Disaster Management and Civil Society: Earthquake Relief in Japan, Turkey and India

Alpaslan Özerdem
Tim Jacoby

I. B. Tauris
Disaster Management
and Civil Society
Though conflict has been the focus of much academic attention, the processes of recovering from war and conflict have been little studied. Confusion still exists as to whether post-war reconstruction is concerned with relief or development, with physical rebuilding, economic recovery, social reintegration or political reconstruction. The result is an all too frequent fragmentation and waste of effort on the ground.

An understanding of the need to plan and integrate the many different activities for reconstruction and recovery within a shared vision is therefore crucial. The *International Library of Post-war Reconstruction and Development* will set out a conceptual and strategic framework for post-war reconstruction practice, at the same time exploring and illustrating specific aspects of practice for those working in the field or training to do so. The series will also act as a focus for a continuing dialogue between academics and practitioners at the forefront of developing the discipline.

Forthcoming in the series:

**Post-war Recovery**
*Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration*
A. Özerdem

**Violence and Post-war Reconstruction**
*Insecurity in post-war environments*
C. Steenkamp

**Policy Transfer in**
*Post-war Reconstruction*
S. Barakat and M. Evans

**Ethnicity and Conflict**
*Cultural identity and post-war reconstruction*
R. Aitken
Disaster Management and Civil Society
Earthquake Relief in Japan, Turkey and India

Alpaslan Özerdem
Tim Jacoby
CONTENTS

vi  List of Tables and Figures
vii  Acknowledgements
ix   Foreword by Professor Ian Davis

1  Introduction

Chapter 1
9  States, Civil Society and Disasters

Chapter 2
29  The Kobe Earthquake

Chapter 3
51  The Marmara Earthquake

Chapter 4
71  The Gujarat Earthquake

Chapter 5
93  Conclusion

115  Notes
121  Bibliography
135  About the Authors
137  Index
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 (page 10): Major Earthquake Disasters Since 1970 (over 5,000 lives lost)
Table 2 (page 17): Types of Civil Society Organisation
Table 3 (page 24): Analytical Approaches to the Third Sector
Table 4 (page 27): Models of Third Sector Regime

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 (page 47): Future Civil Society in Japan
Figure 2 (page 62): Turkey’s Neighbourhood Disaster Support Project
Figure 3 (page 111): The Role of Civil Organisations Following a Disaster
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many colleagues and friends in the UK and civil society practitioners and policy makers in the three case study countries of Japan, Turkey and India have helped us to research and write this book, by providing information and commenting on drafts. They are too numerous to thank individually, but we hope they will recognise their influence on the pages to follow.

Special thanks are due to the British Academy for funding a one-year research project on the civil society-state relationships in the context of disaster management after major earthquake disasters with specific reference to the 1999 Marmara earthquake in Turkey.

We dedicate this book to those volunteers who responded to the earthquake disasters of Kobe, Marmara and the Gujarat with courage, passion and care.
In the final section of this fascinating book, the authors discuss three of the largest earthquakes of the past ten years through the lens of the role of the state in relation to civil society. My leisurely reading of the text in order to write this preface was rudely interrupted by the dramatic news of yet another earthquake, the Indian Ocean Tsunami of December 2004. Surrounded by piles of newspapers, and Internet situation reports, with graphic images filling the TV with scenes of horrific devastation, a range of difficult questions presented themselves concerning this new mega-disaster, an event that has dwarfed the impact of the three described in this book. Statistics by mid February were of an estimated 300,000 deaths, the highest loss of life caused by an earthquake since the 1556 Shansi Earthquake in China, where casualties totalled 830,000. (USGS, 2005)

These questions grow from the penetrating issues raised in this ground-breaking book that uniquely explores the power of the state, (or its limitations) in relation to civil society as a given country suffers the impact of a devastating earthquake. The authors perceptively explore the roles of the state, the market and civil society before and after disasters. These factors are then related to the social environment of disasters, with new insights on patterns of vulnerability and the possibilities or constraints for effective disaster management. They then provide an illuminating consideration of three earthquake case studies that investigate the gaps in provision in state structures and the extent that these can, or cannot be filled by the actions of well-motivated civil societies.

Thus my own questions echo the themes of this text by considering the interaction of three key variables: the state, civil society and earthquake impact within the countries most affected by the tsunami: Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Thailand. Obviously questions surrounding this massive event will result in a vast library of books and reports, so any comments on such links are inevitably premature and superficial, and at this stage are best confined to questions rather than answers.
The first question concerns the effectiveness of the State, (or States) in protecting its vulnerable citizens from disasters when this protection is in sharp conflict with opportunities for the private sector and governments to secure lucrative economic developments. What steps can be taken to encourage political leaders with a short term vision to consider safe sustainable futures? The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has reported that tourism significantly worsened the impact of the tsunami. The highly critical report states that in areas where mangrove forests or coral reefs had been destroyed to make way for tourist developments the tsunami had a far more devastating impact than it would have had otherwise. The director of Tourism Concern, a campaigning organisation for environmentally sustainable tourism, underlined the UN findings:

If coral hadn’t been destroyed to build hotels, mangroves removed to make ‘perfect beaches’ and hotels built so close to the shoreline, the death toll may well have been lower (Paul Miles, 2005)

Then there are many questions concerning the response of Countries to the tsunami? Unlike the position that was taken in response to the Gujarat earthquake the Government of India adopted an independent stance in this instance, while the other countries requested international assistance. This raises the question concerning the effect of the Indian “go it alone” position in accelerating recovery, by thus avoiding the cascade of good, bad and indifferent aid that came as a deluge into the other affected countries. And what was the impact of the unprecedented volume of aid on local recovery in the countries that did request assistance? The picture is confusing since three classic principles of aid provision following disaster appear to have been followed in some places yet ignored in others. The first principle is to always assess needs and damage by experienced local personnel before sending in any aid, secondly, to never provide anything that has not been requested and thirdly, to avoid duplicating what the country concerned, as well as the surviving communities can provide themselves,

Where did power reside in these chaotic days and who controlled the situation? Were national leaders in the affected countries able to maintain a grip on what was being delivered and match it to specific needs? Or was this role meekly handed over to UN officials? Then there is the wider question: when does coordination become control, and when does control suppress local action? Can the different functions of coordination and control be prised apart? There is also the vexing question concerning the role of the Centre, in relation to local affected areas. How does the ‘top-down’ set of functions from the capital city to deliver support relate to ‘bottom–up’ requests from local officials as well as local recovery actions? In an ideal world these complex relationships will have been well worked out in the National Disaster Plan, but assuming this was not the case, how well did the top support the bottom in local recovery actions?

Second, what was the role of civil society in response to the tsunami? Perhaps the core of this issue was to recognise the sheer scale and power of civil society as it responded on a truly epic scale to this mega-disaster. Probably every self-
respecting NGO in the industrialised world, that supports international disaster relief, was obliged to respond to their supporters desire to see them in evidence responding to the needs of this disaster.

The volume of contributions from the public was unprecedented to the point that unique events took place. When was the last time the Red Cross, (or any other agency) took out advertisements in the press to ask people not to send them any more money and was this the first time that Medicines sans Frontiers (MSF) returned contributions to their senders? A friend, representing one of the leading UK agencies described how he had attended a coordination meeting in Sri Lanka during the second week following the tsunami of no less than 149 assorted international agencies chaired by a resolutely determined Government official. His unenviable task to secure a coordinated and well-orchestrated response must have resembled an attempt to herd cats!

Ever since the highly erratic patterns of support by national and international non governmental agencies that followed the disaster there has been a powerful drive within civil society to create a set of agreed and well accepted standards of disaster assistance. They are to be found in two places: the Red Cross Code of Conduct and in the more specific multi-sectoral Sphere Standards for Humanitarian Assistance. How well was either set of performance standards followed as benchmarks in these recovery operations?

Writing this preface less than two months after the disaster it is still too early to gauge answers to such complex questions. Did civil society compliment the government support as a form of effective partnership or did it damage governmental authority by the volume of response? And just how vital was the role of both the state and civil society in relation to recovery actions adopted by the survivors themselves? Then there is the issue of the capacity of local organisations to absorb assistance from their wealthy international partners who may be competing with each other to secure fundable recovery projects.

This book provides a valued framework that has long been needed to consider such questions. This is not the place to attempt to cross-reference my concerns to the text, rather to provide a few key quotations that capture its rich flavour. Considering the role of the state in reducing vulnerability the authors note in Chapter 5 that:

…disasters are therefore created out of natural hazards, rather than existing as an immutable feature of human interaction with nature. So, in order to respond to disasters effectively and in a sustainable way, social concerns, such as power disparities, structural inequalities, resource distribution and political representation must all be addressed.

Then considering Civil Society there is a perceptive observation that before the earthquakes in Japan, Turkey and India:

…the overall assumption was that disaster management was a far too serious business for civil society to take an active role in. For the most part
it was considered from a technical and organisational perspective in which the main actors were state institutions and local authorities.

They note that a stereotypical view used to prevail that:

The civil population at large were regarded as the victims of disasters (and certainly not as a resource of skills and experience which might be mobilised to respond to a disaster) for whom the public sector were saviours.

This example of States having a low regard for civil societies is the precise opposite of a pair of experiences I can recall where Non-Governmental Organisations, as a key element in international civil societies demonstrated their general disregard or perhaps even contempt of States and their effectiveness in planning for disasters or in their management.

In 1998 in the Disaster Management Centre of Cranfield University an international disaster management course was being held. A number of National Disaster Coordinators were present drawn from certain African Countries. We convened a session where the course participants were presented with the *Sphere Minimum Standards in Disaster Response*, these were in an early stage of development at that time. (The Sphere Project, 2004) These had been developed by a group of humanitarian NGO’s and the Red Cross movement from 1997 onwards in the years following the Rwanda genocide. A representative from Sphere presented the purpose of standards and how they were been developed to our eminent collection of students.

This presentation resulted in an unexpected outburst from the National Coordinators, who angrily wanted to know why they, or anyone within their governments had not been consulted in the development of the standards? One suggested that it was the height of arrogance for international NGO’s, who were after all working as guests within their countries, to then proceed independently to develop, and then apply standards for water supply, sanitation, nutrition, shelter etc within their sovereign territory. Another question they might well have asked, was how the standards could be maintained, long after the emergency had been assumed to have ended heralding the departure of the NGO community, if the government were not aware of the standards or were not committed to their implementation?

Alas they left the session without satisfactory answers to their questions. Sphere was an NGO initiative, aimed to regulate the behaviour of other NGO’s. It was constructed, and is currently administered outside the sphere of influence of the Disaster Coordination Offices in the Governments concerned. This is despite the fact that the standards need to operate within their countries. Furthermore, this lack of consultation with governments was in spite of all the familiar rhetoric of NGO’s concerning their commitment to participatory management and project design. Rather the genesis of the Sphere Project was rooted in the principles and provisions of International humanitarian law and laws concerning human rights.
Reinforcing this tension between states and civil society, I recall that a year earlier I had led another Disaster Management Course for a leading international NGO that originated in the United States. The course brought together key people from their various international Relief Management teams from various countries. These highly trained teams rather closely resembled an international fire brigade, as they went into disaster situations for short periods, fully self-sufficient to address whatever needs they located. Their carefully defined approach was to work independently of local NGO’s or local bodies, (who were regarded as potential distractions to their urgent missions); rather it was to conduct well-rehearsed emergency relief operations for the affected communities with no long-term commitment whatsoever.

We spent about ten days together seeking to cover key issues that they faced, reviewing their operations and conducting a series of complex simulation exercises. In the final session I was given the rather thankless task of summarising my impressions of the course, reviewing its strengths and weaknesses. This proved to be far from easy since we had covered a lot of ground together. However, one central negative issue seemed to stand out from our discussions. This was the fact that I could not recall any reference being made throughout the entire course to the role of governments, or of national civil societies.

The entire focus had been on their International NGO, their funding, their work, their logistics, their value and their problems. This narrow perception and introvert approach appeared to be underpinned with a tacit assumption that they were the best guardians of the interests of the disaster survivors, and not local communities, nor locally based NGO’s, and certainly not the local or national government. They also appeared to hold tenaciously to another assumption that disaster response was a straightforward relief issue that had no links to national development. So there was no surprise when my comments landed like a lead balloon in a room full of self confident activists who to the last man and women had an exceedingly low regard for in-country resources or sensitivities and an inflated regard for the value of their own contribution.

However, five years later, some positive signs can be detected. Aside from the medical charities most enlightened international NGO’s would rarely contemplate operating in disaster situations without seeking to work in close partnership with local organisations, in close liaison with national governments. There are also signs that Governments are beginning to follow the Sphere Standards. These may be positive indications of a closing gap between the International NGO community and States. However, there is also contrary evidence that follows the continual growth of the NGO movement. This is particularly in response to donor governments using them, (rather than national governments) as aid conduits, causing them to grow in power and influence with the inevitable consequence to diminish the authority of governments in the management of disaster assistance.

At the outset of this book the authors remind their readers of the major gaps in literature concerning how different states have involved civil society in their attempts to prepare for and mitigate the impact of earthquakes, and of significant
developments within civil society that have been stimulated by the process of reconstruction. They then proceed in an admirable fashion to address these issues within the text, and particularly in the three well-constructed case studies.

The linking of civil society and the state highlights the problem of the coexistence of parallel and fragmented cultures of the state and civil society. The issue also draws attention to the need for effective national disaster plans to be developed, with full legislative backing, that identify in close detail the specific roles and responsibilities of states and all the resources of civil society in disaster management and recovery actions.

While the authors note some signs of improvement between civil society and states, often provoked by disaster recovery actions, much land remains to be possessed. Perhaps the tsunami recovery will stimulate both entities in the affected countries to recognise their mutual interdependence and respective mandates. It may also reveal the pressing need for the full and orderly mobilisation of all national resources in coping with the unprecedented demands that follow major disasters.
INTRODUCTION

In recent years, there has been an upsurge in the number of publications concerned with the study of civil society. While approaches have varied from human geography and sociology to politics and international relations, few writers have attempted to develop a comparative focus and none has combined this with a comprehensive analysis of the impact of natural disasters. Such a project is, though, not without precedent (see for instance, studies of the Mexico City earthquake by Denis Wegner and James Thomas (1994) and the 1994 Northridge earthquake by Robert Bolin and Lois Stanford (1998)). Recent studies of Japan, Turkey and India have, in fact, noted the powerful effects of the catastrophic earthquakes that affected Kobe in 1995, the Marmara region in 1999 and the Gujarat in 2001 on civil society’s relationship with the state (Tierney and Goltz, 1997; Jalali, 2002; Kubicek, 2002; Sharma and Palakudiyil, 2003; Thiruppugazh, 2003; Shaw and Goda, 2004). Here, however, the literature ends. There is no comparison of how different states have involved civil society in their attempts to prepare for, and mitigate the impact of, earthquakes; neither is there a comprehensive study of medium to long-term developments within civil society during and following the reconstruction process.

Such a gap in the literature is particularly important as it leaves unanswered fundamental questions such as whether or not the occurrence of large-scale disasters strengthens the organisational power and autonomy of the state, how such events mesh with the policies and structures of the international development industry and why civil groups across the world have been unable to reduce their vulnerability to natural hazards. These issues are, in fact, particularly pertinent given the optimism which marks much of the literature relating to the third sector. Andrew Maskrey, for instance, asserts that community based organizations ‘enable people to express their real needs and priorities, allowing problems to be correctly defined and responsive mitigation measures to be designed’ (1989: 84). While this may be so, it remains unclear whether such an involvement in disaster management would also bring about political change and whether the role of civil society been limited to creating social capital for an effective disaster response or has it also been able to play a role as an intermediary between the state and disaster-affected people.

Moreover, has it been able, as in the classic formulation of de Tocqueville, to generate organisations representative of society more broadly as well as to act as a checking
mechanism on the actions of the state? How do these features differ across various polities? For example, each of our three case studies represents different economic development levels, Japan being the richest and India the poorest (at least in terms of GDP per person). Correlatively, Japan is often given as a best practice example in the field of disaster management, while Turkey and India are often criticised for their lack of disaster preparedness and response strategies. Is there really a linear relationship between per capita wealth, civil power and state accountability in the context of natural disasters, though? Are there, in fact, other non-economic factors, such as participative democracy and welfare provisions, to consider? To what extent can acutely destructive earthquakes be seen as a catalyst for the development of the third sector and a civil basis for greater governmental efficiency and accountability? Does the empowerment of civil organisations imply a diminution in state responsibility and action? Have processes of civil empowerment endured or have state agents been able to appropriate their spheres of activity and influence? In summary, can earthquakes and the threat of earthquakes be regarded as an important marker in the ‘modern’ transition from a politically passive population to an active, rights-based citizenry?

These questions are important for, as Rita Jalali points out ‘civic cooperation does not appear in vacuum. It requires a state that is strong enough to formulate and enforce rules and regulations, which will allow associational life to grow and flourish’ (2002: 123). In this sense, context-specific narratives, which make up the vast majority of disaster studies, cannot hope to do more than suggest categories for further research. The firmly comparative approach adopted here will, it is hoped, contribute significantly to a more nomothetic understanding of earthquakes’ impact on state-civil relations.

Indeed, it is this pursuit of more general applicability, which has informed the selection of the cases to be explored. In Turkey, for instance, the legacy of Ottoman Empire and the founding principles of the republican state have played a decisive role in structuring the predominantly hierarchic relationship between the state and civil society. The ‘modernisation’ and Westernisation of the country as part of the republican project has been a top-down process overseen by various combinations of economic, bureaucratic and military elites. Meanwhile, the continuing political efficacy of Islam is often regarded as an inhibitor of civil society’s capacity to resist the state. This view, coupled with Ankara’s nationalist and coercive ideological monism, has, for many commentators, restricted the development of collectively determined social groups outside the authority of the state. In conjunction with an etatist vision of politics, state-granted privileges are used in the creation of a patron-client relationship between state and civil society. The result has been a tradition of passivity based on the supremacy of devlet baba, or the paternal state, and, consequently, an absence of civil contribution to the emergence and institutionalisation of the modern, secular Turkish republic. Such civil inaction has been, we argue, a key causal element in the ongoing vulnerability of Turkish society to the region’s earthquake hazard. The mismanagement of regional and urban development policies, the neglect of building regulations, corruption, nepotism and political favouritism all played a part in the vulnerability of the country’s building stock.
Although based on quite different social orientations, Japanese society is also marked by an element of passivity born of state centralisation and communitarian commitments. The fact that, as a result of military conquest, notions of Western-style constitutional government replaced imperial absolutism following the Second World War, rather than through a more endogenous process of social change, meant that civil society retained much of its traditional attitudinal structures. The ‘iron triangle’ between the bureaucracy, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and corporate capital (all ‘glued’ together by the system of *amakudari* – the widespread practice of senior state bureaucrats retiring to top management positions in the private sector) has formed the political framework of Japan’s developmental state. This oligarchic structure underpinned the state’s active intervention in the economy during the economic ‘miracle’ of the 1960s and 1970s and it continues to influence the way that decisions over industrial strategy are made today. Such a close association between the political and economic elites have, through the combined influence of industrial advance and a burgeoning bureaucracy, led to an approximate form of American-style corporate citizenship which tends to place civil organisations within the authoritative scope of the state. The result, we shall argue, has been an over-reliance on market-led physical mitigation measures, to the detriment of disaster response planning. Consequently, Kobe was caught unprepared and its population was left to cope with the impact of the earthquake without an effective public sector mobilisation. Furthermore, not only did the disaster demonstrate the futility of a sole reliance on technocratic fixes and the imperfections of their institutionalisation, it also revealed the vulnerability of socio-economic groups unable to afford modern, earthquake-resistant accommodation.

Although India shares the imperial heritage of Turkey and Japan, civil society has been somewhat strengthened by the self-actualisation of the de-colonisation process. The Gujarat, as Ghandi’s birthplace and as one of the country’s wealthiest regions, has been a key element in India’s economic development. Nonetheless, civil activism has been severely constrained by enduring ethnic polarisation and acute social inequality. The comparative wealth of the Muslim minority and the pro-Hindu clientelism of the central government have created deep-seated tensions undermining notions of state accountability and weakening civil society’s capacity to organise itself. This dual and inter-related failure to scrutinise the state and its agents and to impose the interests of civil society onto the public sector was a key factor in the bureaucracy’s failure to ensure that the market complied with India’s building regulations. The result was a lack of adequate earthquake proofing in the construction process thereby worsening local people’s vulnerability. Such delinquency was exacerbated by the fact that rapid urbanisation of the region had increased housing pressures and obliged even more people, especially those already made vulnerable by their socio-economic circumstances, to live in accommodation susceptible to earthquakes.

A key objective of this book is, therefore, to establish comparative categories and conclusions by assessing the impact of severe earthquakes on state development and civil organisation. Key topics to be addressed include the relationship between disaster mitigation, preparation, response and reconstruction.
and the capacity of civil society organisations to scrutinise the state and represent the interests of the citizenry. Here, similarities and key differences will provide the context for the way in which the state and civil society responded to the earthquakes in each of the case-study countries. Building on the work of Fred Cuny (1983), David Alexander (1997) and Mary Anderson and Peter Woodrow (1989), we will also examine the relationship between vulnerability and disasters and its socio-political implications. The book aims to outline the role of state, the market and the third sector in each of the various stages of the disaster management process. It will then consider the impact of the disaster on these areas by applying and developing Lester Salamon and Helmut Anheier’s regime typology (1999). In the first of its three parts, a theoretical contextualization of the relationship between the state, the market and civil society is offered which seeks to locate and analyse the current debate over effective disaster management. It aims to highlight the debate over the relationship between notions of a ‘civil society’ and the impact of earthquakes by starting with a review of now widely-promulgated approaches to the social nature of ‘natural’ disasters by developing the work of Piers Blaikie, Terry Cannon, Ian Davis and Ben Wisner (1994). Here various forms of social vulnerability will be considered in the light of the different phases involved in the management of severe earthquakes. This will be linked to current debates over civil society on the premise that an ‘associational life’ extends beyond secular or modern voluntary association. Included, then, will be organisations defined by particularist or primordial identities such as race, kinship, ethnicity and religion which interact with the state in the pursuit of their constituents’ interests. Following this, the concept of civil society will be explored in the context of disaster management with a particular focus on the international arena. Finally, by building on the work of Michael Edwards (2004), Thomas Janoski (1998), Mary Kaldor (2002) and David Keane (1998), the chapter attempts to provide an analytical framework that might bring a better understanding to the ways that states and civil society interact with each other both during the aftermath of disasters and in terms of their medium to long term social impact.

Second, three case study chapters analyse the Kobe, Marmara and the Gujarat earthquakes. The first of these looks at the earthquake which hit the Hanshin/Awaji area of Japan on 17 January 1995, killed over 6,000 people and caused 10 trillion yen of damage. Its impact made it clear that the hitherto highly trusted physical mitigation measures were simply not adequate. The state’s late and ineffective response also demonstrated fundamental shortcomings within the administration of the public sector which left civil society organisations and local residents to deal with the earthquake’s aftermath without sufficient support. However, more than one million people came to assist from all over Japan and it will therefore be argued that such an unprecedented level of voluntarism was so radical that it helped to prompt new legislation and the emergence of a stronger and more assertive third sector. These changes did not ensure that the reconstruction process was free from problems, though. Major deficiencies are noted, both in the way that the built environment was renewed and the levels of political access to Tokyo’s decision-makers afforded to the general public.
In terms of the former, for instance, the fact that the earthquake caused especially heavy damage to low-income, densely-populated, inner-city areas of Kobe meant that reconstructed housing needed to be of an affordable type. However, this has not proved to be the case. Civil organisations have generally been unable to prevent post-earthquake urban renewal programmes from following earlier policies of investing in middle to high income units. Consequently, the reconstruction process has, by pushing average property prices up, exacerbated globalisation-led increases in social exclusion. Moreover, there is considerable doubt as to whether or not the proliferation of non-governmental groups following the Kobe disaster has actually led to greater civil access to the state. The persistence of hierarchical notions of corporate citizenship, coupled with the comparative strength of state-affiliated residents’ mutual help organisations in and around Kobe, has tended to ensure continued state patronage and an unfavourable reception for new organisations unrelated to the earthquake.

Chapter Three considers the Marmara earthquake of 17 August 1999 which caused the deaths of approximately 17,000 people, hospitalised a further 44,000 people and produced material damage estimated at around US$10 billion. As in the case of the Kobe earthquake, the state’s response was woefully inadequate. Its lack of preparatory measures, both in terms of material design and contingent planning, were so obvious in the immediate aftermath of the disaster that it gave rise to an acute sense of anger amongst large sections of the general public. This was exacerbated by the fact that many civil organisations performed markedly better than their public sector counterparts, demonstrating that the disaster did not present entirely insurmountable challenges. As in Kobe, however, Turkish civil organisations were largely inadequately equipped to take on the complexities of disaster relief and there were substantial coordination problems, for which the public sector was roundly blamed. This added to the perception that the third sector is the most efficient and effective actor in the majority of post-disaster contexts – a notion enhanced by the growing influence of the European Union, its anti-state discourse and the prospect of future full membership. Together, these factors combined to force the state to seek a reformulated relationship with the third sector, prompting many writers to conclude that Turkish civil society would play an increasingly important political role in the future.

Initially, such predictions appeared to be well-founded. A general collapse in the Turkish public’s faith in the state’s institutional capacity to act in their interests led to growing demands, often centred around eminent civil society organisations, for a public sector with higher organisational capacities, less corruption and greater democratic accountability – a serious challenge to its traditional image as a protective ‘father’ of the Turkish people. Before long, though, the state succeeded in regaining much of its previous influence over civil society. This occurred in a number of different ways – many of which were born of existing divisions within civil society as a whole. Reform pressures were, for instance, significantly diminished by arbitrarily refusing to register non-governmental groups perceived to be opponents of the official ethos of secular nationalism. Islamists, socialists and non-Turkish minorities have been particularly targeted as the state concentrated on
forging partnerships with more sympathetic agents. Consequently, there has emerged a sharp divide between state-affiliated civil groups and those lacking such paternalistic links.

Chapter Four investigates the Gujarat earthquake of 26 January 2001 which killed over 20,000 people, injured another 167,000 and, with nearly one million houses damaged or destroyed rendering approximately 600,000 people instantly homeless, caused material damage estimated at around $5 billion. The Gujarat government, like their counterparts in Japan and Turkey, failed to respond effectively leaving thousands of disaster-affected people to deal with the crisis insufficiently supported. Such assistance that there was, proved to be both too little and inequitably administered as difficulties with transportation and communications systems prevented the state from ensuring a targeted and appropriate response. However, unlike the previous famine and cyclone disasters, which almost exclusively affected the poor and vulnerable, the less discriminate nature of the earthquake mobilised the region’s middle-classes and became an important factor both in the immediate civil response as well as in the longer-term political repercussions. Indeed, many commentators have argued that it is precisely the broad socio-economic, religious, caste and ethnic composition of those affected by the earthquake that accounts for the extensiveness of the disaster’s social impact and the enduring involvement of the third sector. Consequently, the Gujarat government has been able to leave a major part of the relief and reconstruction work to civil society organisations. Although this has brought a renewed dynamism to the third sector, it has had little effect on state accountability, with many initiatives tending to mirror the Gujarat’s social divisions by actively discriminating against members of low castes and religious minorities – casting doubt over some of the more sanguine claims regarding the disaster’s cohering effects.

Chapter Five, the third section of the book, offers a comparative analysis of the case studies by drawing together our main findings in order to understand the aspects which all three case-study countries share and the disasters differing impacts. In terms of the former, all are marked by a major gap between civil society organisations and the state. The typical passivity of the Muslim polity is frequently said to be embodied in Turkey, while the comparative ease with which India was subdued, co-opted and colonised by the British and the ritualised and regimented social structures of Japan are often seen to be indicative of a certain civil meekness. All three have also gone through varying levels of Westernisation prompting various forms of civil resistance. Although extraneous inputs continue to be an important facet of political reform in all three countries, these domestic forces have given rise to powerful forces of collective identity. All have an imperial legacy in their power structures, bureaucracy and governance which continues to exert an important influence on contemporary politics. Despite varying from 6.9 on the Richter scale (the Gujarat) to 7.4 (Turkey) and occurring in very different socio-economic contexts, the disasters were comparable in their scale and destructiveness – thereby demonstrating the weakness of relying on simple geophysical measures of a disaster’s destructive capability (McCall, Laming and Scott, 1992).
The final chapter will also look at key differences between the experiences of the case-study countries and the impact that these have had on disaster preparedness, response, reconstruction and mitigation. Although, in the aftermath of all of the three disasters, civil society had an active role in the distribution of relief assistance and search-and-rescue works, its longer-term involvement has shown distinctive differences. In Turkey, for instance, the state’s top-down approach in the reconstruction process has left little room for third sector manoeuvre, while non-state actors in the Gujarat have had a wider overall involvement. The latter have not only contributed to the rebuilding of housing and services, but have also taken part in the revitalization of livelihoods. In Japan on the other hand, the involvement of a wide spectrum of civil society organisations and spontaneous civil initiatives in the provision of shelter and emergency assistance in the early days of the disaster was not sustained through later disaster management stages. Consequently, reconstruction efforts were not only ineffective in dealing with socio-economic divides, but also, in some cases, the situation was actually worsened during this process.

Although, in terms of mitigation and preparedness measures, there have been changes in disaster management legislation leading to varying degrees of public/third sector mutualism in all of the three case studies, Japan has clearly adopted a more decentralized approach than the Gujarat where new legislation has largely reconfirmed the top-down political structures. In Turkey, by contrast, there have been a number of small legislative changes, but a comprehensive review of the whole disaster management legislation, organisational procedures and structuring of decision making is yet to be made. Instead, Turkey has witnessed an upsurge in the number of search-and-rescue teams established by different state, civil society and market actors which are now often regarded as a panacea for previous problems as well as the appropriate area for future civil society involvement.

Finally, the concluding chapter will return to David Alexander’s six-point typology of vulnerabilities which, along with Lester Salamon and Helmut Anheier’s model of the bases of civil action (initially reviewed and discussed in Chapter One), will make up the context of a comparative analysis of each case study’s third sector. Ultimately, it will be argued that an approach which comprehensively includes the social origins of civil organisation offers the most useful perspective to understand the different forms of statism apparent in each of case study countries.
This chapter looks at three inter-related aspects of disaster analysis. Firstly, it considers the social nature of disaster occurrences. It highlights the different vulnerabilities which make hazard exposure more likely to produce disasters, the various stages involved in responding to such events and the way that these have become increasingly linked to supporting ‘civil society’. Building on this, the second section considers various aspects of the international response to disasters. Recent changes in the geo-political and economic order are discussed in light of third-party intervention into the disaster-affected context, resultant reconstruction and mitigation strategies and their implications for international policy. Thirdly, the ways that states, markets and civil society interact are brought together to offer a tentative analytical framework aimed at categorising, explaining and better understanding both the contexts in which disasters occur and their overall social impact.

Disasters: Social Not Natural

In 1959, Kenneth Waltz began his seminal book, *Man, The State and War*, with the words ‘asking who won a given war, someone has said, is like asking who won the San Francisco earthquake’. Since then, though, Waltz’s assumption that the latter was an example of a natural occurrence ‘whose control or elimination is beyond the wit of man’ has been wearing increasingly thin. Today, hazards such as earthquakes, collective violence, flooding, volcanic eruptions and cyclones are generally regarded as triggers which exacerbate already vulnerable conditions. Poor societies which suffer a fragile physical environment, weak economies and inadequate social and institutional structures are disproportionately likely to make a disaster out of a natural hazard. The impact that these event types have on the recipient society is therefore only determined in part by the severity of the hazard itself. The way that precautionary measures and post hoc mitigation strategies are institutionalised is intrinsically social. As such, ‘neither disasters themselves nor the conditions that give rise to them are undeniably natural’ (Alexander 1997: 289). So even the most acute of hazards are, in terms of their social impact, within the wit of man.

As Table 1 illustrates, however, the wit of man has not been very successful in preventing seismic hazards from becoming disasters. The impact of these events
have been felt in three ways. Firstly, as the Table suggests, the loss of human life has been, perhaps, the key way to define a disaster. In many analyses, lethality is considered to be the singular measure of an earthquake’s destructive force (Silverstein, 1992: 14–15). However since pre-emptive precautionary measures can significantly reduce fatalities from disasters, loss of life cannot be considered to be

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Size of Earthquake (Richter Scale)</th>
<th>Estimated Loss of Life</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Yunan, China</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>50,000+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>23,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tangshan, China</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>242,000–655,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mindanao, Philippines</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Tabas-e-Golshan, Iran</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Mexico City</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>North-West Iran</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>50,000+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Maharashtra, India</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Kobe, Japan</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Northern Afghanistan</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>5,000+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Marmara, Turkey</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>The Gujarat, India</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Bam, Iran</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>30,000+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Major Earthquake Disasters Since 1970 (over 5,000 lives lost)
the only way to quantify the impact of an earthquake. Damage to property, expenditure on reconstruction, the value of relief aid and secondary losses (such as a collapse in tourism or inward investment), for instance, all represent important costs. This second set of measurements are infamously difficult to assess (Otero and Marti, 1995). In a difficult environment to collect data, self-help and non-monetary payments may never be accurately calculated while insurance claims are frequently exaggerated (Wiggins, 1996). Thirdly, disasters have a major impact on the way that society functions. A transient order may emerge in which existing relationships between different social groups are irreparably changed (Drabek, 1986). This is particularly profound in societies already fractured or strained by factors extraneous to the disaster itself.

Debates over how such a catalogue of misery be improved have, over recent years, focussed on designing development programmes in a way that can decrease the vulnerability of the local populace (Winchester, 1992; Haque and Blair, 1992; Snarr and Brown, 1994). In this regard, David Alexander has developed a six-point typology of disaster vulnerability based on the societal context in which a hazard exists. Firstly, the economic vulnerability of the marginally employed can mean that, when a disaster occurs, there is a further loss of livelihoods incurred. Secondly, in terms of the technological or technocratic vulnerability, there would be different levels of loss absorption between the rich and the poor, urban and rural populations, rich and poor countries, and ruling elites and those in socio-economic peripheries. Connected to this, a third, residual, vulnerability may emerge if pre-code buildings and unreinforced historical structures are not upgraded through a lack of political will and funding. Fourthly, human migration or emergent and previously unexperienced hazards may give rise to newly-generated vulnerabilities. Fifthly, delinquent vulnerabilities may be created as a result of deliberately neglecting safety norms, codes and regulations. Finally, total vulnerability can be said to exist in situations where the occurrence of disasters is frequent and devastating yet ‘not a particularly salient problem, given the precariousness of life in general’. For example, although flooding in Bangladesh occurs at every monsoon season, because of their poverty and marginalisation large populations continue to live in river basins (1997: 292).

Similar, fundamentally social issues appear when considering the ways in which disasters are dealt with once they occur. UNDP/UNDRO, for instance, present five main phases of disaster management (1992:13). Firstly, a period of relief is necessary in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. This includes measures such as organising search and rescue teams, meeting survivors’ basic needs of water, food, medical care and shelter and mitigating the impact of further hazard events (such as aftershocks, another upsurge in warfare, secondary infectious disease and so on). Secondly, rehabilitation takes place during the latter stages of relief and attempts to deal with the new situation which the disaster has imposed. It may, for instance, seek to restore a disaster affected community to its former living conditions, establish counselling services for those bereaved or to make necessary adjustments to the changes caused by the disaster. Thirdly, reconstruction includes many rehabilitative measures as well as aiming to improve aspects of life more generally.
Focussed more on permanency and sustainability, it tackles longer-term problems such as housing, utility services, infrastructure and the economy. A key part of, and following on from, the reconstruction phase is, of course, an attempt to prevent a reoccurrence. In this sense, mitigation can be regarded as a fourth phase of a disaster response. This would include all actions that can be taken prior to the occurrence of a disaster including long-term risk reduction measures and preparedness. For example, the 1999 Stockholm declaration which was signed by those Central American countries affected by the 1998 Hurricane ‘Mitch’ disaster and donors, called for partnership in reducing environmental vulnerability, developing reconstruction programmes based on transparency and good governance, consolidating democratic processes, engaging the active participation of local people, promoting human rights, reducing the external debt carried by recipient countries and coordinating disaster management efforts across a range of stakeholders (Wisner, 2001). Preparedness as a separate disaster management phase would include activities which aim to minimise loss of life and damage through measures of evacuation and facilitation of timely and effective search-and-rescue and emergency. In the context of this book, the phases of disaster management will be categorised as preparedness, response (including relief and rehabilitation), reconstruction and mitigation.

Viewing disasters in this way suggests that vulnerability reduction through high levels of local participation is the most effective policy. Developing disaster-related strategies is thus intimately linked with the way that hazards are perceived and the mechanisms through which public policy is arrived at; these are, in turn, closely associated with wider issues of accountability, planning and socio-economic development (Blaikie et al, 1994). Indeed, those countries which do not rank very highly on the UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI) are, in general, much more likely to host large-scale disasters. Of 2,557 disasters between 1991 and 2000, more than two-thirds of the resultant fatalities occurred in countries in the lower third of the Index compared to only 2 per cent in the higher third (IFRC, 2001). This close association between development, governance and hazard mitigation has led to a growing level of interest in the relationship between disasters and civil society. Very often, and especially within the literature on hazard mitigation, this rather elusive term has been used as a catch-all phrase encompassing a notional space between the rulers and the ruled. It has been, as Adam Seligman points out, ‘identified with everything from multi-party systems and the rights of citizenship to individual voluntarism and the spirit of community’ (1997: 5). The next section will look at some of the difficulties associated with this term before, in the following section, considering some of the various manifestations that are currently subsumed beneath the title ‘civil society’.

Debating Civil Society

The origin of such ambiguity is to be found in the long and diverse history of the term. Its origins can be traced back to Aristotle’s politike koinona (political community) in which a beneficent ruler puts the wishes of the citizenry before his (her was not considered) own. Having been Latinised to become societas civilis, this
idea remained an important aspect of writing during the European Enlightenment when it acquired an added emphasis on utopian visions of future civilisations. Under the influence of capitalism and large-scale political centralisation, the notion of civility became increasingly defined in contrast to the state. As Michael Edwards notes, strengthening civil society was seen ‘as a defence against unwarranted intrusions by the state on newly realised individual rights and freedoms, organised through the medium of voluntary associations’ (2004: 7). Thomas Paine, for instance, argued that the rapid expansion of European state infra-structures during the eighteenth century threatened the natural rights of individuals. These, he contended, would be better protected by the market as the only basis upon which collective, civil choices could be made. Alexis de Tocqueville, the most influential of the Enlightenment writers on civil society, shared Paine’s concerns over state intrusion. Shaken by the outcome of the French Revolution, he saw associational organisations as a bulwark against the unrestrained popular will of the demos. He was particularly impressed by the American capacity to organise. ‘If’, he wrote, ‘they want to proclaim a truth or propagate some feeling by the encouragement of great example, they form an association’ (1966: 662). So, as Goran Hyden notes, a Tocquevillean vision of ‘civil society educates the citizenry and scrutinises state action. It facilitates distribution of power and provides mechanisms for direct citizen participation in public affairs’ (1998: 20).

