average of 12 per cent. The social configuration apparently made communal conflict less likely. The same can be said of several other provinces. North Sumatra is a carnival of ethnic and religious diversity, but it did not turn against itself after 1998 (Supriatma forthcoming). Riau has a large internal migrant population, but, although politics were vigorous after 1998, no communal violence broke out.

Table 3.5 also shows some provinces with a high vulnerability index where communal conflict did not occur. They are Bengkulu, South-East Sulawesi, East Nusa Tenggara, and possibly Jambi and West Sumatra. If the vulnerability index really has predictive value (and it is important not to forget that it is rather crude), it should warn us to keep an eye on these places in the future. However, perhaps the index formula is too simple. The proportion of non-agricultural workers is very low in Bengkulu and East Nusa Tenggara – the lowest in the country (Table 3.2). Perhaps the urban population has not reached the threshold size in these places to engage in the kinds of transgressive politics we saw in the four provinces of interest.

Evidently the four vulnerable provinces are sites of crisis. They experienced more social change over the last several decades than has Java. The rapidity with which an urban frontier society has grown up that depends on money from a weak government has established a pattern of state instability in those places.

We now need to round out this picture by asking some further questions, first about the towns outside Java, second about class in those towns, third about state-led development and rent-seeking, and fourth about the consequences of all this for political life in the towns outside Java. As we have seen, deagrarianization is not quite the same as urbanization, indeed in some respects it questions the notion of the urban–rural divide. Nevertheless, ‘towns’ remain a reality, and they do grow as a result of deagrarianization. A superb though now dated study of Indonesia’s cities and towns by the geographer Rutz (1987) drew a similar picture of rapid, state-dependent social transformation in the outer islands that we earlier obtained by another route. It confirms the suggestion that people are moving off the land and (mainly) into town more quickly outside Java. The annual growth rates of towns outside Java in the early 1980s were consistently much higher than in Java (Rutz 1987: 113). Moreover high urban growth rates have been the norm outside Java since the 1930s (Rutz 1987: 220). A study by Gavin Jones (1988) at about the same time also concluded that Indonesian provincial towns showed more evidence of unhealthy uneven urbanization (known as primacy) than did Indonesia’s largest cities.

Rutz’ study also confirms the impression that the urban economy outside Java depends to a greater degree on the state. Towns outside Java have a higher proportion of official services (such as administrative offices and courts), in comparison with the sum of semi-private services (schools, clinics) and private ones (such as commerce or banking establishments) (Rutz 1987: 148, 204). The proportion of a town’s central services that are official is thus another way of
measuring that town’s dependency on the state. In Central Borneo, for example, the proportion of official services is more than six times higher than in Java. Rutz’ explanation is simple: in ‘sparsely populated outer provinces… the development of towns usually followed the establishment of an administration system – this is the decisive factor in Central Borneo, where this figure is extremely high’ (Rutz 1987: 84–5).

The amount of money the central government sent to the outer islands increased in the 1990s. In his 1990 budget speech President Suharto spoke at length about the need to improve infrastructure in eastern Indonesia in order to encourage investment. Eastern Indonesia (Kawasan Indonesia Timur) covered all the outer islands except Sumatra and (usually) Kalimantan. The motivation for this increased spending was couched in developmentalist terms, but commentators speculated that the investment drive arose from the need to find an outlet for an overheating national economy.8 Central government development grants (Instruksi Presiden, or Inpres) to eastern Indonesia grew substantially, reaching

\[
\begin{array}{lll}
\text{Increase} & \text{Ratio civil servants to non-ag.} & \text{Vulnerability} \\
\text{in non-ag.} & \text{workers} & \text{index} \\
\text{workers} & \text{1970s/1980s} & \text{1990} [B] & [V = D \times B] \\
\text{1990s} [D] & & \\

\hline
C Java & 1.30 & 7.5 & 10 \\
E Java & 1.40 & 7.8 & 11 \\
W Java & 1.36 & 8.7 & 12 \\
Bali & 1.42 & 10.0 & 14 \\
Jakarta & 1.01 & 14.5 & 15 \\
Lampung & 1.25 & 12.0 & 15 \\
Indonesia & 1.30 & 11.5 & 15 \\
Jogia & 1.39 & 12.4 & 17 \\
S Kalt & 1.14 & 15.5 & 18 \\
E Kalt & 1.31 & 14.1 & 18 \\
S Sum & 1.26 & 14.8 & 19 \\
N Sum & 1.31 & 14.4 & 19 \\
W Nusa T & 1.29 & 14.8 & 19 \\
S Sul & 1.13 & 18.5 & 21 \\
Riau & 1.30 & 17.8 & 23 \\
N Sul & 1.19 & 22.8 & 27 \\
Jambi & 1.26 & 21.8 & 27 \\
W Sum & 1.38 & 20.3 & 28 \\
W Kalt & 1.55 & 19.1 & 30 \\
Aceh & 1.45 & 20.7 & 30 \\
C Kalt & 1.78 & 20.7 & 37 \\
E Nusa T & 1.54 & 24.3 & 37 \\
Maluku & 1.13 & 33.1 & 37 \\
C Sul & 1.68 & 31.8 & 53 \\
SE Sul & 1.77 & 32.2 & 57 \\
Bengkulu & 1.65 & 45.2 & 75 \\
\end{array}
\]
three times that in western Indonesia on a per capita basis (Azis 1996: 98). Private investment largely failed to follow, and where it did, the spillover effects were limited. The main result was to increase the dependence on the state of an already parasitic urban economy. The official government budget is in the more vulnerable provinces a substantial proportion of the provincial gross domestic product (Hill 2000: 228).

Fears of East Timor-style secessionist sentiment in the outer islands may also have played a role in the increased flow of funds. Local elites knew how to play on them to extract concessions, particularly in the tumultuous months after Suharto resigned. In August 1998 deputy parliamentary speaker Abdul Gafur acknowledged that the key to preventing a ‘revolt’ in the provinces was to give them greater control over government finances. The social formations in the vulnerable provinces were the fruit of a modernization process of a peculiar kind. Government money in peripheral areas has the double function of stimulating economic development and of building a loyal constituency. Robert Bates long ago described these dynamics in Africa (Bates 1981). We can see them at work, for example, in the numerous Indonesian agricultural credit schemes, which have done little to improve agricultural productivity and have served mainly as politically motivated wealth transfer (Diermen in Leinbach 2004: 42).

Who occupies this large bureaucratic sector in the towns outside Java? The educational requirements mean that only the middle class can aspire to an office job. The middle class as commonly understood is clearly a small subset of the non-agricultural working population. Most definitions of the middle class combine wealth and cultural criteria. The former include per capita domestic income or expenditure, or the possession of consumer durables like motorcycles or larger houses. The latter include a distinctive lifestyle or attitudinal traits. The Indonesian middle class has only recently been discovered by social scientists (Tanter and Young 1990). Most of the literature sees them as consumerist, state dependent and unsympathetic to democracy (Rodan 1996, but see Hefner 2000). Their rent-seeking behaviour was fascinating (Robison and Hadiz 2004). At the same time they were seen as economic innovators about to bring about a bourgeois revolution (MacIntyre 1991; Robison and Goodman 1996). Unfortunately, these studies did not disaggregate the national picture (with some exceptions like Prodolliet 1996). We have had few in-depth studies of a provincial town since Geertz’ masterful study of ‘Mojokuto’ (1965).

Fairly conservative wealth criteria resulted in a figure for the size of the middle class of around 7 per cent nationally in the early 1980s (Mackie in Tanter and Young 1990). If we apply similar criteria to the National Socio-Economic Survey (Susenas) data on domestic per capita expenditure by province, it immediately becomes clear that a substantial middle class exists only in two places, namely Jakarta and (the cities of) East Kalimantan. Everywhere else the middle class remains very small, with no sharp difference between Java (outside Jakarta) and the outer islands. So the middle class in Central Java stood at 3 per cent in 1990, the same as Central Sulawesi, and in East Java at 5 per cent, the same as
Maluku. Evers and Gerke (1994) have shown how much this middle-class population overlaps with the population of bureaucrats.

The new middle class, united by a particular life-style and consumption patterns, is mainly made up of civil servants. 85.3% of the government employees in our sample fall into the middle class of society. Or looking at the situation from the other side, 62.8% of the middle class (all generations) consists of government servants.

Their numbers were based on samples in Jogjakarta and Padang (West Sumatra). If the assumption holds that the middle class is a steady subset of the non-agricultural working population, then Table 3.2 would lead us to expect that middle-class dependence on employment in the civil service is even greater in the outer islands than in Java. Voter behaviour confirms it. When democracy came to Indonesia in the 1999 elections, the outer islands did not protest against the government as voters did in Java who massively chose the oppositionist Megawati Sukarnoputri. Instead they continued to vote for the state party Golkar, the hand that had fed them for decades (Klinken 1999). The correlation coefficient between the proportion of parliamentary seats won for Golkar and the proportion of civil servants to the non-agricultural working population in each province is a fairly convincing +0.46.12

Interesting as it is however, the discovery of a state-dependent middle class in state-dependent outer island towns still falls short of an explanation for violent conflict. A middle class of around 5 per cent of the population is too small to make such things happen, especially if it is as culturally distinct from the rest of the population as the scholarly studies suggest. We want to broaden the picture to include the much larger number of people involved in ethnic and religious organizations, and we want to know more about the way money circulates in these outer island towns. One way to do this is to adopt the concept of the ‘intermediate classes’, which is much broader than the middle class. This has been used in India to describe the economy of intermediate towns and surrounding rural areas. Barbara Harriss-White (2003: 44, 241) defines them as follows:

Outside India’s metropolitan cities the economy is dominated by the intermediate classes, a loose coalition of the small-scale capitalist class, agrarian and local agribusiness elites, and local state officials.

The idea is to attribute the peculiar economic dynamics of provincial life to a class force. The unorthodox thought that an economy might become dominated not by the rich but by the much more numerous lower middle class was first put forward by the Polish economist Michal Kalecki in a short essay written in 1964 (1972). He had in mind Sukarno’s Indonesia and Nasser’s Egypt. The class force was made up by the self-employed and small farmers, located in between the traditional aristocracies above and the peasantry below them. State intervention
in the economy was to be the means by which this class force established its
dominance. State regulation was to protect them against foreign capital and its
domestic ‘comprador’ elements above, while land reform was to protect them
from the paupers below. These ideas later became the basis for a solid analysis of
the Indian economy by Jha (1980). Unlike Kalecki, Jha saw no positives in the
arrangement. India’s economic stagnation in the 1970s had been caused by the
parasitism of the intermediate classes, he argued. Corruption was a major feature
of the analysis. Most recently it has been taken up Mushtaq Khan (2000b: 139) in
a magisterial study of rent seeking in Asia, and by Harriss-White in her book
on the economy of rural and small-town India, which she calls ‘the India of
the 88 %’ (Harriss-White 2003: 1).

The black economy and the shadow state are central to understanding the role
of the intermediate classes. The core claims of this work contrast sharply with
the more conventional approach to corruption taken by Rose-Ackerman (1999).
Rather than focusing on the government and asking how it can be strengthened
so its officials will resist temptation, as Ackermann has done, Harriss-White
began by observing closely the exchanges that take place across the ‘porous’
boundary between the state and the economy. Her key observation was that an
intermediate class effectively dominates those exchanges in the small towns of
India, and this has significant consequences for both the state and the economy.
Harriss-White wished to show that World Bank prescriptions for liberalizing the
Indian economy would surely run aground, because their basic analysis was seri-
ously at odds with reality on the ground. The state in India had a long history of
being increasingly privatized, informalized and mafianized. The place to study
this economy was in India’s countless small and intermediate towns, and the
arena was the interface between the state and the economy. In these places a
process of primitive accumulation was taking place that was regulated not by law
but through networks of social relations. Some key elements of Harriss-White’s
analysis are as follows:

- The intermediate classes constitute a well-organized set of social relations
  that effectively dominate the apparatus of the state especially at the local
  level.
- They are capable of stymieing the developmentalist project of the state by
  linking the state to the black economy. They therefore regulate the economy
  through non-state means in a rent-seeking fashion, that is, by artificially
  creating scarcities.
- They enforce their regulatory practices by a combination of reputational
  ethics (the personalization of social relations), plus extralegal force, plus
  exclusive (ethnic) associations.
- The state remains essential because it provides the formal set of laws that
  provide the basis for private extortion.
- But the state is weak. Its effectiveness depends on the ascribed, personal
  qualities of state officials. State authority hence comes to reside in their class
  of origin (such as gender, caste, or age).
An influential terminology of the shadow state was developed for Sierra Leone by William Reno (1995), and before that by the Africanist Bayart (1993). Like Harriss-White, Reno’s objective was to challenge the Euro-centricity in state-centred analyses by pointing to the very different social, economic and political realities in Africa. Conventional Western analyses fail to show ‘how informal markets supplant institutional capacity’ (Reno 1995: 11). Harriss-White subsequently defined the shadow state as

[T]hat part of the informal, ‘real’ economy that cannot operate without the particular form taken by the State. While it might be considered to be analytically separate from the definition of the State as a set of institutions of political and executive control centred upon government, with which we embarked, the ‘shadow’ State is part of the actually existing state…. Hence the real State, including its shadow, is bigger than the formal State, and has a vested interest in the perpetuation of a stricken and porous formal State. (Harriss-White 2003: 89)

Much about the intermediate classes in Indonesia, too, suggests not innovation but the bureaucrat-heavy state socialism of the Indonesia of the early 1960s. In the outer islands the universal local assumption in the heady days after 1998 was that local autonomy would produce another boost in bureaucratic numbers. Bureaucratic ‘downsizing’ was not on the agenda, nor were ideas about combating the many avenues for local elites to ‘capture’ the decentralized bureaucracy (Turner et al. 2003: 156, 157, 160). Indeed, although the absolute number of civil servants did not grow, much more control over their recruitment and placement did pass to district-level (kabupaten) decision makers. The practice, so common after 1998, of splitting existing provinces and districts into several new ones, thus expanding the bureaucracy (pemekaran), does not occur in the manuals of decentralization. The Jakarta government has continually tried to put a brake on it, but to no avail. The number of districts has expanded by approximately 50 per cent since 1998. The phenomenon illustrates the power of the intermediate classes to stymie the projects of the central state.

It is the intermediate classes who do the communal organizing in the outer islands. They dominate the provinces not because they are wealthy but because they are numerous and can raise hell if they are not heard. Their economic motivation is to seek additional income (‘rents’) from the state. The state is weak. Their relationships are typically clientelist (ethnic, religious), and a great proportion of money circulates in the informal sector. Even in normal times, the strength of the intermediate classes is ‘typical’ of a developing country like India (Khan 2000b: 139). Clientelist relationships come into their own at times of crisis, such as the regime transition that took place in Indonesia in 1998. At such moments, the criminalization and personalization of the state can become painfully obvious.

The fiscal crisis beginning in late 1997 reduced government budget allocations for the outer islands, a disaster for a business community dependent on government contracts. Were it not for substantial foreign assistance channelled to the
development budget, the impact would have been worse still. The decentralization initiatives of 1999 did not on the whole bring more money to the regions, but control over how the money was spent did shift to the sub-provincial district level. Anxiety and uncertainty mixed with the gambler’s hope of the main chance – these were the driving emotions among local elites around 1999, the more so in those regions that most needed government money.

Even more important than the dominance of government money in the places of interest is how it was spent. Although Transparency International in 2004 reported that Indonesia was ‘perceived’ to be the fifth most corrupt in its list of 146 countries,13 scholarly studies on rent-seeking and the black economy in Indonesia are rare. There is a large literature on Indonesia’s ‘informal economy’, but it concerns small entrepreneurs, not rent seeking by elites. One of the rare exceptions estimates the size of the ‘underground economy’ by measuring all unreported money. Sasmito Hadi Wibowo made the calculation using monetary techniques, which rely on the assumption that the unreported economy runs on cash (Wibowo 2001). Currency demand arises from both the reported and the unreported economy. On average during the period 1976–99, the underground economy amounted to 22 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), about the same as in Pakistan but less than in Mexico or Russia. However, the proportion increased radically at times of economic and/or political uncertainty. Whereas in the late 1970s the underground economy amounted to just under 10 per cent of GDP, by the late 1990s it had reached over 40 per cent (Wibowo 2001: 46). Similar conclusions were reached in a more descriptive overview study by Aloysius Brata (2004). On a more structural level, William Ascher (1998) described how essential timber- and oil-based off-budget financing was to preserving the political unity of Indonesia’s New Order government. It worked only while the centre held. Timber, as we will see, imperilled that unity when it fuelled the elite struggles that broke out into violence after 1998 in several places. The clientelism inherent in the deals Ascher described can become highly volatile in the face of sudden change.

Stories of corruption swirl around every one of the violent episodes discussed in this book. The objective in this section is not to suggest that communal violence occurred where corruption is worst. If that was the case then Jakarta should be a cauldron of mass violence, for it is easily Indonesia’s most corrupt city (O’Rourke 2002). Rather it is to develop a more coherent view of the role money plays in the exchanges between officials and non-officials in the parasitic, state-dependent economies of outer island small towns. The study of corruption, rent-seeking, and patron–client networks, three related topics hitherto described in different literatures by economists and political scientists, took a major step forward with the publication of the volume edited by Khan and Jomo (2000). ‘Rent’ is defined as an income above the normal in some sense. It takes several different forms, some bad for the economy, some good (Khan 2000a). Rent-seeking is effort expended to create or maintain rents. These too, take different forms, some illegal, others perfectly legal (Khan 2000b: 91–5). The most controversial type of rent is known as ‘transfer rent’, that is, transferring public
property into private property through the political process. Transfer rents can be legal (such as unemployment benefits) or corrupt (such as looting the refugee assistance fund). The typical transfer rent-seeking process in the Indian subcontinent occurs within a network of patron–client relationships, and it is this that grabs the headlines in Indonesia also. It involves a ‘circular flow’. Money and other resources pass in both directions between patrons and clients at different times of the political cycle, thus cementing organizations and facilitating rent-seeking in the future. The redistribution that makes up the transfer rent is a political process, and its outcome depends on the organizational power of political entrepreneurs. These people are not rich but they have access to large numbers of underemployed people who can be mobilized for demonstrations. In the Indian subcontinent, and in Indonesia, the number of competing patrons in the rent-seeking game is high, leading to lots of volatile mobilization in return for shrinking slices of the rent pie. ‘The excess supply of organizational power and the fragmented nature of factions help to explain the dense structure of interlinked economic and political exchanges within patron–client networks in the Indian subcontinent’, writes Khan (2000b: 93). The diagram on p. 94 of Khan schematically represents the flows of rent-seeking inputs and outputs. Politicians, capitalists and bureaucrats themselves seek to extract rents from the state bureaucracy. Each of them does this by mobilizing pressure on the state, which they can achieve by buying the support of their own non-capitalist clients (such as ethnic entrepreneurs). If this is successful, the bureaucracy will then disburse rents to the patron and his constituencies.

One often controversial example is the appointment of new bureaucrats, who hold the purse strings of the state. Religion and ethnicity shape the patronage networks that determine bureaucratic gatekeeping. Though so far not well documented in Indonesia, it is probably similar to that described for southern India by Wade (1985). Fees range from the tens of millions of rupiah (several thousand US dollars) to become a permanent teacher, to a rumoured US 1 million dollars to become Indonesia’s police chief. The fee is then recovered by selling licenses for things like timber concessions and selling offices to clients. Rival communal patrons are able to mobilize their ethnic or religious clients in order to pressure the state into favouring their particular faction. This cycle alone could be enough to cause serious communal conflict in the most bureaucracy-dependent places. Discriminative employment in the civil service has also played a role in violent conflict in East Africa and in Melanesia (Addison and Murshed 2002; Dinnen 2001: 170f.; Nkurunziza and Ngaruko 2004).

Another example is licenses to exploit a natural resource like timber. Rent-seeking businessmen buy licenses and protection that enable them to loot timber more cheaply than if they had to pay the prescribed taxes and observe environmental regulations. Each region has different economic resources for which the state controls exploitation licenses. Ambon is a major producer of cloves. Production was regulated under the late New Order through a scheme run by the president’s son that was much criticized for its corruption. The crisis of 1998 not only caused the collapse of the existing regulatory mechanism but also led to a
sharp price rise as the plummeting rupiah benefited exporters. Yusuf Kalla, the cabinet minister who did much to mediate the Maluku conflict, believed this shakeup caused a crisis of competition in the clove industry that was a major factor in the communal conflict in Ambon. In North Maluku, corruption is prominent in the local discourse about the violent political transition that marked the creation of the province. Allegations have ranged from corrupt disbursal of government funding (Karni and Attamimi 2003) to rent-seeking from a new Australian gold mine in northern Halmahera (Duncan 2005). ‘This area has been sold off cheaply through corruption,’ the newly appointed acting governor sighed when he started work in North Maluku in 2002. In Poso, Central Sulawesi, several studies have examined rent-seeking aspects of the leadership struggles that accompanied the violence (Aditjondro 2002; Aragon 2007; Harley 2003). Access to government contracts, and control over land were important features. In Central Kalimantan, illegal logging was the biggest rent-seeking activity (McCarthy 2001a,b, 2004), with important consequences both for the origins of the Sampit conflict (Casson 2001), as well as for the gubernatorial election that preceded it (Klinken 2002). In West Kalimantan, the Malay brokers in the 1999 episode were well known as local bosses and political fixers with street interests such as prostitution and extortion (Davidson 2002, 2003), and there may have been connections with the illegal timber felling (Klinken 2006).

Rent-seeking was not greater in these places than anywhere else, but it was a fundamental aspect of the local political economy, through the economy of affection (Hyden and Williams 1994). Fragmentariness was its crucial feature. The authority to distribute rents is dispersed through a complex and unruly bureaucracy. Khan distinguishes this pattern from the more centralized forms found in Malaysia or South Korea. Even if the total amounts of money involved are less, decentralized rent-seeking has a much more paralyzing effect on government policy than the centralized form. A similar point is made by MacIntyre (2000). A less centralized government structure after 1998 will probably ensure that Indian-style decentralized rent-seeking will do more damage to the national economy than had happened under the New Order, even though the amounts involved may be smaller today than then.

The criminalization of the state produced violence in the transitional period after 1998 in those places where the state was most important to the local economy. In every case the story revolved around the appointment of new local government leaders through poorly institutionalized, newly democratic means. Communal leaders offered the candidates their organizational expertise to mobilize support, along ethnic and religious lines. The alliances they built crossed urban–rural boundaries, and incorporated the lower middle class. Weak, fearful incumbents in office needed similar support. Their quid pro quo was the simplest form of rent-seeking in the dictionary, namely redistribution of government funds, that is, transfer rents that privatize public property (Khan 2000a: 36).

This chapter has described the social location of Indonesia’s post-New Order communal violence. Like the towns at the frontier of empire in early-twentieth-century Peru, with their personalized politics and uncertain
security (Nugent 1997), small towns in the frontiers of Indonesia are the outposts of administration for a large state with imperial characteristics. The people who make a living in them depend to an extraordinary extent on the state sector. But out here the state is not the efficient developmentalist machine portrayed in the literature of the state at the height of the New Order (‘an effective and powerful civilian bureaucracy’, Hill 1994: xxix). The criminalized, clientelist networks through which the state maintained its support contained the seeds of violence at moments of political instability. Akhil Gupta (1995) has described how the expansion of the state at its frontiers creates such criminality, but at the same time how it generates very modern expectation. These outer islands towns, too, are at the same time sites of an emerging modernity. People expected the state to be there for them. They wanted to exercise the popular sovereignty that they knew modernity promised them. Democratization after 1998 offered them the opportunity to seize a bit more of that sovereignty. Exactly how this all happened is the burden of the next five chapters.
Dayak people [, the Dayak document claimed,] were unlikely to engage in extreme violence of their own volition. Rather, in their fight against the Madurese, warriors were acting under the influence of a demonic supernatural being. The Kanaytan Dayaks refer to this being as ‘Kamang Tariu’. According to the document, the Kamang Tariu is imbued with a strong mystical force, *pajokng*. Exposure to *pajokng* drives people to commit shockingly brutal acts. Out of fear and respect for the anticipated consequences, combatants only dare to call down Kamang Tariu’s spirit at certain supernaturally-charged sites, and then only when they are preparing for a fight to the death. When the fighting is over, a second ceremony is held to send Kamang Tariu’s spirit away. Warriors petitioning Kamang Tariu first emit a characteristic cry, then decapitate a red hen, and, perhaps, a red dog. The brains and blood are collected in a bowl, hence the expression ‘the red bowl’. The bowl is passed among the fighters as a call to arms. Other ingredients in a red bowl offer clues to the scale of the portended conflict. If it contains bits of charcoal, it may convey the message that the enemies’ houses are to be burned to the ground. If the bowl contains feathers, the message may be that warriors are ‘not to differentiate between the feathers’ (*jangan pandang bulu*), that is, to kill as many of the enemy as possible regardless of whether they happen to be men, women, or children.

(Schiller and Garang 2002)

Identity of a savage kind lay at the heart of the communal violence, which has occurred repeatedly in West Kalimantan. This chapter asks how that identity was formed and how it shaped the violence. It is the first of the core chapters dealing with the processes by which communal conflict emerged. The ‘cultural’ nature of all the local movements discussed in this book, already noted in the introductory chapter, is fundamental. It must not be argued away by resorting to notions of false consciousness, as those have done who assert that the conflict was ‘really’ not about culture but about economic or political grievances. Culture is important in its own right; it is not reducible to more objective forces such as class interests. But the answer is not to appeal to ahistorical ideas of a culture of violence. Culture is historical and intensely political. One of the most important innovations of *Dynamics of contention* (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001) is that it has
become more open to the determining power of what goes on inside people’s heads than was the case in the original resource mobilization theory. By incorporating the notion of ‘framing’ it has made significant strides away from a rather elite-oriented analysis of social movements, to take seriously how the mass of ordinary participants feel. The structuralist origins of the new contentious politics theory remains visible enough not to make the synthesis seamless – but as a research programme it is probably the best we have.

Identity lay behind all the events discussed in this book. But it is particularly challenging to understand in Kalimantan. In Sulawesi and Maluku, the identities were mainly religious. Religion and collective action have always been closely intertwined in Indonesia. Most people meet for ritual gatherings in mosques and churches on a weekly or even daily basis; nation-wide religious organizations and political parties have huge memberships and a long history; there are major religious newspapers and school networks. But ethnicity is much less institutionalized. Ethnic organizations are fewer in number and often rather ephemeral. There are no ethnic political parties and no ethnic schools as such. Ethnic ritual is not a frequent habit for many people. So how does ethnic identity arise and become politically salient? That is the question this chapter confronts.

Focusing on identity brings a much larger number of people into the picture than the leaders (‘brokers’) whose interests play such central roles elsewhere in this book. Elites are important, their prominence also makes them easy to study, but they are nobodies without the people who follow or even give rise to them. The fallacy of elitism is to forget this.¹ In this chapter we want to know not just how but why the followers follow. Identity talk forces us to be more serious about the claims made by ordinary participants. When they say they act out of their identity as Dayaks (or Malays, Christians or Muslims), who are we, after all, to doubt them? This is not to say that in West Kalimantan the more structural processes we will observe in the other episodes were not also at work. Just as elsewhere, elites who had worked together under the New Order polarized at the moment of opportunity when it ended; they mobilized people to take part and they built coalitions that permitted violent contention to escalate. Dayaks and Malays also constituted themselves as surprising new social actors. But to describe all these processes would take more than one chapter.

West Kalimantan experienced two major episodes of communal violence, one in early 1997, and one 2 years later in 1999. The first left about 500 dead and 20,000 internally displaced Madurese migrants (Human Rights Watch 1997).² The second left fewer dead but an even greater number of displaced Madurese – approximately 35,000, which swelled to 60,000 following another pogrom in 2000 (Norwegian Refugee Council 2002). News reports made the two episodes look similar. Both took place in the same north-western district of the province; both targeted the unpopular Madurese immigrant community with house burning, wholesale expulsion and murder by decapitation and both militant movements described themselves as indigenous cultural protests against immigrants. But the differences were great as well, and we can learn from them. The first played out
under the banner of Dayak ethnic identity and was driven from a confusing multiplicity of organizing centres. The second was Malay, centrally organized, and looked like a conscious imitation of the first.

Dayaks and Malays make up about equal numbers in West Kalimantan – around 40 per cent each (give or take a few percentage points, as the ethnic controversy ensured the 2000 census data was never released for this province). Madurese were a small minority of less than 3 per cent even before the troubles. The largest remaining group is ethnic Chinese, who have a long history in this part of the archipelago but who stayed out of trouble in this period (Human Rights Watch 1997).

How did the claims about the identity of Dayaks and Malays shape the violence that occurred in both these episodes? This deceptively simple question conceals a number of conceptual problems, which must be solved before it can be answered satisfactorily. However, before broaching the theoretical discussion – and this chapter must broach it more than most others in this book – it is best to begin with the story of communal violence in West Kalimantan.

The narrative

The first, Dayak episode occurred in the final 18 months of the New Order. It is the only one discussed in this book that occurred before the New Order ended, though it came at a moment when the regime’s fragility was becoming apparent. Of course no one knew President Suharto would resign amid massive demonstrations so soon, and in some respects he remained strong. In late May 1997 national elections returned the biggest ever victory for his political party Golkar. However, the cracks showed when the military-backed regime had to deal with three serious outbreaks of collective violence in the second half of 1996. A large anti-government riot took place in Jakarta in July 1996, an anti-Christian and anti-Chinese riot in a town in East Java followed in October and a similar one in West Java in December 1996. Closer to home, West Kalimantan Dayaks had started a new trend in local politics in February 1994 when hundreds of Dayaks protested violently because their favoured candidate for district chief in Sintang district was not selected. They blocked the road towards Sintang and smashed car windows (Davidson 2002; Tanasaldy 2007). But the Dayak violence of early 1997 was about to far exceed these 2- to 3-day affairs in its ferocity.

Information about the 1997 episode is patchy. The main source is a report from Human Rights Watch (1997). Researched before the dust had settled, it left many questions unanswered, particularly about how the violence was organized. One of its recommendations was for a thorough official investigation. But transparency is not a government instinct and the authorities instituted a virtual press ban instead. Two subsequent official reports were almost free of narrative detail. They mainly reproduced contemporary ethnic discourse (Achmad et al. 1999; Suparlan et al. 1999). Subsequent academic work, notably by Jamie Davidson (2002, 2003), focused mainly on the 1999 episode. Nevertheless we have enough information to see some broad outlines.
Sambas district lies in the north-western corner of West Kalimantan province. Its name derives from a minor sultanate that ruled the area in pre-colonial times. Chinese immigrants had taken over the gold mines and begun to clear the forest and create irrigated rice fields in Monterado, part of Sambas, late in the eighteenth century. A great surge of timber felling in the 1970s and 1980s had cleared most of the remaining forest throughout West Kalimantan, giving way to food gardens, forest plantations as well as rice fields. Today virgin forest stands only in the province’s remoter areas – in the east and south-east, and along the border with Malaysia. Much of the coastal plains and inland valleys are fertile irrigated rice land. Singkawang is the only city, while smaller towns like Pemangkat lie near the swampy coast to the north. The small town of Sanggau Ledo lies in the rural interior, on a bitumen road running east-north-east from Singkawang towards a little-used crossing into Malaysian Sarawak.

Dayaks make up the largest population group in this interior part of Sambas. They are swidden cultivators. One of their persistent grievances has been the lack of recognition of their customary land rights. The great bulk of Indonesia’s rural land is officially considered forest reserve. Even after commercial forest plantations had replaced the forests, indigenous locals remained trespassers on their ancestors’ land. Sporadic protests had been taking place since the mid-1990s against these plantation companies (Peluso and Harwell 2001).

The trouble in Sanggau Ledo started with an apparently trivial altercation between young men from different ethnic groups. (This is also how the fighting in Poso and Ambon started.) A Dayak girl had been touched by a supposedly Madurese boy (actually he was not pure Madurese) at a concert in nearby Ledo. The concert was part of early campaigning by Golkar for the May 1997 elections. The ensuing scuffle ended without serious consequences. A couple of weeks later however, on 29 December 1996, the Dayak and Madurese boys involved met again at another concert in Ledo. This time two Dayak boys were stabbed, not fatally. Early the next morning an angry crowd of Dayaks gathered at the local police station demanding to see the Madurese perpetrators. How this crowd was mobilized is not clear. From here on things grew ugly.

The local customary council (dewan adat) advised the police that this demonstration of anger reminded them of a 1983 incident, in which Dayaks had attacked Madurese migrants, leaving at least a dozen and up to 50 people dead. The memory of this and at least six other significant Dayak–Madura clashes over the previous three decades was clearly part of the Dayak identity. Although these memories were to be endlessly reinvented in the weeks that followed, that does not make them a post facto effect of the violence. The fact that the police took them seriously on that day shows they were a reality before anything bad had happened.

The crowd got no satisfaction from the police, who had arrested the stabbers but did not tell the crowd for fear of a lynching. So it set out on foot for Sanggau Ledo 20 kms away. At least one of the Madurese perpetrators lived there. By the time it arrived, the crowd had grown to about 400 and was described as ‘hysterical’. Posters appeared in the town demanding that the Madurese leave, and that Dayak
land be returned. People had also come from Siluas, another 25 kms north-east along the road through Sanggau Ledo, as well as from the surrounding mountains, so that the radius of action of this protest was about 25 kms.

Rituals have a prominent place in the reports. Rumours that a *mato* vow had been taken to expel the Madurese, and that warriors had performed the *tariu* dance to waken the ancestors, fired the zeal of the rioters. Later, the buzz spread that the ‘red bowl’ was circulating. As this magical earthenware bowl of red water supposedly passed from one village to another, it committed the inhabitants to join the attack or face demonic wrath. Counter-rituals such as the *pamabang* also took place. These were regarded as equally Dayak but performed by government-minded customary leaders to placate the rioters. However, they seemed to have less effect. Rituals are important symbolic occasions. It is true that their real importance may have been exaggerated afterwards by an exoticizing press, as well as by officials with primitive ideas about Dayak culture. No doubt, too, the historical roots of the rituals were themselves shallow. Yet it seems clear that ritual was capable of channeling emotions in ways that went well beyond individual interests. Culture was significant.

Rioters started burning down the homes of Madurese who lived in well-known communities near Sanggau Ledo. On the next day, 31 December, they burned down more Madurese homes along the road from Sanggau Ledo through Samalantan back towards Singkawang and in Bengkayang south of Sanggau Ledo. The military evacuated the Madurese from Sanggau Ledo to the small air-force strip near Sanggau Ledo. They apparently felt powerless to stop the rioters, who had grown to the thousands, from burning the Madurese homes.

Little is known about how these crowds were organized. Photographs show enthusiastic and reasonably well-dressed teenagers, overwhelmingly male. One report mentions trucks provided by several local businessmen, and leadership by, among others, several former policemen and other low-ranking officials. Raiding parties set out from other sub-districts as well – Samalantan and Monterado are mentioned. By 4 January rioting subsided, because there were no more Madurese houses to burn. The death toll stood at about 20, all Madurese.

In the lull that followed, some Madurese, despairing of official willingness to restore justice on their behalf, conducted sporadic revenge attacks. The end of the Muslim fasting month released new energies. The most inflammatory raid was a nocturnal affair with jerrycans of petrol on the Pancur Kasih Foundation office in Pontianak on the night of 28–29 January 1997. Dayaks are a minority in the provincial capital and this orients them more strongly than other ethnic groups to the rural communities from which they came. Urban Dayaks do important ideological work to develop Dayak identity, through research, advocacy, welfare, propaganda and education. The Pancur Kasih Foundation the Madurese attacked on that night was the most important among several such identity-shaping centres – we will discuss it again later. News of the attack, which was largely foiled, caused panic among middle-class Dayaks in the city. It also created a sympathetic reaction in majority-Dayak areas in the interior. Dayaks now launched a second wave of attacks, lasting 2 to 3 weeks and leaving about 500 dead, again mostly
This was the most destructive communal warfare West Kalimantan had seen in 30 years.