The predominantly mercantile character of the associational life envisaged by Paine and de Tocqueville, along with obvious growths in inequality which the spread of merchant capital was producing, provoked an extensive counter-school. Mostly through the writing of Marx during the nineteenth century, the term civil society became associated with state-led strategies of domination. It was frequently used ‘more in the sense of a ‘middle-class (bürgerliche) society’ of the bourgeoisie than as a ‘civil society’ made up of citizens (Bürger)’ (Kocka, 2004: 66). During the twentieth century, writers such as Antonio Gramsci modified Marx’s suggestion that cross-class civil organisations would tend to dilute resistance to the state and perpetuate its position as the executive committee of the bourgeoisie. Gramsci reasoned that, since civil associations are a primary means of exercising social control, counter-hegemonic organisations could be formed with the capacity to challenge, and even overturn, the position of the dominant classes (Foley and Hodgkinson, 2002). Gradually, the concept of ‘public space’ emerged as ‘a site for the production of discourses which can in principle be critical of the state’ (Fraser cited in Bryant, 1995: 144).

Within such concepts, the grounds for dispute concern the preservation of a space free from encroachment by a commoditising market or by a legislating state. For writers such as Jürgen Habermas, a functional civil society should be steered by values constructed democratically in just such an uncompromised public sphere (Chambers, 2002: 94). Michael Waltzer also supports this notion of a neutral arena in which to resist the state. The civil society project is, he suggests, ‘anti-ideological’ as it can be used by Marxists as a means of organising class action, by liberals as a way of ensuring individual freedoms and market access and by nationalists to verify membership of an ethnic or cultural group (1995). Similar hopes for civil society are
expressed by John Keane who sees associational institutions as a potential structure for resolving acute social differences non-violently (2003). Others, of course, remain more sceptical. Robert Fatton (1993), for instance, emphasises civil organisations’ close association with African elites while Alex Callinicos notes that they can frequently ‘find themselves reduced to the status of useful idiots to the powerful’ (2001: 117). Broader questions have also been raised regarding civil society’s much vaunted connection with democratisation. For instance, the rise of the Nazi movement in Weimar Germany was, in the view of Sheri Berman, reliant on a vibrant associational network of citizens which could, in keeping with Tocquevillean orthodoxy, represent the views of the masses and challenge the ideological infra-structure of the state (1997).

Despite these rather acute problems, though, civil society has, in recent years, ascended to a fundamental position within the lexicon of both the social sciences and development policy-makers. Indeed, it is the Tocquevillean model which has emerged as dominant. It has been ‘the prime beneficiary of wider political and ideological changes that have redefined the powers and responsibilities of states, markets and voluntary associations over the last twenty years’ (Edwards, 2004: 11). The rise of neo-liberalism, the New Right and the ideology of the small state strengthened, as Omar Encarnación observes, ‘the sense that the government was untrustworthy, wasteful and best kept to a minimum essentially drove the rise of civil society to the top of the agenda’ (2003: 708). An invigorated civil society was also seen as a force of resistance to the declining dictatorships of Eastern Europe and as a means of democratic transition within the developing world where the Soviet’s influence was on the wane (Ekiert & Kubik, 1999). Civil society was frequently seen as a means of mediating the views of masses and restraining the arbitrary governance of a despotic or unaccountable state. Robert Putnam, for instance, wrote that ‘Tocqueville was right: Democracy is strengthened not weakened when it faces a vigorous civil society’ (1992: 182). Such a view was accompanied by considerable optimism constituting, in many cases, a Zeitgeist for policy makers and a panacea for social problems everywhere (Carothers, 1999a: 26). As Encarnación continues, ‘in embracing civil society, liberals hope to find answers to society’s vexing problems – from poverty to racism to environmental degradation – that do not invite further intrusion of the state’ (2003: 708). As such, it has been lauded as a means of both reviving the West’s moribund political culture and of consolidating democratisation in the developing world (Fukuyama, 1996; Diamond, 1999). In all, then, ‘it is Alexis de Tocqueville’s ghost that wanders through the corridors of the World Bank’ not that of Gramsci or Marx (Edwards, 2004: 10).

This vision of civil society sees voluntary associations as the fundamental organisational expression of non-state power. In keeping with de Tocqueville’s view that it serves the dual purpose of representing the masses and resisting or scrutinising governmental extraction and legislation, civil society is regarded as part of society rather than a neutral space or a utopian future. The repository of such civil, or ‘good’, governance is, in most Tocquevillean formulations, the ‘third’ sector; defined by Alison Van Rooy as ‘advocacy groups, non-governmental
organisations, social movement agents, human rights organisations and other actors explicitly involved in ‘change work’ (civil society organisations (CSOs) are thus ‘third’ in the sense that, overtly at least, they do not belong to the market or the state) (1998a: 15). The next section will consider some commonalities between organisations currently working in this sector, before looking at some of the different analytical perspectives that have been developed to increase our understanding of their origins, characteristics and activities.

**CSOs and International Disaster Response**

Mary Kaldor (to whom the first part of this section owes much) identifies overlapping and inter-connected categories of organisations within the third sector. These are illustrated in Table 2. The first, Social Movements, refers to a wide range of different organisations generally committed to bringing some form of transformation in society. They are used, writes Sydney Tarrow, ‘by people who lack regular access to institutions, who act in the name of new or unaccepted claims and who behave in ways that fundamentally challenge others or authority’ (1998: 3). Since their success, or lack of it, depends primarily on their capacity to mobilise and the opportunity structures provided for them by the authorities, social movements’ effectiveness tends to fluctuate. Regimes may reform, thus obviating the need for protest, co-opt the movement through institutionalised political processes leading to a modification of its demands or use repressive tactics in order to radicalise, and thus marginalise, challenges. Consequently, social movements come in waves. Hierarchic mass organisations based around labour, de-colonisation and suffrage have come to be replaced, or challenged, by ‘new’ social movements such as environmentalism, anti-globalisation and human rights which are less rigidly structured and more focussed on resisting state intrusion (Offe, 1996). As Alberto Melucci has noted, these frequently emerge in tandem with macro shifts towards knowledge-based economies, more accessible communication media and greater state permeability (1996). The result, according to Kaldor, is a worldwide plethora of organisations embracing the landless, indigenous peasants, traditional tribal structures and trade unions which have moved ‘away from an economistic preoccupation with wages towards new notions of labour rights’ (2002: 15).

The second ideal type, NGOs, first appeared in Article 71 of the United Nations’ Charter in which the Economic and Social Committee was instructed ‘to make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organisations which are concerned with matters in its competence’ (Gaer, 1996). Under such patronage the numbers of such organisations grew steadily throughout the 1950s, 1960s and – with the loosening of Cold War ‘tightness’ – the 1970s (Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco, 1997). Since then, large increases in NGO numbers (by a third during the 1990s alone) has, writes Helmut Anheier, contributed significantly to economic growth during the 1980s and 90s; over 7 per cent of the workforce in 22 surveyed countries were, for instance, found to be working for NGOs (2000). Currently, NGOs can, according to the Johns Hopkins Comparative Non-Profit Sector Project, be considered to be defined by five key characteristics. They are:
1. **Organised:** institutionalised in terms of the system of operation

2. **Private:** institutionally separate from government

3. **Non-profit distributing:** returning surpluses to the mission of the organisation

4. **Self-governing:** equipped with their own apparatus of command and control

5. **Voluntary:** some degree of voluntary participation in the management and/or the operation of the organisation (Morris, 2000: 6).

The types of services that NGOs typically provide include disaster relief, microcredit systems, health care and education. Many also maintain a commitment to advocacy through which they lobby states to reform policies and increase expenditure. Like Social Movements, though, the NGO sector has been subject to varying degrees of co-option, or what Kaldor calls ‘taming’. In particular, neo-liberal approaches to civil society have pressured NGOs to reorganise the political space in order to minimise the role of the state. Sweetened by the provision of funding, but without regard for local conditions, this has been led by an ever-closer relationship between senior managers within the big Northern NGOs and international policy makers. The result has been a growing emphasis on privatisation, decentralisation and free enterprise within many development NGOs (Glasius, Lewis and Seckinelgin, 2004).

Thirdly, Social Organisations refer to members’ associations ‘defined in social terms rather than cultural and religious terms’ (Kaldor, 2002: 19). These include professional and careerist societies representing lawyers, doctors, employers and the like, as well as community groups advocating the interests of groups such as women, young people, ethnic minorities and the landless. While such organisations frequently overlap with NGOs in their mission statements, their objectives tend to be more closely grounded upon the expressed needs of their members. Many also have pre-modern roots in archaic guilds, sectoral associations and philanthropic clubs. Fourthly, national or religious groups, based on a section of society defined in terms of genealogy or identity, have some similarities with earlier waves of social movements in their mass membership, communitarianism and hierarchic structures, but are frequently more representative of socially excluded young men from urban areas. As a result of their membership’s limited opportunities structures or ideological proclivities, some may engage in criminal activity. However, they may also have developmental goals – either neo-liberal like Italy’s *Lega Nord* or charitable such as associations affiliated to places of worship – or they may simply ‘provide a sense of ontological security on a society that is rapidly changing’ (Kaldor, 2002: 21).

Of these various groupings, many have been highly active in the area of disaster mitigation and response. For example, many religious institutions and
groups have traditions of supporting disaster affected populations. Amateur radio operators can become an essential lifeline in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. The mass media have also been closely involved in disaster management activities from raising public awareness and acting as a pressure group to forming communications in emergency relief. Academia and research institutions have similarly contributed by attempting to develop a better understanding of vulnerability and co-operate in training and public awareness programmes (Twigg, 2004: 70–71). In the past, these, and other, groups, have, it is often claimed, been ‘able to implement programmes that connected victims with unmet needs to a diversity of resources’ (Bolin and Stanford, 1998: 35). Indeed, in virtually all disasters, particularly those in the South, it is, according to Ian Christoplos, ‘the local

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Emancipation of the poor and excluded</th>
<th>Development and relief</th>
<th>Protection and promotion of members’ interests</th>
<th>Protection and promotion of members’ interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>Mobilisation, protests and demonstrations</td>
<td>Service provision and advocacy</td>
<td>Service provision and lobbying</td>
<td>Mobilisation, protests and demonstrations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Composition</td>
<td>Activists and students</td>
<td>Professional and volunteer staff</td>
<td>From displaced people to employer associations</td>
<td>Urban groups, migrants and peasants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forms of Organisation</td>
<td>Loose coalitions and networks</td>
<td>From networks to corporate bureaucracies</td>
<td>From networks to corporate bureaucracies</td>
<td>Charisma-led hierarchies and networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sources of Funds</td>
<td>Donations</td>
<td>Foundations, donations, states and business corporations</td>
<td>Membership</td>
<td>Diaspora, donations and sometimes violent crime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Types of Civil Society Organisation (adapted from Kaldor, 2002: 12).
communities that provide the vast majority of support to victims in crucial, acute stages’ (2003: 102).

The decentralisation of disaster management responsibilities may thus be considered a positive step forward. For writers such as John Twigg, it ‘has changed the ways in which communities and local NGOs interact with state institutions’ by increasing civil engagement (2004: 66). This might, he continues, be achieved by preserving a critical stance in relation to governmental policy and thus, in the case of disaster mitigation, demanding a strategy which is more preventative than reactive. Here, CSOs have, he argues, been important elements in both policy development and administrative implementation. Alternatively, others have suggested that CSO support of state-sector efforts to enhance the resilience of communities at risk from natural hazards can improve disaster preparedness (Luna, 2001: 224). In the Dominican Republic, for instance, there is some evidence to show that the implementation of a nationwide community education programme aimed at raising awareness of natural hazards and their mitigation ‘had some success in meeting its objectives’ when the country was struck by Hurricane Georges in 1998 (Pelling, Özerdem and Barakat, 2002: 301). In all, there exists a widespread view that strengthening local capacities can be an effective tool in disaster management. In this regard, Nuray Karancı and Bahattın Aksit have argued that understanding and incorporating ‘the attitudes, expectations, and resources of the local community in order to develop plans that can be integrated into the ongoing social life of the communities in disaster-prone areas’ is a prerequisite to all successful disaster response strategies (2000: 405).

How the international disaster agencies may go about doing this remains, however, open to question. The diverse and often fragmented character of the INGO/donor sector has significant implications for the organisation of efforts to bring relief to disaster victims, to rehabilitate disaster-affected contexts, to begin reconstruction initiatives and to reduce hazard vulnerability (Dynes, 1993; Quarantelli, 1998). In many cases, local and international CSOs mix with public sector officials from all levels of government, donor representatives, private sector interests of various kinds, military and emergency services, academics, ‘independent’ consultants while barely noticing the needs and voices of disaster-affected people themselves. The oft-lauded observation that ‘risk reduction initiatives must be multi-disciplinary partnerships involving a range of stakeholders’ has not ensured effective cooperation and coordination between these various stakeholders (Twigg, 2004: 61). A lack of understanding and respect between different disciplines, limited dialogue between discrete actors, a culture of competitiveness and professional jealousy and a greater readiness to talk than to listen have led to criticisms of insularity and authoritarianism.

Furthermore, the selection of local CSOs as ‘partners’ of the international community is often guided by highly limited understandings of the disaster-affected community. ‘Civil society strengthening’ is frequently based on thin justification for action. [Instead] there is a range of assumptions made on the universal desirability of certain organisations, political systems and social norms’ (Van Rooy, 1998b: 204). CSOs are often used in ‘fairly narrow instrumental terms’ in order to promote
democracy, understood in terms of Western liberalism, and to increase capitalist exchange free from state intervention (Robinson, 1996). This tends to produce a rash of domestic disaster-orientated CSOs adept at courting donors, but enjoying only very tenuous links with society at large. As Rajib Shaw and Katsuhihiro Goda note of the Kobe catastrophe, ‘NGOs may see themselves as genuine partners of the local community and its organisation, [but] in many cases the same view is not shared by the people’ (2004: 32). Here, a common problem is the donor tendency to favour organisations who share familiar values, organisational structures and the fashionable phraseology of the aid sector. The result is that urban, professional groups are disproportionately funded despite having, at least in the developing world, a narrower constituency of support than ethnic, regional or religious organisations.

Despite these problems, CSOs have, over the last twenty years, been vigorously promoted by developed countries as a means of both nurturing interest in public administration and local decision-making domestically and strengthening democratic accountability within the developing world. Numerous civil engagement programmes have emerged across the world leading to oft-cited notions of an emergent global civil society (Tandon and de Oliveira, 1995). According to John Burbidge, ‘this worldwide resurgence of civil society’ has its roots in, amongst other things, ‘the demand of disenfranchised minorities to participate fully in the society’ at large and ‘a deep cynicism about the role of government’ (1998: 8–9). Put another way, these are the dual forces of popular mediation and minimal state advocated by de Tocqueville. While the promotion of such ideas in the West has mostly been subsumed beneath broader notions of urban renewal, community engagement and citizenship, the international disaster response industry has tended to equate this model of civil society with ‘participatory’ methods, economistic versions of social capital and, most significantly perhaps, democratisation (Cooke and Kothari, 2001). For instance, USAID, by far the largest donor in this area, defines civil society as ‘non-state organisations that can or have the potential to champion democratic/governance reforms’ (Hansen, 1996: 3).

Building CSOs, and by extension ‘democracy’, has, in the last twenty years, absorbed ever-increasing amounts of the West’s annual aid budget. USAID was, for instance, spending around $56 million on civil society initiatives in 1991 and over $181 million in 1998 – by which time such programmes were absorbing almost 10 per cent of the entire aid flow to the developing world (Carothers, 1999b: 50; Van Rooy and Robinson 1998: 34). Concurrently, there has been an exponential rise in the numbers of CSOs. By the late 1990s, India, for instance, was home to over one million registered NGOs and in Kenya over 40 per cent of all educational provisions were undertaken within this sector (Salamon and Anheier, 1999). The West has also hosted a large rise in CSO activity. The number of non-profit organisations in the United States, for example, grew from 10,299 in 1968 to almost 23,000 in 1997. Alongside this, though, has been a steep decline in trade union membership (by as much as 78 per cent in the construction sector) (Putnam, 2000).

The extent to which these developments constitute an enhancement in
democracy is open to considerable debate. CSOs have been scathingly attacked for repeated organisational failings, corruption, unaccountability and working too closely within the interests of the West (Mendelson and Glenn, 2002). American policy of covertly funding the Contras in Nicaragua during the early 1980s was, for instance, closely tied to the National Endowment for Democracy’s programme of funding CSOs with friendly world-views (Robinson, 1992). The fact that this coincided with the cancellation of loan guarantees from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank and the withdrawal of multi-nationals such as the Standard Fruit Company in 1982 and Exxon in 1983 only added to claims that third sector autonomy was impossible. Indeed, calls for NGOs to bear more of the material and ethical responsibility for disaster responses following the catastrophic United Nations intervention in Somalia in 1993, has led to a partial conflation of humanitarianism and militarism. The oxymoronic humanitarian war in the Balkans has, for instance, led writers such as Romeo Dallaire to describe this reformulated third sector ‘a non-military extension of a new structure for great power interests working beside or through the UN’ (1996: 211).

Evidence for such claims can be found in the international response to the wholly social disaster unleashed upon Afghanistan during 2002. There, American military personnel frequently did not wear uniforms while conducting ‘humanitarian’ tasks with CSOs (Washington Post, 28 March 2002). Co-ordinated through the American-led, NGO consortium InterAction from the headquarters of military planning, CENTCOM, in Tampa, Florida, these worked closely with Washington-appointed Afghan officials to disburse monies totalling $4.3 billion in order ‘to create a bureaucratic system which accords with prevailing international norms determined by the World Bank and others (Bojicic Dzelilovic, 2000: 107; Marsden, 2003: 94). Here, disaster response programming based on the promotion of the third sector and the ideology which underpins permitted the West to impose it own vision of the what Philip Bobbitt terms ‘market’ state (2002). Particularly efficacious is the notion of ‘social capital’ defined loosely and functionally as a way in which individuals and groups provide and use ‘informational and cultural models for future collaboration (Jalali, 2002: 122). As Ben Fine notes, its simultaneously adhesive and elastic qualities permit it to be applied to almost anything, providing ‘it is attached to the economy in a functionally positive way for economic performance, especially growth’ (1999: 5). Indeed, Robert Putnam, one of the most influential proponents of the social capital concept is explicit about its links to neoliberal reform. In one of its earlier formulations, he described it as a basis for the organisation of a global and ‘vigorous network of indigenous grassroots associations [which] can be as essential to growth as physical investment, appropriate technology, or (that nostrum of neoclassical economists) ‘getting the prices right’ (1992: 38).

In terms of the international response to disasters, social capital has been vigorously advanced as the ‘glue’ which can, firstly, link hazard-vulnerable individuals together to form CSOs, thereby constituting a restraint on governmental intervention, and, secondly, form a bridge between the demos and the
organisations that purport to represent its views. The value of this Tocquevillean vision is readily apparent. As Fine notes of the World Bank, it resolves an acute contradiction in international assistance policy – that recipient states should simultaneously be rolled back and instructed on the role they should play in the economy given their enduring importance (1999). Since, as Putnam writes, social capital ‘works through and within states and markets, not in place of them… [it] promises to uncover new ways of combining social infrastructure with public policies that work’ (1993: 42, original emphasis). In other words, it serves to embed CSOs into service provisions, state enterprises and social networks which favour donor objectives and extraneous or domestic capital (Hildyard, 1998). USAID, for instance, has made this link plain by claiming that ‘civil society thrives in a dynamic and competitive economy. …An expanding small business sector that stimulates employment [and] entrepreneurship… can help reduce the distortions and inequities in closed economies’ (cited in Van Rooy and Robinson, 1998: 37).

It is clear, then, that the pre-eminence of neo-liberal economic orthodoxy has resulted in an abdication of governmental responsibility during times of crisis, in an erosion of states’ ability to mobilise the citizenry generally and in a penetration of the third sector. As John Twigg observes, this frequently leaves ‘local government and NGOs to take on the task of managing disasters, even though they often lack the skills and finances to do so’ (2004: 67). Furthermore, the neo-liberal logic of decentralised decision-making, often empowers local leaders who are ‘even more hostage than their colleagues at higher levels to demands to deal with immediate problems rather than distant threats’ (Christoplos, 2003: 95). This, coupled with the fact that, for the most part, they do not have the ‘political power to address the deeper political, social and economic forces that put people at risk’, tends to obstruct the development of effective long-term hazard mitigation (Twigg, 2004: 69). As Wisner notes, full disaster mitigation is ‘impossible without challenging the prevailing ideals of limitless growth, of ever-decreasing governmental regulation, and of the dominance of market values’ (2003: 50).

Such problems can, in turn, increase public sector reliance on CSOs despite the fact that many, as José Luis Rocha and Ian Christoplos affirm, continue to be ‘dominated by an intellectual elite of middle-class citizens’ – a factor which ‘explains why they have not managed to create sustainable mechanisms to enable them to act in a common direction’ and adequately respond to the challenge of hazard vulnerability (2001: 247). So when disasters occur, those charged with responding may, (at least in the South) ‘receive a sudden influx of money, but they too often lack of resources and support to raise the issue of dealing with hazards after the media attention has subsided and both collaborating institutions and flows of funding have returned to normal’ (Christoplos, 2003: 96). The result is that, of the four phases of disaster response, emergency relief and rehabilitation are often the main focus. The systemic difficulties in developing coherent mitigation strategies, combined with ‘little mass-appeal in electoral terms’ (especially in the developing world where ‘for many populations, the main concern is with day-to-day survival’), means that governments are frequently criticised for failing to ‘recognise the importance of hazards and vulnerability to national development’ and suffering

So, given the incoherent nature of the civil society, social capital and disaster management discourses, a number of key issues remain unexplored. In particular, the precise impact of disasters, in terms of response, reconstruction, mitigation and preparedness on the relationship between the third sector, the state and the market is far from clear. If, as Rita Jalali claims, CSOs can create ‘social capital (co-operation and trust) for effective disaster relief... by raising issue in the public arena and demanding public action’, attention needs to be given to exactly how this takes place (2002: 123). If CSOs are understood to represent a part of society in general, then a critical focus must be brought to be bear on the inclusiveness, or otherwise, of their response to disasters. Crucial, here, is the extent to which the Tocquevillean notion of a sectoral separation between the tripartite elements of society can be sustained. How, for instance, are the divides affected by engaging in the various elements of disaster response and management? Indeed, can the third sector be said to be fully discrete from market forces and state encroachment at all? Does, for instance, the organisation of civil responses to disaster threaten the very legitimacy of the state, or has the rise of free markets led to a commoditisation of disaster management strategies and resources?

Towards A Model for Analysing CSOs and Disasters

In approaching these issues, it is useful to consider the work of Alpaslan Özerdem and Sultan Barakat (2000). From here, a three-point model emerges which could form a basis for analysing civil engagement in disaster response and policy-making in each of the three case studies approached later in this text. Although developed within the context of mitigation and preparedness, they also aim to improve the local communities’ capacity to initiate relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction activities. The first, legislation, refers to the establishment of robust construction and land-use controls as well as to the formation of national, provincial and local disaster officiates. Secondly, education initiatives are suggested as a means of raising awareness. This may be directed at a wide audience through media outlets as well as at key professions, such as architects, planners and the emergency services, via bespoke curricula. The third, urban management, concerns the way in which the built environment is administered and managed at a local level.

The way that these are undertaken by states depends fundamentally on its relationship with the market and with civil society. There are a number of possible variants of such tripartite relations within broadly democratic systems. Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter, for instance, categorise elitist polities in which there is ‘little scope for democratic participation and individual or collective development, and where whatever scope exist[s] is subject to the threat of constant erosion by powerful social forces’ (Held, 1996: 157). Here, parliamentary government is dominated by a strong executive, parties and an independent and well trained bureaucracy. The market is industrialised and managed by a skilled stratum of experts. In such an environment, the third sector’s access to the state, the market and the masses tends to be limited by the organisational strength of the political
elite and the poorly informed and marginalised character of the electorate (Janoski, 1998).

Alternatively, writers such as a Robert Dahl point to societies in which a more pluralist system may predominate (1971). Here, the various components of civil society are regarded as competing for political influence and thus restraining the will of both the state executive and the market – as well as the potential tyranny of the masses. This ‘polyarchic’ structure protects personal freedoms and minority rights, exerts constitutional restraints and meets the needs of both active and passive members of the citizenry. As such, the market is seen as simply one of many groups, vying for access to the state, although its superior resource base is frequently acknowledged as constituting a considerable comparative advantage. Similarly, the third sector is also an active player in this plurality of competition, playing an active role in mediating the popular will and restraining executive action through its key function in organising associational life.

By contrast, analysts such as Friedrich von Hayek and Robert Nozick propound a ‘view that political life, like economic life, is (and ought to be) a matter of individual freedom and initiative’ (Held, 1987: 243). Consequently, they envisage the collective good as best attained in competitive isolation with minimal organisational intervention. Within the state sector, majority rule is seen as thoroughly circumscribed by institutionalised restraints on both the executive and the bureaucracy. It is these, rather than civil organisation, which protect and promote individual rights. As such, the third sector’s capacity to access the state, the market and the masses is severely limited by a deliberate policy of eradicating collectivism of all types in favour of economic forces which are given the fullest scope to penetrate the state and establish the provision of goods and services to individuals and groups.

Building on these various models, Helmut Anheier and Lester Salamon have developed six broad schools of analytical approaches to understanding the way in which CSOs interact with the state and market (1998: 220–231). These, along with their primary implications, are summarised in Table 3. The first concerns theories of government or market failure. Owing much to the economist Burton Weisbrod (1977), these focus on the market’s inability to provide a full range of public goods (those available to all without payment). Classical economists had long argued that a state was necessary to meet these shortcomings, but Weisbrod noted that, where considerable differences exist over what public goods to produce, democracies will tend to favour the perceived views of a notional median voter leaving a residue demand unmet. In such circumstances, the citizenry is likely to turn to, or in some cases establish, third sector organisations to provide public goods. This implies that societies with high levels of heterogeneity (such as religious diversity or acute wealth disparities) will have a larger and more active third sector. Moreover, since CSOs are, in this model, responding to market and state failures, it is also reasonable to assume that third sectors will tend to be larger and more active in polities where governmental expenditure on social welfare is limited. Finally, because third sector activity is based on civil demands for unsupplied public goods, it is likely that donations and charitable trusts will make up the bulk of CSO funds.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Analytical Approach</strong></th>
<th><strong>Main Implications</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Market/State Failure</strong></td>
<td>Diversity may enlarge and strengthen the third sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Supply-side</strong></td>
<td>Religious competition may enlarge and strengthen third sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trust</strong></td>
<td>A lack of trust between consumers/ purchasers and the market sector may enlarge and strengthen the third sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Welfare State</strong></td>
<td>Indicators of economic development are likely to be associated with a third sector of limited size and strength</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interdependence</strong></td>
<td>The greater the government’s welfare spending, the larger and stronger the third sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Origins</strong></td>
<td>Political power held by the middle classes is likely to produce liberal regimes with limited state sector welfare provisions and a large privately funded third sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Analytical Approaches to the Third Sector (adapted from Salamon and Anheier, 1998).
Secondly, supply-side theories focus more on the opportunity for CSO establishment and activity rather than simple demand. Necessary here, then, are ‘social entrepreneurs’, or individuals and groups with sufficient incentive to form CSOs and the expectation to ensure success (James, 1987). While, such individuals and groups may come from a wide variety of backgrounds, it is commonly hypothesised that they are likely to be most prevalent when different religious groups are competing for adherents. This, it is suggested, offers the most fertile incentives and greatest likelihood of success for the establishment of CSOs. Since religious groups tend to place a considerable amount of emphasis on education, it is likely that there will be a greater number of non-state funded schools. Moreover, as these rely on the presence of an extensive congregational body, it is, like the demand models, reasonable to assume that private giving will make up the largest proportion of third sector income.

Thirdly, theories of trust focus on ‘contract failures’ within the market sector. Consumers frequently perceive themselves to be in an asymmetrical power relationship with the suppliers of goods and services. This is typically because they lack the information to assess the product accurately. ‘In such cases’, Salamon and Anheier observe, ‘purchasers seek alternative bases for trust in the resulting service’ (1998: 222). The third sector’s non-profit character thus represents a more trustworthy substitute source of goods and services (Ben-Ner and Gui, 1993). This suggests that the less dependable the market sector is perceived to be, the more people will seek a replacement in the third sector. This absence of trust also means that CSOs will be able to secure a significant proportion of their income from fees and service charges.

Fourthly, welfare state perspectives tend to offer a more thoroughly theorised account of governmental policy regarding social policy. They focus on the relationship between the expansion of state welfare provisions and economic development arguing the third sector is essentially a pre-modern feature. For, ‘as industrialisation proceeds, it creates needs for public spending by reducing the functions of the traditional family and by dislocating certain categories of individuals whose labour becomes surplus’ (Quadagno, 1987: 112). Consequently, the strength and size of the third sector is curtailed by economic development, particularly within the education, health and social service sectors.

By contrast, a fifth group of approaches – interdependence theories – rejects the assumption, apparent in each of the proceeding categories, that the state, market and third sectors are each in conflict with each other. Instead, it is argued that, since CSOs can – and frequently do – mobilise support for governmental action and because not-for-profit financial structures are inherently limiting, there is a clear need for co-operative arrangements to be forged between the three sectors (Salamon 1995). This is particularly likely where civil resistance to state infrastructures is matched by a high demand for public goods or where state/market support is necessary for CSOs to operate. In both these instances, it would be reasonable to assume that a strong and extensive third sector would be present. Moreover, since governments are viewed as a potential source of financial, as well as political, support for the nonprofit sector, it follows that the state’s ‘share of nonprofit income should also be higher where overall government spending is higher’ (Salamon and Anheier, 1998: 226).
Each of these five approaches has, however, significant weaknesses. As Salamon and Anheier point out, the:

theories outlined above assume a degree of flexibility in institutional choice that seems belied by the historical record. Choices about whether to rely on market, nonprofit, or state provision of key services are not simply made freely by consumers in an open market as advocates of the economic theories seems to assume. Rather, these choices are heavily constrained by prior patterns of historical development that significantly shape the range of options available at a given time and place (1998: 226).

This is important for, as Wolfgang Siebel reminds us, CSOs ‘are not only providers of goods and services but important factors of social and political coordination’ (1990: 46). Within both the market/state failure and the welfare state categories, for instance, there is a failure to acknowledge the wide range of approaches governments have taken towards the supply of alternative systems of public goods and services (James, 1989). As Richard Steinberg and Dennis Young note, ‘some governments seem to prefer private alternatives even when there is a consensus that would permit governmental provision’ (1998: 252). Without a theory of state tolerance, such variance is hard to explain. Similarly, the supply-side impact of religiosity is also highly varied. Since certain faiths are exegetically more evangelical than others and civil organisational entrepreneurialism has a multitude of secular origins, much relies on the transaction costs and opportunity structures determined by the political and economic regime in which religious CSOs operate (Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen, 1998). This is also true of trust theories. Here, consumers experiencing a lack of trust in the market and its supply of public goods and services might, in certain polities, turn to greater state regulation, nationalisation or mixed enterprise rather than the third sector (Steinberg and Young, 1998: 257).

Theories of interdependence are similarly deficient in their capacity to approach multi-variance. As Salamon and Anheier elucidate, ‘the possibility of a co-operative relationship between the nonprofit sector and the state… does not really specify the circumstances under which such a relationship is most likely to develop’ (1998: 252).

A sixth category of approaches – those that focus on the social origins of the third sector – goes some way towards resolving these problems. Grounded upon the seminal work of Barrington Moore (1966), these reject uni-factorial accounts based on variables, such as diversity, trust or economic development, in favour of a more sophisticated theorisation of social power and regime structure which can account for governmental tolerance, various outcomes of religious competition or perceived market deficiencies and the foundations of sectoral interdependence (Esping-Andersen 1990). Rather than simple ascriptions of ‘large/small’ or ‘strong/weak’, the complex conditions in which CSOs emerge and operate are held to form distinguishable patterns or paths. Having reviewed various formulations of these, Salamon and Anheier develop a four-part typology of third sector development, illustrated in Table 4, which predicts the size of the third sector and
the level of government spending on social welfare in liberal, social democratic, corporatist and statist regimes.

In the liberal model, middle-class interests have predominated over landed elites, the state bureaucracy and labour organisations to produce a regime antagonistic towards state expenditure on social welfare. In order to meet civil demand for public goods unsupplied by the state and the market, a large third sector has emerged. By contrast, social democratic regimes are marked by an extensive system of state-provided, social welfare public goods leaving little room for active service provision in the third sector. These are particularly likely to predominate where labour movements have retained a degree of political power – often in alliance with progressive or philanthropic bourgeois groups. Consequently, CSOs, while not typically involved in the provision of welfare services, are likely to remain active ‘as vehicles for the expression of political, social, or even recreational interests’ within such a system (ibid., 229). Both liberal and social democratic regimes are likely to be funded, in the main, by private donations. This is because, in the former, the market and, in the latter, the state take responsibility for the provision of public goods generally and social welfare services in particular.

In the corporatist model, the state forges an alliance with the third sector, as one of a number of ‘pre-modern’ mechanisms, in order to maintain the support of key landed elites and thus offset mass demands for social welfare. This was, for instance, the case in Germany under Bismarck. Then, the state established links with the Church and the Junker to administer state-sponsored palliative welfare provisions without surrendering to widespread demands for more comprehensive reforms (Anheier and Seibel, 2000). This suggests that the size and strength of third sector welfare provisions may increase with state expansion rather than the decrease propounded by ‘welfare state’ models. CSOs are also likely to receive a larger proportion of their funding from central government than those operating under other regime conditions. Finally, in the statist model the government ‘retains the upper hand in a wide range of social policies, but not as the instrument of an organised working class as in the social democratic regimes… [rather it] exercises power on its own behalf, or on behalf of business and economic elites’ (Anheier

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Social Spending</th>
<th>Third Sector Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statist</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social democratic</td>
<td>Corporatist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Models of Third Sector Regime (Salamon and Anheier, 1998: 228).
and Salamon, 2001: 16). This means that, despite the prominent position of its agents within the organisation and delivery of welfare service provisions, public expenditure remains low. Third sector activity is also curtailed by thoroughly institutionalised and highly coherent structures of elite control. Since colonial administrations frequently established these kinds of regime configurations, many developing countries demonstrate highly statist systems in which neither private philanthropy nor governmental finance is available to support civil organisations leaving them either weakened and inactive or acutely dependent on market funding.

So, in summary, this text plans to approach the Kobe Earthquake in Japan, the Marmara Earthquake in Turkey and the Gujarat Earthquake in India in three different ways. Firstly, by analysing the six types of vulnerability (identified by Alexander and outlined at the beginning of this chapter) present in each context which combine, in various ways with differing outcomes, to transform the natural hazard of living in an earthquake-prone region into a social disaster. Secondly, it will critically outline the role of the state, the market and the third sector in each of the various stages of the disaster response process. This will then, thirdly, facilitate a consideration of the impact of the disaster on the regime present in each of the case study situations. Each case will thus be examined in terms of Salamon and Anheier’s four-part typology. In offering an analysis of the three contexts both before and after the earthquake, the impact of the disaster on existent and emerging regimes, on changes in civil vulnerability and relationship of the third sector with the state and the market will be illustrated.
At 5:46 on the morning of Tuesday, 17 January 1995 a 20-second earthquake centred beneath Awajishima Island off the coast of Kobe was recorded at a severity of 7.2 on the Richter scale. Six thousand, four hundred people were killed by a combination of falling debris and the fires which engulfed Kobe for days. Its economic cost was estimated at $100 billion. It was not since the Great Kanto earthquake of 1923 in Tokyo and Kanagawa Prefectures, which killed around 100,000 people, destroyed 700,000 houses and reduced Japan’s industrial output by 18 per cent, that the country had suffered a major disaster comparable to the chaos at Kobe (Saitō, 1995). Although Japan’s disaster management systems have often been taken as a best practice example by many around the world, the earthquake revealed serious shortcomings. In particular, it underlined the weakness of an over-reliance on structural mitigation measures. The resultant confusion and chaos that Kobe and its environs suffered during the second half of January caused considerable anger in Japanese society. Today, the earthquake represents, for many, a rupture in the traditionally passive structure of Japanese civil organisation. In order to explore this, we will first focus on the relationship between the state, the market and the third sector. Investigating different types of civil organisation, the following sections will provide a brief outline of the historical development of the associational life of Japan and consider the scope, size and financial revenues of its CSOs. This chapter will also analyse the emergency relief and recovery response to the Kobe earthquake from both the state and the third sector. Drawing lessons from this experience, it sets out the argument for regarding the Kobe earthquake as a significant turning point in the relationship between civil society and the Japanese state.

State, Market and Civil Society in Japan

Japan has a relatively long history of civil organisation. Yamaoka refers to the monk Kukai who brought the Shingon sect of Buddhism to Japan as ‘the founder of Japan’s private nonprofit, or third sector’, as he established the unique education system of Shugeishuchi-in, built irrigation systems and developed areas for farming on the island of Shikoku (1998: 20). Indeed, Buddhist monks continued to carry out a large part of charitable work in medieval times. Later, with the arrival of Christianity in Japan during the sixteenth century, Catholic missionaries also started to undertake
philanthropic and cultural activities. During the Edo period (1603–1868), non-profit organisations, like cooperative labour associations, were established in order to set up agricultural projects, promote religious fraternities and consolidate merchant and artisan guilds (Masako, 2000). These became particularly active following the collapse of feudalism and the rise of the Meiji state after 1868.

‘What can meaningfully be called civil society’, however, really only emerged through the codification of civil law in 1898 which established general regulations for the formation and supervision of civil organisations (Pharr, 2003: 319; Matsubara and Todoroki, 2003). In Article 34 it defines the various types of organisation within the third sector (to be discussed shortly). This was supported by the 1929 Relief Law which made some organisations eligible for tax subsidies from the state. Consequently, private school associations, financial assistance groups and neighbourhood organisations increased their numbers significantly during the inter-war period. Following the Second World War, the third sector was promoted by the occupying forces of the United States as a way of obstructing the rise of left-wing political sympathies. A number of measures were introduced, including, in the 1950 revision of corporate revenue legislation, a system of tax exemptions (Yamaoka, 1998).

The 1960s witnessed the introduction of new types of civil organisation such as charitable trusts and grant-making foundations. For example, the Toray Science Foundation, which was established in 1960, has had a major impact on the funding of scientific research. Other important grant-making foundations established in this period include the Mitsubishi Foundation, the Toyota Foundation and the Nippon Life Insurance Foundation. During the 1970s, there was an increase in ‘proactive types of movement’ with the rise of consumerism and environmental protection organisations (Yamaoka, 1998: 47). At the same time and enjoying considerable state patronage, organisations such as the Japan Youth Volunteers Promotion Council, Osaka Voluntary Action Centre and the Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers, began to develop a relatively high profile – much enhanced by their active role in responding to the influx of Indochinese refugees during the late 1970s and early 1980s (Matsubara and Todoroki, 2003).

Sumiko Iwao argues that, during the 1980s, three major changes took place within Japanese civil society (1990). The first – a greater tendency towards diversity and individuality – can be seen in a change in self-perceptions. An opinion poll conducted in 1953, for instance, found that only 14 per cent of respondents felt they were equal to westerners while 28 per cent considered themselves to be inferior. In 1983, however, the same survey found that 53 per cent of respondents felt superior, while only 8 per cent perceived themselves to be inferior. Iwao asserts that, with this regaining of self-assurance, ‘values, interests, and options… diversified’ as people began to experience ‘the freedom to choose the kind of lifestyle they wish’ (ibid.: 44). Associated with this was a greater need for instant gratification which, Iwao suggests, was a second major change taking place during the 1980s. This was most obviously reflected in changes to the well-known Japanese work ethic as people, particularly the young, came ‘to expect and demand immediate returns for their efforts’ (ibid.: 45). For example, a survey conducted in
1983 found that 77 per cent of respondents said that they would not be interested in seeking out a better job than the one they had at the time, but only four years later, in 1987, the figure had dropped to 52 per cent. Accompanying this greater sense of career mobility, were growing perceptions of job insecurity and a rise in standards of living, leading to a third major change in Japanese civil society – a growing propensity for conservatism. According to Iwao, individuals became increasingly concerned with protecting the status quo and ‘suspicious of any major changes in their lives’ (ibid.: 48). The overall impact of these, often contradictory, influences was that, during the late 1980s and 1990s, the organisation of civil society was marked by inconsistency and fragmentation.

Today, then, the term ‘civil society’ (shimin sakai) has a number of divergent meanings in Japan. For Masayuki Deguchi, three distinct analytical strands are discernible (1998). The first has its roots in ideas put forward by Western-influenced political thinkers during the nineteenth century. This body of work, which derives some of its philosophical components from Jacobin notions of modernity, has enjoyed a revival since Japan’s catastrophic engagement in the Second World War. Secondly, emerging from a broadly utopian movement led by leftist intellectuals resisting American occupation and searching for a coherent position within the emergent new world order, the term has come to represent the leading role that would be played by citizens in moving towards a socialist society. Finally, while retaining some of these connotations, it has, recently, come to be associated with more apolitical notions of voluntary and non-profit patterns of organisation.

Given the disparate bases for Japanese understandings of its third sector, it is perhaps unsurprising that, as Takayoshi Amenomori notes,

the Japanese nonprofit sector is difficult to define and measure: many organizations are not registered, let alone incorporated…Many nonprofit organizations are virtually treated as part of government…There are also many mass organizations and community-based groups which, deeply rooted in Japanese society and cultures, are difficult to describe in terms used to depict organizations in Western societies (1997: 189).

For example, the phrase ‘non-governmental organisation’ generally refers to the overseas aid and development sector. It is the term ‘non-profit organisation’ which coincides best with the Western understanding of a national NGO engaged in domestic work. To include both these formations and for the purposes of this chapter, the terms CSO and third sector will be used.

The first distinction among CSOs in Japan can be made on the basis of whether or not they are incorporated associations (hōjin) or unincorporated associations (nin’i dantai). Most Japanese CSOs can be categorised in the latter group as they have no legal status and are not registered with the state. A second level of categorisation is within incorporated CSOs. Some are general public interest corporations (köeki hōjin) defined by Article 34 of the Civil Code as ‘associations or foundations relating worship, religion, charity, science, art, or otherwise relating to
public interest and not having for their object the acquisition of gain’. There are a wide range of organisations under this umbrella including Japan’s *International Cooperation Agency*, the *Japanese Red Cross Society* and the privatised national railway companies. They, too, consist of two subgroups – incorporated foundations (zaidan hōjin) and incorporated associations (shadan hōjin). The main difference here is that it is the former’s assets which are dedicated to attaining a given charitable objective, whereas, in the case of the latter, that objective is pursued by a group of people operating collectively (Amenomori and Yamamoto, 1998: 3). Other incorporated CSOs are involved in non-profit activity of a specified nature (tokutei hi-eiri katsudo hōjin). These include organisations such as social welfare corporations (shakai fukushi hōjin), private school corporations (gakkō hōjin), religious corporations (shūkyō hōjin) and medical corporations (iryō hōjin) (Amenomori, 1997; Hirata, 2002).

Of these, the 12,000 or so shakai fukushi hōjin, or social welfare organisations, are amongst the most active. Defined and established under the Social Welfare Services Law of 1951, they mostly work in areas such as childcare, the protection of women and services for the elderly. Between 80 and 90 per cent of their income is provided by the state, making them, in essence, quasi-public, rather than non-governmental, organisations. In fact, these funding structures are in breach of Article 89 of the constitution which explicitly stipulates that public authorities are not allowed to donate money to charitable associations, religious organisations and ecumenical congregations. Intended to keep civil groups away from the state’s influence, the interpretation of this article has, however, changed considerably leading to extensive public sector encroachment, ‘standardized social services, inertia, and [a] loss of incorporative capabilities on behalf of the social welfare corporations’ (Amenomori and Yamamoto, 1998: 6). As far as gakkō hōjin, or private school corporations, are concerned, their numbers have increased considerably in line with Japan’s rapid economic development. Under the Private Schools Law they, like other hōjin, have enjoyed financial support in the form of tax subsidies and, in the same way as social welfare organisations, have circumvented the prohibitions of Article 89. There is, however, less debate over this since private schools are widely considered to be serving the public at large. Moreover, the 15 or so per cent of their income which is derived from the public sector is closely monitored by the Ministry of Education under the same supervisory regime as state schools (ibid.).

Shūkyō hōjin, or religious corporations, disseminate spiritual teaching and organise ceremonies and functions. Until the Second World War, Shinto received special treatment among other religious beliefs as it ‘was chosen to provide the emotional and ideological base for an increasingly totalitarian state’ influenced by the fascist regimes of Europe (Amenomori, 1997: 201). However, during the Allied occupation almost all linkages between the government and collective worship were abolished. Legislation introduced in 1951 institutionalised this dissociation and stipulated that shūkyō hōjin should be permitted to operate in an environment free from external interference and, like other hōjin, exempted from corporate income tax, real estate tax and registration tax. By the early 1990s, there were more than 180,000 religious corporations registered with the Ministry of Education (Amenomori and Yamamoto, 1998). In the late 1990s, the number of iryō hōjin, or
medical corporations, was, around 7,000. Established under the Medical Services Law of 1948, they provide support to the country’s medical services and run hospitals and clinics on a not-for-profit basis. They can be both in the form of a foundation and an association.

_Shimin dantai_, or unincorporated associations, also include a very wide range of quite different organisations. Making up over a million groups (by far the largest segment of the third sector in Japan), they range from youth clubs (_seinendan_), community-based mutual help organisations (_jichikai_) and children’s associations (_kodomokai_). Others are set up as co-operatives (_kyo¯dō kumiai_) and tend to concentrate on issues such as credit, agriculture, the environment and fisheries. One of the largest areas here is consumer rights which have considerable popular support and include a high proportion of female members (Amenomori, 1997). Most are of fairly recent origin, having emerged from the 1970s onwards. They have often, in many cases, been created by individuals, although corporations and even local governments have also established associations and trusts in this sector. In contrast to _hōjin_, they do not possess any legal status and are not subject to tax exemptions beyond income tax concessions. Some of them can, however, be incorporated and benefit from further tax privileges provided they meet additional criteria set by the authorities (Amenomori and Yamamoto, 1998).

So, when the Kobe earthquake struck, the third sector was a $214 billion industry, forming 4.5 per cent of the country’s gross domestic product – bigger than Japan’s agriculture and public utilities sectors and nearly as big as the transportation and communication industry. It employed an equivalent of 2.1 million full-time people, representing 3.5 per cent of the country’s workforce and almost 9 per cent of Japan’s entire service sector – the equivalent of more than one third of the public sector’s workforce. However, in comparison with other developed countries the third sector’s share of total employment in Japan was still below average at 4.8 per cent compared with 7.8 per cent in the United States, 10.5 per cent in Belgium and 12.6 per cent in the Netherlands. Including volunteers in the nonprofit sector, the gap between Japan and the average of other developed countries was even wider with shares of 4.6 per cent and 9.4 per cent respectively (Atoda, Amenomori and Ohta, 1998; Salamon et al, 1999).

Across the third sector as a whole, it is the health and education sectors which predominate. The former alone, for instance, has employs 47.1 per cent of the entire non-profit workforce while the majority of universities and a significant proportion of elementary and secondary schools are of non-profit type. Looking at the size of average operating expenditures, the dominance of education and health sectors can easily be seen. In 1989 the average for the nonprofit sector as a whole was ¥159.4 million per organisation compared to ¥433 million and ¥252 million for the education and health sectors respectively. It is clear, therefore, that, while the nonprofit sector forms a very significant part of the economy in Japan, it focuses on a small number of fields (Atoda, Amenomori and Ohta, 1998: 117). In terms of its income, the bulk of funding to the third sector comes from service fees (approximately 52 per cent) and public sector payments (approximately 45 per cent). This is broadly comparable to other developed countries. As far as the input
from private philanthropy is concerned, however, there is a fairly sharp difference. In Japan, this is only approximately 2.6 per cent of the third sector’s total funding base, while figures around 7.5 per cent are more normal in most developed countries. According to Lester Salamon and his colleagues at Johns Hopkins University, the main reason for this is ‘the long tradition of statism’ and the continuing efficacy of ‘cultural norms stressing cooperation and consensus over individualism’. The result, they continue, is that the third sector in Japan has ‘emerged within the ambit of a clearly dominant state bureaucracy and allied corporate sector rather than as the product of grassroots citizen pressures’ (1999: 256).

It is this symbiotic relationship that creates a large grey area within the Japanese nonprofit sector and ensures that ‘the dividing lines vis-à-vis both the corporate and the public sectors are blurred’ (Amenomori, 1997: 207). It has been argued that this is a consequence of the way the concepts of public (公) and private (私) are rooted in Japanese culture and Confucianism. As there is a tendency to consider the attainment of collective interests, or the interests of the public at large, to be a superior personal goal than the pursuit of private or familial objectives, the support of the state sector is regarded as a matter of great importance by Japanese nonprofit organisations. Amenomori asserts that even ‘the complex and time-consuming registration process and oversight procedures… do not carry [the] negative connotations’ that they might in the West (1997: 208). Similarly, those CSOs which would like to become an incorporated organisation ‘are often advised to accept former bureaucrats as members of the board or as senior staff’ (ibid.). In other words, appointing retired governmental officials to managerial positions within civil organisations is both a cultural matter of credibility and an instrumental means of making a positive impact on the agency responsible for the registration procedure.

The result, according to Peter Witteveen, is ‘a preoccupation with appearances, both literal surfaces and figurative impressions’ (1997: 447). This finds expression in three ways:

First there is the idea that public appearances should match the desired public perception. Second there is the idea that creating the likeness of social order will somehow induce the actual realization of that order. And third there is the idea that moral goodness and collective identity reside in proper appearances (ibid.: 414).

Social issues are thus not taken as the key parameters of debate, ‘instead they are regarded as objects to be treated as received knowledge, something inert and dictated by authorities; not subject to discussion’ (ibid.: 446). Here ‘the notion of acting in a responsible, good and proper way’ is important. It is, Witteveen continues, intimately connected to an ‘acute sensitivity to peer opinion and the possibility of falling outside of relatively narrow defined explicit expectations of preferred behaviour’ (ibid.: 435). This has particular relevance to Japan where identity is mainly structured around social position. In other words, ‘a Japanese
person’s life chances are determined by who he or she is rather than how well he or she does’ (ibid.).

Alongside these cultural patterns, is a strong sense of consumerism which, in essence, constitutes one of the most important linkages between civil society and mass politics. It has its roots in the implantation of a liberal democracy during the Allied occupation after the Second World War. With ‘Western’ notions of pluralism and individuality came a ‘culture of cash spending’ as ‘increasingly urbanized consumers… [were] nourished by a diet of American feature films’ (ibid.: 448). High turnout rates at elections in Japan may, therefore, be a result of an exercise of ‘choice which shoppers could expect’ without ‘the associated cultural meanings found in Western societies. [Consequently] the Japanese interpretation of the democratic form has not carried any of the implications for volunteering [or] citizen participation in political matters’ (ibid.). So, while it is the bourgeoisie that, for the most part, dictates the structure of civil society in the West, in Japan ‘it is the bureaucratic culture and social descendants of the samurai warrior-scholar class, and possibly elements of the former nobility and aristocratic class’ (ibid.: 406). In other words, electoral democracy in Japan was adopted in a way that tended to leave ‘leaders unfettered in their exercise of power, but obliged by paternalism to seek at least demonstrative benefit for the masses’ (ibid.: 448).

This feature has been key to the emergence of Japan as the archetypal ‘developmental state’. During industrialisation in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, the government actively intervened in the economy, made strategic decisions, promoted certain growth-orientated industries, offered subsidies, actively monitored international competitiveness and erected tariffs to protect domestic manufacturers from importations. As a consequence, civil groups were developed ‘in the order of producer sector, the social service sector, and the advocacy sector’ (Yutaka, 2003: 99). The former reached its peak soon after the Second World War while the social sector emerged thereafter. The advocacy sector did not, however, start to expand significantly until the 1990s when it initiated attempts to ‘rectify the limitations that prevented citizen action in Japan’s increasingly pluralistic – though still bureaucratically dominated – society by providing opportunities for civic engagement’ (Salamon et al, 1999: 249). The sector’s late start meant, though, that its civil structures tended to demonstrate, in Tsujinaka Yutaka’s words, ‘the most vulnerability, being weaker than the average association in Japan, if not in the United States and Korea’ (2003: 114). The unified political-economic elite which emerged from the developmental state superstructure has, in other words, asserted its authority over the third sector through an integrated and loyal bureaucracy. Yutaka asserts that it has been this that ‘has maintained an institutional and socio-political structure that includes related legal codes, state agencies, party-political liaisons, and so on, which demonstrate…an institutional complementarity and path dependence in postwar Japan’s socio-political system’ (ibid.: 115).

Currently, then, it is producer groups such as industry associations, agricultural cooperatives and other business collectives that predominate while labour and lobbying organisations are far weaker than their counterparts in the United States and Western Europe. While some student-led and environmental groups have
succeeded in gaining a significant following for a broadly anti-state agenda, most large-scale grass-roots CSOs, which are able to command the interest of an enormous (but mostly fairly servile) mass media, are based around largely apolitical consumer issues. The role of religious organisations in service provision and public discourse is, for example, much more limited than those in almost all other parts of the developed world. In terms of their number, membership size, and financial resources, political advocacy groups are also highly under-represented in the composition of civil society and, while Japan is one of the major donor countries in the world, there is only a small number of CSOs active in the international arena. In all, as Susan Pharr concludes, ‘a close symbiotic relation between an activist [developmental] state and civil society colors and contours, to varying degrees and in different ways, the day-to-day activities of virtually the full range of civil society actors’ (2003: 320–321). Indeed, this has meant that, over the years, a strong relationship between the bureaucracy, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and corporate capital has been formed – often referred to as the ‘iron triangle’. The system of amakudari, or the widespread pattern of senior state bureaucrats retiring to top management positions in the private sector, forms the ‘glue’ for this triangle. Through such patronage, both the market and the state have been able to maintain an important role in moulding the contours of civil society.

In terms of the former, Japan’s increasingly close relationship with global markets has been important. It has brought its business leaders into contact with notions of corporate citizenship, leading to the growth of major grant-making foundations and the establishment of the ‘One Per Cent Club’ made up of those corporations willing to donate one per cent of their earnings to voluntary associations concerned with the human and spiritual betterment of Japanese society (Imada, 1999). The persistent influence of corporate capital over the third sector is indicated by the fact that, despite making up only about 20 per cent of Japan’s active CSOs, business-affiliated associations account for more than 40 per cent of the sector’s revenue. So, although the numbers of CSOs per capita have long been roughly comparable to other post-industrial societies – notably South Korea and the United States – they are much more vulnerable to market trends. As Tsujinaka Yutaka observes, ‘the growth of Japanese associations has been strongly influenced by economic growth’ as well as macro-economic shifts from producer sectors to social service and advocacy sectors. This is apparent, he continues, in the ratio of advocacy and producer CSOs which currently operate in Japan. His study finds that, in Tokyo, 6.3 per cent of the total number of CSOs can be defined as advocacy with 29.8 per cent as producer. This compares to 10.5 per cent and it 18.7 respectively in Seoul (2003: 96).

In terms of the role of the state, both direct and indirect forms of influence are discernible. In direct terms, Tokyo has consistently made ‘purposeful attempts to influence the configuration of organized civil society’ through the provision of legal frameworks for registration, status, tax benefits and financial flows which seek to ‘promot[e] one type of group… and hinder others’ (Pekkanen, 2003: 116–9). So, while the state has been prepared to support small, local groups such as neighbourhood associations, large, independent, professional groups are regarded
with more suspicion. The result has been that state support has become accompanied by conditions and influence. In all, the relationship between the state and nonprofit sector ‘seems best characterised as a patron-client relationship that casts the nonprofit sector in a ‘junior’ role under [the] close supervision of the relevant ministries’ (Yamamoto, 1998: 120). Here, the granting of the lucrative corporate status to CSOs is an important lever held by ministries. Apart from the large sums of money required to gain incorporation, the application process is so exhaustive as, perhaps deliberately, to discourage ‘newly founded and unregistered nonprofit organizations from seeking incorporated status’ (ibid.).

The stipulation that the applicant organisation must have a core of professional staff, for instance, has been a key obstruction about which there has been considerable controversy. Hoshino Masako, the founder of Japan International Volunteer Centre, complains that Japanese society generally believes that the activities of CSOs ‘should be 100 percent volunteer, and that no one should receive salaries’ (2000: 15). Consequently, many prefer their donations to go directly to recipients without the involvement of an intermediary organisation (Look Japan, 1995). So, without a body of full-time professional staff, most CSOs have limited opportunities to influence policies and to change the political landscape (Pekkanen, 2003). There is, thus, a ‘seemingly insurmountable wall between formally incorporated nonprofit organizations and the sizable assortment of citizen groups that have emerged over the past decade or more at the community level’ (Salamon et al, 1999: 249).

Indirect influences have, for the most part, been found in Japan’s institutional structures. The power of the state bureaucracy in local decision making processes, the electoral system, political opportunity structures and even the lack of bulk postage discounts for CSOs have all militated against the emergence of an autonomous and critical third sector. A reason for this is the public sector’s tendency to view CSOs as promoting types of political change which might undermine its influential role in governance and policy formation. Consequently, ‘social capital-type groups have been promoted, while pluralist-type interest groups have been discouraged’ – particularly those that are perceived to be antagonistic towards ‘interest groups that are often coopted or compromised by bureaucratic supervision’ (Pekkanen, 2003: 133). Furthermore, the public sector has sought to bolster its influence within the third sector by creating *kōeki hōjin*, or incorporated public interest organisations, itself. Takayoshi Amenomori estimates that this may be as much as 100 each year (1997: 208). Although frequently justified in terms of cost-efficiency, the patron-client relationship between state bureaucrat and quasi-civil organisation now constitutes a government-created and continually-sponsored stratum within the third sector – a strategy with the additional benefit of providing future employment opportunities for retiring state officials (Amenomori, 1998). Although justified as part of the state’s ‘personnel management schemes to promote younger staff members’ up the bureaucratic chain of command by offering an early retirement outlet for older civil servants (Amenomori, 1997: 209), according to Tadashi Yamamoto, it also:
limits the freedom of nonprofit organizations and reinforces the role of governmental bureaucracy [with the consequence that]… there has been markedly limited participation by nonprofit organizations themselves, either in the form of policy proposals or in other actions. This is quite telling about [sic] the perceived place of the nonprofit sector as a subordinate instrument of government (1998: 123).

Such an exclusive and oligarchic system of elite power has, however, proved to be tenable only so long as it is perceived to be creating economic growth and meeting consumer demand. While is certainly true that, up until ‘the 1995 Kobe earthquake, Japanese nonprofit sector organisations operated in the shadow of the state’, but, more recently, growing pressures of globalisation and recession have weakened the iron triangle, lessening its exclusivity and offering interstices of ‘political space to citizens’ groups that were previously marginalized from the developmental state system’ (Salamon et al, 1999: 249; Hirata, 2002: 4). In responding to the needs of an enlarging foreign labour force, a rapidly ageing population and acute environmental problems, the state has, particularly since the Kobe disaster, increasingly looked to the third sector. Consequently, there have been signs of an ‘attitude adjustment’ in the minds of some officials which has helped to move civil ‘organizations from the fringes of society towards the mainstream’ (Yamamoto, 1998: 132). In all, there has, for some, been ‘a bottom-up movement toward ‘civil society’ where citizens play a larger role in the promotion of the public interest rather than a top-down structure where government agencies dictate the activities of nonprofit and non-governmental organizations’ (ibid.: 57).

CSOs, the Kobe Earthquake and Disaster Management
The Kobe earthquake affected part of the Hyogo Prefecture. It damaged 10 major cities and a further 10 substantial towns over an area of approximately 1,700 km² with a population of around 3.6 million (out of a total for the Prefecture of around 5.4 million – of whom 100,000 residents or so are (mainly Korean) foreign nationals). More than 70,000 buildings collapsed completely and another 55,000 were seriously damaged. The number of people forced to find temporary shelter was in excess of 200,000. The Hanshin expressway, which was expected to withstand a much more severe earthquake, crumbled in five sections. The port at Kobe, which was Japan’s second biggest (handling 12 per cent of the country’s exports), was closed down with only four of its 239 berths surviving the earthquake intact. Telecommunication exchanges and electricity supply systems collapsed, the water mains network was breached, roads were made impassable through damage or traffic congestion caused by panicking residents, and the emergency services became heavily constricted. So, although there were more than 100 fires in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, it took the fire services more than five hours to assemble 90 per cent of their capacity. Medical personal and ambulance services were similarly impaired with 10 out of the area’s 144 hospitals badly damaged (Look Japan, 1995). In all, the Kobe earthquake ’exposed how defenceless the medical institutions [we]re against disasters… [and demonstrated] that the
disaster prevention program as it stood was far from satisfactory’ (Takeshi Gotō, Deputy Director of Hyogo Prefecture’s Public Health and Environment Department, cited in ibid.: 5). Ultimately, it ‘smashed beyond repair one of Japan’s most self-confident myths – that modern technology and good government left the country well prepared for the severe tremors that have jolted the country repeatedly for thousands of years’ (US News & World Report, 1995: 40).

Shun’ichi Furukawa categorises the aftermath of the earthquake in four ways. First, a key challenge was the interruption of communication lines which obstructed the flow of information and, with the collapse of the transportation system, prevented a rapid response from being mobilised during the immediate post-disaster period – particularly in the delivery of skilled emergency personnel. Second, the earthquake demonstrated the physical vulnerabilities of Japan’s building stock, particularly those constructed before the enforcement of the 1971 building act. Third, the fact that up to 320,000 people, most of whom required the immediate provision of shelter, became homeless overnight created immense logistical difficulties. Fourth, the generalised damage to the area’s physical infrastructure meant that an urban life-style hitherto dependent on complex socio-economic facilities was abruptly replaced by ‘dramatically austere living conditions for the people’ for over a month (2000: 10).

As an initial response to the earthquake, the government established an emergency disaster relief centre within the National Land Agency and, two days later, another emergency relief headquarters staffed by all members of the Cabinet. This dual arrangement proved to be quite cumbersome. With the Diet in recess, it had considerable difficulty in reaching decisions and became, in the words of William Farrell, ‘nothing more than a regular meeting’ (1995: 16). Lacking authority and infra-structural connections, it was, for instance, unable to respond effectively to the Hyogo Prefecture’s request for assistance from Japan’s Self-Defence Forces – submitted four hours after the earthquake. Consequently, troops did not arrive in the region for a number of days. Similar problems were reported in the areas of food and water distribution (which arrived without any means of cooking or distribution) and funeral arrangements leading to the temporary housing of thousands of bodies in schools, gymnasiums and temples with no prospects of a proper burial (US News & World Report, 1995). Insufficient resources also detrimentally affected the role of voluntary organisations in the relief and reconstruction process. There were perennial shortages of motivation, opaque organisational mandates and inadequate technical skills (Shaw and Goda, 2004: 21–2). Hiroshi Fukunga, then editor of Tokyo’s Business Today, summarised the frustration that these failings prompted thus;

It now seems clear that even in a national emergency the nation’s pen-pushers will not swerve a millimetre from official procedures, even if fellow citizens’ lives are at risk…While the hours slipped by and thousands lost their lives in the fiery ruins left by the Kobe disaster, Japanese officials’ top priorities were observing protocol and following precedent (cited in Oakes, 1998: 31–2).
Here, William Farrell considers part of the problem to be Japan’s recurring lack of ability to ‘engage in crisis’. He argues that Japanese society deals with uncertainty by institutionalising complex social rituals rather than more flexible and ad hoc measures. If these rituals are disrupted, few alternatives are, he continues, available and the process of crisis response ‘grinds to a halt’ (1995: 16). In other words, since decision making in Japan involves a group consensus developed from a carefully structured gathering and weighing of data, social mobilisation cannot be initiated swiftly. According to Furukawa, this is largely a defensive response ‘to the over-riding authoritarian nature of the military government in the 1930s and 1940s’ during which time the ‘functions of the administration were carefully constructed to ensure checks-and-balance systems’ (2000: 5). The immediate aftermath of an earthquake disaster requires, however, centralised, flexible and rapid decision making. The Japanese government’s obliviousness to this fact is reflected in a select committee’s report on crisis management in 1984 which, instead of stressing the importance of such features, concluded that there was the need to reach a clear consensus among the relevant ministries before taking the issue to the prime minister. Farrell considers this attitude to be partly driven by the ‘protection of bureaucratic turf’ (1995: 17). Some governmental agencies, it is suggested, ‘tend to form fiefdoms, while they try to fend off encroachment of others upon their jurisdictions’ (Nakamura, 2000: 1) Therefore, when the flow of information needs to be fast as in the post-disaster context in Kobe, such fragmentation prevents the free flow of information. Indeed, this organisational inertia is, for many, the critical problem with the country’s administration and the foremost reason why the state’s response to the disaster was delayed and uncoordinated. In all, it has meant that an ‘integrated coordination of crisis management’ at the national level has been ‘often absent’ (Furukawa, 2000: 5).

Another controversial issue in regard to the Kobe earthquake concerned the deployment of the Self Defence Forces (SDF). Legally, it is the responsibility of the governor of a prefecture to ask the SDF to initiate emergency operations. However, as the primary responsibility for responding to disasters lies with municipalities, mayors firstly need to make a written request to the governor to contact SDF officials. This should outline the resources and forces to be deployed and the probable duration of the operation (Nakamura, 2000a). Furthermore, such a request is only valid in writing and not by telephone or facsimile. Such a lengthy and bureaucratic process meant that, in Kobe, the formal request from Governor Toshitami of the Hyogo Prefecture to the SDF was not dispatched until 10 am, almost five hours after the earthquake occurred. The cost of SDF operations was a significant reason why the Hyogo Governor did not request their assistance immediately. The fact that the Disaster Aid and Rescue Act stipulates that the major portion of the costs of deployment must be borne by the initiator partly led the Governor to believe that the Prefecture’s own disaster management systems would be adequate to respond to the situation (ibid.: 26).

Explanations for such complacency are threefold. Firstly, there has been a long-standing reluctance to focus on disasters in favour of more positive electoral messages which tended to correlate exclusively reconstruction processes with
economic growth (Murakami, 1996). This has its roots in the industrialisation drive of the 1940s when, as Furakawa notes, ‘insufficient investment in social capital… resulted in a serious vulnerability to natural disasters throughout the post-war Japan period’ (2000: 3). So, it was not until 1961 that the first legislation of this kind – the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act – was drawn up. Perennially, though, there have been insufficient public resources allocated to making the legislation successful – a fact comprehensively demonstrated in Kobe where, despite the presence of 21,646 municipal employees and disproportionately dominating its prefecture, acute manpower shortages were apparent in dealing with the aftermath of the earthquake. Although, overall, Kobe’s staff responded to a total of 263,899 displaced people at a ratio of one to approximately 12 homeless citizens, labour shortages in some areas of the city created ‘a desperately serious situation’ (Hashimoto, 2000: 16). Nagata ward, for instance, had to deal with 55,000 displaced people (out of an overall population of around 140,000) with 211 staff (a ratio of one to 261).\(^4\) Since disasters also kill those employees who might have a role in responding to disasters, these ratios were, in fact, significantly higher. Indeed, on the day of the Kobe earthquake, the attendance was 35 per cent in Kobe, 42 per cent in the nearby city of Ashiya, 51 per cent in Nishinomiya and 60 per cent in Takarazuka (ibid.: 17).

Secondly, the implementation of disaster-related legislation has been broken up across a number of different hierarchical levels of government. While at the national level it has been, ultimately, the responsibility of The Central Disaster Prevention Council (headed by the Prime Minister and consisting of 29 government agencies and 37 designated public institutions) to ensure that legal stipulations are met, similar council structures (consisting of local government agencies, police and fire departments and other designated public institutions) exist at both the municipal and prefectural levels. In the case of Kobe, which, as a designated city holds functions and fiscal resources comparable to Hyogo Prefecture, these government structures have ‘not [been] known for a harmonious relationship’ (Furukawa, 2000). Although, in the event of a disaster the affected municipal government is supposed to be the first to respond with emergency relief, dealing with abstruse prefectural and national regulations and organisational structures inevitably slows down local efforts to gather data and clarify information – a problem that led to the appointment a Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management in 1995 (Furukawa, 2000). Thirdly, there has not been a concerted effort to devise thorough disaster preparation strategies in Japan. Legislation has generally focussed on four main areas; the clarification of responsibilities for disaster reduction measures, the promotion of comprehensive and systematic approaches to disaster mitigation, the provision of fiscal resources and the prescription of procedures for proclaiming disaster emergencies. Overall, then, attention has been almost entirely concentrated on mitigation and prevention with the main focus of earthquake preparedness being the design and construction of highly resilient buildings and not the development of ways of dealing with earthquakes once they have occurred. ‘Earthquake preparedness has’, in other words, largely ‘failed to move beyond the realms of engineering’ (Murakami, 1996: 11).
Inherent in such technophilic logic is a reluctance to consider the possibility that earthquake-proof structures would also collapse when they face a greater than anticipated force. A nationwide safety culture based around norms, beliefs, roles and attitudes ‘which are concerned with minimising the exposure of individuals to conditions considered dangerous’ helped to create a feeling that ‘Kobe was somehow safe from earthquakes’ (Shaw and Goda, 2004: 23). Moreover, since over 70 per cent of the buildings in Japan were built before the 1981 Seismic Design Codes were implemented, it is clear that the latest construction methods do not, currently, constitute adequate earthquake mitigation. An appropriate alternative requires political determination to deal with Japan’s complicated land and property policies, its vested interests and its oligarchic state. After all, as Suminao Murakami points out, ‘there are many aspects of urban-earthquake-preparedness that technology on its own cannot deal with’ (1996: 12). Search-and-rescue and emergency relief planning, the allocation of open spaces for evacuation, traffic control, communications infrastructure, logistical coordination and the roles of different stakeholders cannot be integrated through a Jacobin belief in science and progress alone. Moreover, as Kobe demonstrated, even the latest constructions fail, given the right combination of pressures or irregularities in technological application. As Murakami continues, the notion that ‘a building can withstand every possible combination of conditions that exist in nature is simply irresponsible (1996: 32). It is, perhaps, in this context that the third sector can, by challenging Japan’s over-reliance on engineering solutions, best play an active role in establishing improved disaster mitigation strategies. To date, though, the focus of the third sector has been mainly on healing the immediate wounds of the disaster. It has avoided the issue of responsibility and demonstrated an acute shyness in dealing with more political issues. Consequently, Japan still relies on its technological superiority. Issues of what sorts of emergency measures are needed and how recovery can be achieved as quickly and effective as possible are yet to enter disaster management debates.

Such inertia represents an example of Alexander’s ‘newly-generated’ vulnerabilities. As Michael Oakes exploration of the relationship between the Kobe disaster and land regulations shows, these have been significantly worsened by the state’s land-use policies (1998). Due to high demand for arable land in a highly mountainous country, the state has attempted to set aside 5 per cent of its overall territory for farming. Consequently, pressure on urban building plots has grown exponentially with the result that construction on land reclaimed from the sea has become commonplace in coastal cities like Kobe. The districts of Port Island and Rokko Island, for instance, were created by transferring large areas of mountainous land around Kobe to the bay during the 1970s. These artificial land masses were then heavily exploited in both commercial and residential construction programmes. Such land conditions offer ‘the worst soil possible for earthquakes’ and, as a result, these districts suffered extensive levels of damage (ibid.: 32). In this way, the extent of the Kobe disaster was ‘inextricably connected to the urban growth plans that the city initiated’ (Nakamura, 2000a: 24). Overall, considering that the construction of buildings on reclaimed land is still a common way of dealing
with real estate shortages, it is clear that Japan is still facing the challenge of a complex combination of vulnerabilities. Moreover, the close relationship between market forces and state means that greater regulation in this area will be inevitably unpopular among property developers and investors and thus difficult to achieve.

In Kobe, these problems exist alongside more typical ‘residual’ vulnerabilities such as the high causality rates amongst occupants of older-style wooden housing where, in the fires which raged for days after the tremor, as many people died as lost their lives as a result of falling debris. Although, under the leadership of Mayor Miyazaki Tatsuo, the city authorities had initiated a number of giant development projects, such as the reclamation of Osaka Bay, many urban areas remained untouched. The west section of the city and Hyogo and Nagata wards in particular were, for instance, still home to a high concentration of traditional dwellings and antiquated small firms. These areas, with their narrow streets and over-crowding, lacked modern infrastructure and had largely turned into residential areas for the aged and impoverished as the young and affluent started to move to new housing development areas in Nishi and other more prosperous wards. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that more than half of the victims of the Kobe earthquake were over 60 years old (Nakamura, 2000a).

Yosuke Hirayama argues that it was, in part, the effects of economic globalisation that were to blame for weakening the stability of urban society in Kobe (2000). These have, he suggests, undermined the profitability of the city’s traditionally most productive sectors of the economy. Shipbuilding, the steel industry and small chemical factories (formerly the backbone of Kobe’s economy) have been failing to compete and have thus considerably declined in recent years. The restructuring of the economy in order to respond to this reduced level of manufacturing has deepened socio-economic polarisation and inner-city areas ‘have further declined with the [resultant] outflow of capital, employment and population’ (Hirayama, 2000: 113). Consequently, before the earthquake there was a marked difference in income between the suburbs and urban areas of Kobe. For example, the proportion of households with an income of less than 3 million yen a year was up to 42 per cent in Hyogo ward and 39 per cent in Nagata ward compared to less than 20 per cent in Nishi ward. The damage inflicted on housing by the earthquake therefore ‘reflect[ed] this geographically divided situation. [In all]… the earthquake itself was a natural phenomenon, but the inequality of housing damage was generated socially’ (ibid.: 114).

The fact that these inner-city areas attract people on low incomes, such as students, foreign workers and the elderly, led to accusations that state policy was disproportionately focussed upon the protection of the wealthy with, according to a number of CSOs, the socially weak ‘completely forgotten in the drawing up of disaster-prevention measures’ (Naoyuki Nakatsuji, Home Director of the Care Centre for the Aged in Nagata, cited in Look Japan, 1995: 8). In many ways, this exclusivity has been replicated during the reconstruction process. Hiroshi Kanda, a priest at the Takatori Catholic Church in Nagata Ward of Kobe, records that, ‘as time passed, economic disparities became palpable; in short, the poor looked on while the rich built new houses’ (Look Japan, 1996: 8). Hirayama underlines this
discrepancy by pointing out that the housing reconstruction was not uniform throughout Kobe city. For example, in Nagata ward three years after the earthquake the recovery rate was only 82 per cent, thereby deepening ‘the socio-spatial polarisation’ of the city (2000: 117).

Alexander (1997) refers to these different levels of loss absorption by the various groups in a society (like rich and poor, urban and rural, men and women and so on) as technological or technocratic vulnerabilities. For Father Kanda, these are part of an ‘us’ and ‘them’ cultural dichotomy in Japanese society in which people often try to establish their identity by finding people ‘weaker’ than themselves (cited in Look Japan, 1996: 8). In recent times, such sentiment has become more focussed on the growing numbers of foreign workers within Japanese society. While incidents of violent confrontation are rare, the relationship is, for many commentators, based more on cultural undercurrents of forbearance than on integration or general interest. In other words, as part of the gaman tradition (which might be roughly translated as endurance incorporating elements of self-sacrifice), people tend to ‘tolerate’ having foreign residents as neighbours, rather than seeing that as something positive (ibid.).

**Impact of the Kobe Earthquake on Civil Society – State Relationships**

While the Japanese government’s slow and confused response to the disaster was undeniable, around 1.5 million individuals responded rapidly by taking on a considerable proportion of relief activity (Masako, 2000). Two days after the earthquake, for instance, the Kobe NGO Council (consisting of eight local CSOs) contributed staff to form the Local NGOs Coordinating Team for Hanshin Quake Relief. The relatively youthful staff profile of this and other similar organisations, challenged a prevailing myth in Japanese society that ‘volunteerism will never take root in Japan because the young are self-centred and reluctant to empathize with the disadvantaged’ (Look Japan, 1995: 6). Indeed, a survey carried out by the Hyogo prefecture in March 1995 found that 73 per cent of volunteers were less than 30 years old (Look Japan, 1996a). General public perceptions of CSOs also began to change as the mobilisation gathered momentum in Kobe. Civil organisations started to lose their popular image ‘as the play-ground of oddball do-gooders strangely possessed with ideas of equal rights and altruism’ (Look Japan, 1996a).