This time the Dayak attacks showed more signs of coordination, involving larger raiding parties, each drawn from a wider area, better armed and ranging over a greater swathe of territory. Militants set up a network of coordination posts (posko), exchanging information by means of telephones and walkie-talkies. The provincial and district level Customary Councils (respectively Majelis Adat Dayak and Dewan Adat Dayak), established by the government about a decade earlier, operated these posko. Nevertheless, Davidson was right when he concluded that ‘the Dayak mobilization has not been monolithic. It is an amalgam of multifarious, sometimes contentious collectivities’ (Davidson 2003: 281). War parties took over the strategic road into the interior from near Mempawah on the coast as far as Sanggau. This area lies in Sanggau and in Pontianak districts, just south of Sambas district. Horrified visitors remarked on the stench of numerous headless corpses abandoned along the roadside. Many of the fighters were armed with semi-automatic rifles bought across the border in Malaysia, while others retained the homemade weapons used previously. A party could have dozens of trucks. They gathered at various places before setting off. Often several parties were moving around at the same time. One of them attacked a Madurese community at Salatiga, at the western end of the road, on 1 February. On 2 February another party of 15 trucks, carrying hundreds of attackers from no less than six sub-districts, moved up the road north of Sanggau towards the Malaysian border. Among the leaders was the deputy district chief of Sanggau. They struck Balaikarangan township, just a few kilometres shy of the border. This led the Malaysians to close all the border gates into West Kalimantan the next day, for 10 days. Several times Dayak parties tried to charge past heavily armed military posts on their way to some Madurese community, only to be cut down in a hail of bullets. The most infamous incident occurred at Anjungan, at the western end of the road into the interior, probably on 5 February. After several military posts had allowed them to pass, a unit of combat engineers (zipur) opened up on their trucks with automatic firearms and killed 18 fighters. Injured fighters were taken to hospital, but even there they obeyed a code of secrecy laid on them by their commanders and told investigators nothing.

After this impressive victory over a largely defenceless minority, Dayaks continued to act militantly throughout West Kalimantan (Davidson 2002: chap. 5). Even so, no single organization emerged as a vehicle for Dayak demands. Dayaks did have a widely read monthly magazine – the Kalimantan Review celebrated and recorded each act for others to imitate. From mid-1997 and into 1998, local Dayak communities imposed ‘customary’ fines on timber companies in many places, on pain of sabotage. When the authority of the New Order collapsed with President Suharto’s resignation in May 1998, the protests only increased. They concerned land rights most of all.

Alongside this pattern of popular resistance was another aimed at institutional power. The district chief’s office is a prize fought over in nearly every episode described in this book. The idea of campaigning for this powerful local government
position by means of ethnicized threats of violence had its origins in West Kalimantan nearly 4 years before the end of the New Order. As mentioned above, Dayaks rioted in February 1994 when their favoured candidate for district chief was not appointed in Sintang district. It was the biggest mass action by Dayaks since Dayak militants expelled the Chinese from the interior of West Kalimantan in 1967. After the 1994 incident, every district chief’s election in West Kalimantan was accompanied by potentially violent ethnic pressuring. The still-lucrative timber industry was a major factor in the shadow economy of West Kalimantan. A huge proportion of it was illegal. It probably played a significant role in the politics of district chief elections. By 1999 Dayaks had gone from controlling none of West Kalimantan’s districts to being in charge of six of the nine at that time – Kapuas Hulu, Sintang, Sanggau, Bengkayang, Landak and Pontianak district (Klinken 2006; Tanasaldy 2007).

The ‘Malay’ episode differed from the Dayak one in several key respects. It played out in the same district of Sambas, but in the western half, north of Singkawang city. Malays form a large local majority of the population here, approaching 80 per cent (Andre 2003). Most are farmers, petty traders and civil servants. Unlike the Dayak ‘hysteria’ of January 1997, this episode did not explode instantly from an apparently trivial incident. Malay activists later did say there was an offensive incident, but weeks of careful coordination passed before the action commenced. That incident took place in the isolated village of Parit Setia, a ferry ride from Pemangkat town to the north of Singkawang city. On 17 January 1999 three truckloads of Madurese from the neighbouring village of Rambayangan had attacked the village to protest the way Parit Setia villagers had a few days earlier beaten up a Madurese man for theft. Three people died. The local police (as recounted so often in this book) demonstrated their incompetence by failing to prevent the attack, which had been predicted, and by following up on it with little conviction. Fights between neighbouring villages of this kind are common all over Indonesia. The Parit Setia incident did make the national press. One newspaper included it among a string of such all-in brawls all over Indonesia on this very day, the first day of the Idul Fitri feast that ended the Muslim fasting month.

Weeks of meetings followed where, according to Davidson (2002: 298), ‘strategies were discussed on how to best solve the Madurese problem’. These discussions took place not in Parit Setia but in Singkawang and in the main towns along the road to the north, namely Pemangkat, Tebas and Sambas. Again by contrast with the Dayaks, a single organization was formed to speak with one voice on the issue of, as they put it, police inaction over Madurese criminality. The FKPM (Forum Komunikasi Pemuda Melayu, Communication Forum of Malay Youth) was formed in late January 1999. It was led by well-connected local businessmen whose interests ranged from building to the ‘informal’ end of the economy – gambling, extortion and protection rackets. Shortly afterwards it was declared a Sambas-wide organization, with its centre of activity in the towns of Pemangkat, Jawai and Tebas.

Establishing the organization did not take a great deal of creative brokerage. It merely gave a name to an existing network of business relations that was typical
of the average outer island town. Davidson concluded that ‘the formation of a Sambas-wide FKPM simply formalized previously mobilized networks of young toughs’ (Davidson 2002: 300). Illegality, criminality and the essential involvement of state officials – these are the elements of what Reno (1995) writing about Sierra Leone has called the ‘shadow state’. Despite its fundamental importance to political relations throughout Indonesia, the concept of the shadow state remains little explored in the literature. We already had something to say about the significance of the political economy of the shadow state in the previous chapter.

FKPM was so close to the district and later the provincial government that it might be described as a semi-government organization. Similarly well-connected ethnic and religious organizations arose in many other parts of Indonesia at this time. One of them was the Dayak organization LMMDD-KT (Lembaga Musyawarah Masyarakat Dayak dan Daerah Kalimantan Tengah) in Central Kalimantan in 2001 (see Chapter 8); another was the Islamic organization ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia) in Jakarta and every province in the country from the late 1990s. Zulkarnaen Bujan, one of the FKPM founders, was retired from the public works department in Singkawang and had been a Golkar functionary. He was known to facilitate timber interests in the interior. Another key FKPM functionary was on the staff of the legal department of the district government in Singkawang and simultaneously on the provincial board of the building contractors association Gapensi. The Sambas district chief, police chief and army commander attended the inaugural meeting of the FKPM in Singkawang. FKPM was to become the most powerful organized force in Sambas district politics through the next several years.

The organization’s well-funded ‘security force’ (Satgas) drew on the large pool of underemployed young men of which every Indonesian town has many. This pool had grown in Sambas because of the collapse due to economic crisis of Indonesia’s largest citrus industry, based here, and because of the influx of Indonesian workers expelled across the nearby border from Malaysia at the same time.

Malay gangs moved into action on 22 February 1999, after a Malay minibus conductor had been stabbed by a Madurese in Pemangkat. Imitating the earlier Dayak repertoire of burning homes and dismembering Madurese they surprised even themselves by their ferocity and their success. The first wave left seven Madurese dead and over a hundred houses burned down. A bigger wave followed in mid-March. This time some Dayaks joined in after a Dayak was killed (under circumstances that made some observers suspect deliberate provocation). With Dayaks active in the Dayak eastern part of the district (Samalantan, Ledo, Sanggau Ledo – the heartland of Dayak militancy in early 1997), well-organized Malay gangs under FKPM commanders moved first to the north of Pemangkat, burning and murdering as they went. By early April they turned their attention southward towards Singkawang.

A couple of times security forces attempted to stop the Malay gangs. In the most talked-about incident, a dozen Malay fighters were shot dead when they ran into a mobile police roadblock just north of Singkawang on 7 April. Yet most of
the time officials cooperated with the FKPM programme to expel all Madurese from Sambas. As they had done 2 years earlier, they transported Madurese from their homes to temporary refuges and helped ship many back to Madura near Java. But this time top officials went much further. West Kalimantan governor Aswin openly blamed the Madurese for ‘repeatedly causing riots’ and approved of the evacuations (Davidson 2002: 311). He asked university academics to investigate what was wrong with the Madurese. A wave of ‘blame the victim’ anti-Madurese sentiment swept the establishment in West Kalimantan and even in Jakarta. This was also clearly reflected in the official reports from Jakarta on the disturbances, referred to earlier (Suparlan et al. 1999).

The careerist element was stronger in the Malay episode than in the Dayak one 2 years earlier. Whereas in 1997 a Dayak struggle for district chief positions seemed to be a middle-class afterthought, the Malay episode in 1999 seemed to be about little else. The Malay moral panic about the Madurese in 1999 had the hallmarks of a chauvinistic scapegoating campaign conducted by actors close to power. Unlike the Dayaks, Malays could quote no history of Malay–Madurese clashes. Indeed the notion Malay had till then been ethnically inclusive, also embracing Bugis, Arabs and Madurese, as we shall see in a moment. Davidson argues plausibly that the repertoire in 1999, from slogans criminalizing Madurese to ritually eating hearts ripped from the chests of Madurese victims, was consciously borrowed from the Dayak repertoire in 1997. The purpose was quite instrumental, namely to assert local Malay hegemony, not against the numerically insignificant Madurese, but against the Dayaks, who were their main rival. Davidson writes (2002: 320–1): ‘[F]or the Malay elite, their own “Malay” resurgence would answer Dayak advances…. Hence, Dayak–Malay political struggles, rather than pure anti-Madurese sentiments, stood at the heart of the 1999 conflagration.’

Dayaks had successfully claimed two district chief’s offices in 1998 – Sanggau and Pontianak district. The second was particularly daring, since Dayaks do not enjoy a clear majority in the district around the provincial capital. Malays quickly needed to stake their claim in this new ethnic competition. The New Order had governed Indonesia mainly by routinely placing military officers in the district chief’s office all over the country. Instant democratization in May 1998 meant the end of military rule, but without a viable political machinery. For local elites, communal ‘power-sharing’ was half the answer to the new opportunities. The widespread ethnic and religious organizing at this time betrayed a complete lack of confidence in the political party as a conflict-resolution tool. Power-sharing had long been an unacknowledged part of secret deals to avoid trouble, but now it became the open subject of coffee-house debate and political bargaining in West Kalimantan.

The other half of the solution to the power struggle was to expand the pie by proliferating local government structures, upon which many townspeople depended for a living. Towards the end of 1998 the decision was taken to subdivide Sambas district into an eastern half called Bengkayang, and a western Sambas rump. Implementation was to take place after the June 1999 election. The understanding
was that they would respectively be ‘Dayak’ and ‘Malay’ districts. Dayaks had already demonstrated their dominance over the eastern half. The Malay demonstration of 1999 presumably intended to set in stone their own dominance in the western half. Indeed, FKPM was the major force behind the appointment of the post-division Sambas district chief. More subdivision followed. Singkawang became its own district (also run by a FKPM protégé). By mid-2004 FKPM was promoting talk of an entirely new province in this part of West Kalimantan to be called North-West Kalimantan, an idea that did not fly in Jakarta.

Thus the 1997 episode had done more than shock. It had become a model for violent protest taken up first by Malays, then in several other areas in Indonesia after May 1998. In a country where ethnic politics had for decades been outlawed, West Kalimantan became a laboratory in which new varieties of such politics were developed and then imitated elsewhere. Most of the time they were not themselves violent, but they deployed the memory of violence that had occurred elsewhere to force the issue. From now on, notions of citizenship and popular sovereignty became radically ethnicized. Under threat of fresh bloodshed, ethnic power-sharing deals of this nature were made openly all over West Kalimantan in the years that followed. Some districts came to be seen as pure Malay or Dayak preserves, while more finely balanced ones were led by a Malay district chief with a Dayak deputy or vice versa.

Now that the two stories are on the table, how should we sum up the similarities and differences between them? Some similarities are obvious. Both Dayaks and Malays put up ethnic claims to local rights over ‘criminal’ migrant Madurese, and both developed a repertoire of murder and expulsion to back up those claims. A less obvious similarity is that there were elites among both the Dayaks and Malays who deployed the threat of violence as part of their campaign for district chief. The Madurese were in both cases the powerless minority who became the victims of localist chauvinism that was not about them but about ethnic self-assertion.

But the differences were important too – so important they amounted to two patterns of violence.

- Dayak action in 1997 arose immediately out of a local issue, namely the stabbing of two boys who had defended the honour of a girl. It always remained connected with local issues. Memories of previous Dayak–Madurese clashes were specific. But racial feeling was not the only issue. Even at the height of the anti-Madurese hysteria, demands around land rights were still heard. Concrete demands against many specific local actors dominated Dayak action immediately before and again after January–February 1997.

  - By contrast, Malay action in 1999 was largely detached from any local issue. Malays did present the incident at Parit Setia as such an issue, but this village was too remote in time and place to be part of the same action cycle.

- Dayak action was organized in many places at the same time. True, it was not ‘spontaneous’. Bringing hundreds of raiders and dozens of trucks together in
one place alone takes planning. But things did not seem to happen mainly because a small number of highly privileged mediators had organized them to happen.\(^\text{16}\)

- Malay action by contrast seemed to have been coordinated largely if not entirely by a single privileged organization, the FKPM (though this was itself admittedly a somewhat fractious affair).

### Identities

The observation that Dayaks and Malays deployed different patterns of violent action has set us on our way towards understanding the role of identity in these two episodes. The observed differences allow us to learn more than if they had been the same. The first question is do we really need a concept of identity at all to explain what happened? If not, what are the alternatives? If yes, we will go on to ask, how do we explain the difference between Dayak and Malay identities? And, finally, how did identity lead to action?

The case for the reality of an identity is far weaker for Malays than for Dayaks. In the Malay movement, the relationship between organizers and rank-and-file fighters looked so businesslike that it hardly seems necessary to look beyond the material interests of all concerned. A weak Malay identity is explained by their local political dominance. Like white Anglo-Saxon Protestants in North America, Malays do not desire an ethnic label. Marginalized Dayaks, by contrast, appear to have a strong identity.

In fact many scholars remain suspicious of any notion of identity as a motivator for action. They feel it smacks of the outdated concept of primordialism, in which ethnic identity is something ancient and ‘out there’. In reality, they believe, ethnicity is constantly being renegotiated under political pressures, so we are better off just studying the politics instead of the identity. They prefer to think of people as rational beings who think for themselves even as they participate in group action. Fearon and Laitin (2000) are among the sceptics. They have suggested some interesting rational mechanisms that could explain apparently identity-driven action without resorting to an identity concept. Ordinary people, they propose, might be rationally persuaded to act by leaders who possess more information than they do. Particularly in an information-poor environment, the power of leaders grows, and followers become highly dependent on the judgment of others when conflict threatens. There is something to be said for this view in the case of West Kalimantan’s Dayaks. Perhaps ordinary Dayaks, on the night of 29–30 December 1996, began to take part in an anti-Madurese pogrom because they were unable to judge for themselves the truth about the stabbing incident in Ledo. They had to rely on what their leaders told them. The latter claimed that (a) the Dayak victims had died, (b) the stabbers were Madurese and (c) the police had done nothing. In fact all these claims were wrong. Another explanation locates the rationality of the situation not with leaders but with the ‘followers’ themselves, who participate not out of social obligation but out of their own
material interests. In West Kalimantan, many Dayaks, rationally albeit unfeelingly, may have participated in the anti-Madurese pogroms not so much out of a sense of outraged identity as of the promise of loot. Many took the land of their Madurese neighbours after expelling them. They would have known of this possibility at the time. Until we have more data it is clearly impossible to be dogmatic.

Such explanations are a useful warning against making the concept of identity do too much work. However, I do not think they are strong enough to account for the whole story. The intense emotions of the Dayak attackers in early 1997, their readiness to join raiding parties with Dayaks they did not know (and who often spoke a different indigenous language!), the universality of their hatred of Madurese – these things are not easily explained without some concept of identity. An identity is a kind of solidarity, a bond between individual and group. One somewhat unwieldy but useful definition stresses that the bond can be cognitive, moral and emotional, all at once.

[W]e have defined collective identity as an individual’s cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice, or institution. It is a perception of a shared status or relation, which may be imagined rather than experienced directly, and it is distinct from personal identities, although it may form part of a personal identity.

(Polletta and Jasper 2001)

Inasmuch as the bond is emotional it brings pleasure, which goes beyond rational calculation of self-interest. Identity also goes beyond ideology, which does not make the members of a group feel good about each other.

So how does this identity relate to action? An important preliminary observation is that the relationship cannot be very direct. Identity is a ‘perception’. The bond between individual and group does not turn individuals into unthinking robots. It is a mistake to think of identity as in itself responsible for action. Identity is one thing, mobilization that leads to action another. Charles Tilly (1978: 214) was the first to emphasize the importance of this distinction (and powerfully restated it in Tilly 2002: 45–56, without, curiously, using the term mobilization). It became the basis for a seminal book on ethnic competition by Olzak (1992: 5–6). Even so, some authors regrettably continue to write about the Indonesian violence as if identities were themselves ‘at war’.17 In Indonesian public discourse, essentializing notions of ethnic identity are routinely invoked to explain violent conflict and propose solutions. So, for example, the police report on the West Kalimantan troubles was organized around the essentialist notions that Dayaks adhere to custom (adat), Malays tend to abide by the law, while Madurese, ‘who are always the cause/trigger of most fights/riots’, live only by the word of their religious teacher (kiai) (Suparlan et al. 1999: 18).18 Such ideas explain little, and they provide a poor basis for conflict resolution.

We therefore need a concept of identity that opens out to politics, to learning and interaction. A key aspect of that will be interaction across the boundaries of identity groups. Cross-boundary interaction is the central thought in the more
political, negotiated concept of ethnicity now widely accepted by anthropologists. Fredrik Barth, in the introduction to a pathbreaking text, wrote that it is ‘the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses’ (Barth 1969: 15). People only realize they have an identity when they interact with outsiders. Ethnic identity grows through competition, not through isolation. This discovery explained the persistence of ethnicity in urban environments that was otherwise inexplicable. Contrary to the predictions of the modernization theory of the 1950s and 1960s, bringing tribal societies into greater contact with other groups might actually stimulate ethnic awareness. Ethnicity might thus be a surprising product of modernization (Yinger 1985).

The literature on how identity leads to action is divided between two main approaches. One of these is sociological and locates the key in the density of social networks that inform the identity. The other is psychological and takes an interest in what people know (cognition). Both offer important insights, but I will make the case that the second is more helpful.

The sociological approach is known as ‘identity theory’. It is most often associated with (Stryker and Serpe 1994, Stryker, Owens and White 2000). It draws on symbolic interactionism and emphasizes the reciprocal relations between the self and society. People make a commitment to act mainly in order to increase their self-esteem within their in-group network of relationships. This implies that the denser the social network is, the greater are the obligations placed on its members. Dynamics of contention (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 135) alludes to this approach when it heuristically distinguishes two patterns of identity-driven action. One identity it names ‘embedded’, the other ‘detached’. An embedded identity is one that informs a wide range of social relations. The family in a village is an example of an embedded identity. Contentions involving embedded identities tend to feature repertoires of contentious action of a distinctive kind. The actions are particularistic, meaning they are attached to certain local groups, issues or places. They are small-scale – involving few clusters of people. And they are direct – not highly mediated by privileged intermediaries. Such contentions look spontaneous. Detached identities, by contrast, inform a specialized, narrow range of social relations. An example is membership of a political party. These tend to feature claim-making that is different to that associated with embedded identities. They are ‘modular’ – not attached to particular places etc. They are large-scale – thus requiring extensive coordination. And they are mediated – requiring political entrepreneurs and communication networks.

These two ideal patterns are remarkably like the two patterns we observed in West Kalimantan. The Dayak episode of 1997 looked as if it flowed out of an embedded identity, rooted in intensely personal, family-like social relations. The action was direct and connected to local issues. The Malay episode of 1999, on the other hand, looked more like one that flows out of a detached identity. It seemed to revolve around privileged mediators. It wielded a slogan about Madurese ‘arrogance’ that lacked local specificity. This detached identity informed the more businesslike social relationships characteristic of what Davidson called ‘previously mobilized networks of young toughs’, an essential
part of the black economy in Sambas district. The identity called Malay was therefore not ethnic in the usual sense. It was a much more limited affair. Indeed we may well question whether it was an identity at all in the sense of a ‘cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community’.

This observation about the differences between Dayak and Malay identities is striking, and it is new. However, it is also somewhat troubling because it is not clear why Dayak and Malay identities should differ so much. Dayaks and Malays have similar social networks. It would be a mistake to think of the Dayak fighters in 1997 as savage tribals from the jungle, while the Malays were urbanites. Both were poor to lower middle class and both knew the life of the small town and shared the same largely rural district of Sambas, though Dayaks were somewhat more rural than Malays. The difference between them therefore cannot lie in sociology. It lies in awareness. The sociological account of identity does not easily allow us to explore how knowledge acquired in the midst of political struggle might have given Dayaks a strong identity but not Malays. Its in-group focus fails to pay attention to the anthropological discovery that ethnicity is an inter-group boundary phenomenon.

The so-called social identity theory, associated with the psychologists Tajfel and Turner, deals better with these objections (see the comparative reviews by Deaux and Martin 2003; Hogg, Terry and White 1995). That a psychological explanation is better than a self-confessed sociological one in a book dedicated to sociology is perhaps ironic, but it happens. Tajfel and his colleagues designed their model to understand ethnic identity formation in Britain. It stresses the cognitive elements in the connection between the socially constructed self and a collective identity. The key lies in a process of stereotyping – technically called cognitive categorization. The in-group develops ‘prototypes’ about who they are in relation to the out-group. Group members enhance their standing within the group by acting out the relevant in-group prototype. They become ‘depersonalized’ in the process. The prototype can quite clearly be an ideological construct. Although it has not been properly operationalized for political science research purposes (Huddy 2001), this approach helps to explain the differences between Dayaks and Malays. Whereas the shape and density of social networking between the two groups is similar, the cognitive content of stereotypes within each group differs sharply. Being Dayak or Malay involves learning information (or culture). What they learn – the prototype – is the product of a history of competition.

The Dayak prototype has been much longer in the making than the Malay, though neither is exactly ancient. The difference lies in the way each group experienced modernization in the twentieth century. Ethnicity was a defensive ideology for the marginalized Dayak latecomer to the modern state, while it was of less interest to more established Malay groups. The colonial state penetrated Kalimantan in the late nineteenth century from the coast to the interior and from the existing sultanates to the entire population. The coastal subjects of the sultan, who came to be known as Malays, provided most of the bureaucratic workforce for the state as it grew. The river dwellers in the remote and thinly populated
interior, on the other hand, were ‘primitive’, the object of paternalistic attention from missionaries, soldiers, officials and anthropologists. Modernization eroded the life chances of their small groups, but did favour a large-scale ethnic identity. In a complex process of both top-down and bottom-up identity formation often described with the term ‘constructivist’, a Dayak identity grew that homogenized the many small groups into one large and self-conscious group that called itself Dayak.¹⁹

Peluso and Harwell (2001) have described how West Kalimantan’s Dayak communities acquired their identity. Late colonial officials classified the scattered little bands of forest-dwelling Dayaks as a homogeneous group of natives consisting of various ‘subgroups’. By institutionalizing ‘customary law’ through the native courts, the Dutch sharply bounded a previously fluid and highly local Dayak identity and territorialized it on a map. These notions were to acquire a remarkable post-colonial permanence. After independence a rising urban Dayak elite appropriated these prestigious ideas when they established the Partai Dayak, a pan-Dayak political party that did well in the 1955 elections at provincial level. The Catholic Church was also important. Many Partai Dayak leaders had been educated at the Nyarumkop seminary near Singkawang (Davidson 2002: 92–3). A NGO movement for indigenous rights arose in Pontianak in the 1980s that again took up some of the colonial themes of a homogeneous ethnicity with territorial rights.

A history of violence helped strengthen the identity. In the early years of the New Order the military took advantage of this homogenization of Dayak identity when it manipulated its leaders into supporting a bloody attack on the Chinese community living in the interior of West Kalimantan. Dayaks were made part of an elaborate psy war counter-insurgency operation in which the entire Chinese community was removed from the interior. The military regarded the Chinese as ‘communists’ because some Chinese had supported the previous Indonesian regime’s left-inspired protest against the formation of Malaysia in northern Borneo in the late 1950s (Davidson and Kammen 2002). This was the first example of ethnic cleansing in Indonesia and the memory of it clearly inspired the Dayak movement in 1997, though this time the targets were not Chinese, and nor is there at present any evidence that the military helped plan it.

All those who helped define the Dayak identity – colonial officials and anthropologists, missionaries, party activists and NGO advocates – were also political actors making choices. This was no less true of NGO actors representing ‘the people’. Peluso and Harwell (2001: 102) observed that even in the act of resistance they chose to use colonial prototypes of Dayak ethnicity. To further underscore the two-way process by which an identity is constructed, from above and from below, they pointed out that participation in violent acts against the Madurese in the past itself reinforced a violent Dayak identity first shaped by colonial officials. Thus was created what Fearon and Laitin (2000) called ‘everyday primordialism’.

Now we turn to the Malays. The fact that the FKPM was unable to activate a genuine Malay ethnic identity in 1999 but only a somewhat thuggish business
network suggests that no such Malay identity exists. Indeed ‘Malayness’ talk in West Kalimantan can be heard only at the university literature faculty in Pontianak, where it is a weak echo of a cultural renaissance also taking place in Sumatra and Johore. Not a single ethnographic study describes the Malay community in West Kalimantan, despite them being as numerous as the intensely described Dayaks, and far more numerous than the Chinese, who also enjoy an extensive literature. Within Indonesia, a large body of official reports, many from the department of education and culture, describes Dayaks and Chinese, essentializing them in an old-fashioned manner as creatures of custom, but leaves Malays invisible. Similarly, in the library of the social sciences department at Pontianak’s Tanjungpura University in early 2004 I counted ten theses on Dayaks, eight on Chinese, seven on Madurese, but only two vaguely on Malays. Malayness in the archipelago generally is described in a recent book as ‘one of the most challenging and confusing terms in the world of Southeast Asia’ (Barnard and Maier 2004: xiii). Malay culture was in the twentieth century an aspect of the inclusive Indonesian nation, not of a core ethnic and not of an ethnic minority (Reid 2004). Throughout Malay-speaking South-East Asia, Malayness was, if anything, associated with modern nationality and urban super-culture. This is not a suitable vehicle for the local ethnic movements that sprang up around Indonesia after the end of the New Order. The only exception might be the vestiges of an earlier notion that Malayness meant to be subject to a Malay king. This idea did experience a revival in West Kalimantan (Klinken in press). However, FKPM leaders have been fairly disdainful of the Sambas royal house.

Mobilization

If, finally, identity is one thing and mobilization another, what can we say about the way identity became salient and underlay mobilization in West Kalimantan? We already have one important answer to the question ‘how does identity relate to action?’ The social identity theory of Tajfel and his colleagues says that in-group members seek to raise their self-esteem by acting out the roles set aside for them by the prevailing prototype, which is a cognitive construct with a history. However we still want to know why the urgency to act is greater at some times than at others. The link between identity and mobilization needs to be made clearer. Here we need to introduce one more theoretical concept in the eclectic manner that has come to characterize contentious politics research. Framing is an analytical tool with a history of its own that has recently been adopted within the contentious politics community. It deals with the way movement organizers attempt to give meaning to contemporary events by building on a set of core popular beliefs (Gamson 1988; Gamson and Meyer 1996; Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988, 1992).

Those core beliefs, or folk memories, are of a very general nature. The underlying beliefs have been given various names. Gamson (1988) called them a ‘theme’, while Rudé (1980) called them an ‘inherent ideology’. They correspond more or less to what Tajfel called the prototype. They are the product
of a politically charged historical process (although few people are aware of this). The Dayak inherent ideology includes the idea that they are a homogeneous group, possessing bounded territorial rights over new arrivals. It also includes the conviction that the world thinks Dayaks are backward, but that Dayaks can show surprising yet admirable savagery if provoked. Organizers who want to mobilize people have to build on this inherent ideology by presenting a set of mobilizational interpretations known as a ‘derived ideology’ or a ‘frame’. The core task, according to Snow, Benford and their colleagues (Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988, 1992), is to frame the contemporary problem in such a way that it resonates for the audience. Organizers must diagnose the situation as problematic, propose a solution and deliver a call to arms. The audience will respond to this framing if what has been said touches what they already believe at central points. This process is called frame alignment. If successful, people who used to blame themselves for their troubles begin suddenly to see that the problem is a lack of justice in the world out there, and they can do something about it.

Something like this frame alignment happened in January 1997, when a large number of Dayaks suddenly decided that expelling the Madurese from the eastern part of Sambas district would make their own lives better. It resonated with a Dayak prototype that had been rehearsed repeatedly from above and from below, in word and in action, in a constructivist fashion, since late colonial times. Suddenly they no longer regarded their grievances of dispossession fatalistically as a misfortune, but as an injustice that could be remedied by direct action. They had been successfully mobilized on the basis of their identity.

The interests of middle-class elites were decisive in this framing effort. Identity politics are rarely democratic. Framing focuses attention on the fraught relationship between leaders and followers. Who were these Dayak leaders who so effectively framed the problem of the Madurese in 1997? If in the colonial era the derived ideology of ‘Dayakness’ – prescribing what had to be done for or by Dayaks – was written by Dutch officials, in recent years it has been developed by an emerging Dayak middle class. These people have moved off the land and into town, but they have faced discrimination because they are regarded as backward. This frustration lies at the root of their ideological work.

West Kalimantan has had the fastest rate of deagrarianization of any province in Indonesia over the last 30 years. Where in 1971 only 13 per cent of the working population worked outside agriculture, by 1998 that had gone up to 38 per cent, or a threefold increase (see Chapter 3). Dayaks have taken part enthusiastically in this upward mobility. The number of Dayak teachers at Christian schools in Pontianak municipality, for example, grew steadily from 5 per cent in the early 1950s to 45 per cent by the late 1980s. The number of Dayak graduates from the government college for aspiring bureaucrats in Pontianak (Akademi Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri) has consistently been around half the total since the early 1960s, well above the Dayak proportion in the overall population (Alqadrie 1990: 282, 289). However, the proportion of Dayaks occupying sub-district chief’s offices (camat) in West Kalimantan has grown only slowly from 20 per cent in the
1960s to 23 per cent in the 1980s (Alqadrie 1990: 293). Although the absolute number of them has gone up more than seven times as the bureaucracy expanded faster than the population, this proportional blockage is frustrating for a middle-class segment highly dependent on the state. This statistic helps explain why middle-class Dayaks told a parliamentary enquiry into the Sambas riots that they felt aggrieved because they were not getting enough government positions (Achmad et al. 1999: 38, 46). It also explains why they so energetically turned the expulsion of rural Madurese to their advantage by demanding district chief’s positions the following year. This was their derived ideology. They made these claims by making use of the everyday primordialism (the inherent ideology) that is so deeply embedded in establishment thought.

By contrast, very few Malays joined a similar call to arms in February 1999. Successful mobilization was limited to a network of thuggish clients of the main organizers. The reason was that the organizers were unable to create frame alignment. The Malay prototype (inherent ideology) was much less well developed, and it did not include backwardness. Even if ethnic Malay organizers wanted to persuade ordinary Malays that their lives would improve if they helped expel the Madurese, this idea did not resonate with the prototype, that is, the folk memories of who the Malays are supposed to be. The constraints on mobilization on the basis of Malay identity were too great, and therefore most Malays did not join in.

In conclusion, this chapter has shown how Dayak and Malay identities differed, and how this led to differences in the way ethnic movements for the expulsion of Madurese migrants were mobilized. The reason was not to be found in differences in the density of sociological networks in the Dayak and Malay communities, as claimed by Stryker and his colleagues and as argued in Dynamics of contention. Instead, Dayaks had a different cognitive construct of what it meant to be a Dayak than did Malays about their identity. This construct, known as a prototype or an inherent ideology, was the product of historical forces since late colonial times, which had become embedded in the consciousness of most ordinary people. It revolved around the injustices that had kept Dayaks backward by comparison with the more dominant Malays. Dayaks increased their standing in the community by acting out this construct in moments of heightened tension. Dayak elites successfully made the case to their constituency for scapegoating the Madurese by appealing to this inherent ideology (frame alignment). Malay elites, by contrast, had far less success arguing the same course of action because the politically dominant Malays have a weak ethnic identity.

This interpretation has brought both leaders and ordinary people into the picture. It has laid a connection between culture, that is, the common information in the heads of a large number of people, and mobilization, that is, the structural mechanisms by which elites looked to secure their interests. Ultimately, the elites were the winners and the people the losers. Dayak elites turned the mayhem of early 1997 into significant political gains when in 1998 they dragooned two district assemblies into selecting Dayak district chiefs or face the consequences of more violence. They thereby discovered a new technique for asserting a claim
to local domination, one that was to be imitated in several other parts of Indonesia in subsequent months. This technique was decisive in the negotiations to divide Sambas district into two parts, one Dayak and one Malay. It was used again by the Malay elite to establish their dominance in the rump district of Sambas in 1999. Indeed by that time the provincial establishment had normalized the technique, as even the governor began to take up its racist idiom.

The great mass of Dayaks and Malays, meanwhile, was not served well by this method of selecting government leaders. Several of the ethnic district chiefs turned out to be corrupt and inefficient. Nor did ordinary Dayaks continue to support these district chiefs once it became obvious they had been duped. Identity politics, fortunately, have had a limited lifespan in Indonesia.
Poso is a sleepy seashore town in rural Central Sulawesi province. For Christians, 24 December 1998 was Christmas Eve, while for Muslims it was the middle of the fasting month Ramadan. When a lad from the Protestant neighbourhood of Lombogia stabbed another from the Muslim neighborhood of Kayamanya, a riot ensued, confined to Poso town. Soon everyone agreed that alcohol had been to blame, and the issue faded into the past. But in April 2000 a more serious round of violence broke out in the town, which later spread to the wider Poso district. On one day in May 2000 Christian forces slaughtered about 80 Muslims in a small Muslim enclave who had taken shelter in a mosque named Walisongo, just south of Poso town. The bodies turned up in the river behind. By July 2001 Muslim militants from Java had arrived to help their brethren. In January 2002, 4 months after the 9/11 attack in the US, Poso was in the New York Times. US Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz explained that ‘Muslim terrorists’ had found ‘a little corner for themselves’ in Sulawesi (Mydans 2002). The conflict had escalated from a neighbourhood brawl to an international issue.

How did this escalation take place? Far from ‘spinning out of control’ as they are often said to do, conflicts escalate for identifiable reasons, as more people decide to get involved. Dynamics of contention prefers the term (upward) scale shift, and defines it as the process by which ‘the number and level of coordinated contentious actions [increase], leading to broader contention involving a wider range of actors and bridging their claims and identities’ (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 331–6). How we analyse a contentious episode depends on what we really want to know. In this chapter we want to know about escalation. By which route did a drunken suburban brawl expand into a war that drew in more and more actors, until eventually the US government took notice? Why did that route follow religious divisions and not some other social divide? The answers will come from examining how alliances are built and strategic choices are made.