Given the sheer scale of volunteer activism in Kobe, acute problems emerged in the coordination of different groups and organisations – as well as between these and the local and state authorities. For example, the Kobe Citizens’ Hospital asked for volunteers to carry water at the hospital as this task was taking too many doctors and nurses away from their medical duties. The city hall rejected this request, claiming that they did not have the necessary labour to give to the hospital. Meanwhile, in the same building there was apparently a list of 5,000 registered, but un-deployed, volunteers ready to undertake any type of manual work. Officials were seemingly unwilling to cooperate with volunteers as this would mean stepping out of their regulated routine. They also expressed doubts over whether or not they were capable of honestly undertaking the responsibilities given to them. For instance, Kiyoyuki Kanemitsu, Director of Kobe’s International Affairs Division,
stated that, ‘we didn’t know much about the people who volunteered. Frankly, we couldn’t verify the trustworthiness of the people who volunteered, so we could not take responsibility for them (cited in Oakes, 1998: 31).

Accompanying such sentiments was the idea – often attributed to public sector officials – that the reconstruction process ended with the restoration of amenities and utilities to the earthquake affected area. However, since most disaster-affected people in Kobe were amongst the weakest groups in society, they had limited resources with which to deal with the difficulties of medium to long term recovery. Here, the relocation of some disaster-affected people away from surroundings with which they were familiar and that might have assisted them in developing effective coping strategies was significant. Its result was to obstruct the rapid development of reciprocal social relationships. Indeed, ‘human relationships in their new communities’ was, along with a ‘lack of support systems’, one of the two key problems identified by the residents of temporary shelters in Kobe. In a study based on 1,000 ‘voice cards’, these displaced individuals and families were, with the elderly reporting the highest levels of distress, found to be ‘acutely worried about their future’ (Shaw and Goda, 2004: 23). Much of this was a consequence of poor lines of communication between the disaster-affected population and the local authorities leading to widespread scepticism about the public sector’s capacity to look after civil interests. It also resulted in decisions being made which did not reflect what disaster-affected people actually wanted. This lack of participation meant that, on the one hand, the local ‘administration was forceful in decision-making, and on the other hand, the people were too dependent on the administration’ (ibid.).

Nonetheless, the lack of attendance to duties by municipal employees because of staff shortages following the earthquake obliged local authorities to deploy volunteer labour. For example, only a few shelter centres within the most pressed wards could be run by designated professional staff. Without the assistance of unwaged workers, it would have been simply impossible to meet demand. This was particularly so in the delivery of relief goods. Here, volunteers ‘took over most of the work, relieving the government employees greatly’ (Hashimoto, 2000: 19). Much of this was co-ordinated by the volunteers themselves through organisations such as the Volunteers’ Centre which were established in each ward of Kobe, the Volunteers’ Committee in Ashiya and the Volunteers’ Headquarters in Takarazuka. Such community activism had an impact on the comparatively decentralised configuration of subsequent legislation. The 1998 By-Law to Promote Safety of Citizens of Kobe, for instance, was structured around the objectives of ensuring a wider range of participation from civil organisations and the private sector in the creation of a safer environment, of nurturing robust community activities through a decentralisation of municipal authority and of passing the lessons learned from the Kobe disaster on to the next generation through educational and informational initiatives.

Much of these ideas were developed and promoted by CSOs founded in the wake of the earthquake’s aftermath. For instance, the Hyogo Phoenix Emergency Aid Corps, established in January 1997, was instrumental in lobbying the state for
improved legislation. Since then, it has become, both in Japan and abroad, a major disaster-response agency in its own right with a resource base of 1,350 volunteers, 14 medical teams, 116 trucks, 11 buses and two ships (Furakawa, 2000: 11). Another example is the Rescue Stock Yard which is a CSO based in the Nagoya area of Kobe. It was established in March 2002 as a continuation of another CSO, the Volunteer Network for Learning Lessons from the (Hanshin-Awaji) Earthquake. Toshio Sugiman, Tomohide Atsumi and Yusaku Inoue argue that it is a good example of how such an organisation ‘can contribute to the enhancement of citizen participation in both relief activities in emergency and disaster prevention activities in peace time’. It has been successful in breaking down the expectation ‘that a government offers every necessary measure or should provide it’ which, they continue, tends to ensure that ‘ordinary citizens are likely to depend on a government on the one hand, while a government is likely to enjoy assuming the passivity of ordinary citizens when necessary measures are developed on the other hand’ (2003: 7). For example, the activities of the Yard in the provision of relief assistance in the aftermath of the Ogaki flood in July 2002, demonstrated that, rather than simply acting as a complement to government functions, a CSO can ‘provide activities that are... difficult for a government to implement’ (ibid.). Sugiman, Atsumi and Inoue therefore conclude that it is necessary to increase the number of CSOs both in the emergency relief sector and more broadly (ibid.: 8).

Not only have new civil organisations emerged from the Kobe disaster, but, in much of the city, existing CSOs have adapted their mandate to meet a new set of challenges. In the Nishi Suma area, for example, there had long been civil opposition to the city government’s plan for a major road through the neighbourhood, initially announced in 1989. Their demands for changes to the proposed plan in order to make it more favourable to local communities and to the environment meant that relations between the area’s residents and Kobe’s authorities were relatively tense before the earthquake. Following the disaster, the road project was relaunched as a key element of the rehabilitation of Nishi Suma. In contrast to the more fragmented opposition of the early 1990s, though, local people established the Nishi Suma Community Building and Planning Assembly in October 1995 as a centralised response. In the more enabling atmosphere of post-disaster Kobe, it succeeded in applying pressure on the authorities and forcing the initiation of an environmental impact assessment process. Through the interaction between researchers, volunteers and experts during the implementation of this initiative ‘residents gained indispensable experience in building an equal partnership with the administration’ and, as a result, some of their ‘proposals were accepted as part of the final plan’ (Shaw and Goda, 2004: 26, 28). In particular, the renewal of Tenjyougawa Park, which had previously been used as a storage place for the road project, was demanded by residents’ associations and granted by the authorities. It is now used for various community activities and an annual festival. In all, then, it is clear that, since the earthquake, there has been a major improvement in Kobe’s civil organisations’ capacity to reach a collective decision and to improve co-ordination levels among their constituents. They have also gone some way to becoming a ‘part of the government decision-making system’ (ibid.: 26).
This rather more cooperative relationship between Kobe’s residents and its administration can be seen in the 1998 People’s Rehabilitation Plan and the subsequent Kobe Action Plan drawn up in 2001. The former was based on the idea that, three years after the earthquake, Kobe had already achieved 80 per cent of its physical recovery leaving 20 per cent to be addressed. Its rehabilitation plans concerned three fundamental themes; community building and planning, alternative livelihoods, and living safely in the community. The Action Plan built on these themes by stipulating three similar goals: to unify livelihoods and community, to help to develop people’s civic activities through empowerment and to achieve a

Figure 1: Future Civil Society in Japan
sustainable civil society. Drawing on these two initiatives, Shaw and Goda propose a structure, outlined in Figure 1, made up of three actors – namely, the administration, residents’ association and CSOs (ibid.: 33–4). While the administration is linked to the other two directly, the main role of CSOs is to provide support to residents’ associations and to form an interface between them and the administration thereby ensuring a process of close consultation and cooperation between all three actors. It could, they suggest, additionally form a basis for the transfer of funds and the devolvement of power from central government, through local government and ward offices and on to implementing agencies.

**Conclusion**

It is clear, then, that the Kobe earthquake did have an important role in sensitising Japanese society to the role of volunteerism in both disaster response and civil action generally. Indeed, it ‘not only affected the physical, social and economic segments of Japanese society, it also forced behavioural changes in its members’ (ibid.: 17). A growing feeling emerged that the government’s tendency to take the lead in civil organisation and activities was both making it ‘almost impossible for volunteer activities to take root in Japan’ and leading to collectively inefficient outcomes (Look Japan, 1995: 7). The huge numbers of people who helped during the aftermath of the Kobe earthquake made it obvious to many that it was not the spirit of volunteerism that was missing in Japan, but the lack of a coherent institutional framework to manage them. As a result of this pressure, public sector officials started, from 1996 onwards, to make more attempts to draw up programmes which could support volunteers and their organisations. Although the bulk of these were created with a considerable emphasis on establishing a body of organisation closely affiliated to the state and its interests, some were able to develop a critical position in relation to governmental policy. As Ken’ichi Kusachi put it, volunteers should continue to provide the administration with alternative ideas. We must do this to ensure that the authorities do not take advantage of us and that we are truly involved in a practical democracy… I would like to see the response to the earthquake as a first step toward the formation of a truly democratic society (quoted in Look Japan, 1996: 7–8; Look Japan, 1995: 7).

There are also signs that civil society’s acceptance of the iron triangle has started to change. As Keiko Hirata points out,

Societal dissatisfaction with the state has reached an unprecedented level…the once subordinate civil society has become defiant, challenging state authority. NGO activists, once marginalized in Japanese society as political radicals, have increased their profile on the political scene. At the same time, civil society-state relations have evolved from mere confrontation to a combination of confrontation and cooperation. Civil
society actors have found shared goals with state officials and have begun to cooperate with the state, when necessary, on equal terms (2002: 3).

Based on lessons learned from the Kobe disaster, a number of important changes have been made in the way that disasters are planned for in Japan. As part of ‘an overall review’, better communications systems, accompanied by a number of important administrative reforms, have been developed which have improved cooperation between regional and national governments and enhanced the way that central government departments co-ordinate their duties (Furukawa, 2000: 3). Before the earthquake, ‘the sectionalism that divide[d] Japan’s turf-conscious government agencies’ meant that, in the event of emergency, a CSO ‘must apply to one agency or another for authorisation and thus delimit its objectives in keeping within the jurisdiction of that agency’ (Deguchi, 1998: 7). However, the chaotic response of the state to the Kobe disaster allowed CSOs to demand a more flexible legal framework for their activities. Since it was clear that the state failed in responding to the needs of disaster-affected people, it was no longer justifiable to argue that disaster management is solely the responsibility of the state. It was clear from the sheer of volume of volunteers who came forward to help in the aftermath of the disaster that CSOs could, and should, have been incorporated in disaster management system more effectively.

The foundation of an independent central rescue organisation separate from the National Land Agency is a good example of such changes. Working under the direct control of the Prime Minister, its director holds the same power and authority as a deputy cabinet secretary. Having all decisions centralised within this new unit provides a high level of synchronisation and goes some way to alleviating perennially apparent problems of intra-bureaucratic fragmentation. Another important change has been a legal amendment which allows mayors or the Prime Minister’s office to request the Self-Defence Forces to initiate emergency operations without being obliged to seek prefectural and municipal approval. Regardless of who makes this request, the central government will now meet the bill (Nakamura, 2000a). There has also been a number of changes to disaster management strategies at the prefectural and municipal levels. In line with an ‘increased crisis awareness, the advancement of the concept of crisis management and the creation of specialized manuals’, there are signs that contingency measures are ‘progressing to a higher level of crisis management administration’ (Tanifuji, 2000: 40). As Etsushi Tanifuji’s notes, ‘contemporary local governments are beginning to mature from their infant stages of crisis management expertise’ to a point ‘where high-level crisis management can become a reality’ (ibid.: 41). A key part of this is the incorporation of greater levels of civil participation. Here, the Kobe earthquake was a turning point. Supported by societal dissatisfaction over Japan’s economic decline since the early 1990s, the disaster provided an opportunity for civil society to demonstrate both its willingness and its capacity to take on a wider range of social roles. For example, according to Takeshita Teiji, Director of the Senior Volunteers Division of Japan’s Cooperation Volunteers Secretariat, there has been a marked increase in the number of participants in his organisation’s
programmes since the Kobe earthquake. In 1995, for instance, the Secretariat had 1,237 registered senior volunteers. By 1999, the figure had risen to 2,707 (Hiroshi, 2000).

For Margarita Estévez-Abe, many of these CSOs ‘directly represent societal views in policy making’ and have obliged the state to ‘establish associations, strengthen[] some associations, and rely[y] on them as administrative partners’ (2003: 168). For example, in 1999, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced an extensive capacity-building programme for CSOs and, from 2002 onwards, increased its project grant allocations and provided more support for CSOs’ administrative costs (Reimann, 2003). Additionally, starting from 1997, the National Personnel Authority developed a programme to allow 830,000 government employees to take up to five days a year of ‘volunteer leave’ (Look Japan, 1997). This new interest in the activity of civil organisations has also been reflected in a rise in the private sector’s support for volunteerism. Anzai Yōichi, Deputy Director of the Business and Society Group in Keidanren’s Social Affairs Bureau, suggests that the reasons for the private sector’s interest in philanthropy are, firstly, a recognition of their responsibilities as members of the community, secondly, an attempt to strengthen their corporate image by becoming associated with public-spirited philanthropy and, thirdly, to effect closer links with their market and with the society at large (cited in Look Japan, 1997). In many ways, such changes have been driven forward by the growing power and independence of civil sector consumers’ groups (Goran, 2003: 62).

That is not to say, however, that Japan is now free from problems. Masayuki Deguchi argues that the poison gas attack in Tokyo’s metro by Aum Shinrikyo in 1995 has been used to pressure civil groups to make compromises in their demands on the state. Consequently, the Non-Profit Organisation Law of 1998 did not make provisions for those organisations that are neither profit-making nor incorporated public-interest bodies. Instead, it ‘made organizations engaged in 12 specified types of activity eligible for corporate status without conferring any special tax breaks’ (1998: 5). Furthermore, although it allowed unincorporated organisations to rent office space and to open bank accounts in the name of the organisation rather than an individual trustee, it also tightened the regulations governing incorporated CSOs by confining business income activities, stipulating term limits for directors and imposing restrictions on internal reserves. Moreover, it did little to alter the persistent compartmentalisation of Japan’s bureaucracy. Furakawa notes that, even well after the earthquake and its impact on public opinion, ‘bureaucrats are [still] often regarded as superior to those who are elected by popular vote’. Over half of the two elected chambers continue, he claims, to be taken up by the ‘sons/daughters of former members’ thereby exerting a dynastic influence over the whole policy making process (2000: 13). Consequently, ‘government efforts still leave much to be desired regarding crisis control’ – a fact demonstrated by the government’s slow response to the Tokai nuclear accident of September 1999 (Nakamura, 2000a: 23).
Turkey is located on the highly active Alpine-Himalayan fault making it extremely prone to severe earthquakes. More than 65 per cent of the population live in high earthquake-risk areas. Over 130 tremors have occurred between 1903 and 1998 causing more than 70,000 deaths. During the 1990s alone, three major urban areas were affected by powerful earthquakes before Marmara; Erzincan (6.8 on the Richter scale in 1992), Dinar (6.0 on the Richter scale in 1995) and Adana-Ceyhan (6.3 on the Richter scale in 1998). These were, however, significantly exceeded by the Marmara which registered 7.4 on the Richter scale and affected an area of over 40,000 square kilometres. It struck at 03.02 on 17 August 1999 and was centred on Gölcük, the country’s most important naval base in the province of Kocaeli 90 kilometres east of Istanbul. The official death toll was 17,127 with more than 43,000 people injured. Over 75,000 households and commercial buildings collapsed or were heavily damaged, a similar number suffered moderate damage and over 90,000 were only slightly affected (Özerdem, 2003). Consequently, more than 250,000 people became displaced. Numerous schools, hospitals, roads, bridges, water supplies, power lines, communication systems and gas pipelines were severely damaged. Since the area affected by the earthquake was also the richest part of Turkey, accounting for more than 35 per cent of the country’s GNP and 20 per cent of its population, the disaster had a devastating economic impact too. According to the Government Crisis Centre in Turkey, damage to Turkey’s productive capacity resulted in a loss of between one-half and 1 percent of GNP or from $7 to 16 billion (DPT, 1999).

Following this disaster, the Turkish state failed to respond adequately. By contrast, the activities undertaken by CSOs, along with a number of spontaneous civil initiatives, were rather more effective. As a result, ‘the public in Turkey has started to question the state and its institutions’ (Özerdem, 2003: 209–10). Indeed, the impact of the Marmara earthquake in Turkey was so profound that the Third Sector Foundation of Turkey (Türkiye Üçüncü Sektör Vakfı – TÜSEV) considers it (along with Turkey’s participation at the 1996 UN Habitat II Conference’s NGO and Foundations Forum in Istanbul and Turkey’s EU candidacy process started in December 1999) as one of the three most important events in the development of Turkish civil society in recent years. According to TÜSEV (2004), the earthquake ‘ignited both national and international awareness, recognition and support for
NGOs’ in Turkey (www.tusev.org.tr). The objectives of the following sections are thus to examine this impact in more detail. They will focus on the relationship between the state, the market and the third sector with a particular emphasis on the activities undertaken by state institutions and CSOs in the aftermath of the earthquake. The chapter, as a whole, will also look at the broader political changes which have emerged in Turkey since the disaster.

**State, Market and Civil Society in Turkey**

In classical terms, the Ottoman-Turkish state has consisted of three distinct, and frequently competing elements; the scholars of Islam, the bureaucracy and the military. For much of Ottoman history, the former (consisting of clerics, judges and teachers) maintained a fundamental role in government, education and law. They administered, for instance, ‘one of the oldest, and most venerable, traditions of not-for profit activity of any country on earth’ – the systems of vakıf (the establishment of charitable foundations) and zekat (alms giving) which stretch back to the early days of Islam (Salamon, 2001: 1). Their views and edicts were also, at the very least, an important source of legitimacy for the Sultan and his claim to be the leader (Caliph) of the Muslim world. At most, a detrimental opinion from a senior cleric could remove a Sultan from power or alter the pattern of accession. For Ergun Özbudun, this structure of checks and balances in the Ottoman Empire was ‘reasonably effective by the standards of its day’ (2000:126–7). Later, though, the religious class came to depend on the state for its appointments, promotions and salaries, giving the late Ottoman state considerable political autonomy and weakening the traditional institutional restraints on the executive.

From the eighteenth century onwards, the clerical elite’s influence waned and by the First World War much of the theocracy’s political authority within Istanbul had been lost. This was institutionalised by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk during the interwar period. His reforms, which included a new legal code to replace the Sharia, the introduction of a Latin script and the secularisation of the public education system, sought to replace the loose, multi-national imperial system with a centralised, bureaucratised, Western-style nation state. For some writers, Kemal’s military-led republicanism represented an attempt to build a ‘modern and viable civil society’ (Saeed, 1994: 161). Binnaz Toprak, for instance, claims that secularisation is an imperative for the creation of a fertile environment where different and competing beliefs, interests and identities of people can be mediated effectively (1996). This is held to be particularly important if civil society is to be ‘the coming together of free individuals of their own volition and with a mutually determined collective aim’ (Yerasimos, 2000: 15). For others, however, Kemal’s policy of repressing collective religious worship, minority identity and his failure to liberalise the single-party regime tended to inhibit the emergence of an autonomous third sector (Kramer 2000).

Indeed, the confrontation between populist Islamism and the reformist vision of senior soldiers and bureaucrats remains a fundamental cleavage in today’s Turkey. While both religious and military leaders derive a considerable portion of their legitimacy from the same source – Turkey’s heritage as the protectorate of
global Islam – it is the latter who have best maintained their political role. The Turkish military, as inheritors of Kemal’s secular state structure have, for instance, deposed four civilian governments since the Second World War; a factor which, coupled with the generals’ thoroughly institutionalised position at the heart of the Turkish government, has led many writers to argue that the military represents a key barrier to the development of an active third sector (Jacoby, 2004). As Paul Kubicek notes, for instance, ‘when government officials opine that the constitution should be liberalized to grant more individual and group freedoms, one can hear grumbling from the military hierarchy, which often stifles the discussion’ (2002: 765). Since the bloody coup of 1980 and the retrogressive constitution of 1982, senior members of the armed forces have consolidated their political role by forging close links with both domestic and international corporate capitalism. This, combined with the violence of the pro-Kurdish campaign of the last twenty years, has meant that, until recently, they have been able to resist calls for a retrenchment of their political position as guardians of Kemal’s ‘modernising’ legacy.

By contrast, the state bureaucracy, although retaining a significant amount of influence through its association with the still vigorously promoted (and, in some quarters, atavistically reified) Kemalist reform programme, has lost much of its classical role at the heart of Ottoman social reform. Since the Second World War, the bureaucracy has been comprehensively challenged by an emergent bourgeoisie. Most notably this occurred during the 1950s, with the arrival in government of an alliance of large-estate farmers and urban entrepreneurs, and since the early 1980s when an extensive programme of neo-liberal reforms has seen sweeping public sector cuts. This latter period of restructuring, led by Prime Minister Turgut Özal, has also meant that there was a boom in some economic sectors such as infrastructure, telecommunications, media and banking. However, the main beneficiaries were a state-affiliated cabal marked by high levels of corruption (Sarıbay, 2000). Based on the market economy approach, a sphere of political autonomy around the assumption of a ‘common good’ between different non-state actors led to a gradual process of public sector proletarianisation (Köker, 1997). For some writers, it is this combination of low morale and poor investment which has motivated the activities of many Turkish CSOs (Jalali, 2002). Heinz Kramer, for instance, asserts that a civil society developed in which ‘the people, accustomed to a ready-made state tradition, have begun to organize to protect their rights against… the established practice of top-down social engineering by the state’ (2000: 18).

As Ersin Kalaycıoğlu points out, this entrenched separation between the public sector and the citizenry brought, and continues to bring, both strength and frailty for the state (2001). Rooted in the rarefied language, mores and recruitment system of the Ottoman scribal service that comprehensively excluded all but an extensively initiated clientele drawn mainly from established urban elites, it has contributed to both the poor social penetration of many of the Kemalist reforms and the space between state and citizen which the third sector seeks to fill. Such an excessive centralisation of power in the hands of the state has, today, produced a polity marked limited and state-dependent intermediary social structures (Özbudun, 2000:...
While the Turkish state’s authoritative strength, enshrined in the 1982 constitution and subsequent anti-terror legislation aimed at combating Kurdish separatism, means that it has frequently been able to silence civil opposition, its lack of infrastructural capacity to penetrate the recesses of both its demography and topography also ensures, however, significant political weaknesses. So, although it is not a Leviathan that harasses society, historically the image of the Turkish state has been that of a distant and omnipotent system that ordinary citizens would do well to avoid at most times. Simultaneously, though, it is also assumed to have infinite means and resources to distribute through benign largesse giving it an overall ambivalence revealed in the paternalism of the commonplace term Devlet Baba (Father State). The result is, for many commentators, a ‘passive-exclusive’ state whose internal contradictions and weaknesses in regulatory and distributive capacities combine to form an administration which ‘neither combats nor promotes civil society’ (Kalaycıog˘lu, 2001: 1). In other words, Devlet Baba thus signifies both distance and authority through which the patrimonial attitude of the public sector has continued the centrist and elitist mentality of the Ottoman pashas thereby posing a considerable obstacle in the development of a civil society (Özbudun, 2000).

This dual legacy has, to a considerable degree, structured the contemporary Turkish associational landscape which can currently be categorised under two major legal types of organisations; professional organisations (kamu nitelig˘indeki meslek kuruluşları) and private associations (dernekler) with trade unions representing an intermediate typology. The former currently consists of ten categories with a total membership of over 8 million people through which it clearly dominates, both in terms of financial power and political influence, the third sector as a whole (Özbudun, 2000: 132–3; Gönel, 1998). Such professional organisations have, over the years, benefited from the way the institutional structure of Turkish associational life has tended to be organised in that it ‘provides a much firmer base for the further expansion of corporatism than for the gradual development of pluralist democracy’ (Bianchi 1984: 350). As a result, many are now embedded within a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports (Schmitter cited in Özbudun, 2000: 130).

So, while public professional organisations in Turkey vary considerably in the extent to which they exemplify these characteristics, they are created by law, their membership is largely obligatory (without such a membership to a relevant professional organisation, practice is virtually impossible), they do hold certain regulatory and disciplinary powers, they do operate under the administrative tutelage and supervision of central authorities and their actions are subject to judicial review by administrative courts (Özbudun, 2000: 132).
This closely corporatist arrangement has, in keeping with the dual paternalism of the Turkish state, been used to influence the ideological pattern of the third sector. As such, bourgeois economic groups or those based on a Kemalist, pro-Western vision of gender relations, such as the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association (Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği – TÜSİAD), are promoted via considerable state patronage while those professional organisations which ‘refer to their cultural roots in Islam and (re)construct this as an important category in daily life, and consequently in business too’ or which maintain minority identities, like the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (Müistik Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği – MÜSİAD), are, at best, treated with suspicion and, at worst, vigorously repressed (Vorhoff, 2000: 190–1). In return, the former tends to adopt a nationalist attitude towards official policies and to show a high level of loyalty to the state, while the latter maintains a more critical approach. Frequently, the result is that professional CSOs are, for the most part, ‘characterized by strong social and political polarization’ (Bora, 2000: 140). Private associations, on the other hand, may be considered to be part of a broadly pluralist system

in which the constituent units are organized into an unspecified number of multiple, voluntary, competitive, nonhierarchically ordered and self-determined (as to type or scope of interest) categories which are not specifically licensed, recognized, subsidized, created or otherwise controlled in leadership selection or interest articulation by the state and which do not exercise a monopoly of representational activity within their respective categories (Schmitter cited in Özbudun, 2000: 130).

The numbers of private associations, TÜSEV estimates, has grown from 2,011 associations in 1950, to 54,144 in 1980 and on to 152,368 by December 2003 to which almost 5,000 charitable trusts must be added. Just over 26 per cent of this part of the third sector work in social services, 20.9 per cent in education and research and 20.7 per cent in social help and solidarity (2003). Today their membership is well over 3.5 million. According to the Turkish Values Survey 1997 and World Values Survey 1989/90, membership rates vary from 3 per cent of the population for religious and culture/art associations to around 9 per cent for public professional organisations. The levels of unionised labour, at 4.8 per cent of the total population is low, but similar to some European countries such as Portugal (4.5 per cent). Elsewhere, there is a huge difference between membership of lobbying organisations in Turkey and in Europe generally. Environmental associations in Turkey, for instance, attract a membership of only 1.9 per cent of the population compared to 13.8 per cent in Denmark (although some European states are even lower – Spain at 1.4 per cent for instance) (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002). Despite this, they have been very important in the development of the third sector in Turkey more broadly, demonstrating perhaps that the capacity of organisations to mobilise support is more significant than numerical size. The successful campaign by Turkey’s Greens and the Turkish branch of Greenpeace to control tourist development in the Dalyan area of the Aegean shoreline, a key breeding
ground for the endangered sea turtle Caretta-Caretta, was, for instance, a significant boost for the third sector in the early 1990s. This was followed by other environmental campaigns against the construction of Turkey’s first nuclear plant near Akkuyu on the southern Mediterranean shore, the commissioning of a lignite-run thermal power station in Gökova (a favourite destination for Turkish holidaymakers) and the ongoing use of cyanide at a gold mine in Bergama (Kramer, 2000).

Human rights organisations have also been very important vehicles for social mobilisation in Turkey. The Turkish Human Rights Association (Türkiye İnsan Hakları Dernegi) and the Turkish Human Rights Foundation (İnsan Hakları Vakfı), ‘have contributed considerably to the public awareness of human rights violations in Turkey’ (Kramer, 2000: 19). The foundation of the Association of Human Rights Solidarity for Oppressed People (İnsan Hakları ve Mazlumlar için Dayanışma Derneği – Mazlum-Der) in 1991, which has a particular interest in acts of repression against those belonging to Islamist circles (though they also claim to defend human rights regardless of socio-demographic, cultural and ideological difference), was another significant point in the development of Turkish civil society. Indeed, it was as a consequence of these human rights organisations’ open and effective criticism of the state, that the government appointed a minister for human rights and established a Human Rights Council in 1990. Nonetheless, the separation between Mazlum-Der’s religiosity and the more secular values of other human rights organisations continues to be ‘emblematic of factionalism in Turkish society’ and the third sector as a whole (Plagemann, 2000: 471).

Another limitation to the overall effectiveness of Turkey’s third sector has been its disproportionate concentration in the west of Turkey. A study of both public professional and private CSOs carried out by the Economic and Social History Foundation of Turkey in collaboration with the UNDP in 1995 revealed that, out of 1,793 organisations surveyed (employing a total of 23,464 full-time and 2,666 part-time staff), almost 40 per cent had their headquarters in İstanbul, with a further 25 per cent in Ankara and 11 per cent in İzmir. Despite their location in the commercial heart of the country, only one-third produced a regular publication and only 39 per cent had a library or an archive. Importantly, only 28 (less than 2 per cent) could be verified as having more than 5,000 members (Tarih Vakfı, 1996). This constitutes a comparatively low ratio of one voluntary association per 540 people which has long been a significant limitation on the third sector’s critical impact. More recently, studies have found a comparably fragmented third sector. In one survey, over half of 399 organisations approached had possessed an annual budget of less than $10,000, 65 per cent had no in-house publication facilities and only 27 per cent had over 1,000 members (Kubicek, 2002: 765).

Despite the highly urbanised nature of CSO organisation in Turkey, there is some evidence that, contrary to the classic theories of modernisation, traditional, regional and kinship networks continue to play an important role. Grassroots community organisations typically retain, for example, their migrant connections in identifying themselves with the suffix lik or lik as in Artvlinilik, Kayserililik, Urfa (belonging to the provinces of Artvin, Kayseri, Urfa) (Saribay, 2001). Indeed, this
type of organisation has proved to be popular with women’s groups, especially if they ‘are based on networks of already existing community relationships, rather than on any formal type of membership’ (White, 1996: 148). Such a broad basis of support has led to a number of high-profile successes. A community affected by problems with its water and sewage systems, for instance, marched to the municipal headquarters to present ‘officials with open jars of reeking tap water’ (ibid.). The broken pipes were, as a consequence, rapidly repaired. In another example, women of a neighbourhood with a dangerous stretch of road where four children were run over blocked the traffic by sitting on the carriageway for several days. The local authorities responded by acquiescing to the women’s demands and permanently closing the street to motorised traffic. Jenny White thus concludes that associational life ‘should not be restricted to the basis of a contract between individuals. It can occur on the basis of shared experience, trust and the bonds of reciprocity’ (1996: 152).

Ersin Kalaycıoğlu (2002) argues that this reciprocity is based on the intertwined facets of associability (or a willingness to volunteer), social and political tolerance and interpersonal trust. In terms of associability, he concludes that Turkey shows a level of membership broadly comparable to other middle-income countries. Using the World Values Survey, he suggests, however, that social and political tolerance and interpersonal trust levels are visibly lower in Turkey than in many other countries. For Özbudun, these are attributable, on the one hand, to the high levels of faith that civil society places in unelected military leaders and, on the other hand, to the low level of confidence which political parties enjoy. Because, he continues, the Turkish political system emerged ‘through a process of reform from above’, civil society has not had the opportunity to challenge the orientation of state elites – whose values remain ‘markedly paternalistic and tutelary’ – despite the fact that survey data repeatedly confirms the Turkish people’s belief in democracy as the most appropriate form of government (2001: 93–7).

The tendency of elements of the state elite to view themselves to be beyond civil constraint was well illustrated by the infamous Susurluk traffic accident of November 1996 in which a senior police officer, a gangster wanted for drugs offences and the murder of a left-wing activist, and a former beauty queen were killed travelling in the same car. The only person to emerge alive from the vehicle was an MP, Sedat Bucak, known for his close links with the security forces in south-eastern Turkey. The subsequent discovery of incriminating documents and weapons in the wreckage linking the gangster to the government was followed by the resignation of the Interior Minister. The official report into the accident uncovered worrying linkages between the security forces and criminal gangs implicated in the killing of political opponents, journalists and Kurdish activists. In return for these extra-judicial killings, it would appear that the gangs were given access to lucrative drugs smuggling routes across borders controlled by the security forces. They were also permitted to run extensive extortion operations in collusion with state agents across the south-east of the country and to launder the resultant assets through a chain of casinos in the tourist centres of the western and southern seaboards. As far as civil society was concerned, the Susurluk Affair, as it became
know, was significant as it prompted an unprecedented campaign of public protest against political corruption and nepotism. The ‘one minute of darkness’ by the Citizens’ Initiative for Enlightenment, which involved putting off the lights at coordinated times throughout the country, for instance, was also an important milestone in the emergence of oppositional civil organisation in Turkey.

The way that the state reinforces this is, for Aydın Gönel, by way of four strategies of control over civil society (1998). First, the state has a direct corporate authority over some CSOs – particularly the more commercially-orientated public professional organisations. Second, influence is exerted through intermediary structures. The state’s regulation of the financial services industry is, for instance, used to control the Vakıflar Bankası (Foundations Bank) and numerous other charitable foundations. Third, legal loopholes and very conservative interpretations of existent statute are used to impose extra restrictions over unapproved CSOs. Finally, processes and directions of change are obstructed in order to prevent the emergence of a permissible environment for CSOs. For example, harmonisation laws for CSOs which accompanied reforms of the 1982 Constitution in 1995 were systematically protracted as they passed through Parliament. In all, then, it is clear that civil society, as both a restraint on the state and as a mechanism for representing the masses, was, before the earthquake at least, ‘not that powerful or prominent’ (Kubicek, 2002: 765). In fact, those CSOs which have become comparatively well-known in this environment have, in many instances, provided strong support for state policy. Kemalist organisations such as Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği (The Association for Kemalist Thought), Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği (The Association for the Support of Modern Life), Cumhuriyetçi Kadınlar Derneği (The Association of Republican Women) and Çağdaş Hukukçular Derneği (The Association of Contemporary Jurists) have become closely associated with the official discourse of ‘laicism, modern life, national unity, and nationalism, (Erdogan, 2000: 252). As a result, these organisations have been constantly ‘oscillating between officialdom and civil society… between authoritarianism and democracy, domination and hegemony’ (ibid. : 268, 281).

To conclude, it is important to understand the legacy of the Ottoman and early republican state when considering the position of Turkish civil society. This, combined with what many writers about the Middle East have claimed to be the ‘traditionally’ passive character of Muslim political culture, tends to encourage an ingrained respect for authority and a comparatively inactive civil society (Gellner, 1994: 43). In this sense, then, the state’s suspicion of the third sector has, partly at least, been a result of enduring patrimonial traditions of state autonomy embodied in the late Ottoman Porte and reinforced by the gradual consolidation of the Turkish Republic during the 1920s and 1930s. This has left a legacy of communitarian structures based on religious, statist and regional identities rather than voluntary association and civil activism (Mardin, 1995). Twentieth century ‘modernisation’ has thus largely been a top-down process overseen by various combinations of economic, bureaucratic and military elites. In place of a liberal search for consensus, this has conceived of democratic organisation and participatory decision-making processes as broadly technical mechanisms bound up
with the act of voting at elections (Jacoby, 2003: 678). The result is an etatist vision of politics in which patron-client relationships are used to distribute state-granted privileges aimed at negating a civil challenge to the established position of the political class. Or, as David Bianchi puts it, 'in contrast to the fitful, uneven, and highly visible development of voluntary associability, the network of modern Turkish corporatism has expanded slowly, steadily, and quietly... enjoy[ing] a clear superiority over the still sprawling and fragmented pluralist network' (1984: 350). In this sense, neither of de Tocqueville’s criteria of civil society has been met – CSOs have not represented the will of the demos in any extensive or sustained way nor have they acted as a significant restraint on the autonomy of the state elite (Kubicek, 2002: 765).

**CSOs, the Marmara Earthquake and Disaster Management**

As Nuray Karancı and Bahattin Aksit have noted, in countries like Turkey where there has been rapid and extensive social change, top-down perspectives on disaster management are often still dominant (2000). Indeed, in the years preceding the Marmara catastrophe, earthquake responses had been marked by a lack of local involvement and empowerment. Following the Erzincan tremor of 1992, for instance, 82 per cent of those questioned by Karancı and Aksit believed that mitigating the potential damage of geological hazards in the area was possible, but only 48 per cent stated that they felt that they could do something to contribute. A similar study after the 1995 earthquake in Dinar in western Turkey obtained comparable results. Those who believed that mitigation was possible were 71 per cent of the sample, but only 47 per cent felt as though they could have a hand in such initiatives. In all, those affected by natural hazards have a frequently-held belief ‘that taking measures for mitigation is the responsibility of agents other than themselves’ with the state authorities or the municipality being the most commonly cited agencies (Karancı and Aksit, 2000: 406).

As David Alexander points out in his six-point typology of disaster vulnerability (discussed in Chapter One), it would seem that such a reliance on public sector authorities does not appear to be in the best interests of those susceptible to natural hazards. It is clear that, in the case of the Marmara earthquake, delinquent vulnerabilities played a highly significant role in the creation of a social disaster. In other words, it occurred because existent safety norms, rules and regulations for earthquake-resistant buildings having been largely ignored or deliberately flouted. Turkey’s *Earthquake Resistant Design Code for Buildings* is modern (having been devised in 1997 and updated periodically since) and sophisticated. Consequently, if it had been properly implemented in the construction process, many of the modern, multi-storey buildings, which were severely damaged causing considerable loss of life, would have been significantly more earthquake-resistant.

This claim is supported by an assessment carried out by the Istanbul Technical University immediately after the earthquake which found that a widespread disregard of Turkey’s building and safety regulations was a key reason for the severe human cost of the disaster. The list of defects observed by the survey team was long and damming. They included an insufficient or absence of reinforcement,
irregular building plans, poor quality concrete, inadequate detailing and reinforcements of column-beam connections and acute defects in design. EQE International’s subsequent technical survey concurred, concluding that ‘buildings were knowingly allowed to be built on active faults and in areas of high liquefaction potential’ (1999). Since historical earthquake records of the area and extensive geological surveys are detailed and widely available, it must be concluded that, in terms of construction planning, ‘the inappropriateness of the certain parts of the affected area was scientifically acknowledged’ yet ‘neglected by national and local planning authorities’ (Özerdem, 2003: 205).

According to a study by the Middle East Technical University, these problems have much of their roots in the institutional weakness of the public sector. This is especially so in the bureaucracy’s oversight and regulation of the market in general and high-capital enterprise, such as construction, in particular. Operational errors were persistently exacerbated by local municipalities’ inadequacies in imposing control mechanisms for checking the work of building contractors. Indeed, the team suggests that the authoritative weakness and professional incompetence of state-sector engineers is unsurprising given ‘the small fees they receive’ (1999). In fact, deprived of adequate financial resources and trained personnel, local authorities in Turkey have long found it difficult to attract experienced engineers from the private sector. Consequently, irregular administrative practices, the use of bribery and the bartering of political favours for planning permission are not unusual (Özerdem and Barakat, 2000). An essential reason for these institutional failings is the culmination of 20 years of neo-liberal cutbacks in public sector investment. The considerable economic hardships which the structural adjustment measures of the 1980s provoked disproportionately affected rural livelihoods leading to rapid urbanisation – now at over 70 per cent of the overall population. Housing provision mechanisms have been simply unable to cope with such exponentially increasing demand with the result that Turkish conurbation have become surrounded by large districts of poor-quality or temporary housing, thereby increasing what David Alexander identifies as ‘newly generated’ and ‘total’ vulnerabilities. In the case of the Marmara earthquake, these combined with the delinquent vulnerabilities of more middle-class housing to produce a disaster of catastrophic proportions and, of course, a very widespread sense of civil resentment.