We cannot launch into a detailed analysis of the narrative of escalation without first understanding the local context. The next section sketches Poso’s economic, political and social landscape, how it came to be that way and what happened just before the situation exploded into violence. Poso is a rural district in the large province of Central Sulawesi. Agriculture is the backbone of the economy. It accounts for roughly half the district GDP everywhere in Central Sulawesi except
in the provincial capital Palu, where it is much less. About a quarter of Poso
district’s population in 1998 of 418,000 lived in an urban area, of which there are
just two. The district capital, also named Poso, had about 52,000 inhabitants in
1998, and Ampana town further east probably a somewhat similar number.

Poso was well known in colonial times as one of the most successful Christian
mission fields in the Netherlands Indies (Aragon 2000; Bigalke 1981; Cote 1996;
Kruyt 1970; Schrauwers 2000). The Dutch Protestant missionaries Kruyt and
Adriani arrived in 1892 and adopted an ethnographic approach that contrasted
with the less sensitive methods used elsewhere. Yet they were inescapably part of
the imperial project. Their biggest harvest of souls followed a bloody pacification
campaign in 1905, after which the highlanders decided en masse to adopt the
religion of the new rulers. The Christian identity that emerged from this traumatic
moment of colonial state formation was typified by the loyal teachers, church
eralers and government clerks that they produced. A similar process has taken
place among many other previously stateless peoples upon conversion.

Modern government continually increased its presence throughout the twentieth
century. Under the New Order the pace quickened rapidly. Today the urban
economy runs on two legs: trade and the government sector. In Poso district,
government money is even more important than trade. Official figures say it
accounts for over 20 per cent of the non-agricultural district GDP. The same is
true in most other districts of Central Sulawesi (BPS Sulawesi Tengah 2002a:
15–29). For the province as a whole, the government sector accounts for 24 per cent
of the domestic product, as compared with 22 per cent for trade. The only districts
in which trade significantly outweighs government are Kepulauan Banggai in the
east and Buol in the north. These are the smallest and most remote districts in the
province. Clearly, government is important to urban livelihoods in Central Sulawesi.

In the later years of the New Order, state-sponsored development transformed
the landscape around Poso. The Trans-Sulawesi Highway, built in stages but
finally sealed by the early 1990s, connected the provincial capital Palu on
the west coast with Palopo in South Sulawesi, and hence with all points south to
the big city of Makassar. On the way it passed through Poso town and through the
Christian heartland of Lake Poso to its south. The splendid isolation of the 1980s
led the ethnographer of Poso, Lorraine Aragon, to entitle her book Fields of the
Along the highway came immigrants from outside the district. Some officially
sponsored immigrants came from faraway Java, but many more unofficial ones
tavelled from nearby South Sulawesi. Government figures indicate that by the
end of the New Order, Poso district had the highest proportion of immigrants in
the province. Nearly a quarter of the population had arrived from elsewhere,
while 17 per cent had arrived in the previous 5 years.\footnote{1}

Immigrants took up land the locals regarded as theirs by custom, but which the
formal law saw as unused (Acciaioli 2001; Li 2002). Cash crops – grown mainly
by immigrants but also by locals – began to displace subsistence farming. Money
increasingly began to circulate in the countryside, stimulating social mobility and
reducing the gap that once divided the country from the town.
In-migration also produced a slight religious shift towards Muslims. Christians were never a majority in any district in Central Sulawesi, so in-migration did not cause a dramatic shift from majority to minority, as had happened in Ambon. The greatest Christian presence was in Poso district, where they declined marginally from 38 per cent in 1980 to 32 per cent in 2000. Christians made up pocket majorities in highland areas of Poso district and, importantly, in the district capital, Poso town (BPS Sulawesi Tengah 1981: 33, 2001a: 32, 2001b: 32).

More unsettling than these gradual social shifts were the sudden political changes that occurred after President Suharto resigned in May 1998. The district establishment had lived for decades at the bottom end of a centralized authoritarian bureaucracy. Even more so than in other areas of Indonesia, local government in Central Sulawesi had been heavily militarized. Sulawesi was wracked by a bloody rebellion in the late 1950s. The perception that this was an unstable area led the New Order to place military officers in all Central Sulawesi’s key positions, such as governor, district chiefs and assembly chairpersons. A military officer chaired Poso’s district assembly until as late as 1999. Poso also had a military district chief for many years, until 1989. Even when Poso had its first permanent civilian chief in 1990, he remained an appointee of the governor in Palu, not chosen by Poso locals (Aditjondro 2004). But by the time his second term of office approached its end and thoughts began to turn to his replacement democracy had come to Indonesia. From now on, not the governor but ‘the people’ were going to decide these things. Everyone knew the rules had changed, but no one knew precisely what the new rules were. A law empowering the elected district assembly to decide who would be district chief was only passed in late 1999, and then not implemented till 1 January 2001. In the interval between the end of the New Order and a functioning democratic system, the expectations of democracy had radically skewed the ‘opportunity structure’ in favour of political entrepreneurs not averse to risk-taking.

Having sketched the broad context – increasing penetration of indigenous society by an authoritarian modern state and by religiously alien in-migrants and their cash crops – we are now ready to return to the process of escalation in Poso. The facts will show that it all started locally. The following narrative therefore foregrounds local actors and their problems. This simple observation makes nonsense of oft-heard explanations that it was ‘orchestrated’ from outside, perhaps by New Order remnants in Jakarta, or even by religious extremists in (Muslim) Saudi Arabia or the (Christian) West. The biggest obstacle facing observers after the New Order was to forget the habits of mind that had proven useful for so long. In a centralizing system it had made sense to trace the origin of all key events to Jakarta. But by December 1998, when the Poso conflict first broke out, this system was in disarray. ‘All politics are local’ now had to be the golden rule for serious observers. Not that local actors played their game in isolation. They moved in a field of social forces whose origins were not only local but also national and even international. Some outsiders wielded great power, whether economic, political or symbolic, which penetrated daily life at many points. But the local had grown rapidly in importance.
It is easy to say, after the event, that Poso’s evenly balanced religious composition made this a religious war waiting to happen. Certainly numerically ascendant Muslims had been increasingly challenging mission-educated Christian elites since the early 1980s for the district’s most influential positions (Aragon 2000: 307). But that observation begs several questions. Why should religious identity be more important than, for example, political ideology, bureaucratic interests or the agricultural economy? Wasn’t the New Order, the crib in which all of Poso’s key actors were nurtured, a decidedly secular order? And if feeling badly done by was the driving force behind the conflict, were there not many non-religious grievances in Poso as well, such as peasant land rights? It is worth exploring some of these alternatives, and asking why they did not provide the pathway for violent conflict. If any of these other pathways had been followed, the outcome would have been very different.

The most serious grievance in the countryside beyond Poso town was in fact not religious but economic. Upland subsistence farmers were rapidly losing their customary title land to entrepreneurial cash-croppers. Cocoa, an export crop, had already been booming for a decade when the 1998 currency crisis sent the price of the bean through the roof. When it did, many new people entered the business. Cocoa plots soon dotted the hillsides along the new road joining Poso to Palu. But not everyone had the means to do the same, and for them the rush to cocoa brought no bonanza. Tania Li (2002) has shown how cocoa was creating classes of agrarian haves and have-nots. Some haves were locals who could adapt, others were entrepreneurial outsiders who came in and took over land. Prominent among the latter were ethnic Bugis in-migrants from South Sulawesi. Local have-nots became more indebted, and more often had no land to pass on to their children. Occasionally this unequal cocoa boom did produce violence. Not far away from Poso in Luwu, South Sulawesi, grievances over the unequal benefits to small-holders played a role in repeated local clashes (Roth 2002). Here too, entrepreneurial immigrants (this time Torajanese) were one element in a complex mix of economics, ethnicity and politics. Immigrants who settled and then tried to become the dominant force on land locals regarded as their ‘homeland’ has caused much resentment around Indonesia. It was among the reasons why the World Bank stopped funding new transmigration in 1988 (Hoshour 2000: 465–77). A few of the countless violent incidents that made up the Poso wars can also be traced to grievances over cocoa. Nor was cocoa the only source of economic grievance in the countryside around Poso district. Other local resource issues that evoked protest included the expansion of capital into ebony logging, forest plantations and sand mining (Harley 2003). Aditjondro (2004) went as far as to conclude that the ‘paradigm’ of the conflict was about the marginalization of indigenous Poso people, not religion.

Yet when we examine in detail the ways in which the process of violent contention escalated in Poso, class issues over land are strikingly muted. Grievances that the have-nots of Poso nursed over immigrants, cocoa, logging and — most fundamentally — land may have helped intensify the fighting. They may even have been the decisive issue in several local events. But they did not provide the
route along which the contention escalated. Poso became primarily a war about religion, mainly led by religious professionals, not about indigenous land rights and led by peasants.

*Dynamics of contention* (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 331–6) describes two pathways by which an episode of violent contention can escalate. One involves information passing along existing lines of interaction. This is called escalation by diffusion. An example of this occurred in Poso when farmers cut down the cocoa trees owned by a neighbouring village because they believed the land on which they were planted belonged to them. The other pathway involves information passing through linkages between previously unconnected social sites. This is called brokerage. A ‘broker’ knows both social sites, and is able to translate the problems experienced in one into a language that appeals to people in the other in such a way that both feel suddenly they are dealing with the same issue. The example from Poso might be students from Palu city joining farmers from a village in a fight against people of another religion, whom both the farmers and the city dwellers regard as their common enemy. Brokers are key individuals in building larger coalitions necessary to win bigger battles.

The point being made here is that in the Poso wars, escalation occurred only rarely by diffusion. Only a few cases are recorded of farmers from neighbouring villages joining together in battle with others over a concrete issue like land and cocoa. Instead, the Poso wars could not have reached the scale that they did without brokerage. Only brokers could have persuaded those further and further away that the problem in the small town of Poso was also their problem. These were, first, religious people in Palu, then religious people in Java and finally political leaders in Washington and Jakarta. Thus if we ask why the escalation of violence had so little to do with rural grievances the answer must be sought in the role of the brokers, who are also leaders.

Studies of violent conflict have shown that apparently intolerable grievances will generally fester unresolved so long as no elites choose to offer leadership (Baechler 1998; Goldstone 2001). This is another way of saying that the diffusion pathway alone does not cause local grievances to escalate into large-scale violent conflict. Brokers, or leaders, are always necessary. When these special people do become involved, their own interests inevitably become mixed in with those of their multiple constituencies. They will make their move at moments that they regard as opportune. This also happened in Poso. The timing of the major incidents in this on-again off-again war provides the evidence. Each of the four major waves coincided with a moment of political transition that was of more interest to an urban middle-class elite than to farmers. Varshney and his colleagues (2004) correctly point out that most of the Poso battle deaths occurred in rural areas. Yet the brokerage roles necessary to build the new alliances by which the contention escalated were played out not in the countryside but in town. Such middle-class brokerage links were typical of all the episodes discussed in this book. They were political, and they make these violent episodes a part of the post-Suharto regime change. The following narrative takes care to highlight the brokerage roles played by key local elites at decisive times.
The first outbreak of violence, in December 1998, was the rioting in town with which this chapter opened. It later became known as Poso I, and it coincided with a political transition in the Poso district. At stake was a replacement for the current district head of Poso, who announced formally on 13 December he was not seeking re-election (Human Rights Watch 2002: 8). A national election timetable was coincidentally released that same month. The June 1999 elections would place new members in the national parliament, as well as provincial and district-level assemblies. The latter (DPRD-II) would in turn elect a new district head. New autonomy rules, already under discussion and to be implemented at the beginning of 2001, were about to make the district head a more powerful post than ever before.

Neither the incumbent district head nor the main contenders to replace him were particularly religious purists. Yet as their lobbyists began to rally support, religion became the decisive issue. The question now is how and why did transcendent religious values intrude so sharply into local politics, when the formal rules remained secular and none of the central players were especially devout? The answer has to do with each candidate’s need to build political support. Poso has numerous religious organizations, but a weak political party infrastructure. This is typical of small-town life all over Indonesia.

To understand why the brokers expanded their coalitions by means of religion we need a short digression on the importance of religion within the Indonesian establishment. Some observers have described Indonesian religious organizations as ‘civil society’, a space for a healthy associational life free from state interference (Hefner 2000). But this is not very appropriate in a small town like Poso. Neither is Robert Putnam’s oft-quoted notion of ‘social capital’, the kind of solidarity that ensures freedom from tyranny (Putnam 1993). It is true that religious solidarity has been growing even in remote areas of Indonesia like Poso for many years. But this solidarity has always been co-opted by the power of the state to a great extent, seriously weakening any civil society based on religion. Culture and power, in other words, intersect. This is the basis of the alternative, more adequate, notion of ‘symbolic capital’ in the work of Bourdieu (see introduction to Harriss, Stokke and Törnquist 2004). A person possessing symbolic capital has the legitimacy to speak on behalf of others and at the same time the power to create the ‘official version of the social world’. Symbolic capital shapes both the formal institutions of government and the informal cultural world in which it is embedded. This helps to explain why, in a generally devout society like Indonesia, religion rarely provides an idiom of the freely worshipping soul or the apolitically pious community. Anti-communist New Order propaganda always defined loyal citizenship in pan-religious terms, meanwhile excising class from the public discourse. In every Indonesian town, the district and military chiefs, who are the central figures in the local establishment, always keep religious leaders by their side. Local political party leaders enjoyed far less symbolic capital, although their prestige increased somewhat with democratization. During the New Order, parties had no local members and offered voters no ideology at election times. The hidden subtext of this religiously coloured symbolic capital even during the New Order was a silent
competition between the two main religions, Islam and Protestant Christianity. This was true also in Central Sulawesi. Lorraine Aragon observed in the 1980s that ordinary people spoke of it as a ‘frontier area’ between a Christian Minahasa in the north and a Muslim South Sulawesi to the south (Aragon 2000: 313–14).

Upwardly mobile students, looking for a place to meet powerful patrons, found that religious organizations answered their aspirations better than political or professional clubs. From the early 1990s, as the authority of the New Order began to erode and politics crept back into the bureaucracy, active civil servants also began to join a religious organization. Middle-class religiosity was growing, but so was the realization that a post-Suharto transition was nigh. Whether in Jakarta or in Poso, the ideal career path for an urban Muslim was to study at a state university, join the Association of Islamic Students HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam), become a bureaucrat, join the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association ICMI and support Golkar. For Protestant Christians a similar path passed through the Indonesian Student Christian Movement GMKI (Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia), and then the Union of Indonesian Christian Intellectuals PIKI (Persatuan Inteligensia Kristen Indonesia). This is where one made the right connections, indispensable in vital matters like civil service recruitment and building contract tendering when government discipline is weak.

Although a civilian had held the Poso district chief’s office for nearly a decade by late 1998, the incumbent in that year had begun his bureaucratic career under military patronage. The same was true of all his potential successors. State discipline was fragile, and the relationship between a civilian bureaucrat and powerful patrons needed strong personal elements of trust to work. Illicit business was part of the relationship, and this too required the personal touch. Religion was an important vehicle for building such trust. All the civilian bureaucrats in Poso combined bureaucratic ladder climbing with active religious affiliation. Not merely loyalty upwards was a key emotion for them, but a competitive glance sideways. Thus Brig Gen Tambunan, Central Sulawesi governor, and Lt Col Kuswandi, Poso district chief, had tended to favour Christians in the 1970s. They recalled that Christians had helped the army against Islamic rebels in the 1950s. Eddy Bungkundapu, one of the Christian candidates for Poso district chief in 1999, was one of those who owed his rise to governor Brig Gen Tambunan. He was a relative of Assa Bungkundapu, who had fought alongside the military against the Darul Islam rebellion (Tandapai 2004). Muslim officers like retired Maj Gen Paliudju, governor in the 1990s, in turn tended to make appointments that favoured his own co-religionists. Muin Pusadan, who became district chief in 1999, had first accumulated symbolic capital as chairman of the Islamic student association HMI in Palu in the 1980s. Its internal training sessions had often emphasized a fear of Christian dominance.6

These realities were an open secret within the local establishment. It gave rise to a quiet New Order bureaucratic convention favouring religious ‘balance’ among office holders. Thus when Arief Patanga became Poso’s first permanent civilian district chief in 1990, care was taken to place a roughly equal number of Christians and Muslims in the key positions. This was later called ‘power-sharing’. Since the
district chief was Muslim, the district secretaryship, the second most powerful position, went in 1992 to a Christian named Yahya Patiro. The three assistant district secretaries changed frequently but had also been mainly Christians (Mappangara 2001: 135).

Religious considerations were important even in cabinet appointments. President Suharto always had a disproportionately high number of Christians among his closest aides. They were useful counters to over-insistent Islamic demands, and they were loyal because Christians in Indonesia make up only a small minority of around 10 per cent. Once Suharto was gone, however, things were done more democratically, and Christian minorities lost their highly placed patrons near the palace. Religion had been a mainstay of loyalty to the state under Suharto, but after his demise it became an arena for competition. The end of Arief Patanga’s maximum of two 5-year terms coincided with the end of the New Order. The competition to replace him provided an opportunity to challenge the unwritten New Order preference for religious balance.

All candidates for district chief in Poso were bureaucrats and therefore loyalists of the New Order party Golkar. No one interpreted democracy to mean the district should be led by, say, a land rights activist or a poet. This was, as was often pointed out, not to be a revolution but *reformasi*. But in 1998 Golkar was taking a lot of popular abuse for having been Suharto’s stooges. For a while it looked like a sinking ship. If the opportunity structures in 1998 did not favour revolution, they did favour elite circulation – out with Suharto’s stooges, in with those who enjoyed well-organized popular appeal. All over Indonesia that favoured the two hitherto insignificant New Order ‘opposition’ parties, PDI-P and PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan). It also favoured religious organizations, and both political parties were well aware of their mobilizational potential. PPP was a Muslim party. PDI-P, successor to the New Order era PDI, was nominally secular and nationalist, but in strong Christian areas like Poso it retained a Protestant identity going back to its origins as a fusion of Christian and nationalist parties in 1973.

The elite Christian lobby in Poso favoured Yahya Patiro as the next district chief. He was well placed as the serving district secretary (*sekwilda*), and they felt he was a shoe-in for the job. His supporters claimed the provincial governor had only given his blessing on Arief Patanga’s appointment as district chief a decade earlier on the understanding that Patiro would succeed him (Aditjondro 2004). Though he would normally expect to look for support to his own party Golkar this was paralyzed by public condemnation, and his strongest support came from the PDI-P. That party in turn had strong links with the Protestant church GKST (Gereja Kristen Sulawesi Tengah), whose heart lay in the historic mission centre of Tentena by a picturesque lake in the mountains south of Poso town. Patiro’s well-oiled support committee already began collecting signatures to back his candidacy among village folk in August 1998. His less well-organized opponents resented this aggressive activism as stealing a march on the official campaign.

Muslim lobbyists backed Damsyik Ladjalani, first assistant to the district secretary, which was a key position in handing out government contracts. He was in his late forties, younger and thus less experienced than Patiro. He too was
Golkar, but for the same reason as Patiro he looked for support to a minority party, in his case the Muslim PPP, as well as to other Muslim organizations.

Naturally, each side had enough resources to give it some confidence of success—money, bodies and some connections. Unfortunately much remains unclear (but see Aragon 2007; Sangaji 2007). Physical force was also a necessity, if only as a defensive measure. On the Christian side the muscle came mainly from the ageing district assembly member Herman Parimo. Parimo was a businessman with links to the military going back to the 1950s, when they backed a militia he led that opposed the Permesta rebellion (Tandapai 2004). At the end of the New Order he was running a large ebony operation together with the military (Harley 2003). Among the key organizers on the Muslim side was Agfar Patanga, younger brother of the incumbent district chief Arief Patanga. The latter evidently hoped a Patanga proxy in the chief’s office might allow his family to extend its decade of good fortune. Unknown to the public at the time its financial muscle came from a small clique of local businessmen, all settlers from outside Poso. These were contractors dependent on government tenders. Several of them were later named in court for misusing funds from the government Farmers Credit Union KUT (Kredit Usaha Tani) – funds that had to be approved by Damsyik. Daeng Raja, the most important of them, was a competitor against Herman Parimo in the ebony business. They were not exceptionally rich – several local ethnic Chinese businessmen were better off – but they hoped that the right connections would give them a competitive edge.

On Christmas Eve 1998 a Christian youth— he was the loutish son of a political party leader—stabbed the son of the priest (imam) at a local mosque. He was drunk. Muslims were celebrating the fasting month Ramadan. Outraged Muslim youths attacked Christian Chinese shops for selling alcohol. Religious holy days were to prove foci for communal suspicions in other conflicts around Indonesia at this anxious time too. The town was in uproar for a week. Christian youths arrived on trucks from the mission heartland of Tentena. Muslim youths arrived from coastal towns of Ampana in the east, Parigi in the north-west and even from Palu. The district chief and his secretary both fled town in a motorboat (Mappangara 2001: 41), while the police did little. The elite and largely Christian suburb of Lombogia suffered much damage.

In the anger and confusion nearly everyone who had any influence in this small town was busy—negotiating with opponents, encouraging friends and letting slip inflammatory remarks. Most were also concerned with the district chief succession and the coming elections. For them, the rioting was intensely political. Several of Herman Parimo’s sons belonged to the thuggish New Order youth organization Pemuda Pancasila. He brought hundreds of young people to Poso for a ‘show of force’ during the December riots. Muslims accused him of being a Christian ‘provocateur’. Agfar Patanga, meanwhile, was later identified as the author of one of the many inflammatory pamphlets that circulated in Poso during the fray. It accused a number of Christian leaders of planning a ‘coup’ against the district chief (Human Rights Watch 2002). Thus the key protagonists, from two historically rival religious communities, were already deploying
the threat of violence and inflammatory propaganda in the very first stage of the Poso wars.

Although considerable damage had been done in Poso town, and refugees had fled to their respective religious heartlands, the December 1998 riot did not escalate further, mainly because the government did act to stop it. Herman Parimo found that his military friends refused to offer him the protection he had counted on. Neither the provincial governor, a military man whom Parimo had helped elect some years earlier, nor the military area commander in Makassar defended him. On the contrary, police from Poso came to Makassar and arrested him at the Makassar military headquarters and announced he had been the provocateur of the Poso riot. He was put on trial in Palu in November 1999, and sentenced to a shock 15-year jail under the subversion law (Mappangara 2001: 44–5). While awaiting his appeal he was allowed out for medical treatment in Makassar, where he died from complications of diabetes in April 2000. Agfar Patanga meanwhile, the provocateur in Christian eyes, had better connections, but he too was charged in April 2000 with inciting trouble, and later sentenced to a short jail term. The two Poso district head hopefuls, Yahya Patiro (Protestant) and Damsyik Ladjalani (Muslim), were both disappointed and found themselves kicked upstairs to jobs in Palu.7

The June 1999 elections passed peacefully in Poso. Golkar won comfortably despite the nation-wide reformasi mood against it. The new district assembly successfully elected a permanent district chief in October 1999. His name was Muin Pusadan, a Muslim, but not a bureaucrat and not closely identified with the Arief Patanga camp the previous year. He was an academic in Palu (Aditjondro 2004). He replaced an interim appointee who had run the office since May. The major factor in his favour was a copious supply of money to hand out to the assembly members who elected him (Damanik 2003: 13–14). ‘Money politics’ had quickly and brazenly become the norm throughout the country now that district assemblies had won such greatly increased powers. Pusadan’s was not the ideal democratic election, but at least it was peaceful. Money and mild repression had done the trick. The relatively even-handed arrests and transfers had successfully short-circuited further violent escalation. The establishment agreed to sweep the December 1998 riot under the carpet. A report from the Indonesian national human rights commission (Komnas HAM) stated that it had all been a matter of ‘miscommunication’, involving no political interests (Human Rights Watch 2002: 15).

However, tension rose again in early 2000. The provincial governor was about to announce who would fill the other coveted district position, that of district secretary. Second in charge to the district head, this office controlled the purse strings. Fears of trouble had delayed the appointment, even though it was a purely bureaucratic affair and not decided by election. None of the candidates on the internal list for consideration belonged to either of the competing religious factions, but far from neutering emotions this led to fears particularly among some Muslim protagonists that they were about to be frozen out. As in late 1998, the Muslim group was still the most aggressive. By April 2000 this side had mobilized afresh. Some of the faces were different, but the organizing principle
was still mainly religious. The networks were the same – provincial bureaucrats and their middle-class allies in business and religion. Christians, meanwhile, having failed to win the district head position, were apparently not lobbying for district secretary at this time, though this does not mean they were not organizing from a sense of vigilance. The focus of attention was now not on the district parliament in Poso but on the governor’s office in Palu. Muslim lobbyists pressured the governor through the government youth organization KNPI (Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia) to appoint Damsyik Ladjalani, their failed district head candidate. Rioting would break out again, a provincial politician warned on the eve of the announcement, if the new district secretary was not Ladjalani. Governor Paliudju, a tough retired military officer, refused to bow to pressure. He appointed an apolitical bureaucrat named Awad Al-Amri as acting district secretary in this office. The elite Muslim ‘warning’ immediately came true. Another riot broke out in Poso town on 16 April, which later became known as Poso II. It was much like Poso I. Young men were brought in by both sides from several outlying areas to help their Christian and Muslim brethren, and once again the fighting was restricted to Poso town. Again elite Christian neighbourhoods suffered serious damage.

Until this moment, coalition building had created new links only in the immediate vicinity of Poso town and this limited the rate at which violence escalated. Hundreds of houses were burned, many fled their homes, but few people were killed and only parts of the district capital were affected. Each side had brokered links from Poso to rural small towns that could serve as sources of manpower. The most vibrant institutions there were religious. However, Muslim organizers always had to struggle against deep fragmentation in their own community. Their central broker was Adnan Arsal, a religious leader in Poso aged in his fifties who also had keen political interests. He was much sought after by political leaders for his access to the grass roots. Around the time of Poso I, he had established a consultative forum that brought together the many Muslim associations in Poso district. He told me it dated to the aftermath of the December 1998 riot. Christian activists allege it was already meeting with the Agfar Patanga group just before the riot (Aditjondro 2004). Both off and on the battlefield he proved himself a courageous figure who led from the front. Muslim fighters were initially drawn from many different groups around Poso. For the young men he was a legend. ‘If the police touched Adnan Arsal, Poso would go up in flames’, one of them said (International Crisis Group 2004: 22).

Christians faced fewer local organizational obstacles than Muslims. The GKST church was large, centralized and hierarchical. It initially did not take a position on the Poso district chief issue. What I have called ‘Christian’ fighters in the Poso I round is strictly a misnomer. Herman Parimo’s boys were not fighting for the church. But during Poso II the church did become more directly involved. Some of the same people who had earlier organized support for Yahya Patiro now organized a Crisis Centre in April 2000. It was housed in a building of historical significance – the old mission headquarters and church synod office in Tentena. Its name was borrowed from the Crisis Centre in Ambon that was reporting so
effectively on the Christian view of the fighting at this time.\textsuperscript{11} It said it was coordinating ‘defence’ on behalf of the church.\textsuperscript{12}

Thus Poso II led both sides to rapidly increase the pace of their coalition building. Each network greatly extended its reach, to Jakarta and even overseas. On 23 May 2000 this buildup exploded into a new round of violence, later called Poso III. This was mainly retaliatory violence by Christian forces. By late May fighting had spread all around the district and it was very bloody. The entire district now became segregated into a patchwork of Muslim and Christian areas. The number of internally displaced people reached 425,000 (Norwegian Refugee Council 2002) and the total death toll is estimated at almost 670 (Varshney, Panggabean and Tadjoeddin 2004: 30). Without hope on either side of influencing the bureaucratic outcome of this particular contentious issue fighting was driven partly by impotent rage, revenge and fear, framed by the incapacity of the state to protect its citizens. But it had also become a struggle for dominance over the entire district – a battle to create realities on the ground by converting symbolic capital into armed occupation. Hundreds of government soldiers arrived from outside, but they failed to halt the escalation.

Poso II and especially Poso III brought with them new bursts of recruitment, in step with the heightened sense of threat. This time religious organizations from Palu began to take an interest. Muhammadiyah, MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia) and the Al-Khairat religious school were provincial branches of nation-wide organizations, none of them radical. These now became new coalition partners for the Muslim protagonists in Poso. They were driven more by missionary zeal than an interest in bureaucratic competition or land issues. They had a reach throughout the country, the fruit of the steady renaissance of middle-class religiosity in Indonesia in recent years.

With Herman Parimo in jail, his brother-in-law, an unlikely warrior with thick glasses named A. L. Lateka, now took up leadership of the Christian fighting forces. He was an engineer, once head of the supervision and control division of the Regional Investment Coordinating Board (BKPMD). In his fury he rang the Poso police commander and told him he had paid for the Christian retaliation himself. He was shot dead on 5 June 2000, after leading a night-time raid in Poso. After him Tungkanan, a retired army lieutenant who had been slashed in the back in Poso II, took up the command. One of his most important deputies was Fabianus Tibo, who was later arrested and sentenced to death, mainly for his alleged role in a massacre on 28 May 2000. On that day Christian militias killed about 80 unarmed people sheltering in the grounds of the Walisongo mosque just south of Poso town. The mosque stood amidst a small pocket of Muslims in a majority Christian area. Tibo was an uneducated farmer but he had charisma. Curiously enough he was a Catholic and a migrant from Flores rather than an indigenous Poso Protestant, which shows that the identities involved were not sharply bounded. The important point was that he became part of an organization in which personal identities mattered less than the line of command. It now seems beyond doubt that Tibo was taking orders from top people within the GKST church, well-connected individuals who managed to erase their involvement by the time Tibo was arrested and
later sentenced to death. May and June 2000 were the peak months of organized Christian militia activity. After that it tended to fall apart again.

The Walisongo massacre was the worst single atrocity of the entire episode. It became a major mobilizational moment for the Muslim side. The press played a crucial brokerage role at this point. Nation-wide press outrage, especially in religious magazines like the widely read and inflammatory *Sabili*, placed Poso on the map as a town like Ambon, where Muslims were also said to be under attack by fanatical Christians. In early June 2000, a few days after Walisongo, the triennial national Quran-reading competition happened to be held in Palu. Several important figures came to town for the occasion. National Golkar treasurer Fadel Muhammad, no doubt pleased with the opportunity to raise his local profile, attended a huge meeting at the long-established Al-Khairat school in support of ‘our brothers in Poso’. The meeting sent some fighters and homemade weapons to Poso (Human Rights Watch 2002: 19). Less public, but of greater military significance, were several clandestine militant Islamist organizations from outside Central Sulawesi that contacted Adnan Arsal to offer assistance. Mujahidin Kompak and Jemaah Islamiyah, related but organizationally distinct, made exploratory visits in June 2000 and soon after sent some trainers. Laskar Jundullah from South Sulawesi followed in September 2000, and an Al-Qaeda organizer from Spain visited in October (International Crisis Group 2004).

The fearsome influx of armed militants did not immediately lead to more violence. More security forces had been sent in after the shocking violence of May, and they had been reasonably successful in preventing armed escalation. The clandestine Islamist militias did conduct several terrorist killings. However, another upsurge in violence took place in June and July 2001, with killings on both sides. This became known as Poso IV. The most shocking scene occurred on the night of 3–4 July, when 14 Muslims, mostly women and children, were massacred in the hamlet of Buyung Katedo, Sepe village. Like Walisongo, this village lay in a Christian enclave just south of Poso town, and the perpetrators were assumed to be Christian militias. Muslim organizers responded with fresh determination. Adnan Arsal expanded the forum he led in Poso in July, and renamed it. The new forum tried to emulate the effective Crisis Centre of the Protestant church by ensuring Muslims spoke with only one voice. Every Muslim organization in the area joined up, including Muslim political parties.

An advance Laskar Jihad delegation arrived from Java with much fanfare in the same month of July 2001, soon followed by 100–150 fighters. This new militant Islamist organization was already nationally known for sending fighters and missionaries to the Ambon conflict, where they had effectively restored the military balance since mid-2000 after 18 months of Christian successes. It did not have strong links with the traditional religious associations, yet the insecurity of the times lent them surprising prestige even in Muslim establishment circles. The Laskar Jihad delegation met openly with provincial and district authorities. One prominent local academic described them as ‘partners of local government’, who would help prevent the further spread of conflict (Human Rights Watch 2002: 11).
Poso district chief Muin Pusadan welcomed two of their representatives in August and said: ‘If we in Poso are attacked, then the defence of Poso will be a holy war (jihad fisabilillah)’ (Pontoh 2002).

Thus Muslim coalition building, starting from a highly fragmented base in Poso district concerned about the district head election, had brokered links of religious solidarity throughout Indonesia, rallied around the theme of an infidel attack. Each new outrage provided fresh impetus to expand the solidarity. Christian coalition building on the contrary, though more effective at the local level, had limited possibilities beyond Poso in post-Suharto Indonesia. This was demonstrated most clearly when the leading militant pastor, Rev. Renaldy Damanik of the Crisis Centre, was arrested for allegedly possessing arms in August 2002. He was almost certainly carrying no weapons and was only providing humanitarian assistance, but he served a jail sentence anyway (Damanik 2003). The best bet for Christians lay in reaching the Christian West. Unlike Christians in the much larger city of Ambon, however, who frequently made it into the Western news media after the arrival of Laskar Jihad forces there in mid-2000, Poso Christians failed to get their message through. Lacking their own Internet connection, Tentena Crisis Centre staff carried computer diskettes by bus to Manado for transmission. Only once, in February 1999, did a message reach the influential Federation of Indonesian Christian in America (FICA) and from there a US Congressional hearing focusing on ‘persecution of Christians’ in Indonesia. By mid-2001, Poso Christians looked quite isolated in their mountain stronghold by Lake Tentena. The only exception was that some journalists began to pick up the Crisis Centre bulletins after the Buyung Katedo massacre of July 2001 prompted the arrival of Laskar Jihad.

Then a fortuitous event happened in the US that turned the tenuous Christian connection with the superpower into coalition-building gold: the 11 September 2001 Al-Qaeda attacks in New York and Washington. Suddenly any event involving Islamic militants was news in the West. In November 2001, Muslim militias, emboldened by the arrival of Laskar Jihad, destroyed five Christian villages along the north coast of Poso district. Early the next month exaggerated reports, quoting the Crisis Centre, appeared in the Western press saying ‘7000’ Laskar Jihad troops were converging on Tentena. One lurid account went on: ‘63,000 Christians are now trapped in the Tentena area and are waiting for the slaughter to begin’ (Murdoch 2001).

*Time* magazine made it unmistakably clear that this sudden Western interest in a remote part of the world was entirely self-interested.

Indonesia’s powerful Laskar Jihad has launched a campaign against Christian villages in Sulawesi…. Once, a few dozen deaths in inter-religious violence on Sulawesi might have rated little more than a few minutes on CNN. But in the post-Sept. 11 world, battlefield victories by Laskar Jihad will have a profound impact on external debt negotiations, international investment and other issues critical to Indonesia’s stability. Although there
is little evidence that militant Islamic groups in Indonesia have links with Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda, the growing strength of Laskar has already set alarm bells ringing in Washington.