Disaffection with the public sector’s obvious failure to meet the needs of the Turkish citizenry was particularly intensified by the nature of the areas worst affected by the disaster. High-income settlements in İzmit, Gölcük, Yalova and Adapazari, which were predominantly home to highly educated, professional and well-connected social groups, were acutely damaged. Moreover, Istanbul, the location of many Turkish media headquarters, was also directly affected, leading to a considerable rise in the public’s awareness of disasters and their socio-economic causes and ramifications. A new desire to engage in earthquake response and mitigation emerged throughout the country. While it is true that after the earthquake in Adana in 1998, some people went to court to sue their building contractors, their cases were neither strong nor prominent enough to have an
impact on ways in which constructions projects were regulated by the state. By contrast, the media focussed on the Marmara earthquake for months (with the Düzce-Bolu earthquake which struck in mid-November that year prolonging interest still further). Even many years of developing public awareness through educational and informational programmes could not have achieved what these earthquakes managed in a period of a few months. Such fertile ground for civil activism led to some degree of cautious optimism that CSOs in Turkey could forge a new role for themselves. As Karancı and Aks’it conclude, ‘the occurrence of the devastating earthquake showed that a good window of opportunity for initiating projects for community participation is when fear and anxiety are high’ (2000: 414).

Indeed, a number of local initiatives did emerge from the aftermath of the Marmara earthquake. The formation of a disaster management implementation and research centre at the University of Uludağ in the city of Bursa near to the earthquake-affected region, for instance, has had some success in establishing training-of-trainers courses in disaster management for various NGOs (Karancı and Aks’it, 2000). However, one year after the earthquake it was found that, of 500 people made homeless by the disaster and currently living in prefabricated houses, only 42.2 per cent had taken part in measures aimed at ‘decrease[ing] the hazards of a future earthquake’. Only 15.6 per cent had obtained earthquake insurance, 11.8 per cent had completed a first-aid course, 14.9 per cent had engaged in voluntary activities while housed in the numerous tent-cities which were constructed in the immediate aftermath of the disaster and 26.1 per cent had attended earthquake training meetings. When the respondents were asked why they had not engaged in such initiatives, though, 50 per cent cited inadequate resources and only 21.4 per cent stated that they did not know how and where to apply. Still fewer (13 per cent) explained their inaction in terms of the fatalistic passivity frequently ascribed to Muslim society. Such instrumentalism was seen as ‘promising’ for future efforts to enhance earthquake preparedness – a perception reinforced by the frequency (93 per cent) of respondents indicating that they would help others in future disasters (Kasapoğlu and Ecevit, 2003).

Such a high level of willingness to respond to disasters is reflected in the growth of volunteerism within the province of Kocaeli, the most severely affected of all the districts within the earthquake’s catchment area. Schemes such as the Neighbourhood Disaster Volunteers (Mahalle Afet Gönüllüleri) emerged as part of a wider participation of the public in disaster management programmes. The rationale behind this project was that the first 72 hours after a disaster is the critical period for search-and-rescue efforts to work successfully and it is during this period that larger organisations, such as public sector agencies, are frequently unable to mobilise effectively. As a consequence, the immediate burden of responding to disaster is often carried by local people. It is, for instance, a widely accepted fact that more than 90 per cent of earthquake-affected people are rescued by their relatives and neighbours and that the ad hoc nature of this sometimes results in further injury or loss of life. The formation of decentralised, voluntary teams at the neighbourhood level was therefore an attempt to offer some training in different techniques and equipment that local people might employ in the future.
Such activities at neighbourhood level were sustained by the creation of the Neighbourhood Disaster Support Project (*Mahalle Afet Destek Projesi*) in 2000. This involved the Governor’s Office in the province of Kocaeli, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, the Greater Municipality of İzmit, various professional associations, local universities and a number of CSOs. Its main purpose was to co-ordinate the training and the disbursement of equipment to the neighbourhood teams and to design an institutional structure that would ensure their long-term sustainability and integration into a National Disaster Management System. The project is structured around the provision of a 34-hour training programme for between 30 and 50 people in participating neighbourhoods. The curricula include a wide range of subjects incorporating Disaster Awareness and Preparedness, Disaster Psychology, Basic Fire Fighting, First Aid and Basic Search-and-Rescue. Having completed this basic training, volunteers then update and hone their skills through a number of follow-up courses and hands-on exercises. A range of different materials have also been disbursed and stored in containers placed at safe and accessible points in each neighbourhood. Liaison between the support project and the neighbourhood teams was undertaken by a four-person committee elected from the team itself. Together, they have been responsible for devising ways to widen the participation of the local community in their activities. The strategy for the project’s participatory disaster response capacity development is shown diagrammatically in Figure 2.

---

**Figure 2: Turkey’s Neighbourhood Disaster Support Project**
Following their training all members of the neighbourhood teams are registered with the Ministry of Interior's Civil Defence protocols. This has its roots in Article 11 of the Civil Defence Law of 1958 which first set out a preliminary framework for the participation of CSOs in large-scale social activities. Organisations such as the Foundation of Wireless and Radio Amateurs (Telsiz ve Radyo Amatörleri Cemiyeti) and the Civic Coordinating Against Disasters (Afete Karşı Sivil Koordinasyonu Destekleme Derneği) have become closely affiliated to state-led civil defence initiatives – particularly since Article 8 of the Civil Defence Law was changed in December 1999 to oblige all volunteers and CSOs to contribute to disaster management under the coordination, and according to the principles, of the Ministry of Interior (Yılmaz 2004). This received further institutional backing the following year through the establishment of the Emergency Management General Directorate (Türkiye Acil Durum Yönetimi Genel Müdürlüğü). As well as the coordination of search-and-rescue, relief and rehabilitation activities, this body is responsible for nationwide risk reduction, disaster preparedness planning and education. This is mandated through the provision of supportive mechanisms for voluntary organisations and individuals involved in emergency response activities, the coordination of emergency aid collection, transportation and logistical distribution. It is, in fact, the first time that a state-sector agency has been given statutory responsibility for establishing cooperative linkages with third sector organisations (Bektas', 2004).

Further institutional changes at the national level included the foundation of the Disaster Coordinating Centre (Afet Koordinasyon Merkezi) in Istanbul in August 2000. This was prompted by growing predictions that a major earthquake will occur under the Marmara Sea sometime in the next few decades – an unwelcome prospect for a densely packed city of over 11 million people, particularly given the damage inflicted upon some of the city’s neighbourhoods by the Marmara earthquake more than 90 kilometres away (Boğaziçi University, 2002). In order to respond to such an acute vulnerability, the centre helped prepare the Istanbul Earthquake Master Plan (İstanbul Deprem Master Planı) with four prominent universities and in cooperation with the Istanbul Greater Municipality. This was eventually completed in August 2003. It consists of five main sections; first, the evaluation of existent earthquake related risks in the city, second, the specific investigation of earthquake-resistance within the city’s building landscape, third, an analysis of human settlement patterns across the metropolis including legal, organisational and resource-management issues, fourth, the creation of an earthquake information database and, finally, the provision of educational and social activities for earthquake impact reduction. The plan designated 54 neighbourhoods as areas that would be affected heavily by an earthquake with a magnitude of 7.0 on the Richter scale or over. In such an event, it estimates that more than 50,000 buildings will either be completely collapsed or heavily damaged resulting in a loss of life of in excess of 90,000. It concludes that, in order to prevent a major disaster like this, the city will need to go through a comprehensive rehabilitation programme. Metin İlkışık, one of the authors of the plan, suggests that this should include the institutionalisation of community participation at the lowest organisational level possible including neighbourhoods,
housing estates and individual residential buildings. This, he continues, can only be achieved by public education and close co-operation with grass-roots CSOs involved in earthquake risk reduction, awareness and informational activities (2004).

Some of these challenges could have actually already been overcome if the opportunities brought about by the Marmara earthquake disaster had not been missed out. In 1999, for instance, the World Bank proposed a $500 million Marmara Earthquake Emergency Project intended to create a comprehensive emergency management structure that coordinates and integrates all phases of disaster management; to strengthen municipalities’ capability to regulate, plan, and implement disaster resistant development and to assist in the reconstruction of permanent housing. Also included were to be programmes for trauma counselling and a thorough review of Turkey’s legal reform process. Due to chronic bureaucratic wrangling, however, much of this programme has been delayed. For instance, it took the Ministry of Settlement and Public Works five years to organise an overarching co-ordination body – the Earthquake Council. This was prompt in appointing seven commissions (focused on Institutional Restructuring, Current Legislation, Disaster Information Systems, Building Inspection, Building Materials, Resource Mobilisation and Insurance, and Education), but then only gave them three months in which to complete their reports (Dünya, 2004).

In conclusion, it is clear that the most important challenges in ensuring the sustainability of volunteerism in disaster preparedness are, firstly, the prolongation of volunteer motivation, secondly, the training and resourcing of volunteers at a level that guarantees the protection of their gained capabilities and, thirdly, the support of volunteerism both from the communities who supply material and moral support and from those who govern them. It is clear, then, that whatever progress has occurred in the promotion of civil activism since the earthquake is only sustainable within a supportive institutional environment. Therefore, the critical question is how long will state sector sponsorship of these initiatives continue? Furthermore, if this does not prove to be indefinite, who will coordinate and provide organisational support in terms of training and the provision of materials and equipment, once the state sector agency is no longer the implementing partner (Soyyigıt and Cantekin 2004). Unless an effective institutional structure is perpetuated through a long-term strategic plan involving the effective coordination of volunteers, neighbourhood residents, public authorities and CSOs, the impact of the earthquake on the relationship between the state and civil society, the focus of the following section, may be shortlived.

The Impact of the Marmara Earthquake on Civil Society-State Relationships

The earthquake had a considerable impact on Turkish civil society. It forced issues of community participation up the agenda and forced the state to re-evaluate its capacity to look after the interests of its citizens. There were large increases in the number of education activities aimed at raising the public’s awareness of disasters and the formation of community-based organisations involved in disaster response and management. In many ways, though, these initiatives still need to be institutionalised. The organisation of public education programmes and the
incorporation of civil organisations into disaster response strategies is yet to be carried out in a systematic and nationwide manner and in a way which conforms to international disaster management principles. There is, for instance, a disproportionate focus on search-and-rescue and relief activities. Issues related to risk reduction and mitigation are yet to receive the same attention. This may be because of the more political nature of long-term planning and reform. Indeed, there is also a question mark over the extent to which the political changes which accompanied the growth of civil activism following the earthquake has proved to be sustainable.

A key problem here is the persistence of what Korhan Gümüş, Chairman of the Human Settlements Association in Istanbul, identifies as the state’s enduring tendency to regard social problems as merely technical issues which can be resolved through the ‘correct’ scientific fix, once discovered, without consultation with those who will be obliged to live with the consequences. He goes on to criticise the plans that are being prepared and accuses the state of exhibiting a top-down elitism. On the one hand, he argues, there is a set of rules that are the province of experts rather than the people who have to implement them and who may offer them some legitimacy, while, on the other hand, there remain huge obstacles in imposing disaster preparedness strategies upon Turkey’s cities. Instead, he suggests that universities, specialist organisations and local authorities should bring all stakeholders together and prepare reports on what needs to be done for earthquake risk reduction and preparedness. Based on these reports, CSOs and professional chambers can form implementation agencies that can both secure the agreement of different stakeholders and work with state sector organisations to promote the establishment of better communication links with local people. In other words, Gümüş argues disaster response planning should start from the smallest unit possible and extend to the wider context of the city and beyond (2004: 87).

Indeed, much of both civil society’s role in disaster management and its enduring fear and anxiety has its origins in the paucity of the state’s response to the victims’ emergency relief needs. This not only obliged considerable civil action, but also prompted a concerted reaction from the Turkish state itself. Rita Jalali notes that a common practice during the disaster response phase was to assert public sector authority by centralising the distribution of relief assistance. In some cases, she continues, this led state officials to close down all the NGO depots for donated goods and threaten to turn off water and electricity supplies to the tents if administration was not transferred to them. They also froze the bank accounts of several organisations. [Consequently] no NGO or individual could distribute aid delivery to victims in the tent cities anymore without the prior permission of the local authorities (2002:127).

The state was also acutely sensitive over the media’s handling of the crisis. One eminent television channel was, for example, punished by the state’s radio and television control board with a one-week closure for its critical reporting of the disaster response and for attempting to raise its audience’s awareness of the public
sector’s inability to mobilise effectively. Furthermore, Osman Durmuş, the then Minister of Health, filed charges against AKUT (Arama Kurtarma Timi – Search and Rescue Team), a mountaineering club credited with saving many lives and very popular with the public, for not having proper authorisation for their relief work. The Ministry of Public Works and Reconstruction also refused to give permission to the Turkish Association of Architects and Civil Engineers to continue its voluntary assistance in the inspection of damaged and destroyed buildings.

An important reason for such measures would appear to be concerns within Bülent Ecevit’s centre-right and staunchly secularist coalition government that permitting an active role for CSOs in the region would worsen declining levels of public confidence in his administration and allow other political organisations – particularly the broadly Islamist Fazilet Party – to secure electoral gains (a situation which, with the landslide victory of AK party (a Fazilet spin-off) in November 2002, has now come to pass). It was also clear that the state was more willing to cooperate with those ‘state-friendly’ CSOs without leftist and Islamist tendencies (Jalali, 2002: 130). Furthermore, where local officials were deemed to be of a dubious ideological background, the state either acted directly, as in the case of the Logistics Support Coordination Centre in İzmit which was run by the army under the supervision of the regional governor, or established close links with favoured CSOs thereby circumventing localised influence. In Gölcük, for example, the Human Resource Development Foundation used its good relations with the Navy, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the state minister to overcome objections from the Islamist mayor of the town (Kubicek, 2002).

This had two implications (Kubicek 2002a). Firstly, it was divisive and exacerbated existing fractures and tensions among CSOs. Secondly, the disaster response programme itself suffered from the inadequacies of many CSOs’ limited resources and organisational structures. The Civil Co-ordination Centre was a case in point: in bringing together 30 disparate groups, it combined a wide range of skills and experience, but was unable to generate the kind of coherent force necessary to resist state pressure and initiate change. Instead, it was ridden with internal dissent, being often accused ‘of taking the work of [component] groups themselves instead of facilitating the[ir] cooperation’ (Kubicek, 2002: 771). It was also fragmented by its wide range of constituent capabilities and experience. Rivalry and ambitiousness in the control of public funds were rife. Some member groups did not want to take an active role in the political change process arguing that they were not equipped for the task. Many, particularly those with very limited resources, claimed that they had ‘no agenda other than to help their fellow citizen’ (Kubicek, 2002a: 8).

Even those civil organisations with resources and popularity such as AKUT, Human Resource Foundation, Turkish Education Volunteers Foundation, and the Lions and Rotary clubs distanced themselves from the Centre’s rather muted calls for CSOs to take a more active role in pushing forward political change agenda which they feared might tarnish their relief work or their reputation in general (Kubicek, 2002). In this sense, the experience of the Civil Co-ordination Centre is indicative of the fragmentary nature of civil organisations in Turkey more widely. As Paul Kubicek points out, ‘while all groups might agree that things need to
change in Turkey, there is no consensus as to the direction of such changes’ (2002a: 7). Since the nucleus of the army and high-ranking bureaucracy is, as Stephane Yerasimos points out, traditionally regarded as both ‘the sword-bearers of modernization’ and the home of pro-Western reform in Turkey, it is sometimes the case that those organisations which most enthusiastically advocate an enlargement of civil engagement ‘tend to support rather than oppose the state’ (2000: 17–18). He expands upon this thus:

The section of society most receptive to modernization is inclined to side with the state, which is intent on stalling democratization due to its fear of Islamic fundamentalism. The conservative section of society, on the other hand, appears to favour democratization in order to reduce the influence of the state. Thus, progressive NGOs can be more closely aligned with the state, while their conservative counterparts can adopt a far more critical stance (ibid.: 20).

The overall result is that ‘hopes invested in civil society have dissipated noticeably’ (ibid.: 9). The earthquake clearly had a hand in the emergence of a potentially powerful force for restraining the traditional autonomy of the Turkish state, but this may be regarded as more a consequence of the space created by the state’s inability to respond effectively to the disaster than any extensive and sustainable associational activism. Rather, the state has used a combination of repression and manipulation to widen existent ideological divides between CSOs and maintain its authoritative distance. For many, the result was that ‘civil society’s meteorite-like appearance… [was] one that was initially bright and dramatic but then faded’ (Kubicek, 2002: 762).

Nevertheless, Turkey has introduced a number of public sector reforms as part of its attempt to gain full European Union membership, of which a fair number have implications for civil organisation. Following the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, which agreed to extend the accession stipulations for full membership to Turkey (on the condition that the Copenhagen political criteria for democracy, human rights and rule of law are met), nine ‘harmonisation’ reform packages have passed through Parliament introducing widespread constitutional amendments and changes to the law. It is, therefore, possible that CSOs will play a more active role in political change from now on. For example, the new Law on Associations, which was adopted by Parliament in July 2004, will, if implemented thoroughly, obstruct state attempts to intervene in the activities of private associations. While CSOs will continue to be governed by statute, they will, for instance, no longer be subject to immediate dissolution for breaching its stipulations. Furthermore, it removes the proscription of associations based on race, ethnicity, religion, sect or region and prohibits the security forces from entering an association’s premises without a court order thereby opening the way for a more active civil role for Turkey’s social minorities. For example, the *Kurdish Writers’ Association* was, in anticipation of this stipulation, established in Diyarbakır in February 2004. It also removes the requirement to seek prior permission to open
branches abroad, to inform local government officials of general assembly
meetings, to join foreign bodies or hold meetings with foreigners thus ending, on
paper at least, years of close surveillance. For many writers, these changes
constitute a major shift in the legal context in which Turkish CSOs are now
operating. Filiz Bikmen, for instance, asserts that these recent changes in the law
will ‘play a transformational role in shaping a new contract between government
and citizens, and NGOs’ (2004: 116). The foundation of a new Department of
Associations within the Ministry of the Interior, which performs tasks that had
previously been entrusted to the Director General of Security, may represent a step
towards such a situation.

In conclusion, it is widely accepted that, as Filiz Bikmen and Rana Zincir note,
‘Turkey is at a pivotal point of socioeconomic transition, which creates a new
mandate for civil society as well as exciting opportunities for increased civic
participation’. As a result, they conclude, ‘new paradigms of state-NGO relations,
philanthropic approaches and local funding sources are emerging’ regardless of
whether the state genuinely desires to cooperate with civil society or not (2004: 20).
A correlative change may also be a greater reflexivity amongst CSOs themselves. In
taking on a more proactive role, the third sector may, it is suggested, abandon some
of its ideological disparateness leading to a less fragmentary, more coherent body
of organisations better able to represent their constituents and exert a restraining
influence upon the state (Yerasimos, 2000: 21) Here, it is possible that ‘the EU
incentive will give significant momentum’ to CSOs, for, as Paul Kubicek points out,
if ‘the gates of democracy cannot be pushed open by Turkish civil society, they may
be pulled open by Europe’ (ibid: 2; 2002: 773). Alternatively, of course, the process
of EU accession may, ultimately, represent another example of how political
changes in Turkey have long been introduced from above or from outside.

**Conclusion**

Overall, it would not be an exaggeration to claim that the Marmara earthquake
presented a significant opportunity for civil organisations in Turkey to take a more
active role in the public sphere. Although, in many ways, the state has not
relinquished its supervisory position, there has been, for the first time in Turkish
history, a recognition of civil society’s potential as a vehicle for fundamental social
change. While this is not likely to be sustainable in the medium to long term without
the institutionalisation of a less autonomous and more accountable state sector, the
process of EU accession, and its accompanying political reform programme, may
be indicative of a gradual move away from an elitist, imposed electoralism towards
a more pluralist and democratic polity. In other words, if implemented properly and
throughout the country, recent constitutional and legal changes might give rise to a
more flexible environment in which civil society’s role in decision making and
political change could improve significantly.

In this sense, then, the legacy of the Marmara earthquake may be a
contributing factor to an overall shift in the regime structure of modern Turkey.
While the state’s response to the disaster might have ultimately reaffirmed its
distance from the citizenry, its paternalist authority has received a considerable
The catastrophe extended existent questions over 'Devlet Baba's' legitimacy, effectiveness and organisational structure to a much wider cross-section of the public (İncioglu, 1999). For many, it was clear that a natural hazard had become a social disaster because, in part at least, of the state's inability to look after the interests of civil society (Özyaprak, 1999). A feeling that the state, with its ineffective and out-dated organisational structure, prevents the implementation of well-intended activities by civil organisations is now relatively widespread. In the aftermath of the Marmara earthquake, the identity of CSOs is now much more positive. For many, they are becoming a more active agent in political decision making and succeeding in incrementally moving the state away from its tradition of hierarchy and command chains to a more networked web of relationships (Tarih Vakfı, 2000: 375). In other words, this greater sense of self-reliance and volition has the potential to alter the socio-historical pattern of political change in Turkey which, for the most part, has been driven by a combination of top-down reform and exogenous pressure. As Yüksel Selek from the Civil Coordination Centre suggests, the Marmara earthquake provided a body-size photograph of the entire governance system in which each part of society can and should see its own shortcomings. By making use of less hierarchical organisational structures and the opportunities offered by electronic communication systems such as the internet, CSOs can, she continues, forge a new partnership with the public sector in which civil calls for greater accountability can be represented and the state's tendency towards unaccountability can be restrained (quoted in ibid.).

To this end, Istanbul Technical University’s Disaster Management Centre proposes the establishment of an undersecretariat for the national emergency management which would be directly responsible to the Prime Minister and the National Security Council. It is suggested that it might incorporate a number of general directorships such as Civil Defence, Emergency Planning, Disaster Works, Local Governance, Fire-fighting and Search-and-Rescue and a new Department for the Coordination of Voluntary Organisations. Its responsibilities are envisaged to include all phases of disaster management ensuring the involvement of a wide range of public-sector agencies in each. This would, it is claimed, help to make the state's approach less reliant upon relief and rehabilitation strategies and, by regarding disaster-affected people as participatory actors rather than 'victims' or an undifferentiated 'target group', it would also better incorporate the input of civil society.

Even so, question marks still remain over the third sector’s capacity to fulfil the two classic Tocquevillian functions. Given that the same individuals can frequently be seen in the committees of CSOs in Turkey, it is not clear how representative civil organisations are at present. Indeed, the tendency of CSOs, which are involved in making executive decisions through an engagement with the public sector, to act as consultants in the implementation of those decision creates what Korhan Gümüş calls a ‘closed circuit’ relationship between the political authorities and ‘double hat’ CSOs (2004). Such a conflict of interests casts significant doubt over these organisations’ and individuals’ capacity to monitor reforms in an autonomous and rigorous manner. Moreover, it is easy for relationships of this type to become
exclusive and oligarchic and thus, in the absence of clear representative connections to the communities they claim to represent, a replication of the state’s own top-down administrative approach. In many ways, this constitutes a form of co-option through which the third sector is prevented from cohering. This has the additional consequence of reducing the legitimacy of many CSOs in the minds of the general public. After all, it is often pointed out that, before demanding accountability from the state, civil organisations should also become accountable for their resources, actions and impacts of their programmes.

Here, market penetration of the third sector, growing in Turkey since the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s, has helped little. Many CSOs replicate both the oligarchic managerial styles of private sector service providers and the close affiliation many large corporations enjoy with the state. Although the beneficiaries of third sector service provisions obviously should not decide how organisational funds are allocated, independent evaluation, free from public sector or market influence, is vital to ensure staff morale and public legitimacy (Uphoff, 1996: 27–28). Turkey’s combination of economic neo-liberalism and political corporatism makes this hard to achieve. The result has been a preponderance of market-friendly, state-affiliated civil organisations. In terms of governmental influence, for instance, it is clear that TUSIAD has been the country’s most effective civil organisation. This predominance of business-friendly associations has, in many ways, contributed to the exclusion of organisations more focussed on social and political issues from lobbying those in positions of power. It was, for example, only in the late 1990s that international human rights organisations were allowed to operate in Turkey.

Moreover, in contrast to the technophilic and extensive preparations of the Japanese disaster management strategies, the third sector in Turkey remains overwhelmingly focussed on trying to learn the lessons of a failed disaster response rather than on developing effective mitigation programmes (Tarih Vakfı, 2001: 23). This has led to an unwarranted focus on search-and-rescue programmes to the detriment of preventative and risk-reduction measures. This is despite the wealth of evidence to show that the vast majority of disaster survivors across the world are rescued not by organised officials, but by friends, neighbours and relatives. In other words, Turkey’s decision to invest large sums of money on the technical equipment and materials needed for search-and-rescue teams is, given that many more lives can be saved by more efficiently and effectively focussing on mitigation strategies, questionable. Developing initiatives aimed at preparing systemic preparedness is, however, generally very expensive. Here, there are fundamental issues of public sector funding at stake. In an age of neo-liberal reform pressures, especially upon middle-income, highly indebted countries such as Turkey, ‘progress’ frequently entails diminishing the capacities of the state and passing some of its main responsibilities, such as the provision of education and health services, on to civil society actors. Such a strategy is almost universally acknowledged to widen access disparities and reduce social inclusiveness, especially for already disadvantaged groups. While it may be desirable for CSOs to take an active role in the provision of many public goods, they can not be regarded as a viable alternative to state-led redistribution.
At 8:46 am on the 26 January 2001, an earthquake of a magnitude of 6.9 on the Richter scale occurred in the Gujarat — a western state of India. Its epicentre was 20 kilometres northeast of Bhuj Town in the Kutch district. Affecting 21 out of the Gujarat’s 25 districts, the earthquake devastated 18 towns, 182 talukas (an administrative division in India smaller than a district) and 7,904 villages (Sharma, 2001). Of these, an estimated 900 villages and 10 towns were razed to the ground. Two district hospitals, 1,200 health clinics and over 11,600 schools were also destroyed or damaged. Urban and rural utility infrastructure, such as electricity, telecommunications and particularly water supply schemes, were also acutely affected. For example, over 240 earthen dams which provided water for irrigation, domestic consumption and industry were damaged. With more than 20,000 cattle killed outright, the overall economic impact of the earthquake, including direct, indirect and secondary losses, was estimated at around $5 billion (World Bank, 2001). The total number of people who lost their lives was in excess 20,000 with over 167,000 individuals sustaining injuries. With nearly one million houses damaged or destroyed, approximately 600,000 people were instantly rendered homeless. In all, the disaster was estimated to have affected around half of the Gujarat’s total population of 38 million.

Before the earthquake, the Gujarat was one of the most prosperous and industrialised states in India. It ranked third after Maharashtra and the Punjab in terms of per capita income, and Ahmedabad, its capital was an important industrial and commercial base. Despite making up only around 5 per cent of India’s population, it provided up to 11 per cent of the national GDP. Nevertheless, there was, and continues to be, a polarised distribution of economic development, in which the countryside lags well behind urban areas (Prasai, 2002). Indeed, one of the main setbacks for the rural development of the region has been the frequent occurrence of ‘natural’ disasters such as cyclical droughts and cyclones. Although the Gujarat has become, in many ways, accustomed to such problems, its state apparatus has long lacked a comprehensive disaster management strategy. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has, for example, been highly critical of the government of the Gujarat’s $128 million relief work on rural aridity in the 1990s, pointing out that ‘short-term unsustainable work under a relief framework has left people more vulnerable to disasters and more dependent on the
Government’ (2001: 3). Therefore, it was not surprising that the state’s initial reaction to the Gujarat earthquake was slow, ad-hoc and chaotic. On the other hand, the response from numerous local CSOs was remarkable in its scale and, for the most part, its effectiveness. This has given rise to hopes that the aftermath of the earthquake could present the opportunity for a more comprehensive disaster response strategy built on greater community participation. Indeed, within two weeks of the earthquake, there were around 245 governmental and nongovernmental agencies from India and around the world conducting relief operations (Enarson, 2001). It is this process of change that forms the main focus of this chapter. It starts with a review of state, market and civil society relationships in India. The second section investigates the role of CSOs in the context of the Gujarat earthquake, while the following section explores its impact on the linkages between the state and the third sector. Finally, the chapter looks at the post-Gujarat earthquake experience in terms of disaster management practice.

State, Market and Civil Society in India

Traditionally, considerable space between the state and the individual has existed in India. For Jayaprakash Narayan, the relative autonomy of caste and village fora, or panchayats, and traders’ guilds throughout the ancient and medieval periods ‘helped to nurture and sustain Indian society over centuries of turbulence and seeming anarchy’ (2003: 78). This, coupled with the fact that ‘religion and dharma have always been beyond the realm of the state’, has meant that, historically, thousands of villages remained untouched by state power, insulating the ‘civil’ sphere from the ‘internecine wars of conquest and bloodshed’ which marked elite politics (ibid). The result was that various types of voluntary activity in the areas of education, medicine and even relief assistance following geophysical disasters, epidemics and foreign invasions emerged as important aspects of village life frequently associated with influential artisan guilds, such as porters, metal workers and carpenters. Together, these ensured that centralised control over the lives of a large part of Indian society was limited – a feature that was later to play an important part in the development of grass-roots resistance to British colonialism (Sen, 1997).

Indeed, it was Britain’s colonial administration which was, perhaps, the primary impetus for the emergence of more coherent civil organisations in India (Tandon and Mohanty, 2000: 11). These social formations broadly fell into eight categories: Christian missionaries and churches, ethnic movements, social associations, business associations, social reform movements, organisations that promoted professions, culture and research, Gandhian voluntary organisations and ‘fundamentalist’ Hindu and Muslim movements (Sen, 1997: 206). Many sought ‘a synthesis of religion, society and education’ to engage with, and in some cases reform, the most controversial issues of the day – the caste system, the status of women, the practice of sati (the burning of widows on the funeral pyre of their husbands), female infanticide and the introduction of Western-style schooling (Sen, 1998: 12). As Britain responded to their resistance with greater oppressiveness and a more pronounced system of partiality favouring industrialists, wealthy traders and northern ethnic groups, many of these organisations developed varying degrees of
nationalist sympathy. In other words, the consolidation of power in the hands of colonialists can be said to have ‘promoted a sense of Indianness among the people’ and helped to create the Indian National Congress in 1885 (Tandon and Mohanty, 2000: 14). This, in turn, gave rise to a number of institutionalised forms of civil resistance, the most prominent of which was Mahatma Gandhi’s non-violent struggle both to oppose the Raj and to unite a wide range of social groups – from peasants and textile workers to the educated middle classes and the state bureaucracy. His social reform agenda, which remains a key influence on the third sector today, focussed on the eradication of untouchability, women’s education and providing livelihoods to the poor through cottage industries.3

Indeed, for Sandria Freitag the legacy of colonialism remains the key determinant of the contours of civil society today. Within the colonial structure the state was ‘the protector and protagonist for ‘general’ or ‘public’ interests; it then relegated ‘private’ or ‘particular’ interests to the myriad communities’ that made up the innumerable local assemblies and which were kept segmented by an overarching policy of divide and rule (1996: 212). Social characteristics such as caste, sect, tribe, language groups and regional identity were thus regarded as beyond the state’s authoritative remit, thereby creating some space for particularist organisation, but simultaneously promoting civil fragmentation. In this sense, the problems of communalism, and even inter-communal violence, today might be considered to be a reaction to attempts by the post-colonial state to impose a more coherent and extensive sense of nationality based upon the perceived, or constructed, identity of the Hindu majority. In Freitag’s words, the current disquiet is

simply a symptom of a much larger and more challenging process under way: the redefinition of Indian civil social space and who will be allowed to participate publicly inside that discursive space. The ambiguity between the state’s relationship to the individual citizen, and its increasingly institutionalized relationship to imagined communities, contributes to the conundrum now being faced in postcolonial India (1996: 232–233).4

Following independence, the new Indian state, sought to undo the impact of colonial rule by strengthening its infra-structural reach in four main ways – all of which have had a significant role in its relationship with civil society over the last 60 years. First, a constitution was drawn up guaranteeing the fundamental human rights of all individuals and citing the state as the repository of those rights. Secular nationalism as the official ideology, placed the state in a fatherly role under which all religions, language groups, castes and other segments of the society ‘have an equal place in the national family and as a principle, none will dominate the functioning of the state’ (Varshney, 2002: 56). However, Hindu and Muslim nationalism remained an important mobilising force helping to establish Pakistan in 1947 and penetrating the Indian state’s ostensive secularity with the idea that Hinduism is ‘what gives India its distinctive national identity’ (ibid).5 Such divisions were exacerbated by India’s complex caste system. The constitution acknowledged
this by allocating one-fifth of parliamentary constituencies to members of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. As such, caste, like secular and religious nationalism, remains a major political device used to challenge the deeply hierarchical and unjust nature of Hindu social order, an order in which the ‘upper’ castes, always a minority, have traditionally enjoyed ritualistic privileges and superior social rank, and the ‘lower’ castes, always a majority, have suffered the disadvantages of a less dignified, even ‘unclean’ status (ibid.: 57).

Second, a multi-party parliamentary system was created which forced the political elite to seek the support of individuals and groups within the non-state sectors. It was based on a federal political structure with 25 state governments and six union territories (some have very high populations – Uttar Pradesh, for instance, is home to over 150 million people). The states do not have their own constitutions, but each has a number of devolved powers through an elected bicameral or unicameral legislature headed by a chief minister. He or she is appointed by Delhi which also retains the power to override regional legislation, to control defence expenditure, foreign affairs, inter-state trade, transportation, mass communication and the system of financial appropriation. With the approval of the President the central government can also dismiss any state government and alter the boundaries of any state or territory (Sharma, 1999).

Third, a model of social development emerged which, in emphasising the importance of agricultural productivity and import-substituting industrialisation, positioned the peasantry and the urban proletariat at the heart of Indian economic change. Fourth, and born of the previous three, the state took on the task of land redistribution and the improved social inclusion of lower castes. The combined impact of these four legacies was that, for much of the post-colonial period, the state and its agents came to be regarded as having ‘complete responsibility for fulfilling the political, social and economic aspirations of the people’ (Tandon and Mohanty, 2003: 15). To achieve this end, prosperity and growth have been considered to be the primary remedy for all social ills. As time passed, however, it has become increasingly apparent that India’s industrial achievements have not translated into tangible benefits for the mass of the country’s people. As Rajesh Tandon and Ranjita Mohanty put it,

Through their nexus with the ruling elite, the dominant and influential sections of society appropriated the benefits of development, while the disadvantaged sections continued to suffer poverty and deprivation. Indeed, development seemed to further increase their misfortune: thousands of families were displaced by dams, mines and industries without adequate resettlement and had to migrate to urban centres where they ended up in urban slums. Social services, employment opportunities and fulfilment of basic needs for vast sections of Indian society remained unachievable (2003: 15).
By the 1950s, such problems had given rise to a number of self-initiated civil initiatives providing alternative channels for the provision of basic social welfare services. These ranged from closely state-affiliated organisations supported by the ruling Congress Party, such as the *Khadi and Village Industries Corporation* and the *Central Social Welfare Board*, to militant revolutionary and youth-led groups committed to the ideals of a classless society such as the *Naxalite* movement (Tandon and Mohanty, 2000). By the 1970s, though, confidence in the state’s capacity to protect and promote the interests of India’s citizenry had comprehensively broken down leading to a weakening of more statist approaches. As a result, ‘civil society began to be filled with voluntary organisations committed to renewing the Gandhian tradition of social reconstruction and providing basic services to the poor’ (Tandon and Mohanty, 2003: 16). Loosely organised groups such as the *Self-Employed Women’s Association*, the *Chipko* movement for saving forests from commercial exploitation in the western Himalayas and the *Narmada* movement to stop the Sardar Sarovar dam project in the Gujarat emerged with moderately anti-state agenda.

For some commentators, these ‘heralded a new beginning and manifested a new stirring – the emerging vibrant civil society’ (Oommen, 2004: 117). The declaration of a national emergency in 1975–1976 and the takeover of the Golden Temple in 1984 by Sikh militants, however, convinced the state that a reassertion of its authority over the third sector was required. This took the form of stricter controls on the formations of civil organisations and the ‘promotion of ‘apolitical NPOs’ [Not-for-Profit Organisations], …and the professionalization of the NPO sector’ (Sen, 1997: 413). The Kudal Commission of Inquiry into allegations regarding missing funds from 945 Ghandhian CSOs and the Financial Act of 1983, which introduced limitations to the funds that civil organisations could receive, represent important steps to limit third sector autonomy. Ostensibly to stop ‘the excesses of civil society be they political secessionists, party extremists or religious nationalists’, these measures broadly served to perpetuate the state as the post-colonial repository of civil hopes (Oommen 2004: 123).

Part of the reason for the state’s enthusiasm in monitoring the third sector is its sheer scale. At around the time of the earthquake, it was estimated at over one million organisations, of which almost half were involved in development activities. The number of people they currently employ is hard to establish, but the *Gandhi Smarak Nidhi Directory* and the *World Wide Fund for Nature* were, in 1998, reported to have registered over a million workers alone. In terms of revenue within the sector as a whole, commercial activities rate highest as a source of income (42 per cent), followed by donations (32.3 per cent) and then government subsidies and payments (23.8 per cent). Direct project-aid from overseas donors makes up only a small element of the sector’s overall funding structure: in 1986 it was as low as 1.9 per cent. Although within some organisations (particularly those receiving World Bank support), it was as high as 22.1 per cent (Sen, 1998).

Today, Indian civil society includes five main categories – traditional associations, religious associations, social movements, membership associations and intermediary organisations. Traditional associations are defined by their link to a
tribe, ethnicity or caste. They tend to work in the areas of natural resource use and protection, but ‘modernisation’ and the expansion of state power have, since decolonisation, reduced their legitimacy and resource base. Religious associations are involved in the provision of charity and have long played a prominent role in Indian society. Social movements work on a wide range of issues from marginalised lower castes and tribal groups to more general socio-economic development projects. Membership associations include labour unions, peasant organisations, business chambers, professional membership associations, socio-cultural associations and self-help groups incorporating community based organisations, savings and credit groups and co-operatives. Finally, intermediary associations work in the delivery of water, sanitation, education and health services. They also take on community empowerment projects, philanthropic activities and environmental, gender and human rights advocacy.