(Elegant 2001b)

When a Spanish judge revealed in November 2001 that Al-Qaeda terrorists had a ‘training camp’ in Poso, the issue became part of the US agenda of pressuring Indonesia to act against Muslim terrorists on its soil. Admiral Dennis C. Blair, commander-in-chief of the US Pacific Command, visited Indonesia and discussed Sulawesi as one of several places where ‘international terrorist groups’ were coming into the country. He said the US was now giving Indonesia ‘unprecedented’ access to US intelligence. Perhaps this meant the CIA was showing Indonesian intelligence chief Lt Gen Hendropriyono photos of the alleged training camps in Poso. A fortnight later Hendropriyono reversed numerous government denials when he said an Al-Qaeda camp was a reality in Poso. Sceptics thought they detected an Indonesian attempt to reopen the American military aid tap, closed in protest over Indonesian abuses in East Timor in 1999, but it later turned out there really had been such camps.17

Wheels began to turn, more government troops and police were sent, and a peace conference on 19–20 December 2001 resulted in the so-called Malino agreement to end the conflict. The accord came out of meetings the previous November that had brought together the most militant leaders from each side. It was reasonably successful. Battles involving hundreds of people became a thing of the past. The militant organization Jemaah Islamiyah, which had earlier sent fighters, supported the agreement, arguing that peace would be a better environment for mission work than war. Nevertheless, many incidents of random bombings and targeted assassinations, all against Christians, continued to claim lives. Among them was a series of attacks on Christian villages in October 2003 by clandestine Mujahidin Kompak fighters, the assassination on two occasions of Christian ministers in front of their congregations in 2004, a bomb in the Tentena marketplace killing 21 in 2005, and the beheading of three Christian schoolgirls also in 2005.18

This was not the end of politics in Poso district, but for now, it was the end of political violence. The urban economy still depended on the state, so everyone in town still wanted more government. This led to round after round of district boundary subdivisions in which power was distributed on the basis of religion, ethnicity and money. But somehow the post-New Order rules were now clear enough to permit most of it to take place minus the panic, minus the state security failures and hence minus the mobilization for war.19 Things will not be quite the same for Christians. No one will let them forget that they belong to a minority. But they are doing OK. Several Christian politicians hold district-level senior executive positions. Meanwhile the landless indigenous peasants remain landless and unheard. And the families of all those who died in the Poso wars – between five hundred and a thousand (Human Rights Watch 2002: 38–9) – must wonder what this had been all about.
This account has not sought to establish the ‘root causes’ of the wars in Poso. Rather it has adopted the more modest goal of describing the process by which the contentious episode escalated from a neighbourhood fight to an international issue. The pathway by which this occurred – brokerage, not diffusion – tells us more about urban society in Poso town than it does about the surrounding countryside where most of the victims fell. It depicts a small-town society in which the economic role of the state is important. Combined with lax internal discipline, this produced competing networks of patron–clients relations, each with a religious character. When the long-established authoritarian system of making bureaucratic appointments made way for local democracy with unclear rules, clashes ensued. The initiative came from those backing one particular Muslim faction, who thought the opportunity was ripe to break unwritten rules to their own advantage. This eventually led to a savage retaliation by Christian militias, whose only effect was to dramatically escalate the violence for several more months. Each side at this stage rapidly built its alliances upwards and outwards – Muslims to Java via Palu, Christians via the Western press to the US. The entire district was soon segregated into Muslim and Christian areas. However, unlike the war in Ambon described in the next chapter, this was not total war. Factionalism had not consumed the entire local establishment, and there was always an alternative candidate more or less untainted by the war.
6 Mobilization in Ambon

Human Rights Watch interviewed a boy, Hamid (not his real name), who said he was eighteen but looked much younger. A Butonese from the neighborhood of Gunung Nona, he had been in his house on January 20 [1999] with his mother and his younger sister. His sister, who was in the third grade of elementary school, went outside to urinate. Suddenly a mob of people arrived wearing red scarves that covered their mouths and noses so that only their eyes were visible. They were all armed with knives, bombs, and arrows. They shot his sister with an arrow that hit her in the chest. She screamed for her mother, but before anyone could come, the mob hacked her with a machete and put her body in a sack, then tied the sack and carried it away. Hamid was about thirty meters away. He then saw three people pour gasoline and burn down his house. He ran as fast as he could toward the al-Fatah mosque but had to pass a crowd of Christians. They asked him where he was from, and he said, ‘Tenggara’ (the Indonesian word for southeast) since most of the Christian families in the area were from southeastern Moluccas. He also said his name was Albertus, an obviously Christian name. They let him pass. When he got to the mosque, he bought one litre of gasoline. He said he wanted to burn down a nearby church since his own home was burned.

(Human Rights Watch 1999)

Of all the communal conflicts to erupt in Indonesia after 1998, the religious wars in Maluku were the most appalling. The fighting in Kalimantan involved relatively minor ethnic groups but this caught up religious communities to which nearly every Indonesian belonged. Unlike fighting in the small town of Poso, which was also a religious war, this consumed the largest town in eastern Indonesia. The death toll ran to at least 2,000 (Varshney, Panggabean and Tadjöeddin 2004: 30) and the internally displaced to over a quarter of a million (Norwegian Refugee Council 2002). Aside from the savage military onslaughts in East Timor in 1975 and 1999, the eruption of fighting in January 1999 made Ambon the theatre of the most shocking violence seen in Indonesia since the anti-communist pogroms of 1965/66. And where other disasters came and went in the worst post-New Order year of 1999, Ambon kept coming back to the headlines for more than 5 years.

This chapter does not aim to give a complete account of the violent episode in Ambon and surrounding islands between January 1999 and the last paroxysm of April 2004. Even what is reliably known would take a book to analyse properly.
Meanwhile that which remains unknown is far greater. Those closest to the violence have played a part in keeping it so. Ambon has become a city segregated in body and mind. More than 6 years after the outbreak of hostilities, the truth remains hostage to the inability of the two communities to listen to each other’s experiences in order to reach a common understanding. The peace agreement of February 2002 included a truth-seeking exercise. But after the high-powered National Independent Investigators Team (Tim Penyelidik Independen Nasional, TPIN) handed its final report to the president in April 2003 it was kept secret. None of the signatories to the agreement have so far protested against this subversion of their intentions. Calls for an East Timor-style truth and reconciliation commission remain muted.

Rather, the chapter aims to analyze one of the most basic processes at work in the episode, namely how people were mobilized to participate in it. The focus is on the first phase of the conflict in 1999. A close reading of the narrative will help pinpoint the driving forces behind the violence more accurately than broadly cultural approaches can do. The approach assumes a certain calculating rationality on the part of the key actors. It focuses on organizational activities rather than on disembodied emotions such as pride or grievance.

There is, of course, another way of reading these events, which is that there was no rationality at all, no ‘politics by other means’, but that the whole thing was a tragedy of unintended consequences arising from fear. This alternative explanation for the eruption of violence has been named the ‘security dilemma’, and it essentially comes down to ‘kill or be killed’. We will consider it at the end of this chapter, as it represents an important alternative.

Mobilization, according to Dynamics of contention, is the process by which ‘normally apathetic, frightened or disorganized people explode onto the streets, put down their tools, or mount the barricades’ (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 38). It occurs on both sides of a conflict in ways that are found back in many different situations. Mobilization is a considerably more complex process than the escalation described in the previous chapter. Put briefly, it consists (according to DoC) of five basic mechanisms. First, an array of broad social change processes precedes the conflict. Second, each side attributes threats to the other side and/or sees opportunities for its own. Third, organizations are created to deal with these threats or opportunities – or (more often) existing organizations are appropriated for new purposes. Fourth, these organizations engage in innovative collective action against the other side. And fifth, this in turn leads to an escalation of perceived uncertainty, which feeds back into earlier attribution of threat or opportunity.

Mobilization is therefore path dependent. It contains a feedback loop that can create new waves of mobilization depending on what happened before. Indeed the Ambon violence, like Poso, did take place in waves, which can be schematized as follows:

- Phase I, 19 January to about May 1999. Despite this violence, the national elections held soon afterwards on 7 June 1999 proceeded peacefully.
- Phase II broke out at the end of July 1999, as the election results became known. By early 2000 an uneasy peace had been reestablished – though
disturbed by news of Christian–Muslim fighting in North Maluku, previously part of Maluku but now a province by itself.

- Phase III began in April 2000, as Muslim militias arrived from Java to help their Ambonese brethren.
- Phase IV – fitful fighting – followed until February 2002, when peace negotiations were concluded in the second Malino agreement (the first Malino agreement was for Poso, 2 months earlier).
- Phase V – mysterious bombings and shootings continued to occur after the Malino agreement, but the incidents no longer involved massed attacks as before. The one exception to this waning of violence was a riot on 25 April 2004, during a parade to commemorate the breakaway RMS movement of 1950.

To understand why mobilization took the path it did, we must begin with the broad social change processes that preceded the conflict. The Maluku wars came as a complete surprise. Nothing on this scale of ferocity had ever happened before in Ambon, not even during the suppression by Indonesian troops of the regional revolt known as RMS nearly half a century earlier. Yet closer inspection reveals that violent contention did not spring out of a vacuum. The most important contextual element in Ambon is a degree of penetration by the state into society that is high even by Indonesian standards. Modern administration expanded into the eastern part of the archipelago with increasing intensity throughout the twentieth century. Ambon was the base for this bureaucratic colonization. The growth of government shaped the city’s history (Chauvel 1990). A high proportion of the urban working population has always been employed in the civil service. In 1990, the whole of Maluku province (which still included Ternate) had nearly 55,000 civil servants, more than East Java, whose population was 17 times larger. When converted to a proportion of all those not working in agriculture, fisheries or forestry – assumed to approximate to the urban working population – this comes to 33 per cent. Almost no other province is more bureaucrat heavy (see further discussion in Chapter 3). The proportion declined to 22 per cent by 1998, as more people all over Indonesia moved into town while the end of the oil boom levelled off civil service growth. But urban Maluku remained near the top of the list of state-dependent provinces. Only the exceptional provinces of East Timor and Papua were higher (BPS 1990, 1998).

The potential for conflict over civil service appointments is evident when we examine some social statistics. A disproportionate number of Maluku’s civil servants have traditionally been Protestant Christians. Most Maluku Christians live in Ambon and surrounding islands with another pocket of local majority around Tobelo in Halmahera far to the north. In 1995 Christians made up 56 per cent of Ambon municipality.² For example, in the Ambon suburb of Benteng, which was 72 per cent Christian before the wars, 71 per cent of those employed worked in the public service. In Batumerah (76 per cent Muslim), less than 8 per cent worked there (Klinken 2001b). Meanwhile the proportion of (mostly Protestant) Christians in Maluku province had been in slow decline for decades – from 50 per cent
in 1971 to 43 per cent in 1990. The shift was probably caused mostly by Muslim in-migration. This, combined with the Indonesia-wide growth of a Muslim middle class, had led by 1998 to more Muslims entering the top level of the bureaucracy in Maluku, while Christians continued to dominate the thousands of lower-level positions.

Moreover, a ‘youth bulge’ exacerbated the potential for conflict. Maluku appears to have a significantly larger proportion of under-25s than does Java, although the reason for this is not clear. Many of those young people were unable to find work (Klinken 2001b). This combination – a large cohort of well-educated youth, unable to find work in the elite civil service sector, and clearly able to blame a certain party for their misfortune – is a well-known precursor to violence elsewhere. It has demonstrably produced revolution elsewhere in the world (Goldstone 2001).

Although the state apparatus bulks large in Maluku, this does not mean it is effective. Seen only as a formal set of institutions, the state is as weak in Maluku as it is in most of Indonesia’s outer islands. For example the city of Ambon, urban population 180,000, had only one ancient fire engine and almost no hydrants before the outbreak of hostilities; its disaster relief agency did not even have a motorcycle; and its police station had room for only 20 detainees. However, effectiveness of the formal state is not the only measure of the state’s importance in a society. For the ‘real’ state is much bigger than its formal institutions. It has a large ‘shadow’ counterpart where its officials exercise dominance through such business activities as building contracts, logging and fisheries. The military and police play out their dominance as much in this shadow state as in the formal one. This state spreads its tentacles deeply into society through clientelistic networks based on communal trust. The connections binding Ambon to Jakarta run as densely through these networks of patronage as they do through formal channels. Their most important organizing principles are one’s ancestral village (every Ambonese has one, even if they visit it rarely) and religion. Especially the latter has always been as much about loyalty to the ‘state’ as about submission to God.

Religion has been part of the political establishment in Ambon for centuries. Christians belong to the oldest church in Asia, planted by the Catholic missionary Francis Xavier in the sixteenth century, neglected for centuries and then arbitrarily incorporated by the Dutch into the (Protestant) Indische Kerk. The latter was a government affair administered first by the Department of Trade and Colonies and then by Education, Worship and Industry. At the village level in Ambon, Chauvel noted, ‘[t]he pendeta [pastor] and the raja [village chief] were the representatives respectively of the religious and secular arms of the colonial government’ (Chauvel 1990: 154). When the Indische Kerk divided into a series of ethnic churches in the 1930s, the Maluku Protestant Church (GPM) lost little of its bureaucratic character. The colonial legacy stamped Ambon’s identity indelibly with the stereotypically loyal Protestant teacher, clerk and soldier. Though the soldiers among them disastrously chose to oppose the new Republic of Indonesia in 1950, most Ambonese were sensible enough to see that what worked under Batavia could work under Jakarta. After state funding for the
church abruptly disappeared with Indonesian independence in 1950, GPM carried out a reorganization that made it even more centralized than before. At the top was a small group of well-connected intellectuals, among them Mr Soplanit, the government’s provincial secretary, who had a Dutch law degree but no theology, and who became deputy chairman of the synod in 1965 (Fraassen 1972: 287–95). A plaque next to the pulpit in the city’s main Protestant church Maranatha commemorates the building’s stone laying as a government gift in 1952, but fails to mention God or faith. Ambonese have always been prominent in the Protestant ecumenical body PGI in Jakarta, which was the main route for ecclesiastical give-and-take with the state under the corporatist New Order. Shortly after fighting broke out, the young Jakarta intellectual Martin Manurung wrote with only a little exaggeration that Suharto built his power first on the military, then on the bureaucracy through Golkar and in the last years of his regime on religion. This was as true of Christianity as of Islam.

The Maluku Protestant Church (Gereja Protestan Maluku, GPM) is by far the largest non-government organization in the province. Its structure parallels that of local government. Its youth wing Angkatan Muda Gereja Protestant Maluku (AM-GPM) has thousands of affiliated branches. All Protestant young people are socialized in the elements of an extremely formal religion through a constant round of activities that takes the dedicated believer away from home most nights of the week. Most prominent Protestant Ambonese are therefore also prominent church leaders.

If the church had encompassed most of society, it could perhaps be said to embody the kind of civil religion that holds things together (Bellah 1967). But half of Ambon is Muslim. This community also traces its origins back about half a millennium, but it does not have the same theocratic tradition. Religious leaders in Muslim villages on Ambon did not challenge the village chief for authority in colonial times. Largely excluded from the colonial and early independent local state by their lower educational achievement, elite Muslims only began to significantly improve their position in the provincial bureaucracy late in the New Order, although their emancipation had begun in the late colonial period with increased travel to metropolitan Batavia. In Ambon Muslims have no equivalent of the Protestant GPM. The major Indonesian Islamic associations Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah are much weaker in Maluku than in Java. Mosque organizations operate independently of each other. Nor is religious socialization as thorough for Muslims as it is for Christians. For example, Ambon has no live-in religious schools like Java’s pesantren. Officially sponsored organizations such as the ulama council MUI and the Islamic ‘intellectuals’ association ICMI have therefore played an important role both in tying Islam to the state and organizing Muslims politically. In short, the civil service, the Protestant church, and (later) the Islamic association ICMI became the key sites for accumulating social capital within Ambon. At the same time, the gradual modernization of Ambonese urban life after independence led to growing emphasis in both communities on purer observance of religion, rejecting the syncretistic adat that had previously created a nativizing bridge between Christianity and Islam (Bartels 2003b).
The key institution tying Ambon to Jakarta during the authoritarian New Order was the army. Throughout the country, active or retired military officers, especially in the outer islands, ran most provinces and districts. Any civil politics that did exist depended on these men. However, from the early 1990s the military began to withdraw, passing the reins to their civilian protégés. The civilian local administrators in 1998 and 1999 were therefore untested in a popular vote. Unsure of their constituency, and accustomed as they were to authoritarianism, Muslim and Protestant Ambonese continued to nurture relations with top officers they regarded as their own even after reformasi. Contrary to an impression of growing Islamic ascendancy after 1998, active and retired Christian generals still significantly outnumber top-level Muslims.5 These military men were not in a position to mobilize civilians directly, and this is why they do not figure more prominently in the present account. But they did provide significant resources to one or another side, for their own reasons, and were thus as much part of the problem as of the solution.

Under the New Order senior provincial bureaucratic appointments were made top-down, but only after complex bottom-up lobbying through multiple channels. Formal power lay with the interior ministry, while the real power lay elsewhere — with the military, religious networks, business tycoons or even with the president’s daughter. The more important the position that was to be filled the greater the number of people who had an interest in it and thus the more complex and expensive the lobbying that was required from below to secure an appointment. The effect of reformasi was instantly to multiply this already high level of complexity. This drove the lobbying for bureaucratic positions into the public sphere, even if the position was not in fact open to democratic election. The resulting competition only made the long-standing Christian–Muslim divide all the more salient.

Having sketched the processes of social change that had given religious identities increasing political importance before the outbreak of hostilities, we are now ready to examine perceptions of threat and of opportunity within the two communities. These had been growing throughout the 1990s around the issue of senior civil service appointments. When Akib Latuconsina became the province’s first non-military governor in the New Order in 1992, he gave chances to some Muslims they would not otherwise have had. ICMI was the government-sponsored patronage network for Muslims around Indonesia, and Akib was its secretary in Ambon and Maluku. Muslim catch-up in the bureaucracy during the 1990s increasingly began to stir Christian emotions, though rarely in public. They remember Akib Latuconsina’s governorship for the vigour with which he conducted his affirmative action campaign. They did lose some positions they considered rightly theirs under Akib as well as under his successor Saleh Latuconsina.6 For example, Saleh Latuconsina did not choose Protestants to fill the other two top positions in the province, namely deputy governor and provincial secretary (both were Catholics). Christians were particularly disturbed about non-Ambonese Muslims taking top jobs. I heard them complain privately, for example, that the provincial branch of the Education Department had been
headed by someone from Sulawesi, as was the provincial planning board (Bappeda) and the city’s labour office (Depnaker).

Unhappiness about outsiders taking jobs from locals (who were known as putra daerah, or sons of the soil) dominated provincial politics around Indonesia from the early 1990s and especially after 1998. But Christians by no means lost all their battles. In 1996 they successfully rejected the candidate for mayor of Ambon preferred by armed forces headquarters in Jakarta, arguing that his Muslim faith made him unsuitable (Pos Keadilan 1999). The next year they successfully resisted Akib’s attempt to have a Muslim appointed rector to the state university Pattimura, which they regarded as a Christian privilege. The university rectorate was to be a point of contention throughout the Ambon wars, and it received a special mention in the Malino peace agreement.

Anxieties in this state-dependent society grew when the plummeting exchange rate for the rupiah plunged Indonesia into economic crisis in late 1997. Government budgets shrunk drastically in 1998, while building materials tripled in price, threatening the livelihoods of hundreds of building contractors. A number of top contractors were prominent at the same time in political party and religious activities.

Maluku’s new governor Saleh Latuconsina, not closely related to his predecessor and a mild technocrat uninterested in religious politics, spent much of his time putting out fires about the religion of civil service appointees. For example, in March and April 1998 he spent a month dealing patiently with Christian teachers in Ambon, who were abuzz because their lobbying for an Ambonese Christian to head up the provincial education office had failed. As soon as the New Order ended, sensitive observers immediately began to warn that bureaucratic competition could take dangerous religious forms in some places. Islamic leader Nurcholish Madjid, for example, with generous criticism of his own religious community warned in June 1998 that Ambon and Manado were two places where a rising Muslim middle class belonging to organizations such as ICMI might cause increasing friction with Christians. He was wrong about Manado but right about Ambon, which depends more on the bureaucracy for a living than does Manado.

Towards the end of 1998 both perceptions of threat and of opportunity rose dramatically in the Christian and Muslim communities in Ambon and the reason was political. From this moment on we begin to see that the vehicles for these perceptions were concrete organizations, namely political parties and religious organizations. On 10–13 November 1998 the nation’s supreme legislative body MPR gathered in Jakarta. President Habibie survived attempts to impeach him as a Suharto stooge because he did offer reform. Democratization was now at the top of the national agenda. No longer internal bureaucratic manoeuvering but party competition was to settle the question of power at every level of society. After several months of frenzied planning under intense public pressure, the government announced in December that national elections would be held the following May.

Maluku had always been a Golkar province, but now Golkar was daily being reviled all over Indonesia as a Suharto puppet party that deserved to be disbanded. Opinion polls had Golkar losing at least two thirds of the votes it had
enjoyed nationally in 1997, the last year of the New Order. The other New Order parties joined the chorus of condemnation while racing to build up their cadre networks after decades of repression. Although nearly anyone could start a new party, only one party caught the national imagination as the symbol of reformasi: Megawati’s PDI-P. The excitement in Ambon was palpable, particularly in Christian circles. Although PDI-P was a secular nationalist party, in Maluku it was run entirely by Protestants (Tatuhey 1990). The reason lay in its history. The last genuinely democratic election in Indonesia, held in 1955, had in Maluku been fought out between two religious parties, Masjumi (Muslim) and Parkindo (Protestant) (Alfian 1971). Unlike Java, Maluku did not have a strong communist party in the 1950s. The most popular alternatives in Maluku to the powerful secular party PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia) were thus not class-based but religious. The New Order restricted political competition by forcibly amalgamating religious with secular parties, thus keeping them chronically weak. Parkindo joined the PDI, New Order forerunner of the PDI-P. But the religious networks of influence remained active within party corridors, albeit hidden from public view. Faced with the opportunities offered by reformasi after 1998, therefore, PDI-P was for leading Christians in Ambon their most promising vehicle.

Between 8 and 10 October 1998 PDI-P held a spectacular national congress in Bali. It was a show of strength for reformasi. The Ambonese delegation was there in force, and they did well. Their man Alex Litaay became the party’s secretary general. A national PDI-P win with an Ambonese Christian in the key organizational post promised a reversal of the misfortunes Ambon’s Protestant elite had suffered in recent years. The prospect gave them ‘new hope’, as one of its leaders told me. In short, PDI-P represented the challenger elite in 1999. In Ambon that translated to a Christian challenger elite.

The parties’ relationship with their voting public was unlike that in the West. They had no membership, generally offered no ideology and no programme. Even under reformasi they were to maintain the ‘floating mass’ approach of the New Order, which meant that symbols rather than substance drove their campaign. Lacking a membership structure, party leaders could only mobilize their constituency through other networks. For the PDI-P in Ambon, dominated by Christian elites, what better constituency was there than the church? GPM was everywhere. It was impossible to ignore, no matter how much church officials protested their innocence by stressing the separation of church and state. All PDI-P leaders in Maluku were also active in the GPM. (The reverse was not true – many other church leaders were active with Muslims in Golkar.)

The big parties all kicked off before the official campaign period opened in March 1999. Golkar announced a ‘yearlong birthday party’ at its October 1998 anniversary. Megawati visited Ambon for her party in mid-1998. At the Bali congress she called on her supporters to build ‘Mutual Help Coordination Posts’ (Posko Gotong Royong) all over the country, to show that PDI-P cared for ordinary folk. Thousands of red-and-black shelters sprang up in prominent places all over the country, manned by enthusiastic if sometimes hooliganish young people, also in Ambon.
Each party had ‘success teams’ at every level of the party’s organization. These were small teams to mobilize support. PDI-P’s Ambon success teams all belonged to the church’s youth organization AM-GPM, though the church was not directly involved. (Unlike in Java, the parties in Ambon did not have militant security task forces.) After the Bali congress, senior PDI-P functionaries toured Christian communities in Ambon. Among them was Maj Gen Theo Syafei, a tough commando who in his retirement had devoted himself equally to the Christian religion and the PDI-P. The remarks he made at meetings of this nature were not flattering to Islam and he made them all over Indonesia. When they finally leaked in Kupang that November, they sparked Muslim outrage and the suspicion that Syafei had provoked the anti-Muslim riot in Kupang in that month.13 The Sunday before election day (delayed to 7 June 1999) churchgoers all over Maluku heard a message from the pulpit encouraging them to vote PDI-P. (Various Muslim party activists, meanwhile, held a door-to-door operation very early on voting day.)

Muslim parties in theory had the same reformasi advantage over Golkar as PDI-P. But they lacked the inspiring symbol of Sukarno’s daughter and they were deeply divided. In Ambon, some older leaders who had once belonged to the 1950s party Masjumi, such as Abdullah Soulissa and Ali Fauzi, joined the new conservative religious party PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang). But others stayed with the uninspiring New Order party PPP, while younger people looked to a variety of alternatives, notably PK (Partai Keadilan). Golkar, meanwhile, was in disarray as it tried to fight off attempts to disband it.

Late 1998 was a shining moment of hope for Indonesians. In Ambon, too, thousands of students joined in a series of magnificent demonstrations against the military to coincide with the MPR meeting in Jakarta in November. However, hopes were also mixed with fear. Many Ambonese dreaded religious competition more than they looked forward to reform. Newly freed print and electronic media, combined with the emerging technologies of mobile telephony and Internet, helped diffuse hot news instantly around the archipelago. Everything that Ambonese heard, they read back into their own situation. Christian Ambonese feared a resurgence of Islamic radicalism might follow a decision at the same session of the MPR to drop the New Order requirement that all organizations adhere to the secular ideology Pancasila as their ‘sole basis’. Muslims grew agitated over photos of several mutilated Muslim Ambonese corpses, members of a military-backed militias beaten to death on the streets of Jakarta for loudly supporting President Habibie during the MPR session. Christians grew troubled when they heard the following week that Christian Ambonese men had been similarly beaten to death, this time in a gangland war around a gaming house in Jakarta’s inner suburb of Ketapang. Nearly two dozen churches were also damaged or destroyed in Ketapang, and several Christian schools (Human Rights Watch 1999). Ambonese church bulletins had for a couple of years been reproducing such reports of church burnings drawn up by a Christian organization in Surabaya led by law professor Sahetapy.14 Muslims in turn became more alarmed at reports that Christians in Kupang, West Timor, had taken revenge for the Ketapang killings by burning mosques and expelling Muslims. The effect of these incidents
in late 1998 was to actualize the Christian–Muslim divide in Ambon. It had always been a delicate issue, but now it became much more salient.15

Conservatives within the government welcomed the opportunity to slow democratization by inflaming these religious tensions. Maluku’s military commander (komandan korem, danrem) Col. Hikayat interpreted the big student protest in front of his headquarters on 18 November 1998 as a ‘Christian’ protest against the military (Azca 2003). It may have been a cynical divide-and-rule strategy on Hikayat’s part or it may have been his genuine conviction. For decades it had been a military practice to label all opposition ‘RMS’ (in reference to the 1950 secessionist revolt), just as the military in Java called all opposition PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia) (communist) and in Papua OPM (Free Papua Organization). It is true that the RMS revolt had been mostly supported by Christian Ambonese. Since then Muslim Ambonese had learnt from childhood how Christian RMS fighters killed Muslim villagers (Lee 1999: 83–90). The protestors’ enthusiasm for Megawati, the symbol of anti-New Order protest, no doubt struck Col. Hikayat as rebellious. Identifying Christianity with rebellion was not policy – indeed Hikayat’s replacement was a Christian officer who did not share this view. But the confusion made it more difficult for soldiers and policemen to think of Muslims and Christians as equally deserving citizens.

When news reached Ambon in mid-December 1998 that police in Jakarta had shipped over a hundred Ambonese thugs back to Ambon that they detained after the Ketapang riot, it raised fears of violence. The governor called together his top officials (Muspida) and representatives of Maluku’s religious organizations. The thugs were known to be well connected. They had worked under the New Order for Pemuda Pancasila, a military-controlled youth movement used for shady business deals as well as to intimidate oppositionists. After reformasi the movement had broken into Christian and Muslim wings with different patrons. The fear was that they had now been deliberately sent to Ambon to cause trouble (Aditjondro 2001a,b; O’Rourke 2002: 348). The meeting in the governor’s office issued a circular letter calling for ‘vigilance’. Official delegations were sent to villages around Maluku on a ‘Ramadan Safari’, it being the Muslim fasting month. They warned of the danger of ‘provocateurs’ and urged people to listen to their religious leaders. The governor, who joined the safari, noticed that mosques in particular were not well connected to any communication network. He encouraged them to install telephones. That way they could always get the latest news from the official Islamic organization MUI, located in the Al Fatah mosque in Ambon city. Plans were made to institute community night watches (siskamling), but these had not been implemented when rioting broke out on 19 January 1999. Thus another organizational mechanism was being put in place whereby perceptions of threat and opportunity in the minds of religious leaders could be converted instantly into rival sets of authoritative ‘news’, and distributed to the respective communities with lightning speed.

The new vigilance mechanisms were immediately put to the test. An incident that normally would have been put down to youthful stupidity was now reported as an instance of precisely the kind of religious fanaticism these mechanisms
were designed to detect. On 28 December inter-village fighting at Air Bak on the northern side of Ambon bay left several houses in ashes. Then on 14 January 1999 police were sent to control a riot in Dobo, South-East Maluku, between neighbouring villages that left eight dead.

Rising nervousness also became evident when Christians started experiencing sightings of Jesus in the lower-class suburb of Gudang Arang in the last week of the Muslim fasting month that ended on 19 January. Thousands of believers flocked to the site for days, in turn frightening local Muslims with their displays of emotion.16

On the late afternoon of 19 January a riot broke out between young men from the neighbouring inner city districts of Batumerah (Muslim) and Mardika (Christian). It was Idul Fitri, the end of the fasting month. Counter to the spirit of peace and forgiveness that marks this day, young men started brawls all over the country on that day.17 Fights between neighbouring districts and villages are common in Maluku (Benda-Beckmann and Benda-Beckmann 1991). They were also so common between the lower-class Batumerah and Mardika suburbs that at first no one took much notice.18 What set this fight apart, however, was its ferocity, the speed with which it spread to other parts of the city and the way it targeted religious symbols. The rioting was sudden and mutual from the beginning. There seem not to have been crowds on the streets before the first massed attacks began. The Human Rights Watch report has a time difference of only about half an hour between the first Muslim and Christian attacks. At 4:00 pm Muslim rioters from Batumerah struck (Christian) Batumerah Dalam, and then moved on to (Christian) Mardika. At 4:30 or 5:00 pm Christian rioters from Kudamati (assisted by Christians from Mardika) hit (Muslim) Batu Gantung. Both groups of attackers kept coming back repeatedly, for hours throughout the night. Both groups were initially inspired by a report of trouble at the transport terminal at Mardika about an hour earlier, which both sides interpreted as Christian-versus-Muslim (Human Rights Watch 1999).

Many Ambonese, Muslim and Christian, believe to this day that the ex-Pemuda Pancasila thugs had been sent to provoke trouble. But the evidence that they actually did go into the streets on that day remains patchy. Just how the hundreds of young men had been mobilized who took part in the initial onslaught from both sides remains unclear. How they came to be wearing red headbands on the Christian side, and white ones on the Muslim side, also remains mysterious. Rather than being organized from above, it seems more likely that the groups were at that stage ad hoc and based on existing neighbourhood solidarity, which is strong especially in lower class suburbs like Mardika and Batumerah. Religion is part of that solidarity. In any case, it is apparent that what came before and after 19 January 1999 had more to do with Ambonese dynamics than with any plans wrought in faraway Jakarta.

A church was burned down in the Muslim suburb of Silale, near the harbour. Muslims who saw the smoke from the other side of the bay the next day mistakenly decided it came from the nearby Al Fatah mosque, and called in help from Hitu on the north coast of the island. Meanwhile Christian rioters based at the
Reheboth church in Kudamati set about systematically trashing the market stalls run by non-Ambonese Muslims. Amid frenzied screaming, hacking, running and burning the number of grisly incidents multiplied rapidly on both sides over the next few days. The Human Rights Watch report details fights all over Ambon as well as in surrounding islands of Haruku, Saparua, Ceram, Buru, Sanana, Manipa and Tanimbar. More vicious fighting broke out in Tual, South-East Maluku, on March 31 – 2 days before Good Friday and 3 days after the Muslim holy day Idul Adha.

Within a few days of the first outbreak of rioting, the two religious organizations already being appropriated to deal with the growing threats (after the government Ramadan Safari) responded with concrete action. Coordination offices were established in the central buildings of each organization. At the Al Fatah mosque a crisis centre was established called the Task Force for Coping with ‘Bloody Idul Fitri’ (Satgas Penanggulangan ‘Idul Fitri Berdarah’). Implicit in its name was the allegation that Christians had been the first to spill blood on this holy day. It was led first by the former military commander in Ambon, Brig Gen (ret.) Rustam Kastor, then effectively by his secretary Lt Col (ret.) Yusuf Ely, a businessman and former naval officer. The Task Force was officially part of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI), chaired by the police officer Lt Col (Police) R. R. Hasanusi. Also at the Al Fatah mosque was the Al Fatah Foundation, which ran a clinic and was directed by the ageing former district chief Abdullah Soulissa. The biggest challenge at Al Fatah lay in building up the communications network with the many different religious organizations based at mosques around Ambon. Little progress had thus far been made on the governor’s proposal along these lines. Relief had to be organized for refugees, information had to be channelled both inside the religious community and to the outside world and fighters had to be coordinated. The militarily experienced Yusuf Ely did the latter, although in reality lots of groups of locally based fighters followed their own instincts. The second wave of violence, in July 1999, was to trigger another frantic round of organizing.

At Maranatha church, a few minutes walk from Al Fatah but now a world away, a similar communications office was established known as Bankom (Bantuan Komunikasi, Communications Assistance). It quickly built up a network of radio communications to every church around Maluku. Like the Al Fatah network, this one had the tactically critical task of collecting and disseminating battlefield intelligence. It was run by Rev. Hery Lekahena, secretary general of the church youth movement AM-GPM. A second important Protestant centre was in the fiercely religious Kudamati suburb, on a hill a few kilometres west of Maranatha. Hundreds of fighters were stationed at the home of Agus Wattimena, a tough 53-year-old former civil servant, devout church activist and PDI-P supporter. He could instantly send them to any trouble spot in Ambon where local fighters feared being overwhelmed.

Thus what had begun as a brawl between young men from neighbouring lower-class suburbs had within a few days been transformed into a war organized out of the two central institutions of religion in Ambon, the Al Fatah mosque and the
main GPM church, Maranatha. It was they who were recruiting, coordinating, arming and feeding the fighters, while at the same time building a strong if one-sided narrative of religious victimization through their internal sermons, their display of refugees and their external press briefings.

The repertoire of shocking actions deployed by each side was similar. Actions served to terrorize the enemy, as well as inspire one’s own. Enemy actions were retold in the narrative and shaped perceptions of the other side’s cruelty. A major element of the repertoire was to attack churches and mosques, symbols of the enemy’s identity. Each time one was torched, or even rumoured to have been, it triggered wild rejoicing on the attackers’ side and outrage and renewed determination among the defendants. Music was a feature of the battlefield. Videos show Christian young men moving forward while the church choir solemnly sang ‘Onward Christian Soldiers’, with trumpet accompaniment. On the other hill white-clad Muslim men streamed down while the valley echoed to the praise of God’s name from the mosque. Massacres – of the faithful at prayer, pregnant women and children – had a powerful terrorizing effect on the victims, but also bolstered their determination – so much so that reports were often exaggerated or even invented. Fire was frequently used to expel the population of an entire village. All minority enclaves were expelled in this manner. They fell under suspicion as potential fifth columnists for the enemy. Refugees from such expulsions would then be housed in the central mosques and churches of their own faith community where, every Friday and every Sunday, other worshippers saw their pitiful plight and rekindled their anger.

Ambon in flames – Sweet Ambon, the ‘Ambon Manise’ of so many love songs – this was a shock to the wider Indonesian public. Amid a flood of metropolitan press commentary generally decrying the loss of human values, a surprisingly large amount concretely identified a single material interest as the key issue, namely Christian–Muslim competition for access to the local state. This was a courageously open discourse about a sensitive topic, even if not all of it was well informed. The most explosive comment was the assertion in late January 1999 by moderate Muslim leader (and later president) Abdurrahman Wahid in Jakarta that the riot was caused by the governor planning to replace all 38 top provincial officials with Muslims. Wahid was irresponsibly quoting one of the many scurrilous pamphlets circulating in Ambon – this one apparently from October 1998. Yet he had put his finger on a sensitive spot. A rapid assessment of the Ambon conflict by a parliamentary delegation from Jakarta concluded early in February 1999 that ‘local people’ had arisen in protest against ‘immigrants’ who had taken over many jobs in the bureaucracy. In March, governor Saleh Latuconsina acknowledged that local elites had ‘systematically poisoned ordinary folk’s minds’ over the religion of office holders. At the same time the lower classes were unhappy over immigrants who increasingly controlled the markets. Sociologist Tamrin Amal Tomagola later said it more boldly when he traced the origins of the war to Christian disappointment at slowly losing influence in the bureaucracy. He mentioned the repeated failure of Christian candidates for high office – Freddy Latumahina for governor in 1992 and 1997 and Dicky Wattimena for a second
term as Ambon mayor after 1988. These elite Christian interests came together with the gripes of ordinary people in church. ‘In every church’, Tomagola wrote, ‘the Sunday sermon plants the awareness that the Christian community in Maluku is under threat of expulsion’. An internal military report in April 1999 similarly traced Christian unhappiness to the failure of Freddy Latumahina’s 1997 campaign.

In March 1999 things had quieted down sufficiently for the election campaign to proceed as planned. Unlike in Java, the parties did not light up Ambon with showy banners and rallies. Little was heard from the Muslim party leaders, who remained most concerned about security. (One exception was the tiny Partai Keadilan or PK. They regularly published information bulletins, ran a clinic and moreover stayed on after the election ensuring a much bigger vote for themselves in the next elections of 2004.) But PDI-P was upbeat and keen there be no delay. The campaign passed so peacefully that some suspicious observers wondered who was turning the tap of violence on and off. Nevertheless, one of them recalled, the parties seemed to benefit from the religious polarization. Big religious symbols suited the contentless floating mass approach they all retained from the New Order. The crisis presented them with an important mobilizational opportunity. They took care to present themselves as the most worthy protectors of the religious community. The PDI-P organized more of their ‘coordinating posts’ to symbolize their readiness to help the common people – this was the only party to have them. Muslim party leaders tried hard to arrange for about 60,000 Muslim voters who had fled Ambon for their homelands in Sulawesi to vote in Ambon. ‘If they do not return, it will benefit PDI-P in the election’, said PBB chairman Ali Fauzi, also based at the Al Fatah mosque. But the Muslims refugees did not vote in Ambon and PDI-P won a magnificent victory there.

After long delays in counting, the Jakarta government finally announced the election results on 21 July. The PDI-P had for long run neck-and-neck for last place with the Islamic party PPP in Golkar-dominated Ambon. Now it had won outright victory: 53 per cent of the Ambon vote, leaving Golkar with 19 and PPP with just 14 per cent. PDI-P was suddenly Ambon’s new establishment party. All the Maluku party branch appointees to the national and provincial parliaments were Christians, as were all but one of the Ambon municipal appointees. PDI-P Maluku chairman John Mailoa cheerfully invited the other party leaders to join him in commemorating the anniversary on 27 July of what to him was the great symbol of PDI-P resistance, the military attack on the PDI headquarters in Jakarta in 1996. The others, particularly disappointed Muslim party leaders, felt this was an invitation to help PDI-P celebrate its astonishing victory. On 23 July stones were thrown at Mailoa’s house, and soon serious fighting had broken out again, this time in the middle-class suburb of Poka, around Pattimura University on the northern side of Ambon bay.

When middle-class professionals began to fall victim to fighting that till now had claimed mainly members of the lower class, they grew more defiant and put out more irreconcilable statements than they had before. Each side worked harder at framing the issue to their own advantage. Ideological activity became part of
the repertoire that each side deployed. It aimed to solicit support from outsiders by linking Ambonese struggles to religious and political agendas more broadly conceived. But it also served to build internal cohesion by providing believers with a canonical account that justified their cause. Polemical literature by Ambonese on both sides increased in volume and vehemence. Both sides circulated videos on CD-ROM showing how the other side committed atrocities with the help of military or police. Much of it reached a very broad audience. Ambonese Muslims found a huge market for their views in the pro-Muslim Indonesian mediascape. The widely read, fundamentalist and notoriously one-sided magazine *Sabili* had been carrying numerous short pieces on the victimization of Muslims in Ambon since the beginning of the war, but now book-length works began to appear from Ambonese Muslims and those sympathetic to their plight (Djaelani 1999, 2001; Jaiz 1999; Kastor 2000a,b,c,d; Putuhena 1999; Suryanegara 1999; Tim penyusun Al-Mukmin 1999; Tuasikal 2000; Tim Penulis MUI 2000). Their polemical thrust was that Christians were at best suffering from sour grapes over losing their hegemony in Ambon, and at worst were disloyal to Indonesia, lackeys of foreign imperialists with separatist tendencies.

This literature of militant Islamic nationalism was new for Ambon. Christian disloyalty had long been whispered in Muslim Ambonese circles since the RMS revolt of 1950, but never out loud. The official image of Ambon was one of social harmony arising from custom (adat), rather than from religion. The image was the product of an establishment for many years dominated by Christians (Lee 1999: 91–7). *Ambon Manise* was the common trope in everything from official speeches to pop songs. Muslims had only won significant influence in the Maluku bureaucracy a few years before the outbreak of violence, and they were mostly technocrats. They had been unwilling to challenge the Ambon Manise clichés, until the literature of militant Islamic regimism produced by Rustam Kastor and others in 1999–2001.

The market for militant Christian ideological interpretations was much smaller in Indonesia, where they make up only a tenth of the population. Several Christian organizations had from the beginning produced chronologies for sympathizers on the Internet, which portrayed Christians as victims of Muslim fanaticism (Bräuchler 2003; Hill and Sen 2002; Spyer 2002). They produced books more slowly (Pattiradjawane and Abel 2000; Pieris 2004). A team of lawyers, mostly from the church GPM, wrote public letters to the UN Secretary General pleading for international intervention. In May 1999 the same team wrote a public letter to ‘Muslims who do not understand the situation in Maluku’, arguing that Muslims had struck first, and that the military had unlawfully given assistance to fanatical Muslims out to turn Indonesia into an Islamic state (Waileruny *et al.* 1999). Five months later, in October 1999, they issued it again for good measure. Thus each side made its appeal in the New Order idiom, marrying religion to power (Turner 2003). Their claims were entirely worldly, lacking even a hint of transcendence.

Militarily, according to my information, Christians were holding their own better than Muslims in Ambon city. Throughout the war Christians continued to control most of the city’s prime real estate, including almost all government
offices. Christians appeared to have better organizational resources – from propaganda to finance, from arms manufacture to a battlefield hierarchy. Muslims never properly overcame the diversity of local mosque organizations, each with its own charismatic leadership. The Muslim side repeatedly resorted to extreme intimidation of its own members in order to surmount these difficulties. When peace negotiations finally did begin in earnest late in 2001, Muslim members of the delegation suffered more than did Christians from fellow-believers who accused them of selling out.²⁹

Both sides, perhaps the Muslim more than the Christian, received significant help from ‘deserting’ soldiers and policemen. Numerous instances of uniformed men participating in the fighting have been documented (Azca 2003; International Crisis Group 2000b, 2002a,b). Rivalry between the military and the police, who were officially separated from the military from April 1999, was a major source of instability. In broad terms more police sided with Christians, while more soldiers sided with Muslims, but the cleavage lines within both the military and the police were more complex than this suggests.

Nevertheless, military assistance to the Muslim side did not significantly shift the strategic balance towards Muslims. Even the destruction of the large Silo church on 26 December 1999 did not have a major impact. This event occurred just 300 metres from the Al Fatah mosque and soldiers appeared to take sides in it. It was a major symbolic blow to Christians. Muslims remained trapped in the narrow run-down strip near the city’s harbour. Christians retaliated for the destruction of Silo by burning the nearby An-Nur mosque. Not till Laskar Jihad militias arrived from Java in May 2000 did the strategic balance begin to approach equivalence. Christians portrayed their arrival as a serious escalation of the war, but many Muslims often welcomed them because they promised security. Some of my Muslim informants continue to believe that only the arrival of the Laskar Jihad forced Christians to the negotiating table.

Laskar Jihad were mobilized in Java as a consequence of a train of events set in motion by the attack on the Silo church. Outrage over the destruction of Silo led Christians in Tobelo, North Maluku, to exact terrible revenge on Muslim militiamen from the neighbouring town of Galela (Bubandt 2001b; Duncan 2005). When news of massacres of innocents at two mosques on the outskirts of Tobelo reached the press in Java, it led to Muslim sympathy rallies organized by militant Islamist organizations. These then set up Laskar Jihad to help. Laskar Jihad and other militant groups enjoyed the high-level support of some factions within the military who, for their own reasons, were opposed to the election of President Abdurrahman Wahid in October 1999 (O’Rourke 2002: 340–9). Wahid was pushing the military to account for their crimes in East Timor the previous September, and the soldiers needed to create a distraction.

Exhausted by fighting that had left the city in ruins, the harbour empty, the economy paralyzed and refugee camps full a long series of meetings facilitated by various outside mediators finally turned to success in early 2002. An agreement was signed at Malino in South Sulawesi on 12 February (Böhm 2004; Malik 2003; Malik et al. 2003). Many bloody incidents of terror continued to occur – random
snipings, bombings and assassinations – some apparently linked to the military. But gradually a tenuous peace returned to Ambon. For all the fighting, no clear winner had emerged. Both Christians and Muslims continue to occupy key positions in the bureaucracy (no one is now interested in pursuing the question of proportions). All the noble ideals of reformasi had come to nought in Ambon. The bitter words of intellectual and presidential aspirant Amien Rais, spoken at the height of anger in January 2000, were an equal condemnation of the government and of ‘the people’: ‘If the Gus Dur government is unable to resolve the Ambon problem, the people will do it themselves. If that happens, the bells will toll for the death of this republic’.30

In conclusion, we have learned several important things about the way people were mobilized for the Maluku wars. The chapter began by focusing on perceptions of threat and opportunity, then moved to organizations that dealt with them. The repertoire of innovative action these employed fed back into threat/opportunity perceptions to renew the cycle. The value of this approach has been that vague cultural suggestions about Ambonese hot-headedness or religious intolerance have made way for a historically grounded, systematic account.

Second, Ambonese actors were central to this mobilizational process. The view that ‘Jakarta did it’, which is very popular in Ambon today, is untenable. It is understandable, for there is much shame in Ambon about what happened, and blaming someone else is good for reconciliation. Indeed, seen more broadly, Jakarta did do it. Everything centres in Jakarta – the military, New Order authoritarianism, money and Indonesia itself. The dynamic of post-authoritarian reformasi too, with its parties that connect with people only through big symbols, began in Jakarta. Yet only in a few places around Indonesia did this lead to extended violence. ‘Jakarta’ probably did not specially select Ambon for a conflagration.

Third, there is little evidence of a popular uprising against elite interests. This violent episode neither looked like a revolution (for example of Ambonese indigenous peoples as has sometime been suggested) nor even like a separatist movement. It had the darkly conservative character of what Ted Gurr called the ‘communal contenders’ conflict, in which elites merely wish to maintain or if possible increase their share of power in the state without fundamentally altering the nature of power relations (Gurr 1993). When democracy unexpectedly came to Indonesia after May 1998, the personalized state–society relations that characterized the polity unleashed forms of local elite competition that were communal rather than civil. This process has been well known since it was described by Olzak (1992). Ambon was vulnerable because its urban society is more dependent on the state for a living. The story of mobilization during Ambon’s wars illustrates how political competition within a state-dependent society can turn into religious warfare at moments of democratic transition if the state is weak.

Fourth, the challenger elite in this competition appeared to be Protestant Christians. The evidence comes mainly from the superior organizational resources they deployed. In their perception reformasi, through the PDI-P, offered the opportunity to turn back the clock on a period of eroding influence over
Ambon’s government. It is a painful conclusion, and it needs to be qualified in two ways. One, the Maluku wars were by no means one-sided. And two, it does seem no one actually planned to start a devastating civil war in Ambon.

This last qualification leads to an alternative possibility, which mobilization theory has failed thus far to consider. Unintended consequences are part and parcel of the theory, but it does not deal well with the idea that violence might essentially be a tragedy rather than politics by other means. One of the main rivals for mobilization theory that still gives a crucial role to organization is the ‘ethnic security dilemma’ (Collins 1998; Lake and Rothchild 1996; Posen 1993). The security dilemma was first discovered for relations between states by Herbert Butterfield. Its essence is the fear that arises when one must make a choice to cooperate with another party whose intentions one does not fully comprehend. ‘We intend them no harm’, is the thinking among participants, ‘but we are uncertain about what is in their mind, and they have the capacity to kill us’. Uncertainty breeds fear, this leads to worst-case suspicions, and eventually to the view that a first strike could be better than defence. Butterfield wrote that the ‘greatest war in history could be produced without the intervention of any great criminals who might be out to do deliberate harm in the world. It could be produced between two Powers both of which were desperately anxious to avoid a conflict of any sort’. Applied to relations between ethnic groups, especially when the state does not provide enough security, the security dilemma helps explain why small incidents can trigger major ethnic wars that no one intended. Barry Posen applied the concept to the wars in the former Yugoslavia. Could the fears described at the beginning of this chapter and the rapid escalation of fighting from a small incident (fighting moreover that everyone experienced as defensive rather than offensive) amount to a strong case for the ethnic security dilemma? Was Ambon essentially a tragedy? The idea sounds attractive. The atmosphere of fear in post-New Order Indonesia created by the failure of proper security measures by the state was exacerbated in Ambon by the millenarianism of a deeply religious society in the year with the mystical-sounding number 1999. A Hobbesian war of all against all seems to explain more than do the strategic calculations of organizers playing to high stakes. Certainly resource mobilizationists need to do more to understand the irrationality of fear, as described by social psychologists and collective behaviourists (Horowitz 2001: 35, 548). By lumping threats and opportunities together as if they were analogous invitations to action, Dynamics of contention does not consider how the threshold and scope for action change when threats dominate opportunities and the attribution of threat takes place under conditions of extreme insecurity.

Nevertheless, the Ambon wars, like the Yugoslav wars, did not occur because of threats alone. The ethnic security dilemma analysis fails to give a convincing account because it closes its eyes to the preceding history, as well as to the array of interests that gave shape not only to threats but also to distinct opportunities. The kill or be killed of a civil war is not only defensive but at the same time offensive, not only threat but also opportunity. The evidence that someone – invariably the other side, according to the participants themselves – was playing politics by other means is not imaginary. Christians in Ambon presented some credible
evidence that radical Muslims were seizing the opportunity to strike, Muslims that Christians were bucking the system because they were losing the influence they once enjoyed and both that the military wished to cause trouble for the country’s democratizing presidents Habibie and Wahid. So many people were seizing opportunities. To deny this is to play into the hands of those who prefer to sweep responsibility for what occurred under the carpet of forgetfulness. Which of these various groups were the most dangerous to peace in Ambon? If the argument based on mobilizational resources presented here bears up, then it leads first to local actors rather than to faraway Jakarta and second to the PDI-P–church connection as the challenger elite.
7 Polarization in North Maluku

Communal violence in North Maluku mostly took place in remote places, media coverage was sparser and it started early a year later than Ambon. This ensured it did not have quite the same shock value among the general public, although it did greatly disturb the most earnest Muslim Indonesians. The fighting was savage. The death toll here was the worst of all the episodes of post-New Order communal violence: almost 2,800 (Varshney, Panggabean and Tadjoeddin 2004) or a quarter of the total non-secessionist death toll around Indonesia. Horrifying video footage of bulldozers pushing hundreds of corpses into a mass grave at two mosques just outside Tobelo, North Halmahera, circulated all over Indonesia on VCDs. The Muslims, including many women and children, had been sheltering at the mosques at the end of December 1999 when Christian forces overwhelmed their fighters and slaughtered those inside. Two hundred thousand people were displaced (Norwegian Refugee Council 2002).

Such a war had never been seen in northern Maluku. Why did it happen now and like this? This chapter will ask a question about local leaders. Whether parliamentarians, civil servants, university lecturers, religious leaders or business people, they had all been part of the moderate centre in northern Maluku for years. After getting on tolerably well for so long, how and why did they now move apart towards an extreme? Dynamics of contention calls this process ‘polarization’ and defines it as a ‘widening [of] the political space between claimants in a contentious episode, and the gravitation of previously uncommitted or moderate actors to one or both extremes. It vacates the moderate centre’ (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 322). Polarization occurs when elites sense an opportunity or a threat. They begin to compete. Each competing faction builds up coalitions by engaging in brokerage of the kind we have discussed before. In order to influence more people to join their coalition while removing them as far as possible from the other side’s control, brokers on each side remind their listeners of certain key categories to describe both themselves and their rivals. This latter mechanism is sometimes called category formation. It is an ideological activity that draws its persuasive power from common popular ideas.

As in previous chapters, the aim is not to give a complete description of every conflictual process at work in North Maluku. As in Poso, here too conflict started small then escalated; as in Ambon, previously apathetic people were mobilized
for action. But in this chapter the focus is on leaders, especially in Ternate, who move towards the extremes after years of working together at the centre. It is a story of occasionally violent factional competition at a moment of transition. By proceeding in this way in each chapter, we gradually build up a picture of politics in crisis in several Indonesian provincial towns. The chapter begins by recounting how Ternate came, by the end of the New Order, to be governed by a modernizing elite, unified in a grand coalition under Golkar, symbol of Suharto’s hegemony. The sudden opening of democratic space in May 1998 created both opportunities and threats. The grand coalition came under increasing strain. Throughout 1999 different factions that had once worked together began to compete with each other. Each side was able to develop some common ideas floating in the population at large and turn them into ideologies of power (category formation). Lastly, each side engaged in brokerage to expand their militant coalition. In reality, all these things were happening at once, not sequentially, but it is helpful to separate them out for analytical purposes.

Unlike Ambon, the war in North Maluku all happened in a relatively short period. The map of violent incidents in northern Maluku in the years 1999 to 2001 is a bewildering patchwork of different arenas, interspersed with places that saw no trouble at all.

This chapter does not pretend the whole episode was ‘about’ only one thing, or that it was all controlled by a small number of leaders in Ternate. Some fought for their village, others for their home, to avenge their dead, or for someone or something they believed in. As the authority of the New Order collapsed, great areas of Maluku fell into numerous highly localistic struggles, first in the area around Ambon in the south, then in northern Maluku. The city of Ternate, on a small island off the west coast of Halmahera, was one of the most important focal points of the latter, but not the only one. Everyone felt they were fighting a desperate territorial war, in which various ‘we’s’ vied for symbolic domination. They went to war in small groups, but also sensed they were part of something bigger. Coalitions began to emerge, which aimed to control two main places. One of these was Ternate, the other was Tobelo, the region’s second largest town, on the northern tip of Halmahera.

Everything happened within earshot, as it were, of Christian–Muslim fighting in Ambon further south, which raged from January 1999. Much of it was between Christians and Muslims here too, but much was not. There were four main phases:

- The first skirmishes in central Halmahera in August 1999 were between two ethnic groups, the mixed Muslim–Christian indigenous Kao and the Muslim local immigrant Makian.
- In October 1999 the same Makian were attacked again and fled to nearby Ternate. Incensed by the miserable fate of the Makian, Muslim sympathizers attacked Christians in Ternate, who fled to majority-Christian areas elsewhere. Thus a local ethnic conflict had been transformed into a province-wide religious one.
- This (and developments in Ambon) triggered Christian–Muslim fighting around the Christian stronghold of Tobelo in the north in December 1999. Battles raged in remote areas for months.
When this in turn led to street fighting in the political heartland of Ternate for three days from 28 December, it was not between Christians and Muslims, but between Muslims and Muslims. From the point of view of provincial politics, this was the decisive battle, though it lasted only a few days.

Rebellion is not a characteristic of the political scene in Ternate, the region's biggest town. Both the RMS rebellion in Ambon in 1950 (Chauvel 1990), and the PRRI/Permesta (Pemerintah Revolusioner/Republik Indonesia/Perdjuangan Semesta) rebellion in Manado (North Sulawesi) in 1957 (Harvey 1977), did have an echo in Ternate, but in neither case did it cause much disruption. A movement in the 1960s to turn the district of North Maluku into a province of its own also failed. The argument in favour was strong, as the huge Maluku province, stretching from Australia to the Philippines, was difficult to administer. But Jakarta dismissed the idea as dangerous localism, akin to the disloyalty of the PRRI/Permesta rebellion. The movement died with the sultan of Ternate in 1975. His son, Mudaffar Syah, was co-opted by the New Order political machine Golkar (Fraassen 1987: I, 60–5). North Maluku district had an uninterrupted series of military district chiefs throughout the New Order.

The reasons for this political docility, inasmuch as they lie in Ternate rather than Jakarta, have much to do with the economy, which depended to a great extent on government money. Where in the 1950s Ternate still remained in the centuries-long doldrums created by the Dutch suppression of its spice trade in the seventeenth century, by the 1970s a different town was beginning to emerge. Ternate, capital of the district of North Maluku, was rapidly becoming a part of Indonesia. Improved road, sea and air transport increased traffic between village and town on the volcanic island of Ternate, from Ternate to the interior of Halmahera, and to Ambon, Manado and ultimately to Jakarta. But this was ‘modernization without industrialization’ (Kiem 1993: 60). Yes, one of Indonesia’s largest plywood factories was built just across the narrow strait from Ternate at Sidangoli, but most of its workers were immigrant Javanese. Outsiders similarly controlled frozen fish exports. By 1990, the occupational structure in Ternate was dominated by the government. Somewhat unreliable official statistics for 1990 had 38 per cent working in government services, or no less than 60 per cent of non-agricultural, non-fisheries employment (Kiem 1993: 60). A sectoral breakdown of the gross regional domestic product (GRDP) also shows a significantly greater dependence on government money than was the national average, though not as strong as these employment figures suggest. In the last pre-crisis year 1997, government services as a proportion of the non-agricultural and non-fisheries GRDP was 13 per cent, whereas trade was 31 per cent (BPS Kota Ternate 2002: 31). Certainly Ternate’s middle class was oriented strongly towards government. Graduates from the local university all hoped to become civil servants. The bureaucracy gave them preferred access, taking one or two hundred a year from a crop of a thousand. ‘Otherwise the students would revolt’, the former university rector told me. The town of Ternate continued to grow steadily throughout the New Order. Most growth occurred in southern Ternate, and was due to in-migration from elsewhere in Indonesia (Kiem 1993: 58).
Steady urbanization driven by government money produced an urban middle class for whom the government was important. This is a recurring feature of provincial towns outside Java. It has implications for the communal violence that erupted after 1998, as shown in Chapter 3.

Political institutions were modernized as well. The Dutch had built their authority on the institutions of indirect rule through the two pre-colonial sultanates of Ternate and Tidore. The early republic had continued to tolerate the sultans, but the New Order finally swept them away. In its place came a uniform, centralized administration. Van Fraassen did his research at this time and concluded that the customs of the Ternatan sultanate ‘survive only in folklore, not as politically significant elements’ (Fraassen 1984: 781). Religion was also ruled out of order as a political principle. In the last pre-New Order elections, held in 1955, North Maluku’s voters had overwhelmingly chosen religious parties (Islamic Masjumi 45 per cent, Protestant Parkindo 22 per cent) (Alfian 1971: 157–60). But in 1971 the secular developmentalist Golkar election machine easily won the first New Order election throughout Indonesia, and also in North Maluku district. Although, as everywhere, intimidation and manipulation were keys to Golkar’s success, the result could not have been achieved without local elite cooperation. Golkar dominance continued to grow throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Kiem 1993: 188). Resistance by the Islamic party PPP proved increasingly futile, even in the local heartland of immigrant-dominated southern Ternate. As late as 1997, with the New Order increasingly in disarray as Suharto began to lose his grip, the region still delivered an overwhelming Golkar victory of around 85 per cent. North Maluku had by this time been split into two districts, named North Maluku (83 per cent Golkar) and Central Halmahera (87 per cent Golkar). Thus by the end of the New Order the region had been governed for a quarter of a century by a Golkar coalition so large it had no serious rivals. Most of the district’s elite was part of it. The military served as its masters and patrons. It was this grand coalition that came under increasing strain after May 1998, until it collapsed in the street wars of late December 1999.

The currency crisis did not cause economic collapse in North Maluku, but it did seriously affect building contractors as the price of materials shot up from late 1997. The industry took a nosedive in 1999 and stayed down for several years (BPS Kota Ternate 2002: 31). Since they both lived mainly from government money Golkar and the building industry had a symbiotic relationship and it is easy to imagine that the economic crisis created friction within the party as the cash flow slowed to a trickle.

The first political crisis came on 21 May 1998, the day the president resigned in Jakarta. Massive street protests in every city of Indonesia heaped abuse on the New Order – on Golkar’s ‘arrogance’, on the military’s human rights abuse, Suharto’s cronyism, the judges’ corruption and on Jakarta’s centralism. Frantic efforts by reformists within Golkar did by late 1998 make the party look less like a military-backed machine and more like a civilian-led party willing to compete on its merits in the coming election. But even the most loyal insiders knew Golkar could not win a clear majority against its two New Order rivals (PDI-P and PPP)
and dozens of upstart new parties. In Ternate, too, the long months between the sudden crisis of May 1998 and its resolution in the ballot box in June 1999 were filled with uncertainty for the many members of the Golkar coalition. This was a period of threat, but also of opportunity. Neither was of their making. Developments in Jakarta had thrust them into their laps.

Like students everywhere in 1998, university students in Ternate demonstrated frequently. Most belonged to the Golkar youth organization KNPI or to the Islamic students organization HMI that was also close to Golkar or to both. They shouted that the North Maluku district chief, a retired military officer, was corrupt and should resign. At the end of June 1998, demonstrators occupied the district chief’s office in Ternate and wrecked it. Fortunately for the young rioters they had allies. Indeed they were of such calibre that the affair began to look less like an act of popular resistance than embryonic internal Golkar factional competition. Although the district chief’s office was located next to the military district commander’s office (komandan kodim), the military did nothing to stop the attack. The commander apparently had his own reasons for wanting to trip up the district chief, who was himself also a military man but retired from active service. Rumour had it the district chief had opposed an army gold mining operation on Obi Island. The military state budget does not stretch far and all military units conduct business operations of this sort to pay the bills. This practice is highly detrimental to the military’s effectiveness as an internal security force, since it ensures they are usually too entangled in the businesses, personalities and ideologies of one or another elite faction to do their job. One of these business partners was the sultan of Ternate, who by now also had his gripes with the district chief. Consequently, the military did not object when the sultan allowed his own youth organization Gemusba (of which more later) to take part in the attack on the district chief’s office. By thus reneging on their duty to maintain order, the security forces helped expand the threats and the opportunities that every political player in Ternate faced.

These internal grumbles notwithstanding, the big Golkar coalition won a fresh lease of life in October 1998 when it took on a new project: the revived struggle for a North Maluku province. At a conference to provide input to the Interior Minister in Jakarta for the upcoming special session of the MPR, the locally well-known HMI activist Syaiful Bahri Ruray proposed there should be a new province called North Maluku. Behind the scenes the idea had come from Central Halmahera district chief Bahar Andili. It fired the imagination of all and triggered a wave of local nationalism and unity. Veterans of the 1960s campaign for North Maluku’s provincehood were once more feted for their heroism. The students shook hands with their former foe the district chief of North Maluku. He disarmed them by acknowledging he had indeed been corrupt but had used the money for a good purpose, namely the Golkar election slush fund. Committees were formed, more meetings were held. In December a delegation of students calling themselves FPPMU (Forum Pemuda Pelajar Mahasiswa Maluku Utara, North Maluku Youth, Pupil and Student Forum) travelled first to the existing provincial capital Ambon for talks and demonstrations, then to Jakarta. They talked up anyone who
would listen, especially North Malukans in high places. A parliamentary delegation, called the Team of Nine, followed in January. All three district chiefs whose areas were to be part of the province – North Maluku, Central Halmahera and Ternate Town (which was by this time also a district of its own) – gave their support.

This was the first movement for a new province in post-New Order Indonesia (several others sprang up soon after), and it was exhilarating. The campaigners believed President Habibie’s reformist programme and his eastern Indonesian origins offered them a window of opportunity. If Habibie was replaced by the centralist Megawati Sukarnoputri at the October 1999 session of the new MPR, as seemed likely because of her popularity, the window would close. When the students learned in January 1999 that Habibie had offered the East Timorese a referendum on their future association with Indonesia, they piled on the pressure by demanding one too. Demonstration after demonstration – each time they sensed hesitation in Jakarta – took place in front of North Maluku’s district chief office in Ternate, which became a kind of street parliament.

President Habibie had an interest in granting the new province. A few extra Golkar seats from a friendly new province might just give him the edge at the upcoming MPR session. On 23 April 1999 a board run by Habibie to make legal reforms decided Maluku would be divided into two provinces after the June 1999 election. But some other government players in Jakarta remained sceptical – including a crucial parliamentary commission that had to approve it. Demonstrations therefore continued, culminating in one so large on 26 June 1999 it made the national press.

A few days before Habibie lost his presidency in October, he signed a law declaring North Maluku a new province (Law 46/1999, 4 October 1999). The law took into account the various interests of North Maluku’s elites. By this time those elites were beginning to gravitate towards two clusters, one around the energetic but sometimes erratic sultan of Ternate and a loose cluster opposed to him. The province was to be called North Maluku, and not the more traditionally sounding Maluku Kie Raha that the sultan preferred. On the other hand the capital stayed in Ternate for now, as the sultan wished, though it was later to move to the village of Sofifi in Central Halmahera, as his opponents wanted. Democracy was part of it too. The law specified that a new provincial parliament would be filled through special local elections. This parliament would in turn elect the province’s first governor.

The impending administrative changes promised to reward everyone with new jobs and facilities. Control over routine government funding was about to pass to the lower levels under decentralization rules being widely discussed at the time. Substantial start-up funds for the new province would come on top of that. Law 46/1999 was a building contractor’s dream. Not merely a slew of new government offices, but an entirely new provincial capital city would be up for tender. Several new districts were in the making as well, although Law 46/1999 postponed the decision about these until after the local elections. The same attractive considerations applied to the new districts – unprecedented control over routine funding, plus start-up funds for new district capitals (to be located in some remote places).
The fine print of the decentralization regulations had not yet been written and no one was interested in anti-corruption measures.

Its mission in Jakarta achieved, the big Golkar coalition now faced a serious crisis within. Competition grew over who should control the new province. The decisive moment was the competitive mid-2000 local election for control of the province. Under the New Order, few meaningful decisions had to be made since Jakarta always had the last word. But those days had passed. Unless it shed some members, the Golkar coalition would be too ungainly to take any real decisions, particularly on the question of who would be boss in the new, democratic era of increasing local autonomy. Naturally this was not a painless exercise. Those who were squeezed out were sure to form a rival coalition. Rather than appeal to the middle, each emerging faction moved deliberately to an extreme. They brokered links with supposedly influential local groups, blackballed their rivals using culturally available stereotypes and threatened physical violence. The ideological work they did was particularly challenging, because it had to respond to the vagaries of coalition building partly beyond their control. These were dangerous times.

Before continuing to explore the dynamics of this developing factionalism within Golkar in Ternate, we pause to consider the challenges they faced when doing this ideological work. We cannot do this without returning to another theoretical device often used in social movement studies, namely the notion of framing (previously discussed in Chapters 4 and 6). This provides the connection between the goals the small number of leaders have in their heads and what the great mass of people think and believe. Ideological work by political activists, commonly called framing, involves trying to focus popular attention on a particular problem in a specific way. It is only effective if it makes some connection with larger ideas floating around in society. These bigger ideas are beyond their control. Gamson (1988) called them ‘cultural themes’. Change comes about because not everyone believes the same thing. Most are content to be conventional, but some fervently believe in a radical alternative. Themes coexist dialectically within a society. There is no theme without a counter-theme. A theme is conventional and normative, whereas a counter-theme is adversarial and contentious.

Ternate at the end of the New Order also had its theme and counter-theme. The normative theme was observance of the traditional hierarchy of customs. The New Order may have been a modernizing and centralizing regime, but its concern for stability always led it to support quiescent notions of tradition. The central figure in this theme was the sultan of Ternate who, as we saw, had been domesticated by the New Order since the mid-1970s. Mudaffar Syah was a key player in the grand Golkar coalition in northern Maluku. His father had been North Maluku’s most prestigious traditional ruler in living memory. His family represented the establishment. Biographies of his father, whether scholarly (Djafaar 1999) or a popular school text (Hamzah 1983), reflected the theme that defined social reality. All the standard texts on Ternatan history gave the sultan a central place (Abdulrahman 2002; Abdulrahman et al. 2001; Amal and Djafaar 2003; Hasan 2001). A popular novel featuring the sultans of Ternate and Tidore in history is still often quoted today (Mangunwijaya 1987). Golkar had co-opted
the traditional deference Mudaffar Syah enjoyed by flying him once every 5 years from his home in Jakarta to appear at election rallies in Ternate. Thus Golkar perpetuated a mythology of benevolent indirect rule, even though in reality the sultanate had long been forced to give up its administrative powers. Successive district military commanders, usually newcomers, had also cultivated good relations with him. They supposed he had the authority to command his subjects on their behalf.

In reality the sultan’s moral authority was limited. It was a product of a complex history of outside meddling in the region in which he was not the only local player. Colonial indirect rule had drawn the geographical boundaries of his domain and had ensured that even within his domain his authority waxed and waned. The line that in 1999 separated a ‘sultan-minded’ northern half of Ternate from a more cosmopolitan, Islamic southern half was known to everyone in the town. Its history went back to the seventeenth century. Successive powers had periodically refreshed it (Fraassen 1999). Over the centuries Ternatans have had to put up successively with the clove-greedy Portuguese, the Spanish, the Dutch and later with republican Jakarta. After an unpleasant experience led them to expel the Portuguese in the late sixteenth century, the Spanish invaded in 1606. The Ternatans then appealed to the Dutch, who seized the northern and eastern half of the island the following year. But for nearly 60 years the Spanish retained the southern half, as well as the island of Tidore just to the south (where the sultan was a Spanish ally). Thus the cultural boundary across Ternate Island was born from imperial rivalry seeking local partners. Even after the Spanish left in 1663, the Dutch treated the northern half as a self-ruled entity under the sultan of Ternate, whereas the southern half of Ternate and the whole of Tidore they ruled directly. Immigrant traders – Europeans, Arabs, Chinese, Makassarese – were permitted to settle only in the south. Linguistic differences remain even today – only in the north does the original Ternatan language still hold out against the ubiquitous Indonesian. The boundary was formalized in a nineteenth-century administrative division and continued to reappear on maps after that. Extended eastward, it divided Halmahera into a northern and a southern half. When the district of Central Halmahera was carved out of the North Maluku district in 1990, it once more followed this same symbolically charged boundary.