The bulk of the estimated $520 million of foreign funds received by these organisations annually is channelled through the government, making up approximately 10 per cent of its total allocation for poverty alleviation measures (Jayal, 2001). The state’s extensive role in administering the third sector’s international contact is widely considered to be born of concerns over foreign support for civil organisations with separatist or extremist contacts or doctrines. Increases in state support for CSOs is therefore frequently ‘seen as a move to have greater control over the sector and make NGOs adopt the model of development prescribed by the state’ (Sen, 1998: 272). Organisations such as The Council for Advancement of People’s Action and Rural Technology (established by the government in 1986), which by 2001 had channelled central funds to over 6,370 COS and 16,697 projects, have, it is argued, been used to curtail alternative sources of funding and enhance the state’s supervision over both the sector and the political aspects of rural development (Jayal, 2001: 135). According to Sidhartha Sen, it has also ‘been cunningly used by politicians and retiring bureaucrats to set up nonprofit organisations’ for their own personal enrichment and/or aggrandisement (1998: 272). In all, civil society in India has been ‘abridged, if not abrogated, and the state [has] bec[o]me its inspirer’, while the market has been ‘encapsulated in the state through the command economy’, making the state ‘the sole effective actor in society’ (Oommen, 2003: 136).

In many ways, then, the third sector replicates other areas of Indian socio-economic life. Today, it is estimated that approximately 19 million out of an organised workforce of around 27 million are employed by the state. Its role in agriculture, permits, licences and quotas; the monopolies of the public sector; the VIP quota culture for everything ranging from a railway ticket to a cricket match; needless restrictions on trade and marketing of agricultural products; the state’s monopoly in almost all public goods and amenities; its control and ownership of all public utilities – means that civil society has become vulnerable to the depredations of state machinery as never before (Narayan, 2003: 83–84).
Furthermore, the state’s focus on ‘the economic sphere of the licence-permit-quota-raj’ has meant that such important spheres as public order and justice have been ignored (ibid.). Since there are more than 30 million cases pending in the courts of India, both faith in the judiciary and respect for the law is, according to many, declining rapidly. Indeed, lawlessness and anarchy in certain parts of the country is of such an order that concepts like human rights, justice and freedom ‘have no relevance to the day-to-day life of ordinary citizens’ (ibid.: 109). For many, this raises the danger of ‘despotism by invitation’ apparent in the recent tendency to conflate democracy and freedom with chaos and anarchy. Consequently, conflicting trends in rising levels of state surveillance and declining perceptions of national unity ‘may creep into the system with the acquiescence of the middle and upper classes’ (ibid.: 109). Furthermore, he points out that ‘the economic liberalisation process itself may exacerbate this latent tendency towards Balkanisation’ (ibid.: 110). Since some parts of the country have benefited from marketisation much more than others, India’s economic development has been, and is continuing to be, acutely divisive. For example, according to the UNDP’s Human Development Index for 1995, the value for India in general was 45 out of a maximum of 100, with 63 recorded in Kerela and 34 in Bihar (Oommen, 2003).

In addition to variations at the level of human development, there are also huge regional disparities in the relative prevalence and strength of civil society organisations. In many ways, this overlaps with the findings of the UNDP. For instance, while civil society organisations are comparatively active in the state of Kerela, they are extremely weak in Orissa (one of India’s poorest states) (Katzenstein, Kothari and Mehta, 2001). Rob Jenkins presents four main reasons for such inter-state variations (2005). First, the large population of most states means that the scope of work and challenges for CSOs is sufficient to occupy them locally, thereby preventing them from spreading their activities to other states. Second, many important policy decisions are made at the state level but not national level. For example, according to the constitution, states have considerably authority over the health, education, welfare, public order, local government, agriculture, industry and land revenue sectors (Sharma, 1999). Third, there is a tendency among political parties to focus more on the state level which is obviously closer to their constituents and electorate than the more distant institutions of Delhi. Finally, linguistic divisions, reinforced by the boundaries of the largely titular federal system, tend to be a barrier for organisations seeking to extend their activities.

Indeed, such disparity, with discrimination and collective alienation, is, according to T. K. Oommen (2003), one of the three key factors crippling civil society’s relationship with the Indian state. As well as familiar urban-rural and regional contrasts, it can also be found in contexts such as gender and the huge gap between the emerging middle classes and the poor. In terms of discrimination, the contexts of gender, language, tribe and caste are important and may start even before birth in the selective termination of female foetuses. Girls may also be ‘subjected to discrimination based on nutrition, clothing, education and freedom when they grow up’ (ibid.: 139). When inequity takes on a multidimensional facet, Oommen argues that it may be considered to be a form of collective alienation. The
Dalit tribe, for instance, faces such problems in social, economic, cultural and political spheres which, in some regions, have reached highly intensive levels. In Bihar, for instance, more than 300 Dalits were murdered between 1997 and 2002. Similar alienation may also be experienced by religious minorities such as Muslims, Christians, Baha’is, Zoroastrians and Jews. Unlike the dalits, these are frequently considered to be ‘outsiders’ eating ‘into the very vitals of the hoped-for Indian ‘nation’ (ibid.: 142). Over these issues, Oommen asserts that vast sections of Indian society are indifferent and ‘civil society is utterly fractured and fractionated’ (ibid.:144).

A result of this is that the third sector has been unable to impose its interests upon the state elite. Consequently, delinquent vulnerabilities have persisted in many areas of the public sector's relationship with civil society. In terms of the state’s capacity to monitor and regulate housing construction, there are perennial problems caused by the use of low quality building materials and deliberate non-compliance with building codes, regulations and safety norms. In the Gujarat, these played a significant role in transforming the region’s seismic hazard from an endemic and largely immutable threat into a disaster of catastrophic proportion. For example, the main earthquake-affected part of Ahmedabad was its affluent areas. The failure of its upmarket and recently-constructed luxury apartments to withstand the tremor indicated that delinquency played a significant role alongside vulnerabilities born of poverty, aging housing stock and unregulated building. The situation in Bhuj, the capital of Kutch province, was similar. There, a proliferation of inappropriate high-rise structures, funded by donations from Indian workers mainly in Gulf countries, had been erected in disregard of statute and with the apparent connivance of politicians and bureaucrats (Swami, Menon and Bavadam, 2001).

For many, it was the government’s failure to ensure that scientific, administrative and technical advances had been incorporated into the public sector – or, more generally, the way that India is governed – that was ‘the root cause of this enormous disaster’ (Times of India, 2001c). Certainly, numerous reports have pointed to a lack of organisational capacity within the Gujarat municipality. Some argued that it was ‘conscious negligence and compromises made to appease the powerful builder lobby that took its toll on Ahmedabad buildings’ and created the levels of delinquent vulnerability necessary to foment a disaster of such catastrophic proportions (Times of India, 2001d). Random surveys carried out by the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and the Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority, for instance, showed that only 10 out of the 1,000-odd high-rise buildings in the city had official, fully documented permission for occupancy. Extrapolating this across the region, it is clear that only around 1 per cent of over 12,000 low-rise structured was likely to be compliant with the National Building Code and the Indian Standard Specifications (codified in 1990) at the time of the earthquake. Seeking to explain such a chaotic situation, the AMC report concluded that ‘many employees at the town development department are practically on the rolls of certain builders operating in the city’ (Times of India, 2001d).

Such delinquency is particularly likely to engender social vulnerabilities given
that the Gujarat is India’s most active seismic zone and, as such, has been affected by major earthquake disasters in 1819, 1844, 1845, 1869 and 1956 (Sharma, 2001). The area is also prone to droughts, which tend to recur every five years, and cyclones, the most recent of which was in 1998. These combine to ensure that the predominant sources of livelihood within much of the disaster-affected area – farming, salt mining, handicrafts and localised trade – remain precarious. Furthermore, although the Gujarat is one of the most developed states in India, the population of the Saurashtra and Kutch peninsula, at the epicentre of the earthquake, have higher levels of poverty and lower social indicators than the rest of the region. For example, those socially vulnerable groups such as the scheduled castes and minority tribes form 7.41 per cent and 14.92 per cent of the population in the Gujarat state respectively. However, in Kutch the proportion of scheduled castes is as high as 12.06 per cent. The rural literacy rate across all sections of society in Kutch is 44.85 per cent, but it is as low as 11.9 per cent for the scheduled castes and 6.95 per cent for the minority tribes (Louis, 2001). This is compounded by long-established prejudices against members of the lower castes. Mostly latent, or structural, behavioural violence has also been noted. Between the Untouchability (Offences) Act of 1955 and 1995, for instance, there was an average of almost 7,000 attacks per year across India with the Gujarat being far from immune (Oommen, 2004).

The fragile balance between different religious groups has, since independence, been another source of social vulnerability. Across India, the national movement has tried to transform the population from subjects to citizens, but, according to Oommen, it has largely failed to bridge the ‘deep divisions amongst… the three religious communities – Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs – who [continue to] define themselves as nations’ (2004: 132). These sentiments have frequently been articulated in inter-religious animosity. Attacks against Christians have, for instance, risen from an average of one incident per year from independence to the late 1990s, to over 300 attacks per annum between 1999 and 2000. In all, more than 8,000 people have been killed in over 10,000 communal riots since independence, most of which have been between Hindus and Muslims.

In the Gujarat comparable long-standing tensions regularly overflowed into large-scale during the 1980s and 1990s (culminating, of course, in the dreadful events of February 2002). This coincided with a decline in the numbers and power of Gandhian civil associations relative to Hindu nationalist organisations and the market. For instance, Gandhi’s Ashram at Sabarmati moved from being a living source of community-building to a tourist site and society’s rejection of alcohol, a fundamental tenet of his philosophy, gave way to widespread consumption and the presence of bootleggers in the political elite (Varshney, 2002: 247). Concurrently, the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, which ultimately took on the leadership of a national coalition government in 1998, made considerable gains in the Gujarat. For many, this represented a backlash against the increasing political assertiveness of the lower castes since independence (Jenkins, 2005). Add to this ‘heady cocktail the curse of corruption, rampant especially in construction related activities,’ and it becomes clear that the impact of the earthquake must be considered within the
context of a complex multi-hazard situation exacerbated by the local population’s socio-economic and political vulnerabilities (United Nations Disaster Management Team, 2001; *Times of India*, 2001c).

A result of these divisions and vulnerabilities is that, within the Gujarat, ‘the marginalised and the poor do not fall into a homogenous category; there are further stratifications among them that lead them to compete and contest for scarce resources’ (Tandon and Mohanty, 2003: 17). This has, to a considerable degree, prevented the emergence of a coherent civil restraint upon the state. The consequence is an acutely asymmetrical relationship between the state elite and the masses. To maintain this distance, the state, when challenged, ‘does not hesitate to use violence’ (ibid.: 18). As such, the third sector operates in a framework of limited political opportunity determined and maintained by the state in which

the agenda for good governance has thus far been hijacked by the state and market without the recognition that ordinary people are also capable of defining their own version of governance, which might be different from that of the state, and whose logic might be different from the logic of the market (ibid.: 20).

For Jayaprakash Narayan, a social transformation in which ‘society has to be made more conducive and fertile for the flowering of a genuine democracy’ is required (2003: 120). To facilitate this, greater levels of individual and community participation are, he suggests, necessary:

The modern state has a great role in shaping society, just as civil society has a seminal role in democratising the state. In order to achieve both of these goals, we need active citizenship and social movements for reform…Collective and informed citizen assertion is the key to the transformation of both the state and society (ibid.).

According to Rajesh Tandon, a possible vehicle for such a transformation might be the village *panchayats* whose elected leadership, he argues, have a long tradition of functioning ‘as democratic, self-governing institutions’ (2003: 69). In influencing negotiations for public goods (from water and sanitation provision to transport and education), promoting state accountability and law, liaising with both local and international development agencies and restraining the influence of the state bureaucracy and the market, they may, he continues, also form a basis for the more effective involvement of disfranchised groups such as women and cultural/religious minorities.

Here, it is important to recognise that there is a four-tier structure of government across India. Local governments, *zilla parishads* (districts), state assemblies and parliaments sit on top of *panchayats* simultaneously restraining their autonomy and offering opportunities for engagement. So, if state oppression is experienced at one of these levels, CSOs may be able to forge collaborative links with the state at other levels. As Tandon and Mohanty put it, ‘even within a
repressive government structure, there are always individuals willing to provide support to civil society’ (2003: 18). Part of the reason for this, according to Shalendra Sharma, that ‘behind the state’s imposing [federal] pyramid, lie complex networks of competing institutions and structures that cut across formal lines of authority, making the seemingly monolithic Leviathan also weak, decentralised, and easily permeable from within and outside’ (1999: 52). This has tended to make the political manipulation of identity differences a commonplace part of Indian politics (Khan, 1989: 55). In other words, the politicisation of caste, sect, religion, ethnicity or linguistic differences as a basis for the mobilisation of the population in politics has meant that a non-partisan space for the civil society framework has been drastically reduced (Chhibber, 1999).

**CSOs, the Gujarat Earthquake and Disaster Management**

Disaster management was formally introduced into India’s civil administration as early as 1878 with the establishment of the first Famine Commission. The Famine Code of 1883 was India’s earliest formal disaster management plan. After independence, it was the responsibility of the Home Ministry to develop disaster response and mitigation strategies until the establishment of the Natural Disaster Management Division within the Ministry of Agriculture. Additionally, the National Centre for Disaster Management within the Indian Institute of Public Administration, a complex system of Contingency Action Plans at various levels of government and a High Powered Committee, established in 1999, all appear to have had overlapping, if ill-defined, mandates relating to disaster management (Sharma and Palakudiyil, 2003). After the Gujarat earthquake, responsibility was shifted back to the Ministry of Home Affairs within a more uniform structure.

Despite this plethora of agencies and institutional responsibilities, the immediate aftermath of the earthquake was marked by considerable state inactivity. For instance, although it struck at 8:30 in the morning, the ‘Chief Minister was still taking the salute at a parade in Gandhinagar at 11:30 a.m.’ and did not arrive in the region until the next day (Sinha and Diwan, 2001: 19). In fact, without the efforts of local communities directly affected by the disaster, there would have been no relief response within the first twenty-four hours at all (Bidwai, 2001; Sharma and Palakudiyil, 2003). Even one week after the earthquake, the Gujarat government, ‘still scrambling to establish a semblance of order, …failed to provide the machinery to channel the relief material that ha[d] come in’ (Times of India, 2001g). There was no clear guidance for volunteers to undertake their work with thousands of villagers left without any relief assistance. Meanwhile, volunteers were dumping whatever emergency aid they brought with them in the towns and on the highways.

Acute communication problems constituted the main reason for this delayed and often inappropriate response from the government in the early days of the disaster. According to Anshu Sharma and Tom Palakudiyil, only ‘one channel of police communication from Bhuj in the heart of the affected area was active after the earthquake, and it was used to send preliminary information to Ahmedabad’ (2003: 84). Indeed, it was only after an aerial survey that the real scale of destruction emerged. Following this, a massive emergency response was undertaken, but, by
then, the government’s initial failure had ‘resulted in a total loss of faith in its capability to come to the aid of its citizens’ (Sinha and Diwan, 2001: 18). The national newspaper *The Tribune* concluded that the state demonstrated all three of the ‘crippling weaknesses of Indian society’: first, ‘the pathetic dependence on the bureaucracy for virtually everything’, second ‘although India lives in its villages, the system thinks of them only in times of a major calamity’ and third, ‘despite a spontaneous outpouring of sympathy and readiness to help, coordination skill is sadly lacking’ (2001a).

These were reinforced by extensive organisational problems. According to the *Frontline* newspaper team who visited the Kutch area two weeks after the earthquake struck, relief aid pouring into the area from all over India and abroad exceeded the capacity of the affected villages to absorb it (Bidwai, 2001). The way the official apparatus continued to respond and its ‘near-absence of vision for what had to be done’ ensured that these problems were not alleviated during the bulk of the relief period (Swami, Menon and Bavadam, 2001: 1). Three days after the earthquake almost all lifelines in the area were still down and thousands of people remained trapped under collapsed buildings. Meanwhile, ‘the chaotic state of relief and rescue work’ held up the arrival of international search and rescue teams – many of which were held up getting permission for their sniffer dogs – and obstructed equipment supplies to local organisations leading to delays in plant delivery of six days or more (*Times of India*, 2001e; *Times of India*, 2001g). Two earthmovers from Japan were, for instance, left ‘lying unused, uncared for outside the Civil supplies Depot at Shahibaug, because an inept relief coordination cell couldn’t decide what to do with them’ (*Indian Express*, 2001b).

The main areas of concern with the government’s response, therefore, were the lack of preparedness for disaster and the way that the distribution of assistance was conducted. According to Vinod Sharma (2001: 352), the efficiency of the civil disaster management system was impaired by the state’s traditional reliance on the armed forces for emergency response co-ordination. While soldiers were certainly instrumental in many of the successes of the initial response period, ‘the end result of [the] recurring employment of [the] armed forces is an indication of the fact that the state has abdicated its responsibilities to rescue and rehabilitate people affected by calamities’ (Louis, 2001: 909–10). As time passed, more than 400 local Indian charities, NGOs and international agencies took part in relief work. Such large-scale mobilisation produced considerable co-ordination challenges and exacerbated many of the problems apparent during the first few days of the response. The distribution of skilled staff was a particular issue. For example, there was a serious shortage of doctors in places like Bhuj’s central square to which the injured were transported by the Border Security Force (BSF) troops following the closure of the city’s main hospital (Swami, Menon and Bavadam, 2001). In contrast, it was reported that a 17-member team of Mumbai-based doctors returned from Bhuj two days after the earthquake for ‘lack of work’ (*Times of India*, 2001e).

Similarly, when food assistance arrived in the area, there was widespread confusion over its transportation (Swami, Menon and Bavadam, 2001). Unduly influenced by the media focus on Bhuj, relief operations were disproportionately
channelled along the Ahmedabad-Bhuj highway. This was soon overwhelmed with traffic leading to the dumping of relief assistance on the most accessible communities, with villages in neighbouring districts receiving no assistance for a number of days (Sharma and Palakudiyil, 2003). So, while Bhuj's markets were full of vegetables and fruit, rural areas were desperate for grain (Parkes, 2001). The *Indian Express* (2001) described the situation thus: ‘Going by reports of lorries stacked with relief material thundering past desperate villagers, it is the same story: of those out of the loop being left neglected’. Limited access to relief assistance was, however, not an issue for rural areas only and it ‘would be incorrect to presume that all families living in a village in rural Gujarat will not have the resources to cope’ (Siddiqui, 2001: 3). In other words, the vulnerabilities of disaster affected people were not only determined by their geographical positions, but also by their coping mechanisms at individual and household levels. Nonetheless, the patchy delivery of supplies appeared, to some, to exclude a disproportionate number of Muslim villages thereby exacerbating inter-communal tensions.

Since the delivery of aid to those areas fortunate enough to receive any was also characterised by a marked ignorance of local conditions, this may well have been more do to with poor information than design. The failure of some relief agencies to consider the eating habits of most Gujaratis was, for instance, a case in point. The *Hindustan Times* (2001) complained that different languages on food packages, including Swedish, Spanish and Arabic, prevented disaster-affected people from knowing what they actually contained – a particular problem in a majority-vegetarian society. Concurrently, eating food provided by communal kitchens was causing problems between different castes within Hindu communities. Another consequence of food distribution problems was a collapse in civil security. Having waited for food assistance for four days, some survivors looted vehicles carrying relief aid, causing ‘chaos on roads leading to Bhuj, Bachhau, Rapar and Anjar in Kutch district’ (*Times of India*, 2001f). Furthermore, in Bachhau survivors were attacked by armed gangs ‘looting jewellery, breaking open already ravaged cupboards and threatening the survivors with choppers, knives and sticks’ (ibid.). These problems were worsened by the re-detailing of security personnel to prepare for, and facilitate, the visit of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to Bhuj – an event which also necessitated closing Bhuj airport and the partial suspension of relief operations (Swami, Menon and Bavadam, 2001). While it is, of course, understandable that politicians try to be close to their constituents in the event of such disasters, it may be necessary to re-consider the value of such visits when they are likely to have a demonstrably negative impact on ongoing search-and-rescue and emergency relief activities.

In seeking to explain the reasons behind such shortcomings, Anita Shah criticises international NGOs for not learning the lessons of the 1993 Latur earthquake and failing ‘to build on local capacities and the ability of communities to cope with future disasters’ (2003: 21). For example, relief materials that could have been obtained locally were brought in from abroad and there was limited focus on restoring livelihoods. The GI sheets brought in as temporary shelters in rural areas were, for instance, unsuitable to environmental conditions in the area and
were thus rejected by earthquake-affected communities (Kapoor, 2001). Indeed, an
independent report, commissioned by the *Disasters Emergency Committee* (a grouping
of Britain’s major international charities) highlighted a number of mistakes such as
a lack of efficiency in using available funds, the duplication of programmes and a
limited understanding of the area (Disaster Mitigation Institute, 2001). The report
also asserts that the relief effort frequently tended to ignore rural areas which, by
and large, received disproportionately less assistance. This was partly due to the
short-term nature of most international organisations’ funding structures (such as
the commonplace six-month spending periodisation) and partly a failure ‘to make
the best use of the plethora of progressive Indian NGOs, as partners in planning
and implementation’ (Shah, 2003: 21).

Overall, the response from the government was ineffective. The state’s failure
to prepare for the disasters left thousands of people to deal with its impact unaided.
When a response was eventually enacted, it was ad-hoc and insufficient to co-
ordinate the assistance from all around the country and the world. By contrast, the

Gujarat’s army of big and small non-government organisations ha[d]
industriously been making its way into the quake-hit interiors. Though they
too admit[ed] to a lack of coordination, the efforts ha[d] been far better
organised. It was the NGOs and unorganised volunteers who sustained
the relief efforts in the early days (*Times of India*, 2001g).

The following section will, therefore, focus on the social impact of this mass
mobilisation with a particular emphasis on its effect upon the linkages between the
state and the third sector.

### The Impact of the Gujarat Earthquake
**on Civil Society – State Relationships**

The co-ordination of the rehabilitation process was carried out by the Gujarat State
Disaster Management Authority (GSDMA) under the chairmanship of the chief
minister of state. It was created as a permanent arrangement by the Gujarat
government in February 2001 with the stated intention of going ‘beyond
reconstruction and mak[ing the] Gujarat economically vibrant, agriculturally and
industrially competitive with improved standards of living and with a capacity to
mitigate and manage future disasters’. Its jurisdiction covers the entire state of the
Gujarat and it is registered as a charitable institution under the Societies Registration
Act of 1860. It has been responsible for activities during all phases of disaster
management from mitigation and preparedness to relief and reconstruction.

It is through this authority that earthquake-affected villagers were offered two
options by the government. The first was a financial compensation package, called
the owner-driven approach. The second was the opportunity to be adopted by
state-appointed NGOs who would take the primary responsibility for
reconstruction. The bulk of participants expressed a strong desire for self-help
construction and opted for the financial compensation (Sharma and Palakudiyl,
2003). This entailed a sharing of the costs between the government, NGOs and
corporate bodies with owners undertaking the construction themselves. A wide range of donors, from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank to Indian private-sector companies, became involved. Each offer came with its own design and interpretation of the overall programme’s stipulations. Contrary to the scheme’s self-help ethos, some promised ‘ready-made’ villages through ‘contractor-driven’ reconstruction programmes, creating a high level of confusion among disaster-affected villagers. In all, there was ‘regrettably little well observed coordination, direction and exchange of information between the various agencies’ (ibid.: 22). Nonetheless, a total of 176,012 houses (approximately 82 per cent of the total) had, by 2003, been reconstructed through the owner-driven approach, while 290 villages were adopted by NGOs leading to the construction of 37,673 houses (Thiruppugazh, 2003).

Pointing to this sizeable output, V. Thiruppugazh (2003), the Joint Chief Executive Officer of the GSDMA, asserts that the planning and implementation of the reconstruction programme has, in both its owner-driven and NGO-led guises, been carried out in a transparent manner under full community control (2003: 33). He cites his organisation’s practice of making all government resolutions for assistance available both from the GSDMA’s administrative office and from the website as an example of good practice. Furthermore, there was a display listing individual beneficiaries and a full schedule of the assistance sanctioned in each of the disaster-affected villages. A comprehensive grievance process was also established through two separate committees. The first sat at the village level and included a member from a scheduled caste or tribe, a female member and a member of a minority ethnic group. The second was based at the district level and included representatives from five NGOs, a social welfare officer, the president of the district panchayat and all regionally-elected members of the legislative assembly and parliament. Together, these had settled almost all of the 40,361 forwarded grievance cases by the Spring of 2003.

There was, however, a marked lack of community participation in the initial formation of the owner-driven/NGO adoption options. Mihir Bose, from the Ahmedabad-based Disaster Mitigation Institute, complained that the composition of the GSDMA steering committee – the then Chief Minister Keshubhai Patel and seven senior bureaucrats – did not reflect the realities of the challenge. He suggests that one ‘could set up a group to handle recreation instead of relief and it wouldn’t be much different in composition’ (quoted in Swami, Menon and Bavadam, 2001: 1). A consequence of this top-down structure was, he claims, that one of the initial strategies considered for the reconstruction of villages by the government was their relocation. It was thought that the provision of new housing away from settlements of origin, which were prone to earthquakes, would receive widespread public support. This was despite evidence from the United Nations Development Programme which suggested that, two years after the 1993 Latur earthquake, only 48 per cent of people subject to relocation were satisfied with their houses (despite a per unit cost of between $1,170 and $4,340) compared to a satisfaction rate of 97 per cent of those surveyed in 52 un-relocated villages where per unit costs were around $320 (2001). Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, the offer of relocation was
accepted by less than 10 per cent of the earthquake-affected villages in the Gujarat and so had to be largely abandoned. Of 213,685 rebuilt houses, only 5,225 (2.5 per cent) were constructed in new settlements away from the location of the disaster (Thiruppugazh, 2003).

To assist in the provision of these new homes, the UNDP initiated its Transition Recovery Project in partnership with the UK’s Department for International Development (Shah, 2003). This was part of an overall mitigation strategy focussed on five main categories – housing, infrastructure, livelihood support programmes, social and community development and disaster management – each with an integral training component. Its aim was threefold. First, to respond to shortcomings in the support of locally-initiated vulnerability reduction plans, second, to disseminate information on seismically safe construction methods and, third, to build the administrative capacity of the GSDMA through the secondment of technical experts. Through the auspices of the Gujarat Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme, engineering college curricula have been revised, masons have been certificated, engineers have been issued licenses and made subject to enhanced supervisory structures, preparatory training for emergency response has been initiated along with feasibility studies in disaster management techniques and an institute of disaster management has been founded (Thiruppizagh, 2003: 32).

In order to meet an estimated demand of 1.2 million houses within the disaster-affected areas in the long term, a particular focus has been placed upon training stone masons in multi-hazard resistant reconstruction. Consequently, seven-day training courses were conducted at taluka and village levels that were attended by more than 26,000 masons. This was combined with the refitting of public buildings and the reconstruction of model houses as good practice exemplars (later handed over to the target villages). By 2003, this initiative had been launched in 484 villages and plans are in place to extend it across the region (ibid.: 35). In tandem with plans to extend the training of masons, a community-based disaster-preparedness scheme has also been put in place by the GSDMA in partnership with the UNDP. The programme will, it is envisaged, eventually be implemented in nearly 3,000 villages from 44 talukas in 11 districts. It is planned to concentrate primarily on raising awareness of natural hazards, training in response and rehabilitation methods and the institutionalisation of mitigation strategies and is expected to have a long term impact on capacity building. The settlements involved will be identified according to their vulnerabilities to different types of disasters. Loose organisations of mainly young people in some villages have already been established with names such as the Early Warning Group, the Evacuation Group, the Rescue Group and the Shelter Management Group and equipped with educational materials (Thirruppigazh, 2003).

Although this initiative has gone some way to making the GSDMA less top-down in its overall implementation approach, a number of problems remain unresolved. What, for example, will happen to these groups once the implementation period is over? Will they be able to maintain their activities? Who will coordinate their activities? Will they be able to train others and ensure sustainability? Initial indications are not encouraging. Under pressure from the World Bank, the Gujarat state started to disburse cash assistance before mitigation
projects had time to disburse sufficient information and training on earthquake-resistance construction techniques (Kapoor, 2001). The result has been that traditional techniques have been replaced by the use of modern materials such as the reinforced cement concrete block – locally known as pillar construction – without an acknowledgement of the possible hazards that might be incurred if these are not deployed properly. The main risk is that cement requires a large quantity of water to cure and become fully rigid. Experience has shown that, in areas where water supplies are at a premium or where the training of engineers and artisans in block-working is limited, serious shortcomings in the load-bearing performance of concrete walling have become apparent. At the same time, some traditional buildings erected following the Gujarat earthquake under GSDMA schemes have suffered from a shortage of skilled labour and poor quality craftsmanship. For example, sophisticated joinery methods were replaced by cheaper methods of nailing beams and columns (Sharma and Palakudiyil, 2003). This has created vulnerabilities to future disasters.

In all, then, it is clear that, although the state’s overall reconstruction policy for the Gujarat makes an explicit commitment to the direct involvement of disaster-affected people in decision making processes, the main focus of the response to the earthquake has been on large-scale housing and infrastructure projects which have not readily lent themselves to the strengthening of civil society. The policy states that the programme ‘goes beyond the immediate priorities of earthquake reconstruction, and pursues broader social and economic issues impinging on the household – and community – level development and empowerment’ (2001: 5). However, it is not clear how this objective might be met, considering that the first phase of the budget allocated only $20 million out of a $625 million total to livelihood rehabilitation and poverty reduction. Despite numerous elaborate references to participatory, transparent and equitable reconstruction through a set of ‘guiding principles’ (which include the encouragement of CSO input and the strengthening of civil capacities through active partnerships), there has been, as Sagar Prasai notes, little evidence to suggest that the state will be able to ‘internalize all or any of these norms in the field immediately’ or in the near future. Rather, the reality is, as Prasai concludes, that the central ‘planning practice does not always conform to its policy language’ (2002: 10). Indeed, it is, in many ways, these gaps, particularly in the areas of livelihood regeneration and vulnerability reduction, which have structured the social space for third sector involvement.

So, in contrast to the top-down and economistic approach of the state sector, local CSOs adopted a more grass-roots and altruistic orientation. Sharma and Palakudiyil describe the situation thus:

Relief workers who reached the scene of the disaster were struck by people’s spontaneous expression of concern and solidarity. Without waiting for outside help, they had started rescue work with whatever they could lay their hands on. Community kitchens had been set up and efforts made to attend to the injured. There were touching reports of villagers who had already received relief items directing relief agencies to other villages that had received none (2003: 82).
Socio-religious organisations such as the Swaminarayan Sect, the Ramakrishna Mission, Kutchi Jain Bisa Oswal, The Kutchi Youth Society, Dhera Saccha Sauda and the local Jati mandalis (caste associations) took a leading role in the provision of relief assistance (Sinha and Diwan, 2001). The efforts of the Kutch Nav Nirman Abhiyan (The Kutch Rebuilding Campaign), a network of 22 small, grassroots NGOs is a case in point. Having been founded as a response to the devastating cyclone of 1998, the Abhiyan has worked in 400 villages in Kutch district undertaking a range of relief and development initiatives and acting as a coordination body between NGOs, the district administration, panchayats and disaster-affected people. The main strength of the Abhiyan’s relief operations, in line with the network’s belief in self-help and enablement of communities, was the delegation of control over the reconstruction process to the programme beneficiaries themselves.

Other initiatives, such as Patanka Navjivan Yojana (The Patanka New Life Project), have brought local authorities and international actors (including NGOs previously involved in the Kobe disaster) together with local CSOs. These have spawned umbrella implementing agencies like The Sustainable Environment and Ecological Development Society. Its three objectives – making vulnerable communities safer from future disasters, identifying suitable livelihoods for community independence and empowering communities – have been pursued with considerable input from local householders from the planning and design of houses to the implementation of construction (Sharma et al, 2003). This participatory strategy ensured that 75 per cent of the reconstruction costs of houses were contributed by families in the villages of Patanka in Patan district where the project has, so far, been implemented and where more than half of the 256 households were completely destroyed by the earthquake. Housing has thus been reconstructed at half the cost of using external contractors and in a way such that CSOs and disaster affected people can take an active role in the whole process. Indeed, its cost effectiveness attracted the panchayat who suddenly ‘felt strongly the need to incorporate risk reduction in all future development activities’ (ibid.: 60).

This spontaneous response from disaster-affected communities and small Indian CSOs has led a number of commentators to identify the civil response to the earthquake as ‘a new and hopeful indication of a strengthening of civil society in India’ (Rutten, 2001: 3358). It is commonly suggested that the Gujarat earthquake was ‘the first time that a natural calamity of this proportion has elicited such a big response from the Indian people’ (ibid.,). Part of the reason for this was the socially diverse character of those affected by the earthquake. Whereas the disaster-affected populations of the 1998 cyclone and 1993 Latur earthquake ‘belonged mainly to the lower echelons of society’, the Gujarat earthquake affected people from all strata of society (ibid.). Even the middle classes of Ahmedabad in their multi-storey buildings were not spared. For the Times of India (2001) the Gujarat earthquake was a real ‘social leveller’. It was, therefore, easier for ‘the middle classes in other parts of India to identify themselves with the victims’ than in previous disasters (Rutten, 2001: 3359).

Such empathy was, however, fractured by caste, family, religion and political affiliation. For example, the Jain and Patel communities had their own well-run
relief camps which were established and run through the utilisation of funds provided by kinship networks from all over India (Sinha and Diwan, 2001). So, while there were many instances where the response did cut across castes and ‘the communal divide between Hindus, Muslims and Christians’ (The Tribune, 2001), reports also persistently pointed to the exacerbation of social tensions during the relief process (Indian Express, 2001a). Minority communities, such as those Harijans living in Ahir-dominated areas of Lodia, complained that the distribution of relief assistance was not carried out in a fair way (Times of India, 2001b). According to Jigyasu (2001), both the provision of relief assistance and the state’s owner-driven approach have intensified social stratification in the area. As such, those castes that were socially and economically better organised and connected mobilised their resources more easily and took better advantage of the relief process. For example, the Khatri community who controlled production mechanisms in the village of Dhamadka, which has an international reputation for its fine block printing, decided to opt for the relocation of their houses, leaving their poor labourers behind (Louis, 2001: 908).

While it has sometimes been argued that religious and caste exclusivity ‘enabled people to organise themselves instantly to carry out relief, for at least their own community members’, it is clear that certain minority groups were not able to access the relief and rehabilitation process (Sinha and Diwan, 2001: 21). For example, the population of the Manfara village in Kutch district, who consist of approximately 47 per cent members of the Dalit tribe and 21 per cent Muslims, complained that they did not get any relief assistance from the government though their village is adjacent to a widely-used and comparatively easily accessible road. The reason that the inhabitants of Manfara were not in the priority list of dispensation was, Prakash Louis asserts, because the ‘dalits are looked upon as the ‘achuths’ or the untouchables and are outside the periphery of the Indian social system. Often they do not even exist within the upper caste worldview’ (2001: 909).

Conclusion

Since the 2001 earthquake, some writers have noted a change in India’s third sector. Prasenjit Maiti, for instance, claims that the expansion of civil society has made Indians less certain of the federal state’s powers of transformation and more confident of the power of the individual and local community. This development has shifted a larger share of the initiative for resolving India’s social problems from the state to the civil society (2001: 3).

Since they are not bound by the imperatives of re-election, CSOs have, it is argued, greater freedom to take on more difficult, long-term and controversial development challenges in India, such as those related to discrimination, exclusion and gender. It is, in other words, the gaps in the development process left by the state that ‘many NGOs try to fill in modern India’ (Chatterjee, 2001: 23). As such, the role of the third sector is not simply to demand that the state legislate and regulate, but to work
towards a more equitable society generally. Here, the Gujarat earthquake represents an important opportunity. As Anita Shah writes, it was ‘nature’s reminder to think afresh’ (Shah, 2001: 2).

It is certainly clear that, before the Gujarat earthquake, disaster management in India was, as the High Powered Committee on disaster management points out, ‘conceived in terms of emergency relief and post-disaster rehabilitation’ rather than more pre-emptive mitigation strategies. The window of opportunity created by disasters for the promotion of risk reduction is, it continues, ‘often relegated to historic memory until the next one occurs’ (2001: 154). The experience of the Gujarat earthquake disaster has unfortunately underlined this reality once again. Lessons from the past have not, for the most part, been learnt, both in terms of response strategies and better preparedness. So, although there was an outpouring of assistance from India and abroad, the state’s response to the Gujarat earthquake replicated the failings of previous disasters.

Supporting this view, Sharma and Palakudiyil point out that ‘despite the vast resources at its command and the power to execute plans, in most cases the state’s response leaves much to be desired. At the root of the problem is its ‘top-down’ approach to disaster management’ which tends to disempower communities by characterising them as ‘victims’ and ‘passive recipients’ from a paternalistic and authoritative perspective (2003: 27). Part of the problem here is that it leaves the disaster management process in the hands of public-sector officials who ‘have no stake in what is planned or executed. The people who have the biggest stake in learning from the mistakes of the past – and making sure that every measure is taken to prepare for disasters in the future – have no say in decision-making’ (Sharma and Palakudiyil, 2003: 28). In addition, it makes minimal use of local knowledge and resources, is frequently prone to making untargeted and inappropriate decisions in order to make political gains and is often blamed for creating, or intensifying, a culture of dependency. Ultimately, it may also be dangerous if, oblivious to popular sentiment, it exacerbates socio-cultural differences.

It would appear that, since the earthquake, the top-down approach has persisted. The Gujarat State Disaster Management Act of 2003, for instance, recognises voluntary agencies (including foreign organisations) as stakeholders, but, in terms of the levels and types of responsibilities and powers it devolves, it leaves the third sector in no doubt that disaster management is still very much a state affair. In cooperation with the Gujarat Government, the GSDMA, which was revised to include the region’s Relief Commissioner, the Director General of the Gujarat police and not more than 14 other members (mainly drawn from governmental departments in Ahmedabad), remains the main authority for the planning and implementation of disaster management processes and has retained much of its elitism. In contrast, the functions of local authorities are mainly reserved to assisting the GSDMA, preparing disaster plans and implementing its decisions.

Chapter XII (revealingly entitled Duties of Communities, Private Sector Enterprises and Other Agencies or Persons) of the Act, for instance, sets out a detailed, yet highly restrictive framework for civil involvement in GSDMA decisions. It states that all CSOs may
(a) participate in capacity-building, vulnerability reduction programmes and training activities; (b) assist in relief operations under the supervision of the Government, the Commissioner, and the Collector; (c) assist in assessing damage and in carrying out reconstruction and rehabilitation activities in accordance with the guidelines by the Authority [GSDMA]; (d) provide such assistance to the Authority, the Commissioner, the Collector as may be necessary for effective disaster management (GSDMA, 2003: 28–9).

As such, it restricts both the organisational autonomy of third sector actors and the flexibility with which they are able to make day-to-day decisions. Part of the reason for this is that the main focus of the Act is the citizenry’s obligation to acquiesce to the requirements of the centre. Accordingly, ‘it shall be the duty of every citizen to assist the Commissioner, the Collector or such other person entrusted with or engaged in disaster management whenever his aid is demanded generally for the purpose of disaster management’ (ibid.: 29). As Kirtee Shab from the Ahmedabad Study Action Group notes, however, the outcome of state legislation does not depend ‘so much on what the government does, but what the people themselves and those work with and in support of – NGOs, voluntary agencies, professionals in charge of activities and projects – do’ (2002: 5). In other words, the next major disaster will perhaps be the best litmus test to see whether the earthquake disaster in the Gujarat has been used as a window of opportunity for an improved disaster management system or, more broadly, the third sector has enhanced its capacity to restrict the elitism of the state and to represent the interests of civil society.12
Ian Christoplos, John Mitchell and Anna Liljelund remind us that initiatives for disaster mitigation and preparedness ‘can no longer be assumed to be a set-piece collection of activities that can be merely be ‘implemented” (2001: 196). In many ways, this is a radical change from conventional approaches to disaster management processes which frequently tend to be restricted to data-led empiricism. It demands a much better understanding of how relationships between different actors are formed in the political economy of a particular country. The preceding case study chapters aimed to go some way towards such an analysis while the comparative investigation offered in this concluding chapter will further extend our analytical consideration of state, civil society and market relations in disaster-affected countries.

First, we will revisit David Alexander’s six-point typology of hazard vulnerability (namely, economic, technological, residual, newly-generated, delinquent and total vulnerabilities) outlined early in Chapter One. We will present a comparison of the societal vulnerabilities that helped to create an environment in which an earthquake, a natural hazard, was able to trigger a social disaster in the three case-study countries. Then, each of the four stages of response to the effects of these vulnerabilities – relief, reconstruction, mitigation and preparedness – will be analysed in a similarly comparative way. Second, CSOs in each case study will be looked at in terms of their mission, activities, social composition, forms of organisation and sources of funds. This section will make a number of critical points regarding both the state’s relationship with the third sector in Japan, Turkey and India and the international response to disasters. Particularly examined will be extent to which CSOs have succeeded in restraining the despotism of the state and representing the demos as described by de Tocqueville. It will also summarise the changes discussed in the preceding chapters with a focus on current legislation and the role of CSOs in disaster management. The last section will concentrate on Lester Salamon’s and Helmut Anheier’s review of the different ways of approaching third sector analysis (1998). Of the six approaches that they offer – ‘Market/State Failure’, ‘Supply-side’, ‘Trust’, ‘Welfare State’, ‘Interdependence’ and ‘Social Origins’ – the latter is, we contend, the most useful means of considering social change within our case-study countries. As such, we seek to develop the social-origins approach by concluding that Japan, Turkey and India represent
somewhat hybridised examples of what Salamon and Anheier identify as a ‘statist’ regime.

**Development, Vulnerabilities and Response**

It is clear that hazards such as earthquakes, flooding, volcanic eruptions and cyclones only exacerbate existing conditions of vulnerability, such as a fragile physical environment, poverty and inadequate social and institutional structures. Disasters are therefore created out of natural hazards, rather than existing as an immutable feature of human interaction with nature (Blaikie et al, 1994). So, in order to mitigate hazards and respond to disasters in an effectively and sustainable way, social concerns, such as power disparities, structural inequalities, resource distribution and political representation must all be addressed. The capacity of disaster-affected states to do this is affected by development programmes in different ways. Development initiatives can be seriously disrupted by disasters due to a loss of resources, logistical interruptions, their adverse impact on investment climates and political destabilisation (UNDP/DHA, 1994). Conversely, development programmes can also make disasters more likely, worsen their effects and even constitute a direct causal element in their occurrence. This is often the result of specific initiatives, such as large dam and irrigation projects, in which environmental impact, especially on soil and water conditions, is inaccurately assessed. Increased employment opportunities due to development programmes can also lead to rapid processes of urbanisation which increase, or generate new, vulnerabilities for migrants. These may be in terms of residential construction or, in the case of flooding, landslides, volcanoes and earthquakes, the location of housing. In many cases, they represent a failure of development planners to see beyond macro-economic priorities which place a disproportionate level of faith on growth as a motor of progressive social change (Rocha and Christoplos, 2001: 246).

Rebuilding after a disaster has occurred can, however, provide many opportunities to initiate development programmes which decrease the susceptibility levels of local people and mitigate the potential impact of natural hazards. To this end, structural mitigation projects might include the prudent construction of dams, windbreaks, terracing and hazard resistant buildings while non-structural mitigation measures might involve land reform legislation, improved building regulation, training and informational programmes and crop diversification. Owing to the wide-ranging social and political impact of large-scale disasters, state authorities are sometimes more willing to introduce these types of changes than would otherwise be the case. For example, before Hurricane Mitch struck Nicaragua in 1998, ‘disaster mitigation and preparedness efforts were not significant priorities for either government or NGOs…After Mitch, a realisation emerged that addressing risk should be a part of development’ (Rocha and Christoplos, 2001: 241). Furthermore, ‘real possibilities have opened’ up for the third sector as the Nicaraguan people began to question the state’s capacity ‘to provide an effective response to disasters’ (ibid.: 245).

As is demonstrated by the contrast between Japanese experience and that of our other two case studies, Turkey and India, mitigation and preparedness remain
amongst the key challenges for many developing countries which are home to severe natural hazards. Whereas Kobe revealed an over-reliance on capital-intensive, structural measures (to the detriment of response and rehabilitation strategic programming), Marmara and the Gujarat underlined the real problems which capital-weak, highly indebted states have in developing adequate disaster mitigation strategies. These countries, which are commonly marked by a fragile economic environment, an inability to protect vulnerable groups and weak local institutions, are often unable to create stronger physical environments, safer locations and better regulated buildings and infrastructure (Blaikie et al, 1994). Moreover, a combination of limited political representation, difficult topography and limited transportation and communication links frequently impedes the presence and legitimacy of the state amongst its citizenry, thereby restricting levels of local participation in disaster preparedness programmes. Since the development of effective disaster mitigation strategies involves engagement with fundamental social concerns – not least the way disasters are perceived by society – issues of sustainable population growth and national planning priorities and dynamics are often not the main focus of state legislation. The less political and reflexive nature of emergency relief and rehabilitation is, in many cases, a more attractive prospect than engaging in a consultative, and potentially reformist, process, ‘especially in countries whose governments remain hesitant to concede authority and resources to civil society’ (Twigg, 2004: 69). In this sense, encouraging the expansion of CSOs’ role in disaster management is perceived to involve an inevitable rise in civil dissatisfaction and criticism.

Here, many writers point to the retrogressive impact of marketisation. It is argued that increases in political conditionalities attached to international development aid have, since the 1980s, led to a weakening of state authority. This has been exacerbated by accompanying structural adjustment and macro-economic reform programmes which have reduced the administrative capacity of the public sector within much of the developing world. As José Luis Rocha and Ian Christoplos point out, since ‘the market place will not mitigate risk and respond to disasters by itself… [l]ocal civil servants have few incentives suddenly to start addressing disaster hazards alongside their day-to-day work’ (2001: 247). In this sense, the lack of interest in the pre-event phases of disaster management is a direct consequence of the penetration of Western corporate capitalism.

In El Salvador, for instance, Ben Wisner claims that the state faced considerable pressure to involve ‘international engineering firms and other transnational corporations’ in the disbursement of $1.4 billion of reconstruction aid following the Hurricane Mitch disaster in 1998. Thus, he concludes, full disaster mitigation may be ‘impossible without challenging the prevailing ideals of limitless growth, of ever-decreasing governmental regulation, and of the dominance of market values’ (2003: 50). Indeed, when CSOs are incorporated into disaster planning, it is frequently a result of cuts in public expenditure born of exogenous pressures from Western governments seeking greater market penetration and an enlarged role for private capital. Consequently, CSOs ‘can easily be pulled into providing services that they cannot sustain’ (Christoplos, 2003: 105). In Nicaragua, for instance, such a
tendency has made civil organisations ‘wary that getting involved in disaster management could saddle them with massive responsibilities’ with the result that progressive change is obstructed and social vulnerabilities persist (Rocha and Christoplos, 2001: 247).

In both the Marmara and the Gujarat earthquakes, the main types of vulnerability can be categorised as delinquent, newly generated and total. In terms of the former, it is clear that the way regional and urban development policies were designed and implemented played a significant role in the creation of the disaster. Although the area affected by the earthquake has always been known for its seismic hazards, construction practices have remained woefully inadequate. Many studies carried out after the Marmara earthquake showed that a lack of respect for the country’s strict earthquake resistant design codes was one of the main reasons why the building stock in the area was too weak to survive intact. Building on unsuitable soil conditions, using inappropriate and deficient construction material, adding new, unregulated floors and changing the design of ground floors to create extra space for shops were all clear examples of how Turkey’s building codes were deliberately ignored by contractors. The local authorities, whose responsibility it was to implement the regulations, are also culpable. A combination of limited human and material resources, low administrative capacities, demoralisation, poor remuneration and status as well as an endemic tendency towards corruption, nepotism and the self-seeking pursuit of political gains ensured that Turkey’s ostensibly comprehensive inspection and control system was systematically flouted.²

It was a similar picture of neglect and deliberate delinquency in the Gujarat where contingent proofing in the construction process showed inadequate levels of resistance to the earthquake. Moreover, many of the luxury apartments of Ahmedabad and Bhuj failed to survive the earthquake because they were built without using any earthquake resistance materials and techniques. As in Turkey, it seems that there was little monitoring and few attempts to impose the state’s construction regulations. Both deliberate non-compliance with building codes and cutting corners through the use of poor-quality building materials was widespread. The result was that less than 1 per cent of the buildings in Ahmedabad had official permission for occupancy. Overall, only one out of 12,000 low-rise buildings was estimated to be fully compliant with the relevant statute when the earthquake hit the area. In both Turkey and the Gujarat, not only were thousands of people buried under their unsafe buildings because of fundamental institutional failings, but millions more, who cannot afford to take advantage of post-disaster improvements in construction regulation, continue to live in housing unsuited to earthquake-active environments. In other words, the delinquent vulnerabilities of the public sector and of the cost-cutting logic of high-capital enterprise are accompanied by the total vulnerability of a region in which the occurrence of disasters is frequent and devastating, yet much of its population are, for socio-economic reasons, able to do little to reduce their levels of hazard exposure.

In addition, both the Gujarat and Marmara region were affected by the newly generated vulnerabilities of rapid migration and urbanisation. For example, the
Marmara region has received very high levels of migrant workers throughout the post-war period. Most arrived in search of work, having been rendered jobless by Turkey's huge agricultural mechanisation programmes during the 1950s and 60s (worsened significantly by the structural adjustment drive of the 1980s and the financial collapse of 2000). Others were displaced by violent conflict in the Balkans and south-east Turkey during the 1990s. Neo-liberal cutbacks on public spending and poor urban planning combined to ensure that housing pressures in Marmara's conurbation (which had become marked by large neighbourhoods of temporary and unregulated housing known as *gecekondu* – literally translated as ‘built overnight’) were at unprecedented levels when the earthquake struck. It was not, however, just the newly-generated (or in some ways technocratic) vulnerabilities of unplanned city quarters which contributed to the scale of the disaster. Relatively modern buildings constructed by the public sector for their own services and employees also collapsed.

In many ways, the state's failure to set any kind of example in the construction of its own public buildings epitomises its role in the creation of delinquent vulnerabilities. As a result of the 1992 earthquake in Erzincan, for example, 35 public buildings, including several schools, a major hospital and residential buildings for judges and attorneys, were all destroyed. The 1995 Dinar earthquake was even worse, with 25 out of the area's 55 public buildings irreparably damaged. Public buildings in the Marmara region did not fare any better in 1999. Within the education sector, for example, 43 schools collapsed and 377 were badly damaged (DPT, 1999). Further evidence of public sector deficiencies can be found in the imprudent nature of the region's regional and urban planning. By starting a major fire at the TÜPRAŞ Oil Refinery, which burned out of control for several days, the earthquake exposed the foolishness of locating a refinery close to other hazardous industries. These included a petrol station, a paper mill, a pharmaceutical factory, a cement plant, a car manufacturer and a fertilizer production plant. The risk of explosions caused by the fire was high enough to necessitate the evacuation of everybody within a three-mile radius. In other words, the cumulative vulnerability of thousands of people was increased by the reckless over-concentration of public and private heavy industries in close proximity to one another in an earthquake-prone area (Özerdem, 2003).

Similarly, in the Gujarat, the state's failure to mitigate the effects of the region's periodic droughts and cyclones served both to produce new vulnerabilities and to compound existing problems for local people. The impact of these hazards have led to a marked pattern of rural-to-rural migration from the drought-prone to the agro-climatically better-endowed districts leading to considerable overcrowding in the districts of destination. This is exacerbated by the fact that migrants from climatically-affected regions are willing to accept excessively low wages in return for a modicum of job security, thereby undercutting the employment prospects of local labour and establishing a 'pull' incentive for those yet to migrate. As Jan Breman points out, this perpetuates a vicious cycle of migration with the overall result that perennial and acute human insecurities before the earthquake considerably worsened its impact (particularly in terms of prolonging the widespread loss of
local livelihoods) and contributed to the perpetuation of total and economic vulnerabilities (2003).

In this sense, the earthquake challenged India's prevailing, yet unwarranted, faith in the state sector as the repository of socio-economic development and progressive social change. Its role as the main ‘provider’ of employment, permits, licences, quotas, services and monopolies came under considerable scrutiny as the true extent of the disaster became apparent and as thousands of people were left to deal with the injured, deceased and dying, rescue their relatives from the rubble and find vital amenities unassisted. The earthquake also revealed the fictitious foundation of the Indian ‘nation’, so keenly promulgated by the state. Even in the midst of shared suffering on an unprecedented scale, the Gujarat’s socio-demographic divisions could not be overcome. Technological vulnerabilities, which the state remained unable or unwilling to address adequately, tended to be concentrated upon already-dispossessed groups defined by their caste, religion, ethnicity or gender.

Despite governing one of the richest and most developed countries in the world, the Japanese state also failed to respond to the Kobe earthquake effectively. Although frequently lauded as one of the leading examples of technological preparedness in the world, the earthquake showed that correlating development measurements and public sectors’ ability to implement adequate responses to disasters is not reliable. It is clear that high levels of Gross National Product per capita do not automatically translate into efficient management outcomes nor successful programmes of social mobilisation. In Kobe, major logistical problems were encountered in organising the evacuation of local residents, traffic control, search-and-rescue and inter-agency coordination, often at levels comparable to disasters experienced in much less developed contexts. A hierarchical and slow bureaucracy gave rise to long delays, a reluctance to engage with civil organisations and administrative bottlenecks broadly similar to those apparent during the aftermath of Marmara and Gujarat earthquakes.

Unlike our other case studies, however, the Kobe disaster was marked by a close correlation between social vulnerabilities and an over-reliance on physical mitigation measures. Faith in technological solutions to what are, in essence, social problems led to a spurious belief that, so long as Japan’s modern physical infrastructure is resilient to earthquakes, there is no need for disaster response measures. Such neglect, particularly in the preparation of emergency relief strategies and resources, in favour of engineering-based structural initiatives focussed on building design and construction, ignored the fact that it is simply impossible to pre-empt all possible combinations of the different conditions that may exist in nature (rather obviously demonstrated by the collapse of the ultra-modern Hanshin expressway in five sections). Part of this failing was the complexity of Japan’s considerable land pressures. Highly marketised property policies, an inadequate supply of real estate and difficult topography have combined to make seismic-sensitive engineering particularly intricate. Nowhere is this more apparent than in Japan's commonplace practice of reclaiming land from the sea which often produces large-scale residential areas in conditions especially sensitive to earthquakes.
Moreover, alongside such newly-emergent vulnerabilities, there existed equally unobserved residual vulnerabilities in the buildings and neighbourhoods which had escaped Japan’s town-planners, engineers and technocrats. In fact, at the time of the earthquake almost 70 per cent of the country’s building stock pre-dated the 1981 Seismic Design Codes. In Kobe, these residual vulnerabilities were neglected partly because the city followed a development strategy which involved the creation of new residential areas for higher income groups, instead of tackling the residual vulnerabilities of older neighbourhoods. As the city sought to embed itself more closely into a globalising economic order, service industries became the prefecture’s main focus, to the detriment of manufacturing enterprises such as shipbuilding, steel foundries and chemical refinement, and the areas of the city in which they were located. These, then, became home to the elderly, students, the unemployed and foreign workers, creating a type of delinquent vulnerability quite different from those in Turkey and India, yet, in many ways, just as acute. In this sense, the Kobe earthquake demonstrated the necessity of engaging with civil organisation as a means of both developing improved methods of dealing with disasters once they have occurred and protecting a wider section of Japan’s more vulnerable citizens from existing natural hazards. Nonetheless, such socio-economic divisions continued to play a part in the allocation of financial resources for the reconstruction process following the earthquake. Those who lived in the affluent new neighbourhoods remained the primary concern of the prefecture while older parts of the city were rebuilt much more slowly and were mostly excluded from any meaningful consultative process, further deepening urban social and spatial polarisation.

In conclusion, it may be noted that the disaster response from the state in all three of our case studies was unprepared, uncoordinated, inadequate and ineffective. Although each earthquake happened in quite different socio-economic contexts (9th (Japan), 88th (Turkey) and 127th (India) on the UNDP’s Human Development Index (2002)), important commonalities exist in each state’s failure. In all three cases, the authorities’ inadequate human resources and physical capacities meant that they were slow to realise the true horror of what was unfolding and even slower to reach disaster-affected people with emergency relief. Once assistance had started to filter through, its distribution was marked by inefficiency, partiality and ineptitude – being often inappropriate in terms of quantity, quality, cultural requirements and local climate and leading to considerable wastage. Unwanted food supplies were, for instance, dumped by the roadsides in the Gujarat (while many communities were without anything to eat) and, while Kobe’s public sector buckled under the demands on its workforce, thousands of volunteers were idle.

The result in all three case studies was a major shift in the way that the public viewed the state. In Japan, the idea of a ‘utopian’ state legitimised by the economic miracle of post-war industrialisation was replaced by a growing awareness of the exclusiveness, dysfunctionality and the rigidity of iron triangle. Society’s confidence in the public sector and its talismanic reliance upon technological supremacy was shattered beyond repair. In Turkey, the concept of the state as a ‘father’ figure who
could protect his citizens in times of need was crushed by the earthquake’s devastation and the inadequacy of Ankara’s response. The realisation that civil society’s weakness was because of the state’s repression grew and supplanted the myth of benign paternalism. In India, the contrast between the state’s ineffectiveness and the commitment and industriousness of the Gujarati’s civil organisations and un-organised volunteers during the relief process brought the limitations of Delhi as the bastion of post-colonial hopes and the ‘provider’ of ‘development’ into sharp relief. Overall, it is clear that, in each of these three countries, the state failed its citizens when they needed its presence and services most, leading to a greater sense of instrumentalism, empowerment and the importance of volunteerism within civil society in general. The following section will explore this rise in third sector activism in more detail.

Civil Society Organisations and Disasters

Until the earthquakes of Kobe, Marmara and Gujarat struck, the question of whether volunteers and CSOs should have a role in disaster management strategy was not a major issue in any of the three case study countries. The overall assumption was that disaster management was a far too serious business for civil society to take an active role in. For the most part, it was considered from a technical and organisational perspective in which the main actors were state institutions and local authorities. The civil population at large were regarded as the victims of disasters (and certainly not a resource of skills and experience which might be mobilised to respond to a disaster) for whom the public sector were saviours. Response was, in other words, an apolitical and socially neutral reflection of need. Indeed, before these earthquakes, CSOs had a very low level of representation in consultation processes generally and, in the cases of Turkey and Japan, were either not widely known or were seen in quite a negative light. In Turkey, for example, they were frequently regarded as fronts for nefarious financial and political activities while, in Japan, they were often stereotyped as staffed by strange do-gooders. The contrast between civil and state responses to the earthquake did, however, give rise to a new set of relationships between the public sector, civil organisations and society more broadly. As the state’s position as a ‘utopia’, ‘father’ or ‘provider’ was eroded, CSOs were spoken of in terms of their specialised capacities, efficiently-allocated resources, higher levels of motivation and greater enthusiasm. In other words, civil organisations were vaunted as better able to execute disaster response programmes than the state itself. Consequently, many CSOs enjoyed a rise in self-esteem and started to believe that they could actually be a stakeholder in the management of disasters in particular and socio-political change in general.

In the immediate aftermath of these earthquakes there was a flourishing of CSOs in all three countries. In Kobe, up to 1.5 million volunteers responded to the disaster and, while there are no reliable data available for volunteer numbers, contemporary accounts suggest that very large numbers of people also came forward following the Marmara and the Gujarat earthquakes. Although civil initiatives were not free from mistakes and organisational problems – not least
because it was, for many, the first time that they had ever worked in the aftermath of a disaster – there is no evidence that these were any more severe that those made by the state authorities and their employees. Indeed, since many of the more major problems were caused by poor coordination and communication structures, the direct responsibility of the public sector, it is difficult to sustain some of the criticisms levied at CSOs – often by the state itself. In fact, there is some evidence to show that CSOs frequently took the lead in trying to develop ways to tackle coordination issues. For example, in Japan volunteer centres in each ward of Kobe established mutually supportive linkages, while the Civil Coordination Centre in Turkey and the Kutch Nav Nirman Abhiyan in the Gujarat took on a number of region-wide consultation duties. So, although in all three case study countries (and particularly in Turkey and India) there are strong socio-political barriers to civil organisations seeking to collectivise, there have been some improvements in the way that CSOs have coordinated their efforts across the sector as a whole.

In Turkey, for instance, the state’s candidature for membership of the EU has been successfully used to obtain resources for the support of various umbrella networks. In fact, the EU now funds a substantial part of Turkey’s third sector including the provision of basic services, advocacy work and human rights monitoring. While, in many ways, this might be regarded as a positive development, it also contains a number of potential dangers. There is, for instance, a risk that Turkey may follow other developing countries, who have found themselves the sudden attention of large-scale donors, and who suffer a rapid and unsustainable growth of the third sector based largely upon the easy availability of funding. Such ‘suitcase’ CSOs, as they are commonly known, tend to produce quite low quality outputs and can damage public confidence across the sector as a whole. This is a particular danger in Turkey where civil organisations are beginning to play a growing part in the reconstruction of the southeast of the country after two decades of armed conflict. While the implications of these changes are yet to become fully clear, it is obvious that the way that ‘post’-war reconstruction is undertaken, particularly the management of returning internally displaced people, is subject to acute public sensitivity and, as such, holds the potential to damage both the reputation of CSOs generally and the nascent reconciliation processes in particular.

In the Gujarat, changes in the structure of the third sector are also too new to be evaluation with any confidence. In terms of its funding configuration, there would appear to have been, as yet, little input from the private sector and the state, supported by international donors, remains the main source of revenue. The aftermath of the Kobe earthquake also witnessed an expansion in the availability of funds to CSOs. As well as taxation benefits introduced in 1998, the state started to channel more of its overall welfare budget through the third sector. So, although it has attempted to establish a number of partnerships with the private sector, the public sector also remains the main source of financial assistance for a wide range of civil society initiatives. These changes have also included a significant review of the state’s relationship with civil organisations leading to major legal changes. Born of a recognition of the public sector’s failure to respond to the disasters, new
statutes have been introduced in each of the case-study countries. For example, Japan’s Non-Profit Organisation Law of 1998 was, despite its considerable weaknesses, an important step towards encouraging the wider participation of the community in general and this has led to a more flexible environment for CSOs operating in the disaster response sector and improvements in the way that Tokyo relates to the prefectures. There has also been an acknowledgement of the continuous need to revise disaster preparedness plans and a gradual move towards closer ties with the private sector (Furukawa, 2000).

Similarly, in Turkey the law for associations and foundations has been amended a number of times after the Marmara earthquake and, in line with the EU membership process, a new law which provides CSOs with some degree of flexibility has recently been passed by parliament. There has also been considerable debate over the way that disaster management is legislatively framed. These have not, however, resulted in comprehensive changes. The need for preparing an appropriate national disaster management model and reforming the Civil Defence Law has been extensively discussed, but the state remains more willing to deal with the challenges of physical reconstruction process than with the more social issues of disaster management administration. Consequently, five years after the Marmara earthquake, serious revisions of disaster management statutes are yet to be carried out.

India has, however, legislated rather more quickly. Within two years of the earthquake, the Gujarat State Disaster Management Act was passed with the intention of developing root and branch improvements in disaster management systems, structures, programmes, resources, capabilities and guiding principles. Fundamental to this statute was an attempt to reduce hazard risks and to prepare more fully for the threats of disasters in the Gujarat. It redefined the different roles envisaged for stakeholders in both the ‘ante’ and ‘post’ phases of disaster management and, on paper at least, it brought the Gujarat into line with internationally-accepted best practice. This includes the integration of disaster management into development planning, adopting a multi-hazard approach, acknowledging the importance of response impartiality and sensitivity to local socio-cultural characteristics. Nonetheless, although there is a legislative commitment to making communities central to the decision-making process ensuring that their priorities are reflected in the programmes undertaken by the state, it also, paradoxically, seeks to perpetuate the public sector as the locus of control thereby reiterating its ‘provider’ status. It does not, in other words, recognise that CSOs are most effective when they are permitted to be flexible in their decision making by decentralised institutional and administrative frameworks.

It is thus unsurprising that, to varying degrees, the upsurge in volunteerism following each disaster did not prove to be sustainable in the medium to long term within any of the case-study countries. Between three and six months after the disaster much of this reaction had dissipated. Many response initiatives had been spontaneous and limited to meeting the immediate needs of earthquake-affected people. It was, therefore, natural for volunteers to return to their lives once the new tent cities in the Marmara region were built or the communal kitchens in the
Gujarat and the temporary shelters in Kobe had been replaced by the rehabilitation process. This did not mean that there was no longer anything else for CSOs to do, though. For example, many organisations in the Marmara region wanted to continue their work by moving into longer-term activities such as education, health and housing. Three months after the earthquake, however, Ankara announced that CSOs were no longer needed and they were ‘politely’ asked to leave the area.

In many ways, this represents a generic fear of the politicisation of humanitarian assistance shared by the states in all the case studies. Efforts to disempower the different ideological groups and political parties that inevitably become involved in the aftermath of such a socially significant event frequently take the form of an attempt to centralise the distribution of relief assistance. Measures such as media control and the institutionalisation of more pernicious third sector supervisory structures are often said to be essential in order to improve the coordination of relief activities. While there are clearly advantages in imposing a central authority over the coordination of emergency assistance during the immediate aftermath of disasters, the value of continuing to resist power devolution (or, as in the case of Turkey, imposing a centralised power structure when already well into the relief process) remains unclear. Indeed, it would seem that, having failed to take charge of a proper crisis management programme, the state has attempted to make political capital out of the successes of CSOs once their efforts have helped to normalise the situation.

A key result of such statism (to be looked at in more detail during the following section) is that very few CSOs in our case-study countries have been able to move from relief-oriented to development-oriented programmes. The involvement of most civil organisations was restricted to the immediate aftermath of the three earthquakes and did not generally move beyond the level of emergency relief. The political nature of such a change seems to have either deterred CSOs or prompted the state sector to take prohibitive measures. While response-orientated organisations have grown rapidly (exemplified by the popularity of search-and-rescue teams in Turkey), there are hardly any CSOs willing to tackle the root causes of the vulnerabilities that gave rise to the disaster in the first place. This policy preference for disaster response over mitigation is symptomatic of, and helps to perpetuate, civil passivity in each of the three case studies. In Turkey and India, it also represents a mirror image of the state’s approach to disaster management in that apolitical and technocratic response strategies are preferred to the more difficult task of trying to prevent a disaster from occurring in the first place. Indeed, the inability of civil society to impose itself upon the state is particularly evident in the way that the role of CSOs is defined and regulated. The Gujarat’s State Disaster Management Act, Turkey’s Civil Defence Law and Japan’s Non-Profit Organisation Law all contain statutes that serve to enclose third sector organisations within hierarchical structures in which their subordination is assured. In other words, the acute need for a centralised approach to decision-making in the immediate aftermath of a disaster gave rise to an overall statutory template for the entire process of disaster management. Experience from the three case studies indicates that such an approach tends to create frameworks which are too narrow for CSOs
to work effectively. So long as they are treated as part of the official disaster management programme, rather than a partner to it, then strategies which best utilise the comparative advantages of both top-down and more grass-roots methods.

**Statism and the Impact of Disasters**

As set out in Chapter One, Lester Salamon and Helmut Anheier have developed six analytical approaches to understanding the way in which CSOs interact with the state and the market (1998: 220–231). The first mostly concerns theories of government or market failure and is generally focussed on society’s inability to provide a full range of public goods. They note that, where civil society is marked by considerable disagreement over what public goods should be produced and administered by the state, regimes subject to regular electoral review will tend to favour the perceived views of a notional median voter, leaving the demands of many citizens unmet and prompting people to support or create CSOs. This implies that societies with high levels of social diversity or inequality (and thus a potential for high levels of disagreement), combined with low governmental social welfare expenditure, will have a larger and more active third sector. Their approach also predicts that, since third sector activity is based on civil mobilisation in the pursuit of public goods unsupplied by the state, donations and charitable trusts will make up the bulk of CSO funds. In this sense, models of market or state failure overlap with a second set of approaches – supply-side theories – which also consider social diversity (and religious differences more specifically) to be especially significant. It is suggested that competition for adherents between such organisations forms the motivational basis to form CSOs, particularly those focussed on education as the primary way through which religious consciousness is perpetuated. In keeping with the market or state failure models, it is also expected that private giving will make up the largest proportion of third sector income.

Looking at our three case studies, however, it is difficult to sustain fully either of these two approaches. For instance, it would appear that a more significant reason for CSOs having grown, to varying degrees, in their social and political significance within the three polities under debate is, especially within the education and health sectors, more to do with state preferences for outsourcing social welfare services than civil pressure for unmet public goods. So, although the Gujarat, for example, represents a wide range of welfare disparities and socio-cultural differences within its complex social structure, the state has remained the dominant force behind the creation and sustenance of much of the third sector. This is indicated by the secular nature of many CSOs which suggests that civil demand within the Gujarat was not the key element in their establishment and mission. Moreover, although partialities were regularly noted, most CSOs carried out their work without an overt commitment to any specific religious, caste, tribe or other social particularism. Similarly, CSOs in Japan have long received substantial support from the state with between 80 and 90 per cent of social welfare organisations being funded directly from public reserves. In Turkey, however, the fractured and, in some cases, quite ideological nature of the third sector has been an important
factor in the establishment of CSOs such as Mazlum Der and The Association for the Support of Modern Life. More broadly, it has also led to quite high levels of private giving and service payments with the bulk of third sector funds coming from membership fees, individual donations and civil organisations’ own investment and activities.

The third set of theories concerning the formation of third sector structures identified by Anheier and Salamon focuses on the inverse relationship between ‘trust’ and ‘contract failures’ within the market sector. Since consumers generally lack the quantity and quality of information necessary to assess the range of products available to them with any accuracy, they frequently perceive themselves to be in a vulnerable position when negotiating with the private sector. This leads them to seek alternative bases for trust in the product, particularly the service, which they require. Here, the third sector’s non-profit character represents a comparative advantage especially in societies where considerable cynicism over the trustworthiness of the market sector predominates. In such a situation, it is expected that CSOs will be able to secure a significant proportion of their income from fees and service charges.

With the services industry of the Gujarat not sufficiently widespread to prompt a crisis of trust and Turkey’s fee-paying patterns mostly confined to making obligatory payments to monopolistic professional organisations, however, it is only Japan, with approximately 52 per cent of third sector’s funding originating from service fees, which would appear to fit this model the most fully. Nevertheless, it should be noted that this high figure is mostly caused by the common practice of making large private payments to educational and research establishments where, in some instances, over 90 per cent of an institution’s income may be generated by the levying of private fees. This contrasts sharply with the health and social services sectors in which a very large percentage of funds is provided by the government – 96 per cent in the case of non-profit medical corporations for instance. In short, then, it is not so much the trustworthy character of CSOs’ non-profitability that explains why fee-charging characterises Japan’s third sector, as the tradition of making payments to private schools for one specific service.

The fourth of Anheier and Salamon’s categories of third sector analysis focuses on the relationship between the expansion of state welfare provisions and economic development. In essence, it argues that, since industrialisation necessitates higher public spending to offset the effects of a decline in the functions of the traditional family and to mitigate the dislocation of surplus categories of labour, the third sector will ultimately be eliminated. If present, it is largely regarded as a pre-modern feature most likely to enjoy a strong position in societies where it has yet to be curtailed by economic development, particularly within the education, health and social service sectors. Evidence from our case studies, however, would seem to suggest that this model has limited applicability. For instance, despite the fact that Japan is one of the richest and most economically developed countries in the world, it also has an extensive and traditionally-orientated civil presence within the education sector. While this pattern is not repeated uniformly across Japan’s public welfare services generally, its not-for-profit schools reveal the
difficulties the economic development model has in explaining inter-sectoral diversity within states. Moreover, in both India and Turkey economic development appears to be correlated with an expansion, or at least a consolidation, of third sector service provision rather than a contraction.

A fifth group of approaches identified by Salamon and Anheier – interdependence theories – rejects the assumption, apparent in each of the proceeding categories, that the state and the third sector are defined by a fundamentally conflictive relationship. Instead, it is argued that, since CSOs can – and frequently do – mobilise support for governmental action and because third sector income is restricted by the inherently limited nature of private donation and not-for-profit fee-charging, there is a clear need for the state and civil organisations to co-operate. This is particularly likely where civil resistance to state infra-structures is matched with a high demand for public goods or where state support is necessary for CSOs to operate. In both these instances, a strong and extensive third sector enjoying considerable public sector inputs would be present. However, in none of our case studies is there such a third sector. While the state bureaucracies in each country do co-operate with civil organisations in various ways, this tends to be within frameworks of public sector predominance rather within more egalitarian or reciprocal relationships. As a result, the support of CSOs, both materially and legislatively, is heavily influenced by the concerns of the political elite. Moreover, only within the more economically developed society of Japan can there be said to be a high demand for, or politically-conscious awareness of, the state’s responsibility to provide public goods, but, as with India and Turkey, this is neither matched by high levels of civil instrumentalism nor an extensively recognised need for greater co-operation with state agents on the part of CSOs.

So, it would seem that, as Salamon and Anheier point out, each of these five approaches struggles to illuminate the diverse range of observable relationships between the state, the market and the third sector (1998: 226). As our treatment of the three case-study countries suggests, what is needed is a greater acknowledgement of the socio-historical structures which underlie the formation of alternative systems of public goods and services supply. Without understanding state development and theorising regime tolerance, such variance is hard to explain – particularly the contrasting ways in which governments respond to market failures. The supply-side impact of religiosity is also highly varied in terms of both evangelical and entrepreneurial fervour. A lack of market-place trust may, in certain regimes, lead to greater state regulation, nationalisation or mixed enterprise rather than an active third sector. Moreover, theories of civil-state interdependence are not able to establish causally the particular conditions under which such prospective mutuality is most likely to emerge. In order to cast the most light on the changes which have taken place in our case-study countries during the post-disaster period, it is necessary, as suggested in the first chapter, to reject uni-factorial accounts based on variables such as diversity, trust or economic development in favour of a more sophisticated account of the political structures which underpin social outcomes and the foundations of sectoral interdependence.

Here, Salamon and Anheier’s sixth category of approaches to understanding
civil-state-market relations – ‘social origins’ – is instructive. This offers a four-part typology of third sector development within liberal, social democratic, corporatist and statist regimes. In the liberal model, the bourgeoisie has, through a historical process of industrial development and social change, established its political authority over propertied elites, the public sector and collective labour organisations. This tends to produce a political elite unwilling to commit high levels of state expenditure to social welfare programmes thereby stimulating the emergence of a large and powerful third sector seeking to meet civil demands for public goods unsupplied by the state and the market. Social democratic regimes, on the other hand, are characterised by an extensive system of state-provided, social welfare public goods leaving little room for a third sector to take an active role in service provision. Labour organisations, progressive and philanthropic groups also tend to exercise considerable political power in such systems and may provide an opportunity for CSOs to take a role in social advocacy and representation. Civil organisations in both liberal and social democratic regimes are likely to be funded, in the main, by private donations since the market or, in the latter instance, the state, takes responsibility for the provision of public goods generally and social welfare services in particular.

The third element of Salamon and Anheier’s social origins model – corporatism – emerges as part of the state’s attempt to maintain the support of key landed elites and to resist civil demands for public goods. Typically, the state forges an alliance with the third sector in order to administer palliative welfare provisions without surrendering to reform pressures. Consequently, the size and strength of the third sector, as well as the funding it receives from central government, is likely to increase with state expansion. Fourthly, in the statist model political elites, seeking to exercise power autonomously or on behalf of economic elites, imposes thoroughly institutionalised and highly coherent restraints upon the third sector. This means that, despite the prominent position of its agents within the organisation and delivery of welfare service provisions, the state’s welfare expenditure remains low. Since both the administrations of Western colonial Powers and Asiatic empires tended to establish these kinds of regime configurations, many developing countries today demonstrate highly statist systems in which neither private philanthropy nor governmental finance is available to support civil organisations, leaving the third sector either weakened or, in some cases, acutely dependent on marketised corporate welfare.

Perhaps unsurprisingly then, India, as Britain’s imperial ‘jewel’, and Turkey, as the inheritors of the archetypal Asiatic empire, currently display a close affiliation to the statist ideal regime type. For Anheier and Salamon (writing in 1998), though, the exemplar of the statist model, ‘with low levels of government social welfare spending accompanied by a relatively small nonprofit sector’, is Japan. Japanese society, they continue

Reflects a tradition of state dominance established during the Meiji Restoration of 1868 that, in the absence of effective urban middle-class or working-class movements, has allowed the state apparatus to retain
considerable autonomous power. Combined with extensive corporate welfare, the result has been a relatively low level of government social protection without a corresponding growth of independent nonprofit activity (1998: 243)

A strong bureaucracy and its close relationship with the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and corporate capital constitutes an iron triangle which has operated within the electoral framework imposed by Douglas MacArthur following the Second World War without ever fully accepting democracy as an active alternative to Japan’s imperial and authoritarian legacy. The state’s relationship with the third sector is thus marked by a rigid patrimonialism which the post-war economic miracle has reinforced rather than dislodged (Anheier and Salamon, 2001: 16). It has, for instance, given rise to the commonplace practice of appointing retired senior state bureaucrats to top management positions in both the private and the third sectors (often described as the ‘glue’ which bonds the triangle together) thereby ensuring that the state and the market continue to mould the contours of civil society.