Meanwhile the sultan’s political authority fell more often than it rose on the tides of history. Dethroned in a modernizing move in 1914, the Dutch restored him in a retraditionalizing one in 1929 (after the communist uprising in 1926/27 had persuaded colonial conservatives that modernity only produced social disintegration). The yo-yo movement continued after independence. Republican nationalists distrusted the sultan, and they placed him under house arrest in Jakarta in 1950 for being too close to separatist rebels (Fraassen 1999: 57–8). The New Order was more pragmatic and made his son a Golkar parliamentarian in Jakarta, useful mainly at election times. In the mid-1990s, as the immanent departure of the ageing President Suharto increased a national sense of foreboding and opportunity, Sultan Mudaffar Syah had begun to speak out about the stabilizing and unifying virtues of custom (adat). He had the initial support of
the North Maluku district chief to do this. Moral claim-staking was on the rise. He was a key initiative taker at a conference of sultans in 1995 and was among the most outspoken members at subsequent conferences of sultans. He clearly hoped traditional authority would make a comeback in the post-Suharto era.10

Opposed to this theme of traditional deference, a counter-theme had long been germinating in Ternate. This was about middle-class democracy and cosmopolitanism, but combined with a literalistic Islamic faith. It was a kind of Protestant ethic of capitalism, typical of harbour and trading communities around the country (Kiem 1993). Although it was an oppositional theme, associated with the Islamic political party Masjumi later banned by Sukarno, as well as with the PPP marginalized by Suharto, it did have many adherents in the southern part of Ternate and in Tidore. This was nominally the domain of the sultan of Tidore, but he had suffered centuries of insignificance for fatally backing the losing Spanish against the Dutch in the seventeenth century. In 1967 the incumbent sultan of Tidore died and no one thought it worthwhile to find a successor, until 1999. Throughout the 1990s, Indonesian political culture had shifted away from traditional deference towards this Islamic ethic (Hefner 2000). An increasing number of top New Order officials had been nurtured in the HMI, the student association that functioned as the vehicle of choice for upwardly mobile believers in the Islamic counter-theme. With KNPI, the HMI had produced most of Golkar’s cadres in recent years, also in the regions outside Java (Hefner 2000; Shiraishi 2002). They represented a rising generation of post-1965 urban intellectuals who valued modernity yet were serious about their faith. Golkar’s national chairman Akbar Tanjung, for example, was a HMI graduate. In Ternate after the New Order, the key figure to whom this rising generation looked was Bahar Andili, the district chief of Central Halmahera (which had been carved out of North Maluku district in 1990). Although both he and the sultan of Ternate belonged to Ternate’s politically docile ruling elite, their slightly different social networks were to prove crucial when tension rose between them. Each was associated with an ideological ‘theme’ that was directly opposed to the other. These lent them their verbal repertoires in the dramaturgy of anger that was to follow.

We now return to the key actors in Ternate. Bahar Andili, the Central Halmahera district chief, was a bureaucrat. He had previously directed the regional planning board Bappeda. He was also an ethnic Makian. The rocky soils and a dangerously active volcano on the small island of Makian some distance south of Ternate had since colonial times produced a steady exodus of enterprising Makians, who sought their future in education and the bureaucracy (G. R. E. Lucardie in Masinambow 1979). As a result, ethnic Makian held many of the top executive jobs in the northern Maluku region. Besides district chief Bahar Andili of Central Halmahera his younger brother Syamsir Andili ran the city of Ternate, which had been carved out of North Maluku as the region’s third district towards the end of the New Order. They owed their success not to aristocratic connections with the sultanate but to hard work and helping each other. Many of the most motivated students at Ternate’s leading Khairun University and the Islamic college STAIN were also Makian. Together with a similarly driven group of
students from the island of Kayoa near Makian, they had formed the ethnic student association Makayoa, which was to be an important actor in the events of 1999. 

Not that the Makian activists identified only or even mainly with their ethnic group. More significant for building broader relationships was their membership of HMI and KNPI. The group around Bahar Andili therefore – Makian, HMI, Golkar, as well as southern Ternate/Tidore – formed a challenger elite who no longer accepted the symbolic primacy of the sultan of Ternate. Since at least the 1970s, a more orthodox form of ‘reformist’ Islam had been growing in influence among the younger generation particularly in southern Ternate. A ‘pure’ religion, egalitarian because it was not admixed with the heathen veneration of kings, became the counter-theme opposed to the conventional sultanist theme mentioned above (Kiem 1993: 103). Once the street fighting was over and this challenger elite had shown its mettle, it produced more revisionist historical literature, in which North Malukans braved the colonial powers without having need of a sultan, indeed in which the sultan belonged to the colonial infrastructure (Kotambunan 2003).

The first hostile competitive moves inside the Golkar coalition had come nearly a year before the big break of October 1999. In December 1998 Mudaffar Syah arranged to have himself elected chairman of the North Maluku branch of Golkar. The meeting had actually voted for another candidate (Abdul Kahar Limatahu), but militant ‘palace guards’ loyal to the sultan had surrounded the hall and shouted so insistently that the decision was changed (Streit 2002: 66). This put Mudaffar Syah in a good position to control the Golkar coalition at a critical moment of democratization. Some of the student demonstrators who had earlier regarded him as an ally against the North Maluku district chief now grew suspicious that he was about to step out of the powerless symbolic role the New Order had assigned to him. They went to ask what he wanted in this new era of democracy, and he told them: ‘I must have somewhere to stand.’ Indeed, he soon won the chairmanship of the North Maluku district assembly. Now he had the final say on who would go to the June 1999 elections on a Golkar ticket. With the new North Maluku province almost a foregone conclusion, this put him in the best position to call all the shots. He began by trimming the fat from the grand Golkar coalition. When in mid-May 1999 the tentative list appeared of Golkar candidates for the district election, all Mudaffar’s rivals had been excluded. Chief among these excluded rivals was the energetic Syaiful Bahri Ruray, an ethnic Makian and hero to the Khairun University students. The latter now began to demonstrate openly against the sultan, for example, when he went to Kayoa Island soon after.

Besides chairing the North Maluku Golkar branch and the district assembly, the sultan had yet another card up his sleeve – physical force. The Sultan Babullah Younger Generation (Generasi Muda Sultan Babullah, Gemusba) described itself as a ‘traditional palace guard’, and claimed the aura of custom that surrounded the sultan in the establishment theme. However, as the post-New Order contradictions sharpened, the theme of traditional deference acquired an increasingly militant edge in the framing ideological activity of its supporters. Gemusba was one of the means for mobilizing support for the sultan within society. Its leaders
described the culture of the villages from which Gemusba’s members were drawn as ‘fanatically loyal’ to him. These villages were located in the geographical area regarded as his ‘domain’ – places such as Hiri Island off Ternate’s north-west tip, and Kao and Tobelo both on Halmahera (the latter largely Christian). In reality Gemusba was no grass-roots adat organization. It had solid connections with Golkar and the military. It was Gemusba who intimidated the meeting that elected Mudaffar to the Golkar chair. Established in September 1998 under the leadership of Mudaffar’s son, it drew heavily on the Golkar youth arm. Its banners and shirts were in the yellow of Golkar, not the green of the sultanate. In November 1999 the local military commander, who still supported the sultan at this time as we saw, asked Gemusba to go onto the streets as a militia to ‘keep the peace’. This led to fighting, on which more later.

The loose but growing anti-Mudaffar coalition had meanwhile not been idle. They felt themselves to be the champions of the popular campaign for a North Maluku province that Syaiful Bahri Ruray had kicked off in October 1998. Like the sultan, they had to look for allies outside the increasingly problematic confines of Golkar. Thus their brokers, too, were busy expanding their constituency on the ground by means of ideological activity. They had to bridge their concerns with those of potential allies, and these were likely to be localistic concerns. The first opportunity to expand the coalition arose in early 1999. Just across the narrow strait from Ternate, at a place on Halmahera called Malifut, there lived a large concentration of Makian farmers. The government had moved them there in the 1970s for their own safety when it seemed the volcano on Makian Island might explode. They became neighbours with a Kao community, who tended to view them as aggressive newcomers. This suspicion only grew when the better-connected Makian attempted to carve out their own administrative sub-district (kecamatan) for themselves. After May 1998, inter-village tensions rose all around Indonesia, for all kinds of reasons, and so they did in Halmahera, especially after the religious wars broke out in Ambon in January 1999. Villagers carrying machetes manned checkpoints along the only road that ran through Malifut and that continued up the east coast of northern Halmahera. In April 1999 the Makian in Malifut complained to their ethnic city cousins in Ternate that they felt threatened by the Kao. They were thus effectively asking to join the emerging Makian/HMI coalition. HMI in Ternate responded enthusiastically to this opportunity. They viewed the Kao as ‘Mudaffar’s pawns’, and repeatedly asked the North Maluku police chief to disarm them. Makayoa, the Makian–Kayoa student association, also became involved. Thus Malifut became the first test of strength between the pared-down Golkar coalition under Mudaffar Syah and an emerging challenger coalition of disaffected Golkar members based in southern Ternate.

Mudaffar’s Golkar was in trouble. It had suffered a blow during the June 1999 elections. Golkar’s share of the vote in North Maluku had been halved to 42 per cent compared with the last New Order election. In Central Halmahera it had declined only a little less to 50 per cent. However, the two other New Order parties, PDI-P and PPP, had divided most of the disaffected votes between them.
This meant Golkar was still easily the biggest party, though it no longer enjoyed an absolute majority in the crucial district of North Maluku.

Violent contention was not far off. The battle for Malifut was complex because the competing parties involved had varying interests. Long-standing inter-village suspicions, fuelled by stories of fighting in Ambon, were now overlaid by a newfound obsession with administrative boundaries among rival city elites. For there was more to Malifut than merely a clash of cultures between the sultan of Ternate and the HMI generation opposed to him. The new province of North Maluku involved more boundary renegotiation than might meet an outsider’s eye. Where would the provincial capital be built? The answer carried symbolic and especially financial import. An additional five new districts were under discussion as well, each with its own capital. The law, moreover, said that a new district could only be created from three or more existing sub-districts, while a viable sub-district had to have a certain number of villages in it. Every boundary revision higher up created a ripple effect further down. This is what gave fresh urgency to the long-standing Makian desire to create a new sub-district of Makian-Malifut, which would comprise the Makian farmers’ territory plus several Kao villages. Makian-Malifut – note the ethnic name, sure to offend the Kao – could be part of a new Makian district. It could possibly even host the provincial capital. Both would bring the rewards of the new province closer to the Makian reach.

To complicate matters even more, a mainly Australian company PT Nusa Halmahera Minerals (NHM) had found gold at Gosowong, in the Kao sub-district near the disputed boundary. The mine was scheduled to open in mid-1999. Although it would run for only 4 years, the locals imagined it would bring great benefits to the sub-district where it lay – preferred employment for labourers, infrastructural spin-offs, and (who knows?) taxes under the fervently hoped-for decentralization laws. Short-term and self-interested behaviour was the norm in the populist atmosphere of those days.

On 24 June the government in Jakarta, at the request of the North Maluku district chief, issued a regulation (known as PP 42/99) creating the new sub-district of Makian-Malifut. District government teams were sent to ‘socialize’ the issue to the Kao villages concerned. The Kao, who felt bypassed, gave them a hostile reception. The ethnic student society Makayoa in Ternate took up the gauntlet. They threatened the Kao on local state radio: ‘Whoever tries to prevent the implementation of regulation 42/99 will face the Makayoa students’ (Hulaleng 2000). When the new sub-district head arrived at Malifut on 18 August 1999 to take up his job, threatening over a loudspeaker to expel any who still baulked, he was met with physical resistance by the Kao. Fighting left several dead over the next few days (Jusuf 1999). This was the first communal violence in North Maluku.

The North Maluku district chief then asked Sultan Mudaffar to accompany him to the trouble spot on 21 August to try to calm things down. However, Mudaffar made use of the opportunity to advance his own coalition-building agenda. According to Christian Kao locals, he spoke the inflammatory words: ‘I have
a black dog, and now someone has woken it.’ He promised to take Kao concerns to the government, thus setting himself up as a Kao supporter in Makian eyes. A local Kao elite group meanwhile decided they would make it their goal to remove all the Makian from the area, whether by diplomacy, the courts or if need be by violent means. Although they did try them, the group quickly concluded that the first two options were exhausted, and they began to conduct a guerrilla campaign, punctuated by magic, to force the Makian to leave (Duncan 2005: 13–14).

Two months later the North Maluku province was a legal fact requiring immediate implementation. Malifut was part of the chain of implementation. This was the moment of decision. Who was in charge of the new province? At this point the black dog bit back. On Sunday evening, 24 October, Kao forces led by a man named Benny Bitjara struck back after a threatening border incursion by Makian that morning. Every Makian house in the area was burned to the ground. All 17,000 Makian fled west across the water to southern Ternate and Tidore. The first round had gone to Sultan Mudaffar.

The sight of such a flood of refugees pouring off the boats sparked anger in Ternate and Tidore. The Makian/HMI anti-Mudaffar activists seized this moment to expand their ranks. They built alliances with radical Muslim activists, and, crucially, they changed their message from an ethnic Makian to a religious Islamic one. The details remain unclear, but meetings were held in southern Ternate that included the production of a provocative brochure. This was a letter, forged to look as if it had been written by the synod chairman of the church in Ambon, urging Christians in Tobelo to ‘take over’ in Halmahera, in response to the earlier bloodshed. Although easily detectable as a forgery to anyone who knew about the church, it was widely distributed. In an information-poor environment such as North Maluku, it made a big impression on many Muslims. This technique of provocation was widely used in the Indonesian conflicts – also in Poso at about the same time.

Christians began to fall victim to incidents of mob violence, first in Tidore on 3 November 1999, then in southern Ternate on 6 November (Hulaleng 2000; Jusuf 1999; Karianga et al. 1999). Frightened Christians began to leave the two islands for majority-Christian areas, mostly to North Sulawesi across the sea to the west. Soon Ternate was cleansed of Christians, as Malifut had earlier been cleansed of its Muslim Makian and as Ambon had been cleansed earlier that year of tens of thousands of its Muslim Butonese. Pre-conflict statistics show that most Christians on Ternate had lived in South Ternate, where about 10,000 of them made up a fifth of the population. Their departure robbed Ternate of much its middle class – teachers, shopkeepers and professionals. One commonly heard version of why the Christians were expelled was that their absence would help tip the balance away from Mudaffar Syah in the planned June 2000 local elections – just as Butonese had to be removed from Ambon ahead of the June 1999 elections to tip the balance towards Christian interests.

The second urban concentration in northern Maluku is Tobelo, at the northern tip of Halmahera. This is a largely Christian town, the heart of the sizeable
Evangelical Messiah Church of Halmahera (Gereja Masehi Injili Halmahera, GMIH). Like the GKST in Poso, it had grown from an intensive missionary effort just as the modern colonial state was penetrating this tribal society (Haire 1981). Northern Halmahera became a third arena of conflict in northern Maluku, after Kao–Malifut and Ternate–Tidore. Just as threatening developments early in 1999 had led the Makian in Malifut to look for help to the embryonic HMI/Makian coalition in Ternate, so some key people in Tobelo began to look to Ternate as well. Christian–Muslim fighting in Ambon had made them fear being isolated as Christians in a Muslim society. A better integrative principle than religion, they began to feel, was trans-religious adat, of which the sultan of Ternate had been a long-standing advocate. They formed new organizations, ideologically aligned with the sultan of Ternate.20 At the same time, Christian elites in Tobelo began to demand that all people of Tidore, Makian and Kayoa descent leave the Tobelo sub-district. When the Sultan of Ternate came to Tobelo on 7 December for a meeting and rally, the proceedings had ‘overtones of Christian power’. Some Muslims weakly countered by demanding that Ambonese Christians leave town. Christians and Muslims began to arm themselves (Duncan 2005: 21–2).

On 26 December, the day after Christmas, Tobelo Christians heard about the burning of the Silo church in Ambon (Bubandt 2001b). Stone-throwing incidents around town escalated into a battle that was at first won by the numerically superior Muslims. However, Christian forces, aided by Kao allies and again led by Benny Bitjara (or Benny Doro after his village of origin), successfully counter-attacked the next day and took control of the town. They set to work with grisly determination. They killed hundreds of Muslim men, women and children in several massacres. The two most notorious ones took place on the outskirts of Tobelo: one at Togoliua to the south on 29 December and another at Popilo to the northwest on 31 December 1999 (Ahmad and Oesman 2000: 57–80). This is when the largest number of deaths in the entire North Maluku conflict occurred.21 Fighting was to continue in northern Halmahera for many months (Duncan 2005). Rival militias, known as Red (Christian) and White (Muslim), surged across the terrain, capturing, losing and recapturing swathes of countryside, unchecked by military or police. The destruction of homes, houses of worship, businesses and offices reached fearsome levels especially in Galela, west of Tobelo. The results differed little from the destruction of East Timor a couple of months earlier, yet the war in northern Halmahera attracted almost no attention in the world press. It only ended through the courageous peacemaking efforts of citizens in northern Halmahera, who began to put out feelers to each other in August 2000 and achieved an agreement to cease hostilities by June the following year.22 News of fighting around Tobelo on 26 December instantly reached Ternate and Tidore. Muslims in Galela, just west of Tobelo, had contact with Islamic groups in south Ternate. Outrage among the Islamic coalition, which by this time was known as the Whites, had been growing against the sultan of Ternate’s loyalists, known as the Yellows, since the previous November. The military, as we saw, had irresponsibly asked the sultan’s Gemusba goons to help ‘secure’ Ternate city against unrest. After the 6 November attacks on Christians in Ternate,
police and military chiefs in Ternate asked the sultan to ‘bring out his people’. Ill-mannered thugs from out of town had been stopping traffic and aggressively demanding to see identity cards. News that Christian Reds, regarded as allies of the sultan (whose colour was Yellow), had attacked Tobelo Muslims, now steeled the Whites to make their move on the sultan.

The White coalition increasingly drew its members from mosques in southern Ternate (Toboko and Mangga Dua) and from villages on Tidore with a reputation for militancy. Their commander was Abubakar Wahid, a retired education department official from Tidore. Significant intellectual leadership came from Wahdah Zainal Imam, chairman of the Maluku Islamic Defence Front (FPI Maluku) and a lawyer close to the Islamic party PPP at the time. One consequence of the increasing polarization in Ternate had been that the leadership initiative passed from Makian students and bureaucrats espousing democracy to militant religious leaders espousing war against infidels. The link was that the Golkar politicians marginalized by Mudaffar Syah had made approaches to PPP. All over Indonesia in 1999 it was a foolish Golkar member who did not at least contemplate jumping ship. A similar phenomenon of secular Golkar cadres looking for allies among religious groups had led to religious radicalization in Poso and in Ambon, as we saw in previous chapters.

To the surprise of the police and military, their Yellow proxies fared badly when fighting broke out on 26 December 1999. By the 28th hostilities had escalated to full-scale battles. Yellow was driven back from its strongholds in the suburbs of Tanah Tinggi and Kampung Pisang and retreated north. The next day fighting raged all day, leaving 29 dead and 39 seriously injured (Bupati Maluku Utara 2000). By late afternoon the Yellow troops had retreated into the sultan’s palace, where the sultan himself was apparently forced to remove and burn his ceremonial clothes before being allowed to flee to North Sulawesi (Bubandt 2001a,b). White troops conducted a victory parade, burning houses and churches. Ternate then became, according to one eyewitness, ‘one big blacksmith shop’ as people set about preparing weapons to go to the aid of their Muslim brethren in northern Halmahera.

The outcome represented a power shift within Ternate, away from Yellow and towards White. Building on national outrage over the massacres in Tobelo, the sultan’s opponents held demonstrative rallies in Ternate and even in Jakarta. A huge religious rally in Jakarta on 7 January 2000 roared ‘Jihad! Jihad!’ It was attended by prominent opposition politicians, who put pressure on President Abdurrahman Wahid to take a tougher line. As much as 3 months later, in April, White commander Abubakar Wahid was still able to mobilize a rally of many thousands of ‘jihad troops’ in Ternate. The sultan of Ternate was the biggest loser. The military and police turned away from him. His opponents in January 2000 moved successfully to remove him from the district assembly chair. He was replaced by Syaiful Bahri Ruray, the young Golkar activist whom he had earlier tried to exclude. Ruray had been elected to this assembly in the June 1999 elections despite Mudaffar’s initial lack of cooperation. Mudaffar’s son-in-law Zulkarnain Soleman, the commander of Gemusba, went underground for his own safety.
This was not the end of the violent conflict in North Maluku, but the end of the process of polarization we set out to analyse in this chapter. Even after fighting gradually ebbed into exhaustion in northern Halmahera by mid-2001, the political process to elect a governor for the new province remained filled with tension. Jakarta imposed a security blanket and closely supervised proceedings. In the end, few of those who had played a prominent role in the contentions of 1999 reaped a major reward. Maluku and North Maluku passed under martial law at the end of December 1999. The local elections towards which every faction had been aiming were cancelled as too volatile. In its place Jakarta brought down a law specifying that the first provincial assembly would be chosen on the basis of the results of the 1999 elections (Law 6/2000, June 2000).

Mudaffar Syah, weakened by his defeat of 29 December 1999, at first continued to work his Golkar connections. When the province finally had its own parliament in November 2000, he put himself forward as gubernatorial candidate. However, Jakarta scrubbed his name from the list. Mudaffar came closer to success when he then lent his support to another candidate, the former cabinet minister Abdul Gafur. Gafur scraped in the votes, but Golkar’s majority had been severely reduced by the 1999 elections, and he was opposed by other parties as well as by the military, who had by now dropped their support for Mudaffar as a liability. He also ran foul of Golkar factionalism in Jakarta, caused by Golkar having to get on with PDI-P chairperson Megawati as President after July 2001. In the end Gafur’s election was declared invalid.

After a further 2 years of factional intrigue, money politics, threatened (but no actual) violence, and legal challenges too complicated to recount here, the governor’s job went in October 2002 to Thaib Arwany. This discreet bureaucrat, the former district secretary, had kept a low profile throughout. He was a Makian and in that sense the anti-Mudaffar coalition had won. As had happened in Poso, none of the most militant figures were rewarded with a senior appointment. Bahar Andili had died suddenly of a heart attack in September 2001. His fellow district chiefs both retired. But lower-ranking figures did well. Many of the young HMI/KNPI demonstrators had by 2003 become building contractors, enjoying the boom of construction caused by the proliferation of districts in North Maluku since 1999. Far from being prosecuted for crimes against humanity, militia leaders like Benny Bitjara were being offered government positions. No one spoke any longer about jihad, and even the far less bloodthirsty adat talk had lost its urgency. Ternate did remain largely ‘cleansed’ of Christians. But the story of what had happened was no longer discussed in public – it became North Maluku’s new taboo. Thus by 2002 North Maluku had regained its composure. The one permanent change was that Golkar did not regain its lost majority in the 2004 election. Although it again won the largest share of the vote, its percentage share dropped further to 23.5 per cent, about half the 1999 percentage. Eight parties, many of them fledglings in 1999 but now well established, took more than 5 per cent each. Constitutional democracy had arrived in North Maluku.30

The approach of closely analysing the narrative has shown that the collective violence in North Maluku had strong political dimensions. It thus resembled the
violence in Ambon and Poso. The local ruling establishment, united under Golkar during the New Order, broke down when it had to start making real decisions after 1998. Haste, unclear rules and almost criminal negligence on the part of the security forces all exacerbated the sense of crisis. As Ternate’s institutions failed and politicians began to frame their problem for the general public in order to recruit others to their own faction, politics took a dramatically cultural turn. The earlier thrill of campaigning together for North Maluku province was forgotten. The categories they now employed to describe themselves and their opponents quickly moved to the extremes, from adat to armed action on one side, from democracy to jihad on the other. We still have much to learn about how such polarizing ideological work is done in a society where the mass media are underdeveloped. However, it clearly was ideological and not the natural expression of enduring identities. The very rapidity with which the categories shifted in step with the situation on the ground is characteristic of an elitist conflict. Word of mouth appeared to be an effective and surprisingly hegemonic medium for quickly updating elite messages. So the challenger side defined its enemy now as the sultan’s feudalism, now as primitive Kao ethnicity, and now as a fanatical Christian religion. The other side made similarly rapid ideological shifts. The speed with which categories shifted reflected the swinging nature of the alliances being brokered, particularly on the Islamic challenger side. It introduced a calculating pragmatism into their ideological work, which could just as easily launch a holy war as invite the holy warriors to shut up and take their seat in parliament.

The dramaturgy of anger displayed by North Maluku’s elites at a moment of polarization was a serious obstacle to democracy. It was certainly not the only obstacle. The police and military also have a case to answer. And it was but a moment of madness in Ternate (the nightmare lasted longer in northern Halmahera). Nevertheless, the episode deserves to be a case study in democratization and its impediments.
On the evening of 20 February 2001, Dayak fighters attacked the riverside timber harbour of Sampit. They sought out Madurese settlers in the town. Those whom they found, they beheaded. By the next evening the fighters were driving around town in trucks, holding up dripping heads in triumph. Thousands of panic-icked Madurese survivors fled to government offices, from whence they were shipped out of Central Kalimantan to the island of Madura near Java where their ethnic roots lay. On 25 February more Dayak fighters burned down Madurese homes in the provincial capital of Palangkaraya – their occupants having already fled the province. One hundred and eighteen Madurese were killed the same day in the small town of Parenggean north of Sampit. The men, women and children in this group had come out of hiding in the jungle with promises of safe passage. More Madurese were massacred at the port town of Samuda south of Sampit. Within a few weeks, Dayak fighters had pushed their campaign of ethnic cleansing to the extremities of the main trans-Kalimantan road through Central Kalimantan – to Kuala Kapuas in the south-east, and to Pangkalanbun in the west. Nearly 90 per cent of the provincial Madurese population of 120–130,000 had left (International Crisis Group 2001a: 1, 5). Only in Pangkalanbun, with a substantial Madurese population, did most stay. A large proportion of those who left never returned to Central Kalimantan. Credible estimates of the number of dead range from 500 to nearly 1,300, most of them Madurese.1

How did ‘Dayaks’ become a collective actor of such powerful proportions as to impress their will on over a hundred thousand people while the government looked on as if paralyzed? Curiously, newspaper accounts seemed to think this was a non-question. ‘Dayak tribes’, they declared, had engaged in a ‘tribal blood sport’. Dayaks would have done it much earlier had the dictator Suharto not used his iron fist to keep things under control (Cooney 2001; Elegant 2001a). The assumption was that savage tribes had always been a reality in the heart of Borneo, ever ready to do what they do best given half a chance. Yet anyone who stopped to think would soon realize that what seemed so self-evident to the journalist bore no relation to reality. No Dayak tribes had been in the news in Central Kalimantan for many years. Certainly none in this part of Kalimantan had ever engaged in the kind of rampage that occurred in February 2001.
Contentious politics theory offers important insights precisely because it poses questions that others do not. One middle-level question it asks is: ‘How is a collective actor constituted?’ In other words, how are previously unorganized or apolitical actors introduced into public conflict processes (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 315)? Being forced to examine the detailed narrative in a disciplined way guards the researcher against unwarranted generalizations, such as those about the existence of Dayak tribes capable of united action, or about a Dayak culture of repressed savagery. Dayak leaders themselves, incidentally, were often the most vocal proponents of such generalizations at the time. But these were ideological statements by interested parties, which need not be accepted uncritically. The process of actor constitution, according to Dynamics of contention, involves a number of elementary ‘mechanisms’. First, the subjects (in this case Dayaks) create or appropriate organizations for their cause. These then engage in a ‘repertoire’ of innovative action, which have a powerful effect on opponents but also on potential supporters. Repertoire is a dramaturgical term and borrows from Goffman’s early work on the sociology of face-to-face interaction (Manning 1992). Opponents then begin to react to the emerging actor. They might portray them as extremely dangerous or conversely they might acknowledge them as authentic. Sympathizers, meanwhile, experience a surge of emotion known as an identity shift. They feel suddenly inspired. Out of the ensuing interaction between the subjects and their opponents, each side begins to call itself and the other side names (Dayaks, Madurese). Soon these names come to seem self-evident to everyone involved. A new actor has been constituted.

If we take this proposed research programme seriously, we first look for an organization. We observe how it sets to work, and how those around it react. This is an important goal of this chapter. It is already an advance on previous research on the violence in Central Kalimantan. The International Crisis Group report on this episode, for example, did not ask about organizations but spoke of festering grievances that ‘explode in violence’ (International Crisis Group 2001a: iv). Beyond that, we want to examine how adequate the process of actor constitution is when applied to this situation. The concept was developed on a mainly Western empirical basis such as gay liberation or anti-nuclear movements. What difference does it make when it is applied to clientelist, patronage-based movements in a society characterized by a weak state?

The organizational core of the Dayak movement of 2001, as we shall see, was an urban network of second-rung government officials and aspiring officials. They saw this as an opportune moment to challenge the incumbent local power-holders, and they did it through ethnic mobilization. Urban Dayaks have been virtually invisible in the anthropology of Central Kalimantan (an exception is Miles 1976). The tribesmen who were so prominent in the media reporting of 2001, by contrast, had long been the central motif in the anthropological literature of Borneo (King 1993). They answered a deeply felt modern need for the exotic, for the noble savage. The ideologues of the 2001 movement were aware of this need and exploited it. They themselves have rarely come under scrutiny, because scholarship has largely failed to notice the fundamental transformation that had
occurred in Central Kalimantan especially since the 1950s. Yet the key context for the 2001 episode was not the jungle but precisely the urban environment that had nurtured these ideologues. We therefore begin by tracing the history of urbanization and modern state formation in Central Kalimantan.

As the state bureaucracy expanded dramatically in the outer islands, new towns sprang up in remote jungles where shifting agriculture had dominated the economy. We examined this process in Chapter 3. It was particularly spectacular in Central Kalimantan. Bureaucratization led to a remarkably rapid rate of urbanization outside Java after the 1930s. The level of urbanization in the outer islands was by the 1980s also higher than in Java, though the effect becomes visible only by taking into account the low population density and the relatively small size of outer island towns. The German geographer Werner Rutz calculated the number of small towns (which he defined as less than 25,000 inhabitants) per square kilometre in proportion to the population density. In Central Kalimantan the ratio was the highest in the country – more than six times higher than in Java (Rutz 1987: 84–5). He also counted the number of official facilities such as administrative offices in relation to the number of private facilities such as commercial establishments in towns all over Indonesia. Outer island towns had a much higher proportion of official facilities than in Java. Official facilities made up about half the total number of facilities in Central Kalimantan’s provincial capital Palangkaraya in the early 1980s (Rutz 1987: 141, 148). Clearly Palangkaraya’s economy revolves to a remarkable extent around the state.

Employment figures show that the workforce in Central Kalimantan has been moving rapidly out of agriculture, and often into the bureaucracy. In 1971 the proportion of the provincial population not working in agriculture was only 20 per cent, or just over half the national average of 36 per cent. But by 1998 it had gone up two and a half times to 51 per cent, just four percentage points short of the national average. This was the second highest rate of deagrarianization and thus urbanization in the country, after West Kalimantan. Moreover many of the deagrarianized workers were civil servants. In 1990, fully a fifth of all those not working in agriculture were bureaucrats. Government dependency was still higher than this, as many private building contractors also lived mainly from government money. These figures encapsulate an urban society in rapid transformation. Towns are the footprints of the state as it colonizes ever-remoter reaches of this vast archipelago.

This social landscape, so unlike the image of noble savages, explains why the greatest upheavals in Central Kalimantan’s history have been the struggles by and within this emerging urban, state-dependent middle class for access to the resources of the state. The defining historical event for the key Dayak spokespersons of 2001 was 1957, the year that Central Kalimantan was carved out of South Kalimantan as its own province. Like the years after 1998, 1957 was a moment of opportunity, when factional struggles in Jakarta and rebellions in the provinces had weakened the national government’s ability to impose its will. The army became the major power broker after the democratically elected cabinet collapsed in March 1957. It sought loyal partners in the provinces who could help it restore
central control against the regional revolts in West Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi and Kalimantan. The conspiratorial way in which the centre and the loyal periphery found each other in Central Kalimantan has sometimes been misinterpreted. Junior government officials in Central Kalimantan clandestinely created a Dayak militia that opposed the local Islamically coloured revolt. But their purpose was not, as is supposed in some accounts, to launch an ethnic revolt against Jakarta. On the contrary, the military, equally clandestinely, supported the militia. The top brass was persuaded by the Dayak offer of loyalty, and in exchange were prepared to let Dayaks lead the local administration in the interior. When the province finally became a reality, it was a moment of ethnic pride for those Dayaks who had done the lobbying. Although the government officially did not mention ethnicity, the province was implicitly recognized as belonging to Dayaks and not to the Banjar in the southern metropolis of Banjarmasin. It was also a moment of economic satisfaction. All the lobbyists soon moved into a plethora of brand new government offices built in a new capital in the jungle, their own mini-Brasilia (Klinken 2006).

Neither in 1957 nor in 2001 was state power as weak as the term ‘weak state’ suggests. Power and money was there in plenty, but it circulated through informal channels. In order to retain the notion of structured power, some scholars prefer the term ‘shadow state’ to describe this blurring of state authority and market forces. The circuits that pass across the boundary between the formal state and the black economy tell us more about how power works than do the formal rules. In Central Kalimantan, that black economy revolves around timber, the province’s major industry. Formal statistics by definition do not capture the black economy, but even the official figures demonstrate how important timber is here – they say it accounts for a fifth of the provincial gross domestic product, far more than in any other province.3 Illegal logging is rampant in Indonesia and generates its own huge economy (International Crisis Group 2001b). An insightful series of papers by John McCarthy describe how it works in Central Kalimantan and elsewhere (McCarthy 2000, 2001a,b, 2004, 2007). Timber extraction and local processing involves timber bosses, often Chinese, who work with a host of rent-seeking state agents, from the local police and military chiefs, through civil administrators in various departments, to the district state prosecutor.

Sampit, Central Kalimantan’s busiest town, lies at the heart of the timber industry. Sixty per cent of Indonesia’s logs come from Central Kalimantan, half of those from the district of which Sampit is the capital (International Crisis Group 2001a: 2). It is a harbour near the mouth of the Mentaya River. Factoids in provincial statistics books illustrate how important this town is – banks in 1999 gave more credit in Sampit than in any other part of the province, the town had far more cinema seats than Palangkaraya, though about the same number of cars and public telephones (BPS Kalimantan Tengah 2000: 46, 143, 206, 248, 266, 322).

An important aspect of the decentralization process after 1999 was a shift towards greater control over natural resource exploitation to the local level. Combined with the fragmentation and rent-seeking so characteristic of the weak state, this had the potential to fuel ethnicized competition. Despite the democratizing demands
of the reformasi movement that toppled Suharto, no strong coalition for reform existed to push for coherent change across sectors and regions. Amidst the effer-

cescence of the post-New Order timber regime, John McCarthy saw an abiding con-

servatism at work through ‘entrenched clientelist networks capable of occupying

the space opened by reformasi’ (McCarthy 2004: 37).

With this historical sketch of Central Kalimantan complete, we are ready to

return to the surprising appearance of Dayaks as a political actor. The organization

at the heart of the contention in 2001 had the awkward acronym LMMDD-KT. It

was established in 1993, at a time when the New Order remained powerful but not unchallenged. It aimed to pressure Jakarta not to reappoint a Javanese provincial governor but to choose a ‘son of the soil’ (*putra daerah*) (Malley 1999). Raising Dayak awareness of the historical rights they had in the province was central to its tactical repertoire. Demonstrations were held. These failed to move Jakarta on the issue of the governor, but the organization continued its activism in subsequent years. Several of its leading individuals had been young activists in the campaign for the province in the 1950s. Its chairman was Prof. K. M. A. Usop, an academic and former journalist the same age as the 1957 activists but who had been in Jakarta and India at the time. As recently retired rector of the state university in Palangkaraya, and provincial spokesperson for the New Order election machine Golkar, he was a respected local establishment figure. To ground the campaign ideologically, he wrote a substantial book recounting the names and deeds of Dayak heroes of the 1950s and going back to the late nineteenth century (Usop 1996). Palangkaraya is not a large city and local books are rare. The local newspaper helped with a flurry of historical articles.