In many ways, though, Japan’s overbearing statism received something of a blow from the Kobe disaster. The context within which the third sector operates is now marked by a growing sense of dissatisfaction with the power of the bureaucracy and the market. Civil organisations have begun to adapt the anti-state elements of neo-liberal discourses to challenge what they perceive to be the problem of excessively large government in Japan. Public services should, it is argued, be increasingly contracted out to CSOs operating in partnership with the private sector in a much less regulated environment. Naoto Yamauchi, for example, suggests that the government’s reluctance to dispense extra funds to Kobe following the rehabilitation phase of the earthquake’s aftermath, on the grounds that it would create public spending disparities with other prefectures and thus lead to disbursal difficulties and greater devolutionary pressures, reveals an inflexibility which can only be addressed through a greater diversification of public service funding and a decentralisation of budgetary controls. This would, he continues, lead to increases in consumer choice, higher levels of civil organisation and ultimately a more plural society (1998). It may be, then, that a key impact of the Kobe earthquake was to increase middle-class engagement with the state and thus, in the absence of a significant change in its traditionally low levels of public welfare expenditure, to move the Japanese regime towards a statist-liberal hybrid.

Turkey’s legacy is also one of statism. Since the most prestigious Ottoman roles were largely reserved for an Islamically-referenced triumvirate of cleric, clerk and soldier, mercantilism was predominantly a feature of the empire’s extensive non-Muslim communities. Once the empire began to collapse, a greater sense of Turkishness emerged which, intensified by the wholesale departure of its Christian and Jewish minority groups, was institutionalised by the nascent republican nation-state. As a result, the public sector took the leading role in the economy from the 1920s onwards which, with a bourgeoisie proving difficult to create from above, continued throughout the import-substitution period of the 1960s and this remains an important element in Turkey’s statism today. Economic elites were not, then, the
venture capitalists of Occidental entrepreneurialism. Rather they, along with large-
estate rural capital and the burgeoning professional and careerist sectors, remained
heavily reliant on state patronage. As such, Turkey’s statism is somewhat moderated
by an enduring sense of corporatism or, put another way, the paternal tendency of
the regime to forge close associations with both the market and third sector
organisations.

Here, the state has combined shifts towards greater marketisation during the
1980s (subsequently reaffirmed in a series of further macro-economic adjustments
under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund in 2000) with fatherly
palliatives intended to obfuscate the reforms’ debilitating effect on the public
sector. For Murat Belge, an example of such platitudinous camouflage are the social
facilities the state provides the leaders of public sector employees’ organisations.
These include a nationwide networks of leisure and hotel complexes – entitled
‘Judges’ Houses’, ‘Police Houses’, ‘Teachers’ Houses’ and so on – for the sole use
of travelling senior officials. Open to considerable abuse and corruption and
perennially under-used, these absorb high levels of public money, particularly on
expensive fixings, fittings and facilities, and are quite clearly intended to co-opt the
leaders of Turkey’s huge and monopolistic public sector associations. Indeed, the
success of such civil penetration by the state is demonstrated by the fact that,
despite a long-term decline in the terms and conditions of state-sector employees,
labour organisation is weak and strike action has been extremely rare (2004).

The apparent rise in civil activism following the Marmara earthquake might,
therefore, best be seen as occurring in parallel to the corporatist statism of Turkey’s
clientelistic regime. Processes of change catalysed by the Marmara earthquake and
further strengthened by Turkey’s efforts to gain accession to the EU may have
ruptured the ‘devlet baba’ tradition, but they have yet to replace the state’s
patrimonialism with a more pluralistic model of governance. In this sense, then,
Turkey’s peculiarly corporatist form of statism has allowed the regime to deal with
the liberal challenge of the earthquake as it dealt with the difficulties of economic
liberalisation. By engaging in a series of constitutional reforms, the state has assured
continued bourgeois support unassailed by a fractured and largely dependent third
sector and, as yet, untroubled by more profound reforms.

Political power is also mainly held by bureaucratic elites in India. Although the
country’s huge size and federal structure makes it quite different from the other two
case studies, the public sector’s role as ‘provider’ following the collapse of the Raj
suggests that it, too, is an example of a statist regime. The enduring Nehruvian
model of social development, which places emphases on bureaucratically managed
agricultural productivity and import-substituting industrialisation, did not meet its
ostensive objective of institutionalising a social democratic polity with a minimal
third sector. Land redistribution, the social inclusion of lower castes and the
development of a neutral and efficient civil service, key parts of the post-colonial
elite’s state-building project, all failed. In their place, there emerged a system which
aspires to adopt the features of a social democratic regime, but which has been
unable to offer the levels of state-provided, social welfare public goods necessary
to promote labour organisations, progressive and philanthropic groups, to pluralise
the political sphere and to reduce the third sector to advocacy, lobbying and representation. The result is that civil organisations remain active, but within a top-down statist regime which is institutionally too weak to impose reform upon both its own agencies and upon the federated regions.

In this sense, the earthquake revealed the distance between the executive, the regional legislatures and the people expected to implement legislation. The failure of the state to rationalise its own internal hierarchies led directly to an inability to protect its citizens from endemic natural hazards. Similar institutional weakness also gave rise to statist notions of the Gujarat as a ‘passive’ victim in need of an ‘active’, notionally social democratic state. Constructing disaster-affected communities as inert recipients thus legitimises statist paternalism and leaves the third sector in no doubt that disaster management is still very much a public sector affair to which CSOs, especially those seeking a role outside advocacy, are marginal. Indeed, the social democratic pretensions of statist India continue to be apparent in the bureaucracy’s reluctance to involve local people in decision-making processes. Since the earthquake, the state has made only minimal use of local knowledge and resources and, while it recognises CSOs as legitimate representatives of disaster-affected communities, it has kept the bulk of disaster planning and implementation powers within its own agential remit.

In all, then, the three case studies of Japan, Turkey and India can be described as varieties on Anheier and Salamon’s model of a statist regime. Japan’s fundamentally statist system incorporates some elements of liberalism, while Turkey displays quite significant corporatist elements and India has aspirations towards the social democratic model. In each country, the earthquake affected these tendencies in different ways. There are signs that the Kobe disaster helped to move Japan closer to a liberal regime type. The Turkish state, on the other hand, seems to have survived the Marmara earthquake without, as yet, significantly altering its peculiar blend of corporatist statism. In India, the Gujarat earthquake appears to have reinforced the state’s social democratic ambitions rather than to have strengthened its commitment to an active third sector.

Conclusions

The UN-designated International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction, which ran from 1990 to 1999, identified four overriding objectives as guiding principles for its activities. Each represents a challenge to regimes dominated by fundamentally statist inter-sectoral relationships. The first recognised the need for a political commitment from public authorities involved in the design and implementation of disaster management programmes. The second concerned the importance of increasing public awareness of, and public participation in, activities intended to reduce their vulnerability to natural hazards. Thirdly, the Decade sought to foster a better understanding and a deeper knowledge of the causes of disasters through the transfer and exchange of international experiences and by providing greater access to relevant data and information. Fourthly, it advocated the stimulation of inter-disciplinary and inter-sectoral partnerships between agencies involved in disaster management (including governments at central and local levels,
the private sector and academic institutions as well as humanitarian, development, community based and environmental civil organisations) with the intention of reducing vulnerability levels.

In order to ensure increased inter-sectoral coordination (as set out in the UN’s first objective), for instance, it is important that disaster management legislation makes specific reference to the role of different actors and the way that they are expected to engage with each other. Only then will each agency be able to make a full commitment to the disaster management process. Likewise, the second and third of the UN’s objectives can also only be met through a statutory commitment to improved informational clarity and better systems of data dissemination. This will help to empower local actors and further the first objective’s aim to institutionalise a more integrated structure of disaster response. Meeting the fourth objective involves the implementation of effective coordination mechanisms in each of the different phases of disaster management. There is, as Briceño Sálvano points out, a direct linkage between the adoption of appropriate disaster management policies and successful disaster risk reduction (2003).

Here, and in each of the other three objectives, CSOs can play an active part. As Rajib Shaw’s description of the role of civil organisations during various stages

\[\text{Figure 3: The Role of Civil Organisations Following a Disaster}\]
of disaster response (illustrated in Figure Three) demonstrates, the main function of CSOs during the immediate aftermath of an earthquake is to provide technical skills in rescue work and to develop relief strategies in co-operation with disaster-affected people (2003). To this end, CSOs can help to coordinate the activities of government, local people and international organisations. During the rehabilitation and reconstruction phases, CSOs can provide an interface between the government and disaster-affected people through which the community’s priorities can be communicated, a long term commitment to dealing with such needs can be institutionalised and a less statist approach to disaster management can emerge. During the mitigation or preparedness phase, CSOs can help transmit the lessons learned from post-disaster relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction to future generations so as to cope better with existent hazards. Civil organisations can assist in the creation of a co-operative environment between the state and its citizens without which it is difficult to ensure that disaster management processes remain motivated, flexible and sustainable.

The legislative changes in disaster management introduced in the three case studies so far have, indeed, gone some way to introducing a more flexible environment for CSOs to work in. The involvement of the third sector in the immediate aftermath of the Kobe, Marmara and Gujarat earthquakes show that CSOs can mobilise large human and physical resources for search-and-rescue and emergency relief. It also demonstrated that, due to the specific requirements of the relief period, it is important that CSOs be equipped with both the equipment and the technical knowledge to undertake search-and-rescue work safely and effectively. Another factor which emerged from the experiences of these disasters is that co-ordinating the various actors involved in relief period is extremely convoluted. In all of the three cases, the third sector tried to moderate the state’s failure to deal with the intricacies of this challenge by setting up its own co-ordination mechanisms with varying degrees of success. It is important that these initiatives be strengthened by improved reciprocity between the public and local CSOs and by legislation at the state level.

This is also true of rehabilitation and reconstruction activities. Here, the three case studies present a mixture of experiences for CSOs. For example, reconstruction after the Kobe earthquake managed to involve the activities of CSOs in the provision of emergency shelters and in responding to the specific needs of elderly and disabled people, but, ultimately it was not able to prevent the perpetuation, or in some the cases the exacerbation, of urban socio-economic divides. Similarly, aspects of the reconstruction process in the Gujarat, included a number of CSOs in moving beyond the simple rebuilding of permanent housing and towards a concerted attempt to address livelihoods provision and other welfare issues but, again, they were not able to sustain their role and move in the direction of a functional public/third sector partnership. In many ways, reconstruction after the Marmara earthquake was even more top-down as the state shifted the locus of renewal away from the third sector by limiting the involvement of CSOs and reasserting its own patrimonial position.

Of the four phases of disaster management, though, it would appear from our
case studies that developing society-based mitigation strategies presents the most intractable challenge. Its inherent engagement with socio-economic and political issues means that ‘neutral’ technocratic ‘fixes’ are unsustainable. This tends to disempower both public sector officials and, it would seem, the bulk of the third sector alike. Both this reluctance, and the salient fact that most CSOs do not perceive themselves to be equipped with the necessary resources to deal with the multi-mandate complexities of planning, development and disaster preparedness, has its roots in the perpetuation of statist socio-historical traditions within each of our case-study countries. The resultant weakness and material dependency of the third sector in such regimes tends to inhibit the development of both an active and critical stance towards the state executive and the representation of the needs of the demos. The overall consequence is that a reliance on structural, technocratic mitigation exists to the detriment of political attempts to deal with the very vulnerabilities which turn a natural hazard into a social disaster.
NOTES

Notes to Introduction

1 It should be noted that, in order to include a wide range of very different non-state and non-market organisations involved in disaster management, the comparatively broad term ‘third sector’ will be used. Likewise, the phrase ‘civil society organisation’ will be used to describe agents active in the third sector. This is necessary to deal with the contrasting ways that civil society is understood in our case-study countries and the different terminological patterns which each has produced. For example, in Japan the phrase ‘non governmental organisation’ mostly refers to agencies involved in the overseas aid and development sector while ‘nonprofit organisations’ are considered to be predominantly engaged in domestic activities. Whereas, in India the title ‘voluntary agency’ is mostly preferred to NGO and, in Turkey, it is largely used in translation as ‘sivil toplum kurumu’, or ‘civil society organisation’. So, while no term is fully satisfactory, it is necessary for us to use a broad set of descriptive categories in order to establish a functional comparative framework.

Notes to Chapter 1

1 This can happen in a variety of ways. Sudden onset disasters, for instance, include earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, tropical storms, volcanic eruptions, landslides while slow onset disasters can be triggered by environmental hazards such as drought, famine, environmental degradation, desertification and pest infestation.

2 Examples from the global North include Knight and Stokes’ work in the UK (1996), Putnam’s famous bowling clubs in the US (1995) and Eva Cox’s lecture series entitled A Truly Civil Society in Australia in 1995.

3 A similar pattern emerged in the subsequent war in Iraq. There it has been reported that, with “a fervent belief in small government and big business” and holding a $900 million reconstruction budget, the “administration and rebuilding of Iraq”, was undertaken through the Defence Department as Phase Four of the war-plan and implemented in tandem with the usual coterie of NGOs (New York Times, 11 March 2003; BBC News, 11 March 2003; History News Network, 5 May 2003).

4 Instead of accepting the nation-state’s responsibilities “for the well-being of groups”, “the market state” means “maximising the choices available to individuals… [and] restraining rather than empowering governments” (Bobbitt, 2002: 228, 230). By extension, the space created by the retardation of public administration is to be filled by decentralised CSOs.

Notes to Chapter 2

1 The contradictory nature of these developments is, for Iwao, unsurprising given the fact that the ‘Japanese tend to regard inconsistencies between opinions and behaviour as something natural and inherent to social beings’ (1990: 41).

2 Obtaining the legal status of incorporation and its associated tax concessions requires an endowment of ¥300 million and an annual budget exceeding ¥30 million (Amenomori, 1997)
3 Prefecture is a type of regional government in Japan made up of municipalities. There are 47 prefectures which control financial allocations to over 3,200 municipalities. Within Japan’s disaster management system, the primary responsibility lies with local municipal governments as they have fire-fighting functions and mobilize personnel. Prefectural governments undertake the provision of support at a regional level. Although they have a nominally independent status with their own governors and elected assembly members, their primary responsibility is to implement national legislation. At the national level, there is, apart from the police force, no direct means of gathering information. The result is that ‘information often is not shared with other governmental organizations’, thereby causing serious problems in the implementation of early response strategies (Furukawa, 2000: 5).

4 Of the three cities adjacent to Kobe, Ashiya had 1,289 employees and 20,960 people displaced (a ratio of one to 16), Nishinomiya had 4,147 employees and 44,351 displaced (a ratio of one to 11) and Takarazuka had 2,307 employees and 15,945 displaced (a ratio of one to 7).

5 Reverend Ken’ichi Kusachi, Secretary-General of the Peace, Health and Human Development Foundation, described the essence of volunteerism as ‘doing something independently and spontaneously for the public good,… a movement for the creation of a democratic civil society, free from any specific political or ideological influence’ (quoted in Look Japan, 1996: 7).

6 Another successful civic movement, influenced by the success of the Community Building and Planning Assembly, was the Nishi Suma Danran. Based on a membership deposit scheme, which ensured the financial independence and sustainability of its activities, it was established to work on three main areas of social welfare: home services (such as cleaning, nursing, gardening, accompanying the elderly to hospital and shopping), the provision of a meeting place for community activities and the strengthening of the ward’s community network system through the formation of collaborative links with other CSOs (Shaw and Goda, 2004).

Notes to Chapter 3


2 Political parties also do well at 9.7 per cent. The high membership here may largely be due to the tangible pecuniary benefits that can be obtained from such an association. It indicates the extensiveness of Turkey’s patron-client political sphere and suggests that, if current constitutional and legal changes to this structure are thoroughly implemented, ‘we may observe a decline in party membership, and an increase in non-clientelistic voluntary associations in society in general’ (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002: 74).

3 Of the 876 organisations upon which membership data existed, 138 had between 501 and 5,000 members, 306 had a membership of between 101 and 500, 155 had a membership of between 26 and 50 and 63 organisations had a membership of less than 25.

4 Of these activities, voluntary fire fighting has emerged as one of the most successful. Although a relatively new practice in Turkey, being initiated for the first time in İzmit in 2000 under the umbrella of the İzmit Greater Municipality Fire Fighting Department, it underlines the significance of the Marmara earthquake in an emergent sense of civil efficacy. Indeed, the commitment and professionalism of the staff of the Voluntary Fire Fighters Group (İzmit Gönüllü İtfaiyeçiler Birliği) have shown that there may be considerable potential for voluntary fire fighting nationwide. (Pehlivan 2004).

5 The universities that prepared the plan were the Istanbul Technical University, Yıldız Technical University, Boğaziçi University and the Middle East Technical University.
The exponential growth in the number of search-and-rescue teams across Turkey has led to some reports of over-activity. Following the collapse of two high-rise residential buildings in Konya in 2003, for instance, over 400 people mainly from search-and-rescue CSOs inundated the site presenting considerable logistical problems for state-sector response teams already there (Yılmaz, 2004).

These include the abolition of the death penalty, the lifting of the ban on broadcasting and teaching in Kurdish, an end to trials of civilians in military courts during peacetime, the prioritisation of prosecutions involving allegations of state torture and the general expansion of civil freedoms of thought and expression.

An example of more cooperative relationships between the state and a CSO is The Association for the Support of Modern Life’s project entitled ‘In the Development of the Southeast, State-CSOs Hand-in-Hand’. It consists of a number of different initiatives from establishing public libraries, building schools and advocacy work for the education of girls to agricultural programmes and health surveys in the region. This organisation had long been associated with the secular, nationalist regime, but according to its leader Deniz Banog˘lu, its success in lobbying the government for CSOs’ right to receive donations directly following the earthquake (which itself prompted an extensive series of reforms within the organisation) has allowed it to reach more deeply into Turkish society and increase in general trustworthiness with the public at large (Tarih Vakfı, 2001: 62).

However, owing to a Presidential veto on articles that permit associations to conduct joint projects with, and receive financial support from, other associations and public institutions based overseas, the reforms are not fully in force yet.

Notes to Chapter 4

1 This is why it is referred to as both the Bhuj and the Kutch, as well as the Gujarat earthquake.

2 As Siddhartha Sen points out, it is problematic to talk about ‘a’ third sector in India, The huge size of the country has given rise to a very wide of different organisations of such contrasting structures and outlooks as to make a single term difficult to sustain. The idea of a non-governmental organisation is, for instance, frequently discarded in favour of the term ‘voluntary development organization’. So, rather than trying to develop a concept of a unified sector that can reflect all colours and contours of India’s civil society, he suggests thinking about civil society as an analytical construct which, instead of operating conceptually, acknowledges such considerable diversity (Sen, 1997: 200). In order to develop a comparative framework which can incorporate our other case studies, we will use the terms ‘third sector’ and ‘civil society organisation’ in the Indian context advisedly.

3 The Gujarat, Gandhi’s home state, and Ahmedabad as his adopted city, have had a special place in the development of civil society in India. From the 1920s to 1940s the Congress Party successfully brought all communities together giving rise to a wide range of social and educational voluntary agencies which, ‘because of Gandhi’s direct helmsmanship,… attracted funds and a large following, becoming a remarkable presence on the state’s civic scene’ (Varhney, 2002: 223). For instance, two of Gandhi’s newspapers – *Navjivan* (in Gujarati) and *Young India* (in English) – were published in Ahmedabad, creating ‘a formidable culture of debate and discussion’ with the result that ‘voluntarism, rather than ascription, became the basis of association’ within the Gujarat. As a result, the region largely ‘escaped the larger national trend toward Hindu-Muslim rioting’ until the chaos of independence (ibid.: 238).

4 For an alternative view, see Atul Kohli’s work. This suggests that ‘India inherited a number of political traits from British rule that can be argued to be significant for India’s future democratic evolution: a relatively centralised state, including a well functioning civil service; early introduction of elections; and socialisation of the highest political elite in values of liberal democracy’ (2001: 4-5).
According to the 1991 census, 82 per cent of the population in India is Hindu, while 12.1 per cent is Muslim. 2.3 per cent are Christians, 2.0 per cent is Sikh and 1.2% is Buddhists and Jainist (Varshney, 2002: 56).

It is estimated that the ‘Upper Castes’ form 16.1 per cent of the population, while ‘Other Backward Castes’, ‘Scheduled Castes’, ‘Scheduled Tribes’ and ‘Non-Hindu Minorities’ are 43.7 per cent, 14.9 pre cent, 8.1 per cent and 17.2 per cent respectively (Varshney, 2002: 58).

The 1975 declaration of emergency rule also ‘broke the complacency of the people who had taken democracy and its benevolence for granted;’ having showed how those given rights can also be taken away by the state so easily, it ‘shattered the myth that the state could do no wrong’ (Tandon and Mohanty, 2000: 25).

During the 1980s there was also a considerable shift in power, in terms of electoral politics, from the middle classes to members of the lower castes and regional parties. Garnering a large share of the national vote did not, however, translate into an improved socio-economic position. Ghanshyam Shah explain this thus:

‘The government, political parties, and the capitalist class co-opt the leaders of the poor by offering them political positions and other benefits. At the same time, the state freely uses repressive measures against those among the poor who press for any betterment of their lot. The terror of the landlords, rich peasants, forest contractors, and industrialists continues unabated. They have formed armies of goondas with licensed and unlicensed weapons to terrorize the poor as and when they demand their rights. These armies operate in collusion with the police and government administration and do not hesitate to violate laws…The civil and democratic rights of the vast exploited masses are thus legally and effectively curtailed’ (1988: 304).

This killed around 2,000 people and displaced a further 90,000 (although some estimates put this latter figure at 150,000). Economic losses were estimated at around $1 billion.

The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry in partnership with CARE, for instance, offered to build 10,000 dwellings in 30 villages (Kapoor, 2001). Inspired by such interest, the GSDMA initially produced the utterly unrealistic plan to build 800,000 houses before the end of June 2001 (Rutten and Engelshoven, 2001).

Such top-down visions of public goods provisions may, some commentators have speculated, have its origins in the traditional sarkar system whereby beneficent leaders distribute charity to those who queue up.

Early signs here are not encouraging. The internecine fighting in the Gujarat in February 2002 provoked, in the minds of many commentators, an altogether inadequate response from the CSO sector (Singh, 2002: 1). Since it was widely regarded as ‘a carefully orchestrated attack against Muslims… with extensive participation of the police and state government officials’ (Human Rights Watch, 2002), it is possible that both international and national CSOs purposefully ignored the consequences of the Gujarat pogrom because of its political nature (Deccan Herald 2002). In the words of Murad Banaji, it was a ‘well-organised, state-sponsored pogrom’ (2002: 2). Subscribing to this view, Mari Thekaekara concludes that in the Gujarat, ‘there are no effective civic organisations to watch over and guide the democratic process. Further, our civic culture lacks the spirit of the democratic way of life’ (2002: 2). Moreover, it is argued that some third sector organisations such as the Rashtrya Swayamsevak Sangh, or National Volunteers’ Association, (the ideological core of the Hindu nationalist movement) had ‘a crucial influence on the grisly outcome’ (Jenkins, 2005: 12).

Notes to Chapter 5

Economic losses can be categorised as direct, such as property or capital stock damage, indirect, like declines in productivity, the provision of goods and services and the cost of reconstruction, and secondary if losses are recorded in employment levels, market stability and debt servicing (UNDP/UNDRO, 1992; Alexander, 1997; Pelling, Özerdem and Barakat, 2002).
Additionally, it should also be noted that, if people showed as much interest in the earthquake resistance of their apartments as they show in the type of taps, doors and tiles used, then it might make building contractors more likely to adhere to the rules and regulations (Özerdem, 1999).

A good example of such fatalism is Turkish society's low interest in the state's compulsory building insurance scheme. Introduced through a by-law in the immediate aftermath of the Marmara earthquake, it has led to only 2,026,667 out of 12,988,665 housing units in the Marmara (this ratio is likely to be even lower in other parts of Turkey) being insured despite costing only around 20 cents per day for a 120 m² apartment in Istanbul is around, but only around one quarter of houses. Idris Serdar, Chairman of *Doğal Afet Sigortaları Kurumu* (Natural Disaster Insurance Corporation), asserts that unless the law is changed to bring a fine for not getting the compulsory earthquake insurance it will not be possible to overcome society's traditional dependence on the myth of the omnipotent state that will rebuild a dwelling for every citizen who loses one in a disaster (NTVMSNBC, 2004).

The social composition of CSOs is an important factor in their effectiveness. Relying on voluntary human resource contributions without professional input, many CSOs are bound to remain in the sphere of basic service provision without moving towards advocacy work. Experience shows that the employment of a core of professional staff by CSOs is a significant contributor in the successful achievement of their aims and objectives. In many countries, though, there is still considerable resistance to donations being used for such purposes. In Japan, for example, public sentiment is such that the majority of CSOs are prevented from moving away from a purely voluntary basis and consequently struggle to take a more active role in social change.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bibliography to Foreword

Bibliography to Introduction
Blaikie, Piers; Cannon, Terry; Davis, Ian; Wisner, Ben. 1994. At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability, and Disasters, London: Routledge.
Bibliography to Chapter 1


Bibliography to Chapter 2


Imada, Makoto. 1999. Transition to Civil Society in Japan: Japan-America Civil Society, Washington DC: Japan-America Society


Bibliography to Chapter 3


EQE International. 1999. İzmit, Turkey Earthquake of August 17, 1999, ABS Infolink, Houston


Özerdem, Alpaslan. 2003. ‘Disaster as Manifestation of Unresolved Development


TÜSEV, 2003. ‘Data on Civil Society Organizations in Turkey’


Bibliography to Chapter 4


Indian Express 2000a. ‘Relief Discrimination Irks Lodia Villagers’, 8 February.

Indian Express 2000b. ‘Tale of Two Earthmovers and an Inept Relief Call’, 5 February.


Prasai, Sagar. 2002. Gujarat Earthquake: Planning Concerns in Post-Disaster Development, Development of Urban Planning and Regional Planning, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.


Rutten, Mario and Engelshoven, Miranda. 2001. ‘Earthquake in India: Weak State, Strong Middle Class?’, Newsletter of The International Institute for Asian Studies, No. 25.


*Times of India* 2001d. ‘Only 10 High-rises in Ahmedabad Had Occupancy Permission’, 14 February.


*Times of India* 2001f. ‘Food Riots Hamper Quake Relief Work in Gujarat’, 30 January.

*Times of India* 2001g. ‘Unprepared Govt Undermines Relief Mobilisation’, 4 February.


### Bibliography to Chapter 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Publication Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blaike, Piers; Cannon, Terry; Davis, Ian; Wisner, Ben.</td>
<td><em>At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability, and Disaster</em>, London: Routledge.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India Development and Relief Fund.</td>
<td>‘IDRF Grants Made to NGOs’ <a href="http://www.idrf.org/dynamic/modules.php?name=Hncontent&amp;pa=showpage&amp;pid=248">http://www.idrf.org/dynamic/modules.php?name=Hncontent&amp;pa=showpage&amp;pid=248</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Dr Alpaslan Özerdem

Post-War Reconstruction and Development Unit
Department of Politics
University of York

Dr Alpaslan Özerdem teaches in the areas of post-conflict recovery and politics of humanitarianism. He is Director of MA in Post-war Recovery Studies Course at the Department of Politics’ Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU) at the University of York. His research interests centre around disaster management with specific reference to state-civil society relationships in the aftermath of earthquake disasters, reintegration of former combatants, and post-conflict reconstruction. His forthcoming book focuses on the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants in the context of post-war recovery (I.B. Tauris, 2006).

Dr Tim Jacoby

The Institute for Development Policy and Management
The University of Manchester

Dr Tim Jacoby has worked for various development agencies in West Africa, the Middle East and the UK. He now teaches at The Institute for Development Policy and Management at The University of Manchester. His research interests centre around issues of state development, conflict analysis and reconstruction. His publications include Social Power and the Turkish State (Frank Cass 2004) and Understanding Conflict and Violence: Theoretical and Interdisciplinary Approaches (Routledge forthcoming).
Accountability 2, 3, 5, 6, 12, 19, 69, 70
Action plan 47, 81
Advocacy 14, 16, 17, 35, 36, 76, 101, 107, 110, 117, 119, 123
Associational life 2, 4, 13, 23, 29, 54, 57
Associations 16, 20, 30, 31, 33, 35, 36, 50, 55, 62, 67, 68, 70, 72, 75–76, 88, 102, 109
charitable 32
children’s 33
civil 13, 79
employer 17
incorporated 31–32
neighbourhood 36
private 54, 55, 67
religious 75–76
residents’ 46, 48
unincorporated 31, 33
voluntary 13, 14, 36
Authoritarian 18, 40, 58, 108

Beneficiaries 53, 70, 85, 88
Bottom-up 38
Building contractors 60
Building inspection 64
Bureaucracy 3, 6, 22, 23, 35, 36, 38, 50, 52, 53, 60, 67, 82, 98, 108, 110
state 27, 34, 37, 53, 73, 80
Business-affiliated associations 36

Capitalism 13, 53, 95
Caste 6, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77, 79, 81, 83, 85, 88, 89, 98, 104, 109
Catastrophic 1, 20, 31, 60, 78
Centralised 40, 46, 49, 52, 72, 103
Christian 72, 78, 79, 89, 108
Charity 31, 76
Citizenry 2, 4, 12, 13, 21, 23, 53, 60, 68, 75, 91, 95
Citizen groups 37
Civic engagement 35
Civil defence 63, 69, 102, 103
Civil organisations 2, 3, 5, 14, 28, 30, 34, 44, 45, 46, 50, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70, 72, 75, 76, 96, 98, 100, 101, 103, 105, 106, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112
Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) 4, 5, 6, 7, 15, 77, 100
Civil society-state relations 48, 64
Collectivism 23
Colonialism 72, 73
Communal divide 89
Communications 6, 17, 42, 49, 53, 71
Communitarianism 16
Community-based groups 31
Community participation 61, 63, 64, 72, 80, 85
Consensus 26, 34, 40, 58, 67
Construction 19, 22, 41, 42, 56, 61, 78, 79, 85, 86, 87, 88, 94, 96, 97, 98
planning 60
process 3, 59, 96
self-help 84
Cooperation 2, 18, 22, 30, 32, 34, 48, 49, 62, 63, 66, 90
Coordination x, xi, xii, 5, 18, 26, 40, 42, 44, 63, 64, 66, 69, 82, 84, 85, 88, 98, 101, 103, 111
Hazards 9, 11, 12, 21, 61, 87, 94, 95, 97, 112
geological 59
natural xi, 1, 18, 59, 86, 94–95, 99, 110
seismic 9, 96
Health 77, 103
care 16
clinics 71
sector 24, 25, 33, 71, 104, 105
services 70, 76
Hegemony 58
Hierarchy 53, 69
Hindu 3, 72, 73, 74, 79, 83
Housing 3, 7, 12, 43, 44, 64, 78, 85, 86, 87, 94, 96, 103
permanent 64, 112
reconstructed 5, 88
temporary 39, 60
unregulated 97
wooden 43
Human development 77
Human Development Index 12, 77, 99
Human rights xii, 12, 15, 56, 67, 70, 73, 76, 77, 101
Humanitarian 20
assistance xi, 103
development 111
law xii
NGOs xii
war 20
Identity 6, 16, 34, 44, 52, 69, 73, 81
Ideology 14, 20, 73
Incorporated foundations 32
India x, xi, 1, 2, 3, 6, 10, 19, 28, 71–91, 93, 94, 98, 99, 100–103, 106, 107, 109, 110,
Individualism 34
Industrialisation 25, 35, 41, 74, 99, 105, 109
Infrastructure 12, 21, 39, 42, 43, 53, 71, 86, 87, 95, 98
Instrumentalism 61, 100, 106
Insurance 11, 61, 64
Intermediary organisations 75
International community 18
International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction 110
International donors 101
Iron triangle 3, 36, 38, 48, 99, 108
Islam 2, 52, 53, 55
Islamist 56, 66
Istanbul 51, 52, 56, 59, 60, 63, 65, 69
Izmit 60, 62, 66
Japan xi, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 28, 29–50, 82, 93, 98–108, 110
Japanese associations 36
Japanese civil society 30–31
Kinship networks 56, 89
Kobe disaster 5, 38, 39, 42, 45, 46, 49, 88, 98, 108, 110
Kutch 71, 78, 79, 82, 83, 88, 89, 101
Legislation 4, 7, 14, 22, 30, 32, 41, 45, 46, 54, 64, 74, 91, 93–95, 110–112
Legitimacy 22, 52, 65, 69, 70, 76, 95
Leviathan 54, 81
Liberal 24, 27, 35, 36, 58, 107–110
Democratic Party 3, 36, 108
neo- 16, 21, 53, 60, 70, 97, 108
Livelihoods 7, 11, 47, 60, 73, 83, 88, 98, 112
Lobbying 17, 35, 45, 55, 70, 110
Local authorities xii, 45, 57, 60, 65, 88, 90, 96, 100
Local capacities 18, 83
Local decision making 19, 37
Logistics xiii
Logistics Support Coordination Centre 66
Losses 11, 71
Market ix, 3, 4, 7, 13, 15, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 36, 50, 52, 60, 70, 72, 79, 80, 95, 104, 106, 107, 108, 109
Market, continued

economy 53
failure 23–24, 26, 93, 104, 106
forces 22, 43
-friendly 70
funding 28
sector 24, 25, 105
values 21, 95

Marmara earthquake 5, 28, 51–70, 96, 102, 109, 110, 112

Media 15, 17, 21, 22, 36, 53, 60, 61, 65, 82, 103

Membership size 36

Military 2, 3, 18, 20, 40, 52, 53, 57, 58
non- 20

Minority rights 23

Mitigation 7, 12, 16, 22, 41, 59, 60, 65, 84, 85, 86, 93, 94, 98, 103, 112, 113
disaster 3, 16, 18, 21, 41, 42, 93–95
earthquake 42
hazard 12, 18, 21
measures 1, 3, 4, 7, 29
programmes 70
strategies 9, 21, 70, 81, 86, 90, 95, 113

Mobilisation xiv, 17, 44, 81, 82
civil 104
mass 84
public sector 3
resource 64
social 40, 56, 98

Modernisation 2, 56, 58, 76

Modernity 31

Multi-hazard 80, 86, 102
Municipality 59, 62, 63, 78
Muslim 3, 6, 52, 58, 61, 72, 73, 83, 108

National xiv, 16, 22, 32, 40–41, 51, 52, 63, 71, 73, 77, 79, 82, 98, 102
agencies xi
Building Code 78
Centre for Disaster Management 81
civil societies xiii
development xiii, 21
(disaster) coordinators xii

Disaster Management System 62
Disaster Plan x
disaster plans xiv
emergency 39, 69, 75
government xiii, 49
Land Agency 39, 49
leaders x
NGO 31
Personnel Authority 50
planning 60, 95
Security Council 69
unity 58, 77

Nationalism 5, 58, 73–74
Nationalist 2, 17, 55, 73, 79
Natural disasters 1, 2, 4, 41, 71
Neighbourhood associations 36
Neo-liberalism 14, 70
Nepotism 2, 58, 96
Networks 17, 21, 56, 57, 81, 89, 101, 109

Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) xii, 15–21, 44, 52, 61, 67, 68, 76, 82–85, 88, 89, 91, 94

Non-profit organisation 31, 50, 102, 103

Non-profit sector 15, 33

Not-for-Profit Organisations (NPO) 75

Overseas aid 31
Ownership 76

Participation 22, 38, 45, 51, 61
citizen 13, 35, 46
civic 68
civil 49
community 61–63, 64, 72, 80, 85, 102
local 12, 95
public 110
voluntary 16

Paternalistic 6, 57, 90

Patron-client relationship 2, 37

Philanthropic 16, 27, 30, 68, 76, 107, 109
Planning xii, 12, 22, 47, 69, 84, 85, 87, 88, 90, 97, 102, 113
authorities 60
contingent 5
disaster 95, 110
disaster preparedness 63
disaster response 3, 65
emergency relief 42
long-term 65
military 20
permission 60
Pluralist 23, 37, 54, 55, 59, 68
Political advocacy 36
Political authority 52, 107
Political change 1, 37, 66–69
Political culture 14, 58
Politics 1, 2, 59
contemporary 6
elite 72
Indian 81
mass 35
Post-disaster 5, 39, 40, 90, 96, 106, 112
Poverty 11, 14, 74, 76, 78, 79, 87, 94
Prefabricated houses 61
Preparedness 12, 22, 65, 70, 82, 84, 90, 93–94, 98, 112
disaster 2, 7, 18, 62–64, 65, 86, 93–95, 102, 113
earthquake 41–42, 61
measures 7, 12
Prevention 39, 41, 43, 46
Private associations 54–55, 67
Private sector x, 3, 18, 36, 45, 50, 60, 70, 85, 90, 101–102, 105, 108, 111
Privatisation 16
Professional groups 19, 36
Public administration 19, 81
Public awareness 17, 56, 61, 110
Public goods 23, 25–27, 70, 76, 80, 104, 106–107, 109
Public services 108
Rebuilding 7, 88, 94, 112
Reconstruction 3–7, 11, 22, 44, 64, 66, 75, 84–88, 93, 95, 112
activities 22, 91, 112
initiatives 18
phase 12
post-war 101
process xiv, 1, 4–5, 7, 39, 40, 43, 45, 88, 99, 102, 112
programmes 12, 85, 86
strategies 9
Reform 15, 16, 57, 65, 67, 72, 110
legal 64, 94
neo-liberal 20, 70
political 6, 68
pressures 5, 107
programmes 53, 95
social 53, 72–73, 80
top-down 69
Registration 36, 84
procedure 34
process 34
tax 32
Rehabilitation 11, 12, 21, 22, 46, 84, 86, 87, 89, 95, 103, 108, 112
activities 63, 91, 112
plans 47
post-disaster 90
programme 63, 86, 95
strategies 69
Relief 6, 11, 12, 17, 18, 22, 39, 44, 45, 46, 63, 65, 66, 69, 71, 81, 82, 83, 84, 88, 89, 90, 91, 93, 100, 112
agencies 83, 87
aid 11, 82, 83
assistance 7, 46, 65, 72, 81, 83, 88, 89, 103
disaster xi, 5, 16, 39
emergency xiii, 17, 21–22, 29, 39, 41–42, 46, 65, 90, 95, 98, 99, 103, 112
Law (1929) 30
management xiii
needs 65
workers 87
Religious organisations 19, 32, 36, 88
Residual vulnerability 11
Richter scale 6, 10, 29, 51, 63, 71