The 1993 campaign for a son of the soil governor had revived for a new genera-
tion the theme of an ethnicizing struggle for local control that had lain buried

under a centralizing, modernizing regime since the late 1950s. Five years later, in

1998, President Suharto resigned amid huge street protests, and the New Order

was no more. Economic crisis combined with a leadership crisis to create radically more open opportunity structures. Partly these were formal opportunities. Elections were planned under more democratic laws, local autonomy laws were written. But the informal opportunities were even greater. Official tolerance of demonstrations, the suddenly acceptable mass media discourse of radical change in every area of public life and repeated police inaction against collective violence created threats and opportunities unimaginable a few months earlier.

In Central Kalimantan the Dayak figures associated with the LMMDD-KT clearly felt the formal opportunities were less significant than the informal ones. Professor Usop did continue to participate in formal politics. He joined a national rush out of Golkar and into the opposition party thought most likely to win the coming election, the PDI-P. And indeed there was a swing towards the PDI-P in the June 1999 elections, though at 35 per cent the party did not manage to replicate Golkar’s former dominance. But national political parties were constitutionally unable to promote the sons of the soil politics that interested him most. Local parties – that is, parties appealing to an ethnic constituency in only one province – were banned from the 1999 election because this might have led to ‘national
disintegration’ \((\text{disintegrasi})\), a much-quoted fear in those years. Thus formal politics offered even fewer opportunities to Dayak activists in 1999 than they had in 1955, when a local Dayak party did participate in the election, though rather ineffectively. Informal politics, or rather a politics of theatre on the margins of the state, were the indicated route.

The organization’s first idea after May 1998 was borrowed from the 1950s campaign, namely a large awareness-raising congress in Palangkaraya. It was named the Second People’s Congress as a reminder of a similar congress held in the glorious year 1956, and took place in late 1998 on the same days, 2–5 December. Papers read at the congress reiterated the distinction between newcomers and natives. ‘Dayaks to become masters in their own country’, proclaimed one of them.\(^6\) Other provinces were to follow the example set in Palangkaraya. Riau held a people’s congress in late January and early February 2000, Papua in late May to early June 2000, and Minahasa (North Sulawesi) in August 2000. As in 1956–7, when the people’s congress was invented as a technique for pressuring Jakarta into granting provincial status to upwardly mobile local elites, these were led by Golkar members in the region who wanted more now that the New Order shackles had loosened. LMMDD-KT was in reality a local political party whose nativist ideology was narrowly focused on control of the bureaucracy. It challenged the technocratic language of the New Order with an idiom of indigenous rights, and the New Order anti-political formalisms with populist mobilization. Yet its interest in oppositional agendas did not extend beyond indigenous rights to areas like anti-militarism, workers rights, land rights, the environment, gender equality or even the rule of law. In that sense it remained wedded to the elitism of the New Order.

Its immediate goal was once more to win the governorship of Central Kalimantan, which came up for renewal in July 1999. Jakarta proposed the Javanese incumbent should stay on as caretaker until the newly elected provincial parliament could choose a definitive governor in January 2000. LMMDD-KT argued back that the caretaker must be Dayak, but to no avail. As the moment approached in January 2000 when parliament would elect the definitive governor, LMMDD-KT was on the hustings outside parliament house. Chairman Prof. Usop was among the gubernatorial candidates. The organization had branches in every district, as well as a network of allied ethnic Dayak organizations. It threatened to mobilize ‘hundreds of thousands of demonstrators, from the deepest interior to the cities’ to oppose two candidates it disliked.\(^7\) Large amounts of money changed hands in the provincial parliament during the election.\(^8\) ‘Money politics’ had become the norm around Indonesia during reformasi (Choi 2004). It seriously undermined party discipline and ensured that numerical strength alone was no longer enough to predict the result. Unfortunately for LMMDD-KT, its war chest was too small. Usop lost out to the Asmawi Agani, another Dayak and former district head of South Barito. Asmawi was backed by two local timber bosses. Where Usop’s money came from remained unclear. Thus Central Kalimantan once more had a native governor, the first in 16 years. All over Indonesia new governors and district chiefs were now \textit{sons of the soil}. It was part of a new national consensus.
LMMDD-KT had been one of its most outspoken proponents, but so far without seeing the benefits.

LMMDD-KT now adopted the role of societal voice in opposition to Governor Asmawi Agani. It joined a loose coalition of mostly ethnic NGOs, as well as some political party representatives, that frequently launched verbal attacks on him. The issues focused, somewhat hypocritically, on corruption. Asmawi’s election had been irregular, he had been corrupt in his previous post as district head, he was handling sports corruptly, his wife was corrupt and so on. NGOs with which Usop was close pressured Asmawi to resign from various associations of which he was ex officio chief, with some success. The organization’s district branches were similarly active. In the same month of January 2000 in which the new governor was elected, the organization placed its support behind a candidate for district head in East Kotawaringin, whose capital was Sampit. This was successful. However, the relationship was to turn sour within a year when the new district head refused to reward his ethnic backers.

We now come to the ethnic violence of February 2001. LMMDD-KT had been promoting Dayak empowerment, or rather the empowerment of its own leaders, since its opponents in government were also increasingly Dayak. It no doubt felt frustrated that its influence remained somewhat marginal. The next moment of opportunity was the implementation on 1 January 2001 of the new autonomy laws passed in 1999. The district of which Sampit was the capital, East Kotawaringin, was the most populous in Central Kalimantan. It had the largest annual government budget. Autonomous districts had more control over their money than previously. But they also had to pay for many more bureaucrats who had been transferred from central to local control, so district chiefs always complained of money shortages. A new district chief had been elected in East Kotawaringin early in March 2000, with LMMDD-KT support as we saw. He set to work vigorously to raise more local finances. He did it by legalizing and then taxing the enormous amount of timber yearly being cut and exported illegally from the district (Casson 2001). This original move soon resulted in a vastly improved district bank balance. Other districts around Central Kalimantan started doing the same. The combination of autonomy, a large black economy in illegal timber (as well as gold mining) and a large government budget made access to the East Kotawaringin district government a valuable resource.

In early February the district chief was to appoint a new ‘cabinet’ in accordance with the just-implemented autonomy laws. LMMDD-KT had to make its voice heard. The organization’s repertoire had till then been enough to interest but not to shock. Beginning with a book, a newspaper blitz and seminars about Dayak rights, they had by 1998 expanded to a congress and to (the threat of) demonstrations by 2000. None had been transgressive techniques. But when the organization began to name a particular ethnic group as an enemy of the Dayaks it must have been taking a deep breath, because it was bound to lead to violence. Popular anti-Madurese racism had been a feature of everyday life in various parts of the archipelago for a long time. The same is true of feeling against other mobile
groups such as Buginese and Chinese. The colonial government had first brought Madurese to this part of Borneo to build roads in the 1930s. This had continued into the 1990s, when Madurese labourers built the trans-Kalimantan road across Central Kalimantan. Some had done well, such as Haji Ismail Mursade in Sampit who owned several petrol stations, as well as the hotel owner Haji Satiman and stevedoring entrepreneur Haji Marlinggi. Like all ethnic groups, Madurese had their ethnic association, named Ikama and chaired by Marlinggi. But no ethnic group stood out for its wealth in Central Kalimantan. Most Madurese were about as poor as most Dayaks. They made up only a small proportion of the population in the province, about 6–7 per cent (International Crisis Group 2001a: 1). The Javanese (18 per cent) and the Banjarese (24 per cent) were larger and more influential, and the Dayaks largest of all: at least 41 per cent according to the 2000 census, not counting smaller Dayak groups included with ‘other’ (BPS 2001: 75). The political significance of the Madurese in these dynamics lay therefore not in their strength but in their weakness. They were in no position to look for trouble collectively. As a despised minority they were unlikely to fight back. Instead, like the Jews at the birth of Nazi Germany, or the Chinese at the birth of Indonesia’s New Order, the Madurese in this post-New Order ethnic era were the perfect target for a chauvinistic campaign that was not about them but about domination by the majority group. Militants in Central Kalimantan did not have to look far for inspiration along these lines. Dayaks had expelled the Madurese from West Kalimantan just next door in 1997, without any repercussions, as we saw in Chapter 4. If they got away with it while the New Order was strong, how much less risky would it be now the president was a half-blind cleric constantly ridiculed for his erraticism?

The occasion was a fight between Dayak and Madurese gold miners. Small-scale alluvial gold mining, also in Central Kalimantan, is mostly illegal. It is organized along ethnic client–patron lines, where a patron (cukong) supplies the capital for machinery and the political connections and bribery for protection from the authorities, while poor villagers supply the backbreaking labour. Illegal forestry operations are organized the same way. Both the illegal mining and logging regimes experienced dramatic transformations shortly after 1998, as local cukong took advantage of weakness in Jakarta to carve out a larger niche for themselves. Splits between the military and the police played into their hands. Much to the military’s chagrin, the police were given increased powers under post-1998 democratizing measures. While the police tried to do the centre’s bidding, the military sabotaged it by offering protection to local bosses (McCarthy 2007). This explains why post-1998 ethnic militants, who usually combined politics with business, frequently portrayed the police as the bad guys and the military as their friends.

Central Kalimantan’s forests have always been a lawless frontier, and the strains of the recent shifts helped ensure that the ethnic work gangs did sometimes clash. Dayak and Madurese miners fought each other in the gold rush shantytown of Tumbang Samba in September 1999. In July 2000 Malay labourers clashed with the followers of a Madurese timber boss known as Mat Ribut in Pangkalanbun’s
port town of Kumai. In December 2000 another Dayak–Madura riot broke out in the gold rush town of Kereng Pangi (Ampalit), halfway between Palangkaraya and Sampit. A Dayak man named Sendong died on 15 December. Some accounts had him as a leading fighter in the Tumbang Samba event the previous year, while others said he was an ordinary drunk miner. Sendong’s death would have been an unremarkable police matter if the LMMDD-KT had not turned it into a cause célèbre. They complained about police inaction over his death and suggested it was racially motivated apathy. The leading figures in LMMDD-KT toured Kereng Pangi alongside the governor, ostensibly to calm Dayak anger but all the while stoking it. Led by Usop, they warned Jakarta that Dayak anger was growing. Sabran Achmad, a veteran of the 1957 struggle, linked the death of Sendong to the LMMDD-KT agenda of Dayak bureaucratic control: ‘Central Kalimantan was born from struggle and the sacrifice of human blood. This province was not a gift from the central government. So people from outside have to be able to adapt to the customs and social characteristics of this region.’ The military agreed with LMMDD-KT opinion makers that the trouble lay with the Madurese. With the enthusiastic support of the East Kotawaringin deputy district chief, who had been active in LMMDD-KT in the past, the government deported the entire Madurese community out of Ampalit through Sampit. This was the first, highly local, ethnic cleansing in Central Kalimantan, a kind of pilot project. Recalling what had befallen the Madurese in West Kalimantan the Ampalit expulsions created defensive reactions among the Madurese in Sampit, where some began to arm themselves.

When the vital moment arrived in February 2001 to play a significant role in the district government of East Kotawaringin, LMMDD-KT experienced another setback. The line-up of assistants to the East Kotawaringin district chief to be sworn in on 18 February 2001 did not include LMMDD-KT East Kotawaringin branch secretary Fedlik Asser. This ambitious young official had a MA from the prestigious Gadjah Mada University in Jogjakarta and was a divisional head within the Planning Board (Bappeda). Another disappointed LMMDD-KT heavyweight was his brother-in-law Lewis, an official within the Forestry Service.

Police said that the Dayak attacks that followed on Sampit 2 days later, 20 February 2001, were ‘highly organized’. Interpenetration of the LMMDD-KT and local government down to the sub-district level was the key to organizational success. One LMMDD-KT office-holder in Sampit told me they used the fax machines in sub-district offices (kantor camat) to spread messages. Like the 1950s Dayak militia named Mandau Telabang Pantjasila Kalimantan, which was led by sub-district chief Christian Simbar, the militias that descended on Sampit on 20 February 2001 should be regarded as a semi-government affair. Both probably also enjoyed a measure of military backing, though the details remain vague. The 2001 militias were known as ‘special forces’, pasukan khusus or passus in Indonesian, which sounds like the fearsome Indonesian military special forces Kopassus. They were led by mysterious commanders known as pangkalima perang. The fighters came from upriver communities in the north of East Kotawaringin. It seems they were largely recruited from the ethnic logging and gold-mining gangs described earlier. Organizers faced the challenge of negotiating the
decentralized nature of the numerous ethnic Dayak organizations, among which LMMDD-KT appeared to function as an umbrella and public face. Coalition building such as we described for Poso (Chapter 5) and mobilization as in Ambon (Chapter 6) occurred here as well.

The shocking repertoire of action adopted by the Dayak militias in early 2001 was a close imitation of techniques used by Dayaks in West Kalimantan 4 years earlier. Decapitation, evisceration, consuming the hearts and livers of victims – these had all been well documented and the images circulated on the Internet.\textsuperscript{17} Organized ethnic cleansing followed, assisted by the government. This time those same techniques were applied more thoroughly. Whereas Madurese were only removed from certain areas within West Kalimantan, and that temporarily, here the intention was evidently to leave not a single Madurese in the province, and to permanently preclude their return.

The effect was amplified in a barrage of propaganda, often taken up uncritically by a sensation-hungry press. It alleged that the Madurese had initiated the violence by storing bombs in their homes and ‘taking over’ Sampit on the evening of 18 February, that they were guilty of a long series of provocations against Dayaks going back to 1982, that the solution was to expel all Dayaks accused of violence, etc. Henceforth official ideology should acknowledge the prior rights of locals and their customs, as expressed in the adage ‘holding up the sky where the feet touch the ground’ (\textit{dimana bumi dipijak, di situ langit dijunjung}) (LMMDD-KT 2001a). A good part of the shock effect came from naming the Madurese openly rather than deploying the usual euphemisms of ‘a certain group’. Lurid accounts of Dayaks who could detect the wrong ethnicity by their smell (Madurese look much the same as other Indonesians) and of swords that flew unaided through the air to sever Madurese heads entertained newspaper readers around the country.\textsuperscript{18} A second volume from the LMMDD-KT, like the first filled with militant declarations from Dayak organizations and circulated in photocopied form, elaborated the Madurese conspiracy by showing photos of alleged Madurese militias who had been training to attack Dayaks (LMMDD-KT 2001b). These were in fact ordinary group photos, found in abandoned Madurese homes, of harbour workers and religious youths taken on ceremonial occasions.

How did opponents react to this dramatic repertoire of action? The police, as the outsiders in Central Kalimantan’s timber-rich shadow state at this time, were in the best position to act against those who had organized the violence. But they were dealt a weak hand. The military had their own reasons to want the police to fail; local government was seriously compromised by militant Dayak ideology; the central government was too preoccupied with its own power struggles to care about trouble in a remote province and Indonesian civil society generally was too starved of objective information to know what to say. Police arrested a group of 84 militia commanders, among them Fedlik Asser of LMMDD-KT, at the Hotel Rama in Sampit. Human heads littered the grounds. Apparently the men were arguing about who had earned the right to pre-eminence with the most heads. Lewis was later arrested too. But all were released after Dayak militants threatened further violence.
Meanwhile Dayak attacks spread to other towns over the next few weeks without anyone stopping them – Palangkaraya, Kuala Kapuas and Pangkalanbun. On 9 March a police mobile brigade shot dead several Dayak protesters during a visit to Palangkaraya by President Abdurrahman Wahid. The police unit had just returned from an exhausting tour of duty in Papua and faced a hostile crowd, but it was a bad moment to overreact. The LMMDD-KT had been complaining loudly about the police since the previous December, and now called for the provincial police chief to be replaced. Again Dayak militants scored a success. In April the police chief, a Javanese, was replaced with the first Dayak police chief ever.19 On 3 May the national police took one last desperate gamble to uphold their authority when they arrested Prof. Usop himself for provoking the violence. But this too, was soon undone after effective Dayak lobbying. The cases against the three Dayak ‘provocateurs’ lingered for several years before fading into oblivion.

Attempts to decertify the emerging ‘Dayak’ actor as criminal had thus rapidly come unstuck. A few lonely voices attempted to make it reasonable that people who commit or permit ethnic cleansing should be held accountable, but no one took them up. One was the former attorney general, Soedjono C. Atmonegoro, who together with human rights lawyer Munir threatened to bring a ‘class action’ against the government on behalf of the Madurese for failing to protect them.20 Atmonegoro was popular with citizens for his vigorous prosecution of Suharto cronies after May 1998, but not with the establishment, which got rid of the overzealous reformer only a month after reformasi had begun. Moreover Atmonegoro was an ethnic Madurese and thus seen as not ‘neutral’. Other influential Madurese in Java, such as ex-cabinet minister Gen (ret.) R. Hartono, and prominent intellectuals Amir Santoso and Didik Rachbini, tried to formulate a similar protest on behalf of the victims, but decided in the end not to stake their reputations on defending an unpopular minority in a remote province.21

Hardly less remarkable than the failure of some civic nationalists to make the criminal label stick to the Dayak militants was the conversion of other opponents into apparent sympathizers with the militants. Governor Asmawi Agani had put up with niggling LMMDD-KT opposition throughout 2000, and had finally launched a rather feeble defamation suit against Usop and the NGO coalition that had criticized him. But the astonishing vigour of the Dayak movement in February 2001 made him decide further opposition was useless. In mid-March he invited dozens of the mysterious Dayak warriors to join him on a ‘peacemaking’ mission to be held with Madurese representatives in Java.22 At the same time he told a ‘traditional’ ritual gathering that he wanted all the Dayak warriors released who had been arrested at the Rama Hotel.23 In May he even added his voice to Dayak pleas for the release of his nemesis, LMMDD-KT chairman Prof. Usop.24 In June 2001 Governor Asmawi went further and provided government financial support to the ‘Third People’s Congress’, which was again dominated by Usop. This conference recommended that Madurese who had fled Central Kalimantan be banned from returning until they had apologized for their behaviour, had been screened for criminality and vagrancy, had agreed to abide by Dayak custom and, in any case, not be allowed to return for many years to allow emotions to cool (Kongres Rakyat
Kalimantan Tengah Tahun 2001). It followed an earlier conference in Sampit, also
government supported, that had roundly declared all Madurese ‘coarse, tempera-
mental, dishonest, aggressive, uneducated, violent, and hard-working’, while Dayaks
were ‘simple, hospitable, honest, reverent towards custom, with high solidarity
feelings, and tolerant’ (Panitia Pelaksana Musyawarah Masyarakat Kotawaringin
Timur Tahun 2001). The resolutions from this congress were later incorporated,
in slightly euphemistic form, into a number of provincial and district regulations
(\textit{perda}) that effectively banned the Madurese permanently from returning to
Central Kalimantan. These were the clearest examples of racist legislation to
come out of the local autonomy process in Indonesia.

The governor’s change of attitude was a loss for any inclusive concept of
Indonesian citizenship, but it was not difficult to understand. The swift Dayak
victory had induced a sudden identity shift in probably the majority of the Dayak
population in Central Kalimantan. I noticed a sense of exhilaration on the streets
of Palangkaraya in mid-March 2001. A crude effigy of a Madurese with a mon-
key face stood tied to an oil drum on a corner. It evoked laughter from passers-by
when I photographed it. It felt good to be Dayak on that day. The identity shift had
grown out of a moral panic over the threat to social order presented by the
Madurese. When the threat was removed through decisive action, people felt
momentarily liberated. Goodwin and Jasper (2003: 259) describe the moral panic
as a ‘sudden concern over a group or activity, accompanied by calls for control
and suppression. Out of an infinite range of potential perceived threats, one –
which may be neither new nor on the rise – suddenly receives considerable atten-
tion.’ Scholars have often observed that such moral panics are manipulated by
interested elites – the mass media, religious leaders or private ‘moral entrepre-
neurs’ – to achieve their own regressive goals. The moral panic against the
Madurese as a ‘criminal’ ethnic group in Central Kalimantan seems similarly to
have been manipulated. In this case it was not because the Madurese were making
any special claims on society, but because an emerging \textit{Dayak} actor needed to
establish its militant credentials in opposition to the Jakarta men of the New
Order. The latter suddenly began to look humane by comparison.

When the issue had faded from the headlines by about June 2001, not much
had actually changed in Central Kalimantan’s political scene. Asmawi Agani
remained governor, the district chief of East Kotawaringin remained in power,
Prof. Usop remained hopeful of a formal position in government and other
LMMDD-KT activists remained out of jail. Indeed the whole militant Dayak
movement seemed to evaporate. LMMDD-KT had gone dormant. There was no
ongoing agitation, as we might expect with an oppositional social movement, or
any further institutionalization of racist propaganda, as occurred in Germany
once the Nazis achieved power. Nevertheless, just as the memory of the pogrom
against communists hung over the New Order as a symbol of right-wing hege-
mony, so the memory of the expulsions of February 2001 continued to hang over
Central Kalimantan as a permanent warning that ethnic chauvinism could be
invoked at any moment, because it works. \textit{Dayaks} had become an actor in their
own right. No one even seemed to remember that this was not always the case.
Indeed the whole militant Dayak movement seemed to evaporate – Prof. Usop failed again in the direct elections for governor of mid-2005.

With our account of how Dayaks constituted themselves as a collective actor complete, we need to step back briefly and ask how useful our theoretical framework really was. Social movements theory has drawn most of its raw material from the democratic North. What we have described here is not democratic but a chauvinistic movement in a poor, unequal and badly governed society. Such movements have rarely been described in social movement terms. The movement we have portrayed differs in one key respect from a democratic one such that of the blacks in the US. The militant Dayak movement of Central Kalimantan was shaped by elites to such an extent that it can hardly be described as an opposition movement. Something similar occurred in West Kalimantan (Chapter 4). Here the grey zone between state and society is broad and the notion of a civil society ranged against the state is problematic. State actors typically play a significant part in apparently oppositional politics, whether they do so openly or clandestinely, with or without authorization from above. The failure of the state to maintain or reproduce its authority through formal institutions forces state actors who fear being marginalized to negotiate coalitions on the streets.

To the extent that local elites determined the shape of the movement, it becomes increasingly difficult to interpret its meaning. Ideology usually plays a secondary role for elites who are engaged in a struggle for power in a political system structured along lines of personal relationships rather than formal rules. This has been convincingly shown for Africa by Bratton and Van de Walle (1994). Militant ethnic movements are particularly difficult to read. One way to conceptualize the differences between elitist and popular movements was put forward by Donald Horowitz (1985: 29), who distinguished ‘ranked’ ethnic conflicts from ‘unranked’ ones. A ranked struggle is waged by a social movements actor representing the poor and marginalized against a powerful establishment. An unranked struggle, by contrast, pits groups against each other that are more or less equal in power. This second kind of struggle tends to have a darkly conservative character quite different from the struggle for emancipation in a ranked conflict. Social movement actors in these two kinds of conflict have a different character. Those struggling for emancipation are ‘oppositional’, while the well-connected actors in an unranked conflict are more properly called ‘chauvinist’. Examples of the latter are the Hutus in Rwanda in 1994 or Italian brown shirts in the 1930s.

Rather than a clear ideology, the repertoire of a chauvinist social movement actor is often characterized by scapegoating and the moral panic (Goodwin and Jasper 2003: 259). If elsewhere the dramaturgical notion of repertoire perhaps depicts actors in a more cynical and manipulative light than the situation deserves, here it seemed rather apt. There was a theatricality about the expulsion of the Madurese from Central Kalimantan that one did not find, for example, in the East Timorese liberation movement culminating in 1999. Key protagonists postured with feigned indignation, then moved on to other issues. It seemed as if only the international conflict mediation groups, and of course the victims, took it all seriously. The movement synchronized its outrage with the political timetable,
namely the first implementation of regional autonomy. We noticed previously in North Maluku (Chapter 7) how quickly a communal campaign can change its ideological colours, in step with the shifting demands of coalition building and with the opportunities as the leaders see them. A chauvinistic movement, in short, appears to be both less ideological and more opportunistic than a genuinely oppositional one. Nevertheless, chauvinistic movements can enjoy burst of great popularity, something that became very clear in the Dayak episode described in this chapter.
Indonesia’s post-authoritarian democratic transition was not as peaceful as is often thought. The perception of a mainly non-violent transition grew because large-scale bloodletting did not occur at moments when it was most feared. The military did not create a Tiananmen-style bloodbath during anti-Suharto demonstrations early in 1998, nor did they launch a coup that May or in September the following year when East Timor voted ‘no’ to Indonesia. Electoral violence was minimal in 1999 and again in 2004. Yet altogether almost 19,000 people died in various kinds of fighting that were every bit as political as those classic sites of violent regime transitions. Over half of them perished as a result of large-scale communal conflict. This does have enduring implications for Indonesian democracy, and in a moment we will consider what these might be.

The innovative contentious politics techniques employed in this book have helped throw new light on the six episodes of communal violence that occurred between 1997 and about 2002. Carefully tracing the processes by which they emerged revealed dynamics that make them look different from the way they have often been portrayed. It is now no longer possible, for example, to describe these episodes as essentially a case of the widespread (‘anomic’) breakdown of social relations, due perhaps to short-term economic distress or to long-term cultural pathologies such as religious intolerance or a tendency to violence. The breakdown view lay behind the disintegrasi discourse that was then (and probably still is) mainstream in Indonesia. The implication that this was ‘horizontal’ violence, taking place beyond the repressive reach of the state, is not accurate. Nor, to quote another popular interpretation, was it violence provoked from above, presumably by military intelligence with their finger on the pulse of society, in order to sabotage Indonesia’s nascent democracy. Nor, on the contrary, was this in essence a protest from below against oppressive agro-capitalist development, state-sponsored migration or Javanese imperialism. No doubt the fighting had elements of all these interpretations, but its true dynamic lay elsewhere.

Instead, all six episodes were, in some sense, ‘local politics by other means’, playing out at a moment when the opportunities for all kinds of hopeful and desperate politics lay wide open. In each episode, the people who determined the course of the conflict by their key roles in mobilization and coalition building were politically motivated. They were moreover not oppositional figures but generally

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close to the levers of local power. The leading brokers were stirred to action by
erapid changes taking place in the structure of the state. The devolution of authority
to lower levels of the state, combined with democratizing changes in the way key
office-holders were appointed, unleashed intense competitive dynamics. The vio-

lence can be correlated with the appointment of a new district chief or governor,
with the administrative subdivision of a province, district or sub-district into
smaller units (pemekaran), with parliamentary elections or with a combination of
these. Since the formal political parties had been emasculated under the authori-
tarian New Order, ethnic and religious groups – all closely related to the state –
became *de facto* parties. The security forces routinely failed to control escalating
violence, and sometimes contributed to it. Local elites, in other words, mobilized
crowds along religious and ethnic lines in order to maintain their privileged access
to the state or even, if possible, to expand it. They had a greater interest in behaving
this way in provincial towns beyond Java, where the state plays a bigger role in the
local economy. The state’ s capacity to contain such irregular politics was also
weaker there, and that explains the location and timing of communal violence.

However, even this conclusion, which has probably become a commonplace
among analysts in Indonesia and abroad with some social science training, begs
many questions about what really happened. Wasn’t there more popular anger on
the streets than can be explained merely by the instrumental needs of local elites?
Wouldn’t you expect ordinary folk to be as much moved by their grievances about
economic oppression as by an outraged sense of communal identity? Didn’t
people act as much out of fear as out of a political nose for opportunity? Weren’t
these ‘local elites’ the same people who had always been provincial sheep, obe-
diently following New Order commands from above and, if yes, does it really
make sense to portray them as sudden mortal enemies after 1998? Isn’t it true that
especially the ethnic identities were hardly politicized in the years before this all
happened and, if yes, doesn’t that make it hard to imagine them being ‘mobilized’
so readily?

It took a detailed look at each of the episodes, through the lens of a different
social process, to go some way towards answering these five difficult questions.
Let us run through them briefly. The question of popular feelings, and hence of
why followers follow, is the most difficult for social movement theorists to
answer, and that is why it was tackled first (Chapter 4). By contrasting the way
Dayaks and Malays in West Kalimantan each engaged in ethnic cleansing against
the unpopular minority Madurese, we saw that Dayaks had a strong identity and
Malays a weak or even non-existent one. This led, in rather complex ways that we
also had to investigate, to different patterns of mobilization. Disparities in iden-
tity were not due to different densities in their respective social networks, as some
theories infer, but to different cognitions of what it meant to be Dayak or Malay.
This conclusion in turn led us to view ethnic identity formation as, in part, an
ideological activity with a complex and highly political history that is full of post-
colonial ironies. Similar ironies would be found in the way Christians and
Muslims in Maluku and Central Sulawesi acquired their identities, but the point
cannot be pursued in this small book.
The second question, about class interests versus communal ones, was dealt with by tracing the conflict escalation process in Poso, Central Sulawesi (Chapter 5). The reason why this conflict kept on expanding as a religious war was not because farmers in Poso were more preoccupied with their religious identities than their material needs for land, but because armed conflict requires organization and brokers. The religions on both sides of the war were simply better organized, with better connections in the corridors of power, than land-hungry subsistence peasants. The same dynamics applied in all the other places where conflict occurred. I met peasants in Central Kalimantan at the height of the anti-Madurese fury who told me they had absolutely no interest in the issue and only wanted their land back, but no one in power cared to listen to them (Klinken 2001a).

The third question, about the motivation of fear rather than a nose for opportunity, was addressed by investigating the mobilization process in Ambon (Chapter 6). The focus on organizations, rather than on stereotypical cultural traits as was often done in Indonesia, was useful in the first place for clarifying that this war involved not just ordinary town dwellers and their perhaps irrational temperaments but a lot of cool-headed, politically interested elites as well. But to what purpose did these organizations engage in violent conflict? ‘Security dilemma’ theorists do not deny that organization is essential, but they do deny that communal conflicts are politics by other means. Instead they see only unintended tragedy, triggered by uncertainty about how the other party will act. Who is right? Security fears do have a place in contentious politics theory, but not a well-defined one, and the social movements theory from which it emerged had even less feeling for the insecurity in which Third World politics are played out. Nevertheless, contrary to security dilemma theorists, the story of Ambon made it clear that security fears did not paralyze the politics of opportunity. Church and mosque leaders coordinated defensive street fighting and simultaneously sought to change the electoral balance in Ambon, with an eye to the future. Violence was, unfortunately, a part of politics not only in Ambon but in all the places we have studied.

The fourth question, about local elites who are sheep at one moment and wolves at another, was broached by studying the process of polarization in North Maluku (Chapter 7). Just as in every other provincial town we have studied, the elite club in Ternate was small and realistic enough to knuckle under to the ruling order when Jakarta was strong. This attitude permitted Golkar and the military to retain firm control over all of Indonesia’s outer island towns for three decades. When Jakarta grew weak, however, real decisions had to be taken at the local level, and the grand but powerless Golkar coalition began to fragment into competing factions. Each group made its appeal to various constituencies in town and beyond, using a bewildering variety of ideological tropes as the elite battles in Ternate shifted ground. The same process of elites suddenly vacating the moderate centre for the extremes took place in every place we studied. Enough people to make a war followed these panicked local patrons because they were dependent on them. The elitist character of much of the conflict helps account for the sudden eruption of fierce drama at a politically decisive moment, as well as for its equally sudden
fading when it had passed (even if fighting dragged on for months in North Maluku’s rural back blocks far from the provincial capital).

Finally, the sudden salience of previously unpolticized identities also lay behind our investigation of actor formation in Central Kalimantan (Chapter 8). Similar dynamics of identity formation had occurred there as in West Kalimantan, and previously cooperating elites had become similarly polarized there as elsewhere. But the specific question here was how Dayaks came to be a group actor when for decades no one had noticed them act politically. The answer had to be sought, not in the social psychology of suppressed tribals, as all the journalists did, but in the little noticed but feverish organization being conducted behind the scenes by well-connected local elites. The ability of a network of ethnic Dayak organizations to electrify its Dayak and non-Dayak audiences by engaging in a shocking repertoire of innovative action – public decapitation and evisceration of Madurese victims – goes a long way towards explaining why people suddenly felt so ‘Dayak’ in Central Kalimantan. As in Ambon, therefore, mobilization in Central Kalimantan could be explained by looking at the capacities of organizations. But where in Ambon the organizations were religious and long established, here a relatively loose and new organization was able to achieve a devastating force of unilateral action by manipulating a moral panic about the immigrant Madurese minority.

The violence is now mainly in the past. It is important to remember that this was transitional violence, not a permanent state of war. The graph of violent deaths and incidents in the UNSFIR report (Varshney, Panggabean and Tadjoeddin 2004), reproduced in Figure 1.1, shows a steady decline after the year 2000. This book has been about the first, rising part of the graph because I wanted to know how it all started. But the graph did not keep rising. Heightened attention in special think tanks and university study programmes to patterns of violence. For Indonesia today, the big hump of instability that lies between the autocratic and the democratic polities (Marshall and Gurr 2003: 19–20) lies in the past.

The next few paragraphs will sketch how each of the major episodes ended, and what its legacies are today. We have little theory about how a violent conflict ends, by contrast with what we know about how it starts. This is a significant lack in the literature on contentious politics and demands more research (Koopmans 2004: 22).

In general it is not difficult to see that conflict ends when the opportunity structure closes down. That occurred in Indonesia in July 2001, when Megawati Sukarnoputri took over the presidency from Abdurrahman Wahid. This brought to an end a 4-year period when the most basic rules of the New Order were laid open to re-engineering (under President Habibie), and when injustices were more frequently aired in public than before or since (under President Wahid). But by mid-2001 a new ruling coalition began to emerge that included many figures from the New Order. We do not yet have a clear idea how this national shift back to the established moderates led elites in the regions to regroup, militant alliances to dissolve, militias to demobilize and identities to grow less salient. The fact that the shift did happen underlines the oft-noted truth that radical movements for change...
Communal violence in Kalimantan differed significantly from that further east in Sulawesi and Maluku. In Kalimantan, where it happened three times, it was a one-sided affair, not a civil war between two equally determined parties. Every time it was a locally dominant ethnic group – Dayak or Malay – who carried out a campaign of ethnic expulsion against a small and despised minority, namely the Madurese. Each time the campaign lasted only a few weeks and ended with resounding success. These episodes are included in the present study because they covered a substantial area – the entire district of Sambas and beyond, and almost the entire province of Central Kalimantan. The displaced Madurese fled first to the nearest large urban centre, and from there were often shipped back to their ethnic homeland of Madura, off Java. Afterwards the central government tried to have the Madurese return to their original homes in Kalimantan, but each time it met resistance from community leaders in the ethnic group that had carried out the expulsion. In Central Kalimantan an ethnic Dayak People’s Congress in June 2001 brought down resolutions banning the return of the Madurese except under some draconian and discriminatory conditions. These resolutions were then implemented as local government regulations. Although with the passage of time some have quietly returned to both Central Kalimantan (especially in the west where others never fled) and to West Kalimantan, a large number of internally displaced Madurese continue to live a marginal existence on the island of Madura.

In Ambon, North Maluku and Poso the conflict had resembled a civil war. Unlike the unequal ethnic fighting in Kalimantan, all of these episodes involved fighting between more or less evenly matched religious groups. Christians and Muslims fought each other in all three, although in North Maluku that was only one of three arenas (one was between adherents of two equally Muslim sultans, another was between ethnic groups that had a religious dimension). All three religious conflicts dragged on for several years, in successive waves in which the parties used increasingly sophisticated weapons and more brutal tactics. Fighting ranged across wide swaths of country, often breaking out in many different places without giving much appearance of coordinated action. In Maluku, the rump province of which Ambon is the capital, it occurred as far away as Tual in the east and Buru Island in the west. In North Maluku the fighting in the provincial capital Ternate, between two Muslim factions, only lasted a few days, while in northern Halmahera, between Christians and Muslims, it went on for 18 months. In Poso and Ambon peace negotiations were assisted from Jakarta and resulted in shaky agreements about 3 years after the start of hostilities. In all three areas a proportion of the internally displaced have returned to their original homes, but on the whole Ambon and Poso remained segregated places at the time of writing (2005). The scars of battle remain visible in the urban landscape. In Ambon, and even more so in Poso, sporadic violence has continued to about mid-2005, but it had taken on a much less mobilizational character than the earlier massed battles. These were guerrilla-style attacks on police stations and terrorist attacks on civilian targets by snipings and bombings. Poso has been described as a training ground for jihadist terrorism by domestic networks that have grown...
increasingly professional through years of communal fighting. While they have some international connections, they are essentially homegrown (International Crisis Group 2004).  

At a deeper level, however, the ethnic violence in Kalimantan and the religious violence further east were comparable. In each case ordinary people felt moved to action by the politics of fear, while local elites made their calculations on the basis of the politics of opportunity. People had hoped reformasi would bring them freedom and a better life – farmers wanted land and higher prices for their products, those in town wanted work. But now fear displaced their hopes. Yet the course of the conflict was determined by political entrepreneurs with interests of their own, mainly bureaucratic ones. They managed to create a climate in which the only positive course of action was to support a district chief who belonged to their communal group. Once that objective was won or lost, any alternative agenda for the poor collapsed. In none of the five conflict arenas were the poor in any sense empowered through the events.

Today, silence reigns in each of the five areas over what has occurred. Outraged pamphleteering when the fighting was at its hottest had revealed some of what was going on, but with peace has come a reluctance to ‘reopen old wounds’. Within each community, rival versions of the story continue to circulate in private. Children are inheriting the silent hatreds of their elders. Those few brave groups who do wish to begin an open, non-polemical dialogue about what each community has experienced – there are some in nearly every place I visited – face great difficulties. Assistance from outside has concentrated on physical reconstruction, not on aiding a process of social healing. Yet many post-conflict therapeutic techniques are available, from the truth and reconciliation commission, through making memorials, to trauma workshopping, child art or video exchanges.

Silence is not the best way to deal with the legacy for governance either. What has been learned? In one sense the problems were technical and, therefore, tractable. Uncertainty about whether and under what rules local elections would be held played a role in the violence in North Maluku. Organizational capacity was poor within many branches of government, from the security apparatus to humanitarian relief. This was particularly true in the smaller outer islands towns, outposts of the administration upon which greater responsibilities had suddenly been devolved. Many of these problems have since been resolved, within the limits of the governance capacities of a large but poor country. Rules have been agreed in detail, and troublesome political entrepreneurs have been replaced (though almost never prosecuted). No entirely new episodes of communal conflict have erupted anywhere in Indonesia. The 2004 elections passed peacefully, as did the election of hundreds of new district chiefs by a new system of direct elections beginning in mid-2005. Which is not to say violence will no longer occur probably on a smaller scale. Democratic Indonesia could grow to resemble democratic India in the frequency with which local incidents escalate into violence.

Potentially conflictual arrangements of a more structural nature do persist in the small and intermediate towns that became epicentres of violence. These are frontier towns in rapidly deagrarianizing areas, in which the urban working population depends to a great extent on the state. Rent-seeking – what Goran
Hyden called the ‘economy of affection’ – is a dominant reality here. The next major political transition in Indonesia could unleash the same violent competitive dynamics. The potential for violence in rent-seeking activities has hardly been recognized as a serious problem and it will not be easy to resolve. The communal movements we have examined often enjoyed so many connections with factions within the local state that they could be regarded as semi-government affairs. Solutions that do not face the reality of the economy of affection will fail to make much difference. Local and ‘rooted’ as the social configuration of the violence was, it was not normal or natural. It was the product of a specific history in particular places, namely state-dependent outer island towns at the end of the New Order. It arose, not from an excess of civil society, but from the sheer dominance of parastatal organizations in provincial towns of this kind. Many locals experienced this social configuration as oppressive. The local elites who did battle with each other for the spoils of office so dominated district and provincial politics that the poor were never heard. Dispossessed forest dwellers, peasants on shrinking incomes and the young urban unemployed – they were recruited for the communal militias in fear of their lives, but not empowered. They deserve better than this. For them, meaningful democratization remains a hope for the future.

In a larger sense, too, the small town wars of 1999–2002 were not merely technical or structural problems in some few unfortunate places far from the capital, but were a national problem. Much of the discussion within Indonesian civil society recognized this when it worried that the ‘social disintegration’ symbolized by Maluku spelled the end of the non-communal, cosmopolitan bases of Indonesian nationalism hitherto. The intellectual Didik Rachbini, himself Madurese, warned perceptively of ‘local Nazism’ arising in Kalimantan. The wars only strengthened the hold that exclusive and bureaucratized religious institutions have over social life in Ambon. Religion in Ambon remains on a collision course with democracy. This is true of both church and mosque, and therefore has little to do with the theological failures of any particular religion. Moreover the basic pattern of politics that erupted into violence in those places where the stakes were highest is to be found all over Indonesia. Indeed, populist mobilization of communal solidarities in the name of democracy was a feature of the twentieth century everywhere in the world. Just when democracy came to Indonesia, local politicians began to mobilize constituencies along religious and ethnic lines. This is a perversion of the democratic ideal, but it cannot be separated from democracy in modern times. Michael Mann has scandalized the link between democracy and communal conflict in his book *The dark side of democracy: explaining ethnic cleansing* (2004). Modern nationalism has always cherished communal identity as the main instrument for bringing people into the state. This has turned the twentieth century into a century of genocides.

Murderous ethnic cleansing is a hazard of the age of democracy since amid multi-ethnicity the ideal of rule by the people began to entwine the *demos* with the dominant *ethnos*, generating organic conceptions of the nation and
the state that encouraged the cleansing of minorities…. Regimes newly embarked upon democratization are more likely to commit murderous ethnic cleansing than are stable authoritarian regimes…. Stably institutionalized democracies are less likely than either democratizing or authoritarian regimes to commit murderous cleansing.

(Mann 2004: 3–4)

The possibility that the small town wars in remote places could come back to haunt Indonesia’s heartlands is the most disturbing aspect of the whole story. At the time they were dismissed in Jakarta as the unfortunate troubles of primitive people in faraway places, unlikely to endanger the national heart. In a narrow security sense this turned out to be true. But in a more fundamental sense they might have serious implications for Indonesian democracy. What if they represent merely the most extreme case of an emerging new style of democratic practice throughout Indonesia – one less dominated by state officials, one in which more groups that wear communal identities begin to engage in politics and in which coercion and violence to settle political conflicts becomes more normal? The sudden mainstreaming of violent communal posturing is one of the most striking aspects of the stories recounted in this book. The ease with which people who had previously been moderates surrendered the initiative to groups normally regarded as radical, or even adopted radical discursive repertoires themselves, can not be explained only as a fear reaction. It often looked more like a deliberate mobilizational strategy. Such strategies are available to anyone who considers the opportunity ripe, not only in small frontier towns.

In that case Indonesians need to do start a much more serious debate than hitherto about what kind of democracy they want. Some voices in that debate will argue that they always knew democracy was going to give too many chances to potentially violent ‘primordial’ sentiments, and this is a good reason to go back to the New Order practice of depoliticizing the masses. But that should not be the last word in this debate. Much more civil, inclusive and dialogical forms of politics are also being practised in Indonesia today. Even in a society deeply divided by communal identity – which is not everywhere the case in Indonesia – democracy can be made to work. Perhaps it needs to be of a ‘consociational’ kind (Lijphart 1977, 1999). Thought could be given to this approach at least in areas trying to rebuild political community after devastating communal conflict. In West Kalimantan this is, de facto, already the case, although it is not openly formalized. Democratization in the narrow sense of more elections will not bring many answers, certainly not in the short term. But in the longer term a deeper democratization, which includes building in accountability to deal with obstacles to democracy, remains ‘the ultimate prize’ (Doig and Theobald 2000: 33). Experiments being quietly conducted by young people in the very areas that suffered most, to build a more open society, unafraid of the truth and confident of the future, might give us a glimpse of better times to come.6
The small towns wars of reformasi confront Indonesians with what Partha Chatterjee in a brilliant new book has called ‘the politics of the governed’ (Chatterjee 2004). In most of the post-colonial world, whenever the great mass of what he calls ‘subaltern citizens’ have begun to participate in popular politics, they express their understanding of the inspiring symbol of popular sovereignty in communitarian ways. Ethnic mobilization is part of that, to the dismay of the modernizing elites committed to the formal rules of parliamentary democracy. The communitarian politics of the governed play out largely beyond the bounds of ‘civil society’ and the formal institutions of the state, yet they are surprisingly popular at the local level, as we have seen.

One response to these changes, according to Chatterjee (2004: 50), is to revert to a variant of the colonial strategy of indirect rule.

This involves a suspension of the modernization project, walling in the protected zones of bourgeois civil society and dispensing governmental functions of law and order and welfare through the ‘natural leaders’ of the governed populations.

This was essentially the strategy of the New Order. It is a cynical one, because it is adopted in the full knowledge that it can only be implemented with considerable violence, since the governed no longer accept that they are not to be sovereign after all. It is also ignorant, because the politics of the governed are themselves a product of the modernization process set in train by the same impulses that today underlie the state. Such politics are unlikely to wither so long as the state remains what it is.

A more enlightened response, continues Chatterjee, begins with a sense that the nebulous zone of popular politics in fact offers possibilities. Both the subaltern classes and the modernizing elites are already embarked on a path of internal transformation, as they learn from each other. This response to the politics of the governed is worth quoting at length, because it seems as applicable to Indonesia as it does to India. It attempts to steer [the project of enlightenment] through the thicket of contestations in what I have called political society. It takes seriously the functions of direction and leadership of a vanguard, but accepts that the legal arm of the state in a country like India cannot reach into a vast range of social practices that continue to be regulated by other beliefs and administered by other authorities. But it also knows that those dark zones are being penetrated by the welfare functions of modern governmental practices, producing those effects on claims and representation that I have called the urge for democratization. This is the zone in which the project of democratic modernity has to operate – slowly, painfully, unsurely.

Such a project, if Indonesians committed to it, would not bring the victims of the small town wars back to life. But it might assure their souls that something has been learned from their anguish.
Notes

Acknowledgements


1 Introduction

1 Personal communication Edward Aspinall, 2 June 2006, based on newspaper tallies.
3 A useful review of the demise of social strain theory in the face of social movements theory is Buechler (2004). Two of the most cogent critics of social movement theory to explain collective violence have objected, among other arguments, that viewing such events simply as politics by other means fatally underrates the importance that all human beings attach to obeying social norms (Piven and Cloward 1995). However, social movements theorists respond that no collective action can result only from the widespread breakdown of social relations implied by the term strain and breakdown.
4 Eva Lotta-Hedman (2005) has written an interesting review of the potential theoretical contributions to research on violence in Indonesia made by three key texts on violence in India, namely Wilkinson (2004, on electoral rational choice), Varshney (2002, on social capital), and Brass (2003, on representation and discourse).

2 Why now? Temporal contexts

1 Another Western author of the 1950s and 1960s being rediscovered in culturalist debates in Indonesia is Edward Bruner, who argued that a dominant culture is good for local politics (Bruner 1974).
2 Payne’s article was quoted in a Kompas opinion piece (Maruli Tobing, ‘Demokrasi semu di atas tatanan kekerasan’, Kompas, 25 May 2005).
3 The work was inspired by Booth (1992) and by Stewart (2002). Tadjoeddin (2004) has subsequently pursued other lines of explanation, such as tensions within civil society.
4 Inequality and unemployment, while difficult to measure, did slightly increase the likelihood of conflict. However, the data set for this study, while extensive, is problematic because it was compiled by the Indonesian government for a different purpose.
5 Some major volumes on the democratic transition in Indonesia include Budiman, Hatley and Kingsbury (1999); Dijk (2001); Emmerson (1999); Manning and Diermen (2000) and O’Rourke (2002). Books specifically on the politics of decentralization include Aspinall and Fealy (2003), Kingsbury and Aveling (2003), Sakai (2002), and Schulte and Klinken (2007).
6 See also the chapter on the security forces in Poso by Arianto Sangaji, in Schulte and Klinken (2007).

7 Others contradict this image of inevitably declining state powers around the world. A new consensus has emerged in the Western halls of power that states should maintain some regulatory powers after all, albeit powers that suit the needs of global capital (Suriajaya in Lindsey and Dick 2002, see also Rose-Ackerman 1999 on how to fight corruption – by reforming the state rather than downsizing it).

3 Why here? The town beyond Java

1 There is no standard definition of the small town (Lindert and Verkoren 1997: 3; Pedersen 1997: 1, 20). Rondinelli (1983: 48–9) defines the secondary city, which performs essential urban functions, as any centre over 100,000. Those smaller than that are predominantly agricultural and rural service centres. Hardoy and Satterthwaite (1986: 13–15) define the small town as 5–20,000, with the intermediate urban centre as 20–100,000. All the towns discussed in this book had substantial urban functions and are thus more appropriately called intermediate urban centres.

2 A good overview of the debate over development in smaller Third World towns is in Pedersen (1997).

3 More precise databases of conflict, with their own interpretations as to causes, can be found in the following references. I value the insights of this work but have consciously adopted a political economy approach not found in any of them (Barron, Kaiser and Pradhan 2004; Varshney, Panggabean and Tadjoeddin 2004; Welsh 2003).

4 The figures are based on self-reporting. In fact half the income even of those who say they live mainly by agriculture is derived from off-farm activities (Booth in Leinbach 2004: 19–20).

5 Economists should be able to produce good indicators of state dependence, but those listed by Hal Hill (2000: 222f) do not give a clear picture. One possible indicator is the government sector as a proportion of the total provincial GDP. But this figure, besides being dated (1989), remains subject to distortion by enclave industries. Central Sulawesi is high on this indicator – its government sector is larger than trade (BPS Sulawesi Tengah 2002a: 15–29, constant 1993 prices). Another is ‘net exports’, where a negative figure indicates a current account deficit and thus a net subsidy through the state. Central and West Kalimantan are high on this indicator – which is puzzling in view of their timber resources. A persistent problem with all Indonesian economic indicators is that they do not capture the black economy. Timber-rich provinces are rife with illegal economic activity. Nevertheless, these two indicators are not meaningless. Two provinces that score high on both these economic indicators of state dependence are East Nusa Tenggara and Bengkulu.

6 Is it significant that two of the vulnerable provinces owe their high V index more to a high value of deagrarianization D (West and Central Kalimantan), while the other two owe it more to a high bureaucratization B (Maluku and Central Sulawesi)? I do not know.

7 The urban–rural ratios in Rutz are lower than the ratio of non-agricultural to agricultural working populations. This is because by no means all those who leave agriculture also move to town. His urban–rural ratios are also lower than in Indonesian government data, because he devised his own criteria to ensure consistency across the decades. Rutz determines that the level of urbanization in and outside Java did not differ greatly – both were around 20 per cent in 1980 (1987: 34 column 7, 85). Indeed on one criterion the outer islands were more urbanized than Java, according to Rutz. The reason was that there were far more small towns (25,000 or less) for a given population outside Java than in Java (Rutz 1987: 85).

8 Interview with Daniel Dakhindae, Jakarta, 26 November 2004.

10 Exceptions include Wouden (1997) and Franck (1993), both confined to Java.
11 Calculated from Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia, 1990, using per capita monthly domestic expenditure of Rp. 60,000 as the lower limit.
12 Dwight King (2003: 144–53) found that the relative size of the government sector did not correlate with an increased Golkar vote in 1999. However, he did not consider the government sector in relation to the urban population, which is smaller outside Java.
14 Naning Indratni, ‘Eksklusif: Prof Dr HA Syafii Maarif – tokoh agama jangan “memasung” diri’, Suara Pembaruan, 23 February 2002. This is unlikely to be correct, but see Soselisa (2003).

4 Identity formation in West Kalimantan

1 See the debate between Knight and Higley in Dogan and Higley (1998).
2 Varshney et al. (2004: 23) estimate double this death toll, or over a thousand. (Note that this section of the Varshney et al. report inadvertently writes ‘Central’ instead of ‘West’ Kalimantan.)
3 I helped write this report.
4 Results of the 2000 national census, which contained an ethnic question, were not published in West Kalimantan due to political sensitivity. My calculations are based on Andre (2003: 44), who quotes Central Bureau of Statistics data.
5 See Indonesian Forestry Department maps at <http://www.dephut.go.id>.
6 See also reports by Down to Earth <http://www.gn.apc.org/dte>.
10 All the following material is drawn from Davidson (2002) unless indicated otherwise.
14 More examples of the way religious, ethnic or business organizations played the role normally reserved for political parties – the privatization and mafianization of the state in a moment of crisis – can be found in Schulte and Klinken (2007).
16 This conclusion remains tentative, as the data on what happened in early 1997 remains patchy. There are some indications of centralized, Pontianak-based Dayak organizational efforts after late January 1997 though it is unclear how significant they were.
17 ‘Cyber-identities at war’ is the title of an article by Bräuchler (2003). The notion of an Indonesian culture of violence (Colombijn 2001) also comes close to suggesting that collective violence can be understood by reference to identity alone, without mobilization.
18 Parsudi Suparlan (Achmad et al. 1999: 39; Suparlan 2000), whose reports on recent ethnic conflict have been influential, quotes the work of his mentor Edward Bruner, in particular his recommendation of ‘segregated pluralism’ as a solution to ethnic tension (Bruner 1974). The idea is that each ethnic group, conceived essentialistically, should have ‘dominance’ in its own territory.
19 The constructivist process of identity formation was described for Africa in a path-breaking paper by Berman (1998).
Victor King begins his standard work on the peoples of Borneo by announcing: ‘In this book, I shall not have much to say about these various immigrant groups. Instead I shall be concentrating on the Dayak populations of Borneo. . .’ (King 1993: 35). Are the absent Malays, as numerous as Dayaks, not equally indigenous?

Rudé based his notion of inherent and derived ideologies on Gramsci’s distinction between organic and arbitrary ideologies. The concept of frame was first put forward by Goffman (1974).

The theory of frame alignment was developed to describe the ideational work of democratic social movements in industrialized nations. In this book we are describing communal chauvinism in an information-poor Third World nation about to emerge from authoritarian rule. The differences are considerable. Organizational forms are often ephemeral, non-formal mediation such as rumour and religious sermons trump the mass media. Moreover we have far less reliable information about what happened in West Kalimantan than in the Western case studies. Nevertheless, I find the toolbox of cultural framing concepts useful to help bridge the gap between culturalist and structuralist-mobilizational explanations of the violent episodes described in this book.

Charles Tilly has proposed ‘boundary activation’ as an alternative way of bridging the same gap between identity and mobilization (Tilly 2003). This is appealing because it refers to the interactional notion of ethnicity after Barth. But it needs to be operationalized more clearly to match the sophistication of the frame-alignments apparatus.

5 Escalation in Poso

Of all the episodes described in this book, few are as well studied as Poso. A strong group of civil society researchers in the provincial capital Palu has built an impressive body of written work. Among them are Arianto Sangaji, George Aditjondro and Harley. The group has also been generous to foreign observers, among them Lorraine Aragon, Greg Acciaioli, Tanya Li, David McRae and myself. As the least knowledgeable of them all, I gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness to both the Palu group and these foreign scholars.

This discussion concerns district and provincial boundaries as they were before the creation (by subdivision) of a new province and several new districts, a process known as pemekaran that took place in stages after 1999. Recent official population figures for Poso and Morowali districts, which previously made up Poso district are 77,000 or 18 per cent lower than those for 1998 (BPS Sulawesi Tengah 1999: 70, 2001b). Presumably this reflects conflict-related population movements out of Poso district, much of it towards Palu and Donggala. I was not able to find pre-conflict statistics about the urban-rural divide. Post-conflict statistics are unreliable. My figure for Poso town is extrapolated from Rutz (1987: 274), but Rutz does not report on Ampana.

The data is somewhat unreliable, partly because the national census of 2000 that was the source for some of it took place at a time of severe conflict-related displacement, and also because the term ‘immigrant’ is not defined consistently at all times. One official estimate has the proportion of immigrants in Poso and the new district of Morowali (which split from Poso in September 1999) as 17 per cent, with most of them living in Morowali (BPS Sulawesi Tengah 2001b: 53). Another gives the proportion as 24 per cent, but has most of them living in the rump Poso district (BPS Sulawesi Tengah 2002b: 88).

One journalist wrote in this vein: ‘At the heart of the war is a demographic shift in which Muslim settlers from southern Sulawesi and Java changed the balance in Poso and its surrounding villages, which had been largely Christian’ (Mydans 2002).

In at least two reported incidents cocoa played a role. Both were attacks west of Poso town: one in May 2000 (‘Poso: burning desire for real peace’, Tempo Magazine, 15–21 January 2002) and one in October–November 2001 (Human Rights Watch 2002: 9).

Interview with Arianto Sangaji, Palu, 23 March 2003.

The warning was made by Chaelani Umar, a member of the provincial parliament with the PPP party (‘Buntut kerusuhan Poso: wartawan diperiksa sebagai saksi’, Kompas, 29 April 2000).

There were two other Muslim elite concerns: the ongoing trial of Agfar Patanga for inciting violence in Poso I and fraud charges against a businessman (Aliansa Tompo) who had financed Patanga.

Adnan Arsal was a long-time activist with the student organization Pelajar Islam Indonesia, which had been associated with the Sukarno-era party Masjumi and went underground after New Order repression in the mid-1980s. The group re-emerged after the collapse of the New Order. (Interview with Adnan Arsal, Poso, 27 March 2003).

Catholics also had a highly visible Ambon Crisis Centre, which was politically more neutral.


Forum Silaturahim Perjuangan Umat Islam Poso, the Poso Islamic Congregation’s Forum for Consultation and Struggle.

Interview Adnan Arsal, Poso, 27 March 2003.

‘Cong. Human Rights Caucus briefing – 9 February 1999 (4 statements)’, email list Indonesia-L <apakabar>, 26 February 1999. See also the FICA website <http://www.fica.org>. For more on how Indonesian Christians have appealed to Western Christian activists over the Internet see Hill and Sen (2002).


A list of 2003–4 events is in appendix C of International Crisis Group (2004). The later events were all traced to a single group of militants who were arrested in May 2006 (‘Suspects confess on tape to beheading three schoolgirls’, The Jakarta Post, 15 May 2006).

An exception was intermittent fighting between Christians and Muslims that left about a dozen dead over 2003–5 in the new district of Mamasa, part of the new province of West Sulawesi, not far from Palu (International Crisis Group 2005).

Mobilization in Ambon

The press ban was announced early in the investigation and the completion of the substantial report was never reported (‘TPIN minta pers jangan publikasikan hasil investigasi’, Suara Pembaruan, 13 July 2002). When Maluku provincial parliamentarian Chris Sahetapy asked 18 months later for the report to be made public, other fraction leaders told him to shut up (‘Presiden diminta umumkan hasil TPIN konflik Maluku’, detikcom, 30 August 2004).


Religion, patronage and a history of authoritarianism are also the key elements in the account of Bertrand (2002). There is as yet no comprehensive and up-to-date history


5 Christian Ambonese include Lt Gen (ret.) Leo Lopulisa, now seriously ill, Brig Gen (ret.) Max Tamaela, Brig Gen (ret.) Ade Pecaulima, Rear Admiral (ret.) Franky Kaihatu, Rear Air Marshall Pieter Wattimena, and Maj Gen George Toisuta. In the past Maj Gen J. Muskitta, Col. Herman Pieters, and Air Commodore Leo Wattimena, now deceased, helped protect Christian Ambonese interests. Muslims have only Lt Gen (ret.) Suaidi Marasabessy and Brig Gen (ret.) Rustam Kastor. Thanks to Aris Santos for this information.


7 Bertrand 2004: 119; Faried Basalamah, ‘Re: Kasus Ambon dimulai 10 tahun yang lalu’, Indonesia-L email list <apakabar>, 8 January 2000, and others in this thread.


9 Three examples of politically connected contractors are Yosias (‘Yossy’) Polnaya, a Golkar supporter who shifted to PDI-P after reformasi, Yusuf Ely, of Golkar, and Abdullah Tuasikal, of Golkar but later with the conservative Islamic party PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang). All three became well-known organizers of religious militants during the Maluku wars (Kontras and Lerai 2000).

Another possibly conflictual aspect of the economic crisis was the price of cloves, which are important to Maluku’s economy. Minister Yusuf Kalla once claimed that the Maluku wars were largely due to a sudden increase in clove prices (Naning Indratni, ‘Eksklusif: Prof Dr HA Syafii Maarif – tokoh agama jangan “memasung” diri’, Suara Pembaruan, 23 February 2002). Some of the fighting particularly on Saparua Island was over clove trees. But the most drastic price rise did not come till May 1999, well after the wars had started (Soselisa 2003).


13 Interview with Saleh Latuconsina, Jakarta, 23 December 2004; also Pos Keadilan (1999).

14 On the importance of actualized boundaries for communal violence see Tilly (2003).


16 ‘Tawuran terjadi dalam waktu hampir bersamaan’, Republika Online, 22 January 1999. This report mentioned mass inter-village brawls in four places around Central Java, also in West Java, Central Sulawesi, North Sumatra, Lampung (southern Sumatra) and West Kalimantan. The last of these led to a prolonged episode of anti-Madurese violence and is discussed in Chapter 4 of the present book. The same newspaper had earlier reported the fight in Ambon city on the same day.

17 Welsh (2003) has shown quantitatively how common such events were in West Java in the late 1990s. We need a similar study for Ambon.
20 For example, the alleged shooting by police of four Muslims at morning prayer in the al-Huda mosque in Rinjani, Batu Merah, was widely but inaccurately reported in Jakarta on 1 March 1999 (Human Rights Watch 1999).
25 ‘Jaringan provokator kerusuhan Ambon’, Tajuk, 15–28 April 1999. The details of this latter construction are too speculative – Latumahina lived in Jakarta and had largely lost contact with Ambonese society. Moreover he was Golkar, not PDI, and thus not in a position to protest.
27 ‘Meraih kursi dari para pengungsi’, Tajuk, vol. 2, no. 6, distributed on email list <apakabar@radix.net> 5 June 1999.
29 Three Muslim peace negotiators had their houses bombed or burned because of this – Yusuf Ely, Thamrin Ely and Lutfy Sanaki.
31 Curiously, the otherwise comprehensive Blackwell companion to social movements (Snow, Soule and Kriesi 2004a) fails to discuss security issues of any sort. Meanwhile such issues are prominent in two critiques of resource mobilization explanations for violent collective behaviour by Useem (1998) and Goldstone (1994: 315).

7 Polarization in North Maluku

1 Despite its remote location, the violence in North Maluku has been described in several excellent studies (Adeney-Risakotta 2005; Bubandt 2000, 2001a,b, 2002; Duncan 2005; Hulaleng 2000; International Crisis Group 2000a; Jusuf 1999; Mawdsley, Tanuhandaru and Holman 2002; Streit 2002; Tomagola 1999, 2000; UNDP Indonesia Conflict Prevention and Recovery Unit 2002). A substantial local literature also exists (Ahmad and Oesman 2000; Karianga et al. 1999; Nanere 2000; Oesman 2003; Samiun 2003).
2 I was unable to locate a similar occupational breakdown for Ternate for later years.
4 Kiem quotes an official annual growth rate of 2.2 per cent in the 1980s. This may be an underestimate. Annual urban growth in Maluku generally (though no doubt dominated by Ambon) has consistently been 3–4 per cent since the 1930s (Rutz 1987: 113–14). I was unable to locate alternative urbanization figures for Ternate.
6 The next two paragraphs are based on a group interview with 1999 activists Hasbi Yusuf, Basri Salamah, Anwar Ways, Hasyim Abdul Kadir and Arsad Sangaji (Ternate 12 August 2003) with thanks to them and to Muhlis (‘Ojie’) Assegaf for letting me copy his superb archives of this period. See also Samiun (2003). The interpretation is my own.

7 ‘Ketua KPU Rudini tentang usul pemekaran Maluku dan Irian Jaya: itu bisa tunda pemilu’, Kompas, 26 April 1999. This was the Justice and Law Enforcement Council (DPKSH, Dewan Penegakan Keamanan dan Sistem Hukum).

8 ‘Pemekaran wilayah: seribu pulau, dua provinsi’, Gatra, no. 34/V, 10 July 1999.

9 A classic study of coalitions asserts that ‘winning coalitions tend toward the minimal size’ (Riker 1984: 211). Overweight coalitions are too ungainly to take meaningful decisions. This principle seemed to apply here too.


11 Interview Arsad Sangaji, Ternate, 12 August 2003.

12 The September 1998 date was given by Hanny Tanjung, the sultan’s son-in-law and a Gemusba chairperson, interviewed on 11 August 2003. Streit (2002: 65), who points out the Golkar connection, believes it goes back to 1997.

13 Gould (1999) has described evocatively how this generally happens. As tensions rise, antes are upped, solidarities grow increasingly militant and each side refuses to back down.


15 Interview with Namotemo brothers, Toma Baru, Halmahera, 18 August 2003.

16 Streit (2002: Document 2) reproduces this so-called Sosol berdarah letter and adds a German translation.

17 The Jusuf report contains detailed but not independently verified allegations that lower-ranking government officials were involved in provoking several cases of anti-Christian mob violence.


20 The Lembaga Adat Hibualamo was formed in Tobelo in March 1999, followed by Generasi Muda Hibualamo (Gemahilo) in August 1999 and then Forum Solidaritas Halmahera Utara (FSHU). Muslim militants later regarded these as Christian fronts (Ahmad and Oesman 2000: 141). The Kao also formed a customary association allied with the sultan of Ternate, but not till May 2003 (interview with the brothers Yakobus Namotemo and Rev. Yance Namotemo, Toma Baru, Halmahera, 18 August 2003). The pre-conflict balance of Christians and Muslims in northern Halmahera shows a mixed society with majority-Christian areas (Kao, Tobelo, Loloda, Ibu) and majority-Muslim ones (Jailolo, Galela, Malifut) (Ahmad and Oesman 2000: 66; Streit 2002: map 4a).


22 Interviews with Nurain Konofo, Syamsul Bahri and Sadrak Tongo-Tongo in Galela and Tobelo, August 2003. The remarkable story of this negotiation effort by local community figures on both sides must be told elsewhere.

23 They were the North Maluku district police chief (Kapolres) Lt Col (Police) Didiek Priandono, the North Maluku district military commander (dandim) Lt Col Slamet Riady, and the local garrison battalion commander (danyon 732) Major Widagdo.

Notes

25 ‘Menunggu Mbak Mega di Tobelo, Wapres akan diinapkan di kapal perang...’, 
*Republika*, 30 January 2000; ‘Pecah konflik di Sosupu, Halmahera Utara’, *Kompas*, 
22 January 2000.

26 Interview with Fahmie Alhadar, Ternate, 12 August 2003.

27 ‘Muslim leaders appear at Jakarta protest’, *Straits Times*, 8 January 2000.

28 ‘500,000 pasukan jihad hadiri tablig akbar di Ternate’, *Analisa*, 24 April 2000. The 
figure of half a million *jihad* forces must be a gross exaggeration.

29 ‘Sultan Ternate dipecat dari jabatannya selaku ketua DPRD’, *Republika*, 28 January 
2000; ‘Sebanyak 20 parpol dukung pemecatan Sultan Ternate’, *Republika*, 5 February 
2000.

June 2005).

8 Actor constitution in Central Kalimantan

1 The government put the total at 469 (International Crisis Group 2001a: 5), the Catholic 
Church at 822 (Pelayanan Krisis dan Rekonsiliasi Konferensi Waligereja Indonesia 
2001) and Varshney and his colleagues, studying press reports, at 1,284 (Varshney, 
Panggabean and Tadjoeddin 2004: 30). Conversations with government officials in 
Sampit made me think the lower estimate was more likely.

2 Figures calculated from the annual *Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia*, Jakarta: Badan 
Pusat Statistik. These statistics were discussed in more comparative detail in Chapter 3.

3 ‘May 18, 1999: where the (natural resource) wealth is’, Jakarta: Embassy of the United 
wealth.html> (accessed 11 January 2005), quoting Indonesian BPS data. The next 
highest is West Kalimantan, at 8 per cent.

4 The remainder of this chapter draws on Klinks (2002), while applying a more 
consistent conceptual framework to it.

5 Lembaga Musyawarah Masyarakat Dayak dan Daerah Kalimantan Tengah, or Central 
Kalimantan Institute for Dayak and Regional Social Consultation (my translation).

6 Manan Bunda, Pedlik Asser, Dahir Madjat, Suparman Ismail, Yoas Elko, ‘Poko-poko 
pikiran: visi Dayak menghadapi abad 21 – Dayak menjadi tuan di negeri sendiri’, 
LMMDD-Kotim, paper presented at Kongres Rakyat Kalimantan Tengah II, 


8 ‘Indikasi money politics dalam pemilihan gubernur Kalteng’, Jakarta, *Kompas Cyber 


11 ‘Situasi Ampalit masih mencekam: warga mengungsi ke markas Polda Kalteng’, 

12 ‘Sejumlah tokoh Dayak berkumpul: bantah akan serang Kereng Pangi’, *Banjarmasin 
Post*, 23 December 2000; ‘Kereng Pangi rusuh satu tewas, belasan rumah dibakar massa’, 


14 ‘Polri: otak kerusuhan Sampit ada di Jakarta’, *Mandiri*, 28 February 2001; see also 

15 Interview, Sampit, 10 May 2003.

16 Sentot and Amos, ‘Catatan diskusi: Kekerasan di Kalimantan Tengah’, unpublished doc-
ument, Elsam, Jakarta, 4 May 2001; also ‘Peristiwa pembunuhan dan deportasi massal 
di Kalimantan Tengah, 18 Februari–30 Maret 2001: “Kejahatan terhadap kemanusiaan”’, 

17 Decapitation was imitated outside Kalimantan as well. Young Javanese men used it 
against suspected sorcerers in East Java in late 1998 (Brown 2000; Siegel 2001).
18 One account in a Banjarmasin tabloid starts by describing Commander Bird (Panglima Burung) that inspired much Dayak violence:

Until now no one has ever seen Commander Bird in the flesh, not even Dayaks themselves. She is a woman in the abstract, about 300 years old and living in a cave whose location no one knows. When she comes out of the cave, she looks young with long loose hair. Or she could change into an eagle, or a spirit. So the stories about flying swords and spears are true, for someone is moving them. According to a Dayak story, Commander Bird has unusual powers, such as knowing someone’s hidden wounds, walking on a banana leaf [still on the tree], knowing where someone is, and so on.

(N. M. Daniansyah, ‘Selalu menyertai dalam peperangan’, BeBAS, 21–27 March 2001)


26 For example, a moral panic in American cities in the 1990s about the ‘black underclass’ focused on crime, teenage pregnancy and drugs. It was used to scale back affirmative action programmes established in the 1980s.

9 Concluding reflections

1 The logic of the Indonesian violence was thus broadly similar to that described by Wilkinson (2004) for India. There, local political elites deployed communal mobilization as part of a rational strategy for success when (a) there were relatively few parties in the competition, (b) at least one large party had no electoral interest in protecting an unpopular minority, and (c) the supralocal state was unable or unwilling to provide adequate security. The difference in Indonesia is that political competition and mobilization did not run exclusively through parliamentary elections by means of political parties but also through lobbying for top executive positions by means of ad hoc ethnic and religious ‘forums’.


4 For example Emil Salim, ‘Membangun integrasi bangsa’, Kompas, 2 and 3 September 1999.


6 One example is the small Muslim group Lakpesdam in Ambon. It has a programme of community empowerment based on inter-faith dialogue, pluralism, human rights and democratization. Another example is the edited volume by Malukan young intellectuals, both Christian and Muslim, who met each other in Jogjakarta (Salatalohy and Pelu 2004).
